ILIddo Landau

Iddo Landau

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Iddo Landau has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Can there be overly meaningful lives? Conflicts between meaning in life and other values

    by Iddo Landau

    This is a philosophical paper that heeds psychological work on meaning in life, and hopes to acquaint both psychologists and philosophers more with each other’s work and enhance a dialogue between them. Many works on meaning in life in philosophy and in psychology have already focused on the relations between meaning in life and specific values such as happiness (subjective wellbeing), authenticity, morality, knowledge, and artistic creation. This paper discusses the general structure of the relation between both objective and subjective meaning in life and other values, and emphasizes ways in which such values sometimes conflict with rather than enhance objective or subjective meaning in life. The paper argues that, because of such conflicts, there are cases in which we should refrain from augmenting the objective or subjective meaning in our lives and even seek to decrease it; there can be overly meaningful lives. The paper concludes with some practical implications of this discussion.


  • Open Access

    ON THE COMMON CLAIM THAT ONE MUST FULFIL ONE'S POTENTIAL AND DO ONE'S BEST TO HAVE A MEANINGFUL LIFE

    by Iddo Landau

    The article examines whether fulfilling one's potential and doing one's best are sufficient or necessary conditions for having a meaningful life. It concludes that they are just contributing factors and can sometimes even diminish life's meaning.

  • Open Access

    Is Jessie right to end her life?

    by Iddo Landau

    Presupposing that our consideration of ethical issues can be enriched by examining literary works, this paper focuses on Marsha Norman's play ‘night, Mother. The play describes the last hour and a half in the life of Jessie, a young woman who decides to die by suicide. Before ending her life, Jessie explains to her mother her reasons for her suicide. In the context of the play, these are presented as quite weighty and as, perhaps, justifying her decision. Scholarly research on the play has also treated Jessie's suicide favorably. In this paper I argue that Jessie, and people in similar conditions, are wrong to die by suicide. Among other points, I criticize Jessie's arguments from the impossibility to improve life; the assured termination of suffering; the badness of the world; and the right for suicide. I also criticize arguments in the scholarly literature that view Jessie's suicide favorably, such as the arguments from independence, heroism, authenticity, and emotional closeness.

  • Is Meaning in Life Constituted by Value or Intelligibility?

    by Iddo Landau

    Several authors have recently argued that intelligibility, rather than value, constitutes life’s meaning. In this paper I criticize the intelligibility view by offering examples of cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do not coincide. I show this for both meaning in life and meaning of life; under both naturalist and supernaturalist assumptions; and in ways relevant to subjectivists, objectivists, and hybridists. I show why the value view is not, in fact, vulnerable to several putative counterexamples to it, and I explain why, if value rather than intelligibility constitutes meaningfulness, there are so many cases in which intelligibility and meaningfulness rates do coincide. Finally, I explain why various arguments for the intelligibility view fail to show that it is advantageous to the value view.


  • Problems in Levinas

    by Iddo Landau

    Emmanuel Levinas is one of the most elaborately discussed moral philosophers of recent decades, and his philosophy has many adherents. I believe, however, that the scholarly literature on his work is overly expository and insufficiently critical. In this article I try to take some steps toward filling this gap in Levinas scholarship. My aim is not to present another exegetical account of Levinas’s philosophy but rather to point at under-discussed problems in it. I will suggest here that some central claims in Levinas’s philosophy are highly problematic, indeed, too problematic to accept.


  • Open Access

    Externalism, internalism, and meaningful lives

    by Iddo Landau


  • VIKTOR FRANKL ON ALL PEOPLE'S FREEDOM TO FIND THEIR LIVES MEANINGFUL

    by Iddo Landau

    According to Viktor Frankl, although people are not always free to choose the conditions in which they find themselves, they are always free to choose their attitude towards these conditions and. thus. are always free to find their lives meaningful. This basic tenet of Frankl's theory is also often repeated approvingly in the secondary literature. I argue that the claim is wrong; not all people are free to find their lives meaningful. Counterexamples include people who suffer from severe depression or people who, due to lack of sufficient intelligence, ability to focus, or determination cannot profit from psychological counseling (including logotherapeutic counseling). I also criticize Frankl's oft-repeated argument that some people's success in finding their lives meaningful in the concentration camps shows that all people are free to find their lives meaningful. Frankl's discussion of the noetic dimension and its relation to other dimensions of the human personality is also insufficient for defending his claim about all people's freedom to find their lives meaningful. Frankl's theory of the noos suggests that all people's lives are meaningful. But since not all people's lives are meaningful, Frankl's claims about the noos seem incorrect: either some people do not have (or are not also) a noetic dimension or the noetic dimension does not always endow life with meaning. Further, the claim that, thanks to all people's noetic dimension, all people's lives are already meaningful is in tension with the claim that all people can wrest meaning from life. I suggest that understanding Frankl as only claiming that all people have a potential for meaningful lives is also unhelpful. Finally. I discuss the implications of my criticism for Frankl's theory at large. I argue that much in this very helpful theory can be retained, but identify those aspects of the theory that need to be modified.