Wayne D. Riggs
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Wayne D. Riggs has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dominik Jarczewski
Jagiellonian University
1 shared publication Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Texas A & M University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- p. 1-19
Socializing Virtue Epistemology
In recent years, virtue epistemology has been criticized for its individualism. Correspondingly, some attempts have been made to make it more social. However, there is some confusion about what it means for virtue epistemology to be individualistic, and how it should be socialized in the face of this. The current paper proposes a systematic answer to these questions. We distinguish elements of theories of virtue that might give rise to different forms of individualism: “subject individualism,” “faculty/trait individualism,” and “value individualism.” Then we show what specific challenges these elements might pose for virtue reliabilism and responsibilism. We focus on two challenges: the epistemic value of other-regarding intellectual virtues, and the problem of “epistemic outsourcing.” In both cases, we identify and evaluate possible strategies for socializing these elements of virtue epistemology.
- 27 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- p. 1-19
Open AccessSocializing Virtue Epistemology
In recent years, virtue epistemology has been criticized for its individualism. Correspondingly, some attempts have been made to make it more social. However, there is some confusion about what it means for virtue epistemology to be individualistic, and how it should be socialized in the face of this. The current paper proposes a systematic answer to these questions. We distinguish elements of theories of virtue that might give rise to different forms of individualism: “subject individualism,” “faculty/trait individualism,” and “value individualism.” Then we show what specific challenges these elements might pose for virtue reliabilism and responsibilism. We focus on two challenges: the epistemic value of other-regarding intellectual virtues, and the problem of “epistemic outsourcing.” In both cases, we identify and evaluate possible strategies for socializing these elements of virtue epistemology.
- 22 December 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 18-37
Open-Mindedness, Insight, and Understanding
This chapter presents that it is obvious that open-mindedness and insightfulness form a powerful combination for advancing people's understanding. An open-minded person is alert and attuned to the possibility that perspectives not entirely consistent with their own can be epistemically superior. An insightful person is gifted at noticing when apparent harmony obscures deeper incongruity. The advancement of an individual's understanding is surely a goal of that person's education. The sensitivity and propriety are parts of the virtue itself, and any purported analysis or definition of the virtue must make a place for them. The best and most fully articulated account of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is provided by Jason Baehr in his book, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. The empirical research regarding things like the framing effect, confirmation bias, and so on can help instill a degree of epistemic humility that facilitates the development of open-mindedness.
- 22 December 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 18-37
Open-Mindedness, Insight, and Understanding
This chapter presents that it is obvious that open-mindedness and insightfulness form a powerful combination for advancing people's understanding. An open-minded person is alert and attuned to the possibility that perspectives not entirely consistent with their own can be epistemically superior. An insightful person is gifted at noticing when apparent harmony obscures deeper incongruity. The advancement of an individual's understanding is surely a goal of that person's education. The sensitivity and propriety are parts of the virtue itself, and any purported analysis or definition of the virtue must make a place for them. The best and most fully articulated account of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is provided by Jason Baehr in his book, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology. The empirical research regarding things like the framing effect, confirmation bias, and so on can help instill a degree of epistemic humility that facilitates the development of open-mindedness.
- 8 October 2014
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 45 (4-5) , 627-639
Luck, Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence
There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could find a more restricted notion that captured the core phenomena of luck that are relevant to whether or not someone knows. This essay makes the attempt to delineate such a notion, called “mere coincidence.”
- 8 October 2014
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 45 (4-5) , 627-639
Luck, Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence
There are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could find a more restricted notion that captured the core phenomena of luck that are relevant to whether or not someone knows. This essay makes the attempt to delineate such a notion, called “mere coincidence.”
- 3 April 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 26 (2) , 149-162
Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic?
This paper focuses on several issues that arise in Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic injustice surrounding her claims about our (moral) culpability for perpetrating acts of testimonial injustice. While she makes frequent claims about moral culpability with respect to specific examples, she never addresses the issue in its full generality, and we are left to extrapolate her general view about moral culpability for acts of testimonial injustice from these more restricted and particular claims. Although Fricker never describes testimonial injustice in such terms, I argue that the fundamental wrong done in acts of testimonial injustice is a form of negligence. Once we understand testimonial injustice in this way, it is easier to see when and why we are culpable for perpetrating such injustices. Indeed, explicitly recognizing testimonial injustice as a form of negligence solves several problems for Fricker’s view, which are elucidated briefly along the way. However, construing testimonial injustice as a form of negligence has a cost as well. It highlights the fact that the normative core of Fricker’s view is deontological, rather than virtue-theoretic. Fricker claims to be offering a theory of the virtue of testimonial justice along the model of current virtue theories in epistemology, yet it seems that there is no compelling reason to think of what she has offered as a virtue theory, at least not on the model of virtue theories that one finds in epistemology. This is not to say that her view is any less plausible for not being a virtue theory. But calling it a virtue theory affects how one interprets its various claims, and tends to lead one away from, rather than toward, a proper understanding of the deep deontological nature of her account.
