Garen J. Wintemute
Current Organizations / Institutes
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Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Garen J. Wintemute has a total of 146 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Elizabeth A. Tomsich
30 shared publicationsAndrew Crawford
Affiliation Department of Emergency Medicine, University of California Davis School of Medicine, Sacramento, California, United States of America
18 shared publicationsMona A. Wright
16 shared publications- Veronica A. Pear
University of California Davis School of Medicine
16 shared publications Bradley Velasquez
13 shared publications- Sonia L. Robinson
Affiliation Department of Emergency Medicine, University of California Davis School of Medicine, Sacramento, California, United States of America
12 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
No King, and Other Matters—America’s Perspectives in Mid-2026 on Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Election-Related Violence: Findings from a Nationally Representative Survey
Background: Political violence and the rise of authoritarianism are emerging threats to the nation’s health, stability, and future as a representative democracy. To inform and facilitate prevention efforts, we present new and updated findings on the public’s views on authoritarianism and its support for and willingness to engage in election-related and pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 5, conducted May 15-June 15, 2026, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel that was initiated in 2022. Findings are for the cohort as a whole and for subgroups defined by political party/Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliation. Year-to-year change for items included in 2025 and 2026 is estimated using mean change scores. Cross-sectional findings for 2026 are presented as weighted prevalences and item scores.Results: The completion rate was 90.7%; there were 7,552 respondents. Nearly 90% of respondents continued to consider it very or extremely important that the US remain a democracy (change 0.01, 95% CI -0.00, 0.03). Agreement with expressions of authoritarianism was much less common; it decreased for the statement, “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy” (change -0.04, 95% CI -0.07, -0.02) and others. In 2026, 2.1% (95% CI 1.6%, 2.7%) of respondents agreed strongly or very strongly that President Trump should be made king, but nearly half (47.7%, 95% CI 46.2%, 49.2%) agreed strongly or very strongly that he should be impeached and removed from office. There was little agreement with 5 actions the federal government might take in 2026 that employed violence to enforce its policies or suppress its critics in the US; the prevalence of strong or very strong agreement ranged between 4.4% and 9.6%. Across 12 items, there was very little agreement with actions—including violence—the federal government might take to subvert elections; strong or very strong agreement ranged between 2% and 4%. Willingness to commit violence was rare. For example, only 1.6% (95% CI 1.2%, 2.1%) were very or completely willing to use violence “to make sure that President Trump remains in office after his term ends.” Decreases from 2025 to 2026 in support for expressions of authoritarianism and for government-initiated violence were common across the spectrum of party/MAGA movement affiliations.Conclusions: With national elections a few months away, Americans remained strongly supportive of democracy, did not endorse authoritarianism, and rejected the use of force by the current federal government to enforce its policies or subvert elections. They were deeply unwilling to engage in violence. These hopeful findings can inform and guide efforts to preserve democracy and prevent political violence.
- 30 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessNo King, and Other Matters—America’s Perspectives in Mid-2026 on Democracy, Authoritarianism, and Election-Related Violence: Findings from a Nationally Representative Survey
Background: Political violence and the rise of authoritarianism are emerging threats to the nation’s health, stability, and future as a representative democracy. To inform and facilitate prevention efforts, we present new and updated findings on the public’s views on authoritarianism and its support for and willingness to engage in election-related and pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 5, conducted May 15-June 15, 2026, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel that was initiated in 2022. Findings are for the cohort as a whole and for subgroups defined by political party/Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliation. Year-to-year change for items included in 2025 and 2026 is estimated using mean change scores. Cross-sectional findings for 2026 are presented as weighted prevalences and item scores.Results: The completion rate was 90.7%; there were 7,552 respondents. Nearly 90% of respondents continued to consider it very or extremely important that the US remain a democracy (change 0.01, 95% CI -0.00, 0.03). Agreement with expressions of authoritarianism was much less common; it decreased for the statement, “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy” (change -0.04, 95% CI -0.07, -0.02) and others. In 2026, 2.1% (95% CI 1.6%, 2.7%) of respondents agreed strongly or very strongly that President Trump should be made king, but nearly half (47.7%, 95% CI 46.2%, 49.2%) agreed strongly or very strongly that he should be impeached and removed from office. There was little agreement with 5 actions the federal government might take in 2026 that employed violence to enforce its policies or suppress its critics in the US; the prevalence of strong or very strong agreement ranged between 4.4% and 9.6%. Across 12 items, there was very little agreement with actions—including violence—the federal government might take to subvert elections; strong or very strong agreement ranged between 2% and 4%. Willingness to commit violence was rare. For example, only 1.6% (95% CI 1.2%, 2.1%) were very or completely willing to use violence “to make sure that President Trump remains in office after his term ends.” Decreases from 2025 to 2026 in support for expressions of authoritarianism and for government-initiated violence were common across the spectrum of party/MAGA movement affiliations.Conclusions: With national elections a few months away, Americans remained strongly supportive of democracy, did not endorse authoritarianism, and rejected the use of force by the current federal government to enforce its policies or subvert elections. They were deeply unwilling to engage in violence. These hopeful findings can inform and guide efforts to preserve democracy and prevent political violence.
- Open Access
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 21 (9) , e0355678
Party affiliation, political ideology, views on democracy and society, and support for political violence in the United States of America: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: Recent research in the United States has found concerning levels of support for and willingness to engage in political violence and for extreme beliefs linked to violence. Associations between political party affiliation and political ideology and these levels of support have not been quantified. Methods: Cross-sectional nationally representative survey conducted May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Primary outcomes concerned support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, presented as prevalences (weighted to achieve representativeness) with 95% confidence intervals (CI) and prevalence differences (adjusted for sociodemographics and geography) with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. Results: The completion rate was 55.8%; the analytic sample included 8,620 respondents. Higher percentages of Republicans (from 35.3% to 49.5%) than Democrats (from 24.7% to 26.7%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Few respondents (<3%), with no statistically significant differences by party affiliation, were “very or completely willing” to threaten or intimidate, injure, or kill another person for political purposes. Strong Republicans were more likely than strong Democrats to consider it “very or extremely likely” that they would be armed in a future situation where they considered political violence to be justified: 14.6% (95% CI, 12.5%, 17.0%) and 4.7% (95% CI, 3.4%, 6.3%), respectively; adjusted prevalence difference 9.7% (95% CI, 6.9%, 12.1%; q < 0.001). Respondents rarely (<2%), and again without differences by party affiliation, thought it very or extremely likely that they would shoot someone in such a situation. Findings for political ideology resembled those for party affiliation. Conclusions: Republicans and conservatives were more likely than Democrats and liberals to view political violence as justified to advance specific political objectives; this finding is a function of the specific objectives that were presented. Republicans were not more willing than Democrats to engage in political violence themselves. These findings deepen our understanding of the potential threat posed by political violence in the United States and can contribute to prevention efforts.
- 16 September 2026
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 21 (9) , e0355678
Open AccessParty affiliation, political ideology, views on democracy and society, and support for political violence in the United States of America: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: Recent research in the United States has found concerning levels of support for and willingness to engage in political violence and for extreme beliefs linked to violence. Associations between political party affiliation and political ideology and these levels of support have not been quantified. Methods: Cross-sectional nationally representative survey conducted May 13 to June 2, 2022, of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Primary outcomes concerned support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence, presented as prevalences (weighted to achieve representativeness) with 95% confidence intervals (CI) and prevalence differences (adjusted for sociodemographics and geography) with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. Results: The completion rate was 55.8%; the analytic sample included 8,620 respondents. Higher percentages of Republicans (from 35.3% to 49.5%) than Democrats (from 24.7% to 26.7%) considered violence to be usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 17 specific political objectives. Few respondents (<3%), with no statistically significant differences by party affiliation, were “very or completely willing” to threaten or intimidate, injure, or kill another person for political purposes. Strong Republicans were more likely than strong Democrats to consider it “very or extremely likely” that they would be armed in a future situation where they considered political violence to be justified: 14.6% (95% CI, 12.5%, 17.0%) and 4.7% (95% CI, 3.4%, 6.3%), respectively; adjusted prevalence difference 9.7% (95% CI, 6.9%, 12.1%; q < 0.001). Respondents rarely (<2%), and again without differences by party affiliation, thought it very or extremely likely that they would shoot someone in such a situation. Findings for political ideology resembled those for party affiliation. Conclusions: Republicans and conservatives were more likely than Democrats and liberals to view political violence as justified to advance specific political objectives; this finding is a function of the specific objectives that were presented. Republicans were not more willing than Democrats to engage in political violence themselves. These findings deepen our understanding of the potential threat posed by political violence in the United States and can contribute to prevention efforts.