- 3 April 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 26 (2) , 149-162
Culpability for Epistemic Injustice: Deontic or Aretetic?
This paper focuses on several issues that arise in Miranda Fricker’s book Epistemic injustice surrounding her claims about our (moral) culpability for perpetrating acts of testimonial injustice. While she makes frequent claims about moral culpability with respect to specific examples, she never addresses the issue in its full generality, and we are left to extrapolate her general view about moral culpability for acts of testimonial injustice from these more restricted and particular claims. Although Fricker never describes testimonial injustice in such terms, I argue that the fundamental wrong done in acts of testimonial injustice is a form of negligence. Once we understand testimonial injustice in this way, it is easier to see when and why we are culpable for perpetrating such injustices. Indeed, explicitly recognizing testimonial injustice as a form of negligence solves several problems for Fricker’s view, which are elucidated briefly along the way. However, construing testimonial injustice as a form of negligence has a cost as well. It highlights the fact that the normative core of Fricker’s view is deontological, rather than virtue-theoretic. Fricker claims to be offering a theory of the virtue of testimonial justice along the model of current virtue theories in epistemology, yet it seems that there is no compelling reason to think of what she has offered as a virtue theory, at least not on the model of virtue theories that one finds in epistemology. This is not to say that her view is any less plausible for not being a virtue theory. But calling it a virtue theory affects how one interprets its various claims, and tends to lead one away from, rather than toward, a proper understanding of the deep deontological nature of her account.
- 11 January 2010
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 41 (1-2) , 172-188
OPEN‐MINDEDNESS
Open‐mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or “epistemic” virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains why open‐mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full‐blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view of open‐mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view, open‐mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, rather than toward any particular belief. To be open‐minded is to be aware of one's fallibility as a believer, and to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, one could be wrong. In order to see that such an attitude is epistemically valuable even to an already virtuous agent, some details of the skills and habits of the open‐minded agent are elucidated.
- 11 January 2010
- Published by Wiley in Metaphilosophy
- Vol. 41 (1-2) , 172-188
OPEN‐MINDEDNESS
Open‐mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or “epistemic” virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains why open‐mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full‐blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view of open‐mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view, open‐mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, rather than toward any particular belief. To be open‐minded is to be aware of one's fallibility as a believer, and to acknowledge the possibility that anytime one believes something, one could be wrong. In order to see that such an attitude is epistemically valuable even to an already virtuous agent, some details of the skills and habits of the open‐minded agent are elucidated.
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 204-222
Luck, Knowledge, and Control
A variety of ‘anti-luck’ theories of knowledge have recently been defended in the epistemological literature, but the nature of luck itself is contentious. Two prominent recent accounts of luck are the ‘lack of control’ theory and the ‘safety’ theory. This chapter undertakes a two-part defense of the former as against the latter—specifically, against Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety account. The first part argues that Pritchard's modal definition of luck falls to decisive counterexamples, both as a core notion of luck, and as a component in his theory of knowledge. The second part addresses an important objection that strikes at the heart of the lack of control account, the response to which illuminates some interesting features of luck that must be taken into account by any adequate theory.
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 204-222
Luck, Knowledge, and Control
A variety of ‘anti-luck’ theories of knowledge have recently been defended in the epistemological literature, but the nature of luck itself is contentious. Two prominent recent accounts of luck are the ‘lack of control’ theory and the ‘safety’ theory. This chapter undertakes a two-part defense of the former as against the latter—specifically, against Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety account. The first part argues that Pritchard's modal definition of luck falls to decisive counterexamples, both as a core notion of luck, and as a component in his theory of knowledge. The second part addresses an important objection that strikes at the heart of the lack of control account, the response to which illuminates some interesting features of luck that must be taken into account by any adequate theory.
- 1 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 169 (1) , 201-216
Two problems of easy credit
- 1 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 169 (1) , 201-216
Two problems of easy credit
- 23 February 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Analytica
- Vol. 23 (1) , 1-8
Epistemic Risk and Relativism
- 23 February 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Analytica
- Vol. 23 (1) , 1-8
Epistemic Risk and Relativism
- 10 October 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 158 (3) , 329-344
Why epistemologists are so down on their luck
- 10 October 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 158 (3) , 329-344
Why epistemologists are so down on their luck