- Open Access
- 7 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Decreased Support for Political Violence in the United States in Mid-2026: Findings from a Nationally Representative Survey
Background: Recent survey research has found concerning but stable prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence in the United States (US). This study re-estimates those prevalences in mid-2026—a midterm election year in which support for political violence might be expected to increase.Methods: Findings are from Wave 5, conducted May 15-June 15, 2026, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel that was initiated in 2022. Primary findings are for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis examined responses by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcomes are measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and anticipated firearm use in political violence. Results for individual years are presented as weighted prevalences and item scores. Change from mid-2025 to mid-2026 is estimated based on mean change scores. Results: The completion rate was 90.7%; there were 7,752 respondents. As in 2025, high levels of support for and willingness to participate in political violence were uncommon in 2026. Of 53 items addressing anticipation of, justification for, and willingness to commit political violence, 51 showed decreases from 2025 to 2026. All 51 decreases were small, but 35 were significant; only expectation of civil war increased significantly. Decreases from 2025-2026 occurred across the political spectrum. In 2026, MAGA Republicans and MAGA supporters who were non-Republicans were often more supportive of political violence than others, and the latter were often more willing to engage in it.Conclusions: Nearly all measures of support for and willingness to commit political violence decreased for the population as a whole, in many cases across the political spectrum. Higher levels of support for and willingness to participate in violence among MAGA supporters who were non-Republicans warrant further investigation. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US midterm election year.
- 7 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessDecreased Support for Political Violence in the United States in Mid-2026: Findings from a Nationally Representative Survey
Background: Recent survey research has found concerning but stable prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence in the United States (US). This study re-estimates those prevalences in mid-2026—a midterm election year in which support for political violence might be expected to increase.Methods: Findings are from Wave 5, conducted May 15-June 15, 2026, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel that was initiated in 2022. Primary findings are for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis examined responses by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcomes are measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and anticipated firearm use in political violence. Results for individual years are presented as weighted prevalences and item scores. Change from mid-2025 to mid-2026 is estimated based on mean change scores. Results: The completion rate was 90.7%; there were 7,752 respondents. As in 2025, high levels of support for and willingness to participate in political violence were uncommon in 2026. Of 53 items addressing anticipation of, justification for, and willingness to commit political violence, 51 showed decreases from 2025 to 2026. All 51 decreases were small, but 35 were significant; only expectation of civil war increased significantly. Decreases from 2025-2026 occurred across the political spectrum. In 2026, MAGA Republicans and MAGA supporters who were non-Republicans were often more supportive of political violence than others, and the latter were often more willing to engage in it.Conclusions: Nearly all measures of support for and willingness to commit political violence decreased for the population as a whole, in many cases across the political spectrum. Higher levels of support for and willingness to participate in violence among MAGA supporters who were non-Republicans warrant further investigation. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US midterm election year.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 51
Using extreme risk protection orders to prevent violence among people experiencing homelessness in California and Colorado: a case series
Background: Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) temporarily restrict firearm access from those at risk of harming themselves and/or others. This case series describes when and how ERPOs have been used for people experiencing homelessness. Methods: We examined ERPO court case files previously abstracted in California (n = 37, 1/1/2016–6/30/2020) and Colorado (n = 12, 1/1/2020–12/31/2022) involving housing insecurity among respondents. We determined whether the respondent was experiencing homelessness (i.e., sleeping in a public place, shelter, vehicle, motel, or temporarily “couch surfing” with a friend). For each such case, we created narrative summaries and conducted thematic analysis. Results: We identified 25 ERPO respondents experiencing homelessness in California and 11 in Colorado; 83% (n = 30) were male, 44% (n = 16) were white, 25% (n = 9) were Black, and 22% (n = 8) were Hispanic. Domestic violence was mentioned in 44% (n = 16) of cases and a similar percentage (42%) mentioned suicide; 25% of cases involved threats of mass violence. ERPOs were often filed in response to violence that occurred while respondents were losing their housing; reasons for impending homelessness included financial hardship, eviction, and loss of relationships. Other respondents experienced homelessness prior to the ERPO; threats of violence were intertwined with challenges of housing instability, loss of employment, family estrangement, untreated mental illness, and substance misuse. Serving ERPOs to people experiencing homelessness was challenging. Conclusions: ERPO respondents who were experiencing homelessness were in crisis and at high risk of violence. Courts and law enforcement agencies should consider how to improve serving ERPOs, recovering firearms, and providing services to homeless respondents.
- 2 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 51
Open AccessUsing extreme risk protection orders to prevent violence among people experiencing homelessness in California and Colorado: a case series
Background: Extreme Risk Protection Orders (ERPOs) temporarily restrict firearm access from those at risk of harming themselves and/or others. This case series describes when and how ERPOs have been used for people experiencing homelessness. Methods: We examined ERPO court case files previously abstracted in California (n = 37, 1/1/2016–6/30/2020) and Colorado (n = 12, 1/1/2020–12/31/2022) involving housing insecurity among respondents. We determined whether the respondent was experiencing homelessness (i.e., sleeping in a public place, shelter, vehicle, motel, or temporarily “couch surfing” with a friend). For each such case, we created narrative summaries and conducted thematic analysis. Results: We identified 25 ERPO respondents experiencing homelessness in California and 11 in Colorado; 83% (n = 30) were male, 44% (n = 16) were white, 25% (n = 9) were Black, and 22% (n = 8) were Hispanic. Domestic violence was mentioned in 44% (n = 16) of cases and a similar percentage (42%) mentioned suicide; 25% of cases involved threats of mass violence. ERPOs were often filed in response to violence that occurred while respondents were losing their housing; reasons for impending homelessness included financial hardship, eviction, and loss of relationships. Other respondents experienced homelessness prior to the ERPO; threats of violence were intertwined with challenges of housing instability, loss of employment, family estrangement, untreated mental illness, and substance misuse. Serving ERPOs to people experiencing homelessness was challenging. Conclusions: ERPO respondents who were experiencing homelessness were in crisis and at high risk of violence. Courts and law enforcement agencies should consider how to improve serving ERPOs, recovering firearms, and providing services to homeless respondents.
- Open Access
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 43
Views on democracy and political violence in the United States in 2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) has found concerning prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence. This study examines changes in those prevalences from mid-2024 to mid-2025. Methods: Survey participants were members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel, ≥ 18 years old as of recruitment in 2022. Wave 4 was conducted May 23–June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis categorized respondents by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences, with comparisons based on adjusted prevalence differences. Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on mean change scores. Results: The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 individual objectives. There were few changes in willingness to commit political violence and none in expectation of firearm use. Despite some increases among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures. Conclusions: Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US election year.
- 27 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 43
Open AccessViews on democracy and political violence in the United States in 2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: From 2022 to 2024, an annual, nationally representative, longitudinal survey in the United States (US) has found concerning prevalences of support for and willingness to engage in political violence. This study examines changes in those prevalences from mid-2024 to mid-2025. Methods: Survey participants were members of Ipsos Knowledge Panel, ≥ 18 years old as of recruitment in 2022. Wave 4 was conducted May 23–June 13, 2025. The primary analysis generated findings for the entire cohort; a secondary analysis categorized respondents by political party and Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement affiliations. Principal outcome measures comprised measures of justification for, willingness to engage in, and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Results for 2025 were presented as weighted prevalences, with comparisons based on adjusted prevalence differences. Change from 2024 to 2025 was estimated based on mean change scores. Results: The 2025 completion rate was 89.9% (8,248 respondents/9,179 invitees). For the cohort as a whole, there were only small increases from 2024 to 2025 in the prevalence of the belief that violence was usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (2024: 32.3%, 95% confidence interval (CI) 31.0%, 33.6%; 2025: 35.6%, 95% CI 34.1%, 37.0%) and to advance 16 of 20 individual objectives. There were few changes in willingness to commit political violence and none in expectation of firearm use. Despite some increases among Democrats, MAGA Republicans in 2025 were substantially more likely than strong Democrats to consider violence usually or always justified to advance at least 1 of 20 political objectives (MAGA Republicans 52.2%, 95% CI 48.4%, 56.1%; strong Democrats 32.1%, 95% CI 28.6%, 35.6%) and to advance 10 of those objectives when objectives were considered individually. A small group of non-Republican MAGA supporters had higher prevalences than most other groups on many measures. Conclusions: Support for and willingness to commit political violence increased only modestly from 2024 to 2025 and, where differences existed, remained generally higher among MAGA movement affiliates and Republicans than among Democrats. These findings can help advance prevention efforts, which are urgently needed in this US election year.
- Open Access
- 26 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 41
Support for authoritarianism and use of force by and against the federal government in the United States in mid-2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: During this period of heightened risk for political violence and authoritarian government in the United States (US), there is an urgent need for information on the public’s support for authoritarianism and government-initiated violence and its willingness to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 4, conducted May 23-June 13, 2025, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Findings are presented for the cohort as a whole and for demographic and political affiliation subgroups. Outcomes are expressed as weighted prevalences and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate. Results: The survey completion rate was 89.9%. Of 8248 respondents, 15.0% (95% confidence interval (CI) 13.9%, 16.1%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy.” One in 10 (9.6%, 95% CI 8.8%, 10.6%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “the [federal] government should use the military to help enforce its policies in the United States,” and 4.4% (95% CI 3.7%, 5.2%) strongly or very strongly agreed with the use of “private armed militia groups” for that purpose. Between 5% and 7% of respondents strongly or very strongly agreed that the federal government should arrest its critics, and about 2% were very or completely willing to personally engage in violence in support of (or opposition to) “government policies or the President” and against individual opponents (or supporters) of the government. Younger respondents tended to be less supportive of democracy as a form of government, more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism, and more willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Compared with strong Democrats, “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans were more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism and the current federal government’s use of the military and private militia groups but were not more willing personally to engage in violence. Conclusions: In 2025, substantial minorities of US adults endorsed statements consistent with authoritarianism. Smaller minorities endorsed and were willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. These findings call for sustained, concerted action to avert widespread political violence and preserve democracy in the United States.
- 26 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 41
Open AccessSupport for authoritarianism and use of force by and against the federal government in the United States in mid-2025: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: During this period of heightened risk for political violence and authoritarian government in the United States (US), there is an urgent need for information on the public’s support for authoritarianism and government-initiated violence and its willingness to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Methods: Findings are from Wave 4, conducted May 23-June 13, 2025, of a nationally representative annual longitudinal survey of adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Findings are presented for the cohort as a whole and for demographic and political affiliation subgroups. Outcomes are expressed as weighted prevalences and adjusted prevalence differences, with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate. Results: The survey completion rate was 89.9%. Of 8248 respondents, 15.0% (95% confidence interval (CI) 13.9%, 16.1%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy.” One in 10 (9.6%, 95% CI 8.8%, 10.6%) strongly or very strongly agreed that “the [federal] government should use the military to help enforce its policies in the United States,” and 4.4% (95% CI 3.7%, 5.2%) strongly or very strongly agreed with the use of “private armed militia groups” for that purpose. Between 5% and 7% of respondents strongly or very strongly agreed that the federal government should arrest its critics, and about 2% were very or completely willing to personally engage in violence in support of (or opposition to) “government policies or the President” and against individual opponents (or supporters) of the government. Younger respondents tended to be less supportive of democracy as a form of government, more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism, and more willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. Compared with strong Democrats, “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) Republicans were more supportive of statements consistent with authoritarianism and the current federal government’s use of the military and private militia groups but were not more willing personally to engage in violence. Conclusions: In 2025, substantial minorities of US adults endorsed statements consistent with authoritarianism. Smaller minorities endorsed and were willing to engage in pro- or anti-government violence. These findings call for sustained, concerted action to avert widespread political violence and preserve democracy in the United States.
- Open Access
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1)
Approval of the National Rifle Association and political violence: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: The National Rifle Association (NRA) is one of the most widely known social movement organizations in the United States (US). At a time of heightened concern for political violence, we assess individual-level associations between self-reported NRA approval and support for political violence, willingness to engage in political violence, and attitudes and beliefs linked to political violence. Methods: Findings are for respondents to Wave 2 (conducted May 18-June 8, 2023) of a nationally representative longitudinal survey; participants are members of Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Prevalences are reported as weighted percentages with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Associations are expressed as adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs), measured in percentage points (pp), with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. Results: The Wave 2 completion rate was 84.2%. There were 9,385 respondents, of whom 8,361 (89.1%) reported their level of NRA approval and are included here. Strong or very strong NRA approval was reported by 2,669 respondents (“NRA approvers”; 27.0%, 95% CI 25.7%, 28.2%), and 3,423 respondents (46.6%, 95% CI 45.1%, 48.0%) reported non-approval. Only half of NRA approvers (49.8%, 95% CI 47.2%, 52.5%) personally owned firearms. NRA approvers were more likely than non-approvers to support political violence and more willing to engage in it. For example, approvers were more than twice as likely as non-approvers to view violence as usually or always justified to advance at least 1 political objective (approvers 44.0%, 95% CI 41.4%, 46.6%; non-approvers 21.5%, 95% CI 19.6%, 23.4%; aPD 18.3pp, 95% CI 14.1pp, 22.5pp; q < 0.001) and to consider it very or extremely likely that they would shoot someone to advance a political objective (approvers 4.2%, 95% CI 2.9%, 5.5%; non-approvers 0.8%, 95% CI 0.4%, 1.2%; aPD 4.3pp, 95% CI 2.5pp, 6.1pp; q < 0.001). NRA approvers were more likely than non-approvers to endorse a wide array of beliefs and personal characteristics that have been associated with violence, including political violence. Conclusions: Approval of the NRA is associated with increased support for and willingness to engage in political violence, including lethal violence. These findings can help focus political violence prevention efforts in the United States.
- 14 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1)
Open AccessApproval of the National Rifle Association and political violence: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: The National Rifle Association (NRA) is one of the most widely known social movement organizations in the United States (US). At a time of heightened concern for political violence, we assess individual-level associations between self-reported NRA approval and support for political violence, willingness to engage in political violence, and attitudes and beliefs linked to political violence. Methods: Findings are for respondents to Wave 2 (conducted May 18-June 8, 2023) of a nationally representative longitudinal survey; participants are members of Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Prevalences are reported as weighted percentages with 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Associations are expressed as adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs), measured in percentage points (pp), with p-values adjusted for the false discovery rate and reported as q-values. Results: The Wave 2 completion rate was 84.2%. There were 9,385 respondents, of whom 8,361 (89.1%) reported their level of NRA approval and are included here. Strong or very strong NRA approval was reported by 2,669 respondents (“NRA approvers”; 27.0%, 95% CI 25.7%, 28.2%), and 3,423 respondents (46.6%, 95% CI 45.1%, 48.0%) reported non-approval. Only half of NRA approvers (49.8%, 95% CI 47.2%, 52.5%) personally owned firearms. NRA approvers were more likely than non-approvers to support political violence and more willing to engage in it. For example, approvers were more than twice as likely as non-approvers to view violence as usually or always justified to advance at least 1 political objective (approvers 44.0%, 95% CI 41.4%, 46.6%; non-approvers 21.5%, 95% CI 19.6%, 23.4%; aPD 18.3pp, 95% CI 14.1pp, 22.5pp; q < 0.001) and to consider it very or extremely likely that they would shoot someone to advance a political objective (approvers 4.2%, 95% CI 2.9%, 5.5%; non-approvers 0.8%, 95% CI 0.4%, 1.2%; aPD 4.3pp, 95% CI 2.5pp, 6.1pp; q < 0.001). NRA approvers were more likely than non-approvers to endorse a wide array of beliefs and personal characteristics that have been associated with violence, including political violence. Conclusions: Approval of the NRA is associated with increased support for and willingness to engage in political violence, including lethal violence. These findings can help focus political violence prevention efforts in the United States.
- Open Access
- 16 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1)
A synthetic control study of the effects of comprehensive background check policies on non-fatal firearm crime in five states
Background: Research on the effectiveness of comprehensive background check requirements for firearm purchases often finds individual-level associations that do not translate to the population level. However, few studies assess the effects of these policies on nonfatal firearm violence. Methods: First, several imputation strategies were compared to mitigate the effects of systematic missingness of crime data reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by law enforcement agencies. Next, the imputed data and the augmented synthetic control method, adapted for multiple treated units, were used to estimate the effects of implementing comprehensive background check policies on nonfatal firearm violence in five states. The study period began 15 years prior to the enactment date for each state and extended through 2020. Results: The results were largely null across multiple specifications and sensitivity analyses. Conclusions: Background checks are central to many firearm policies in the United States, yet several studies, including this one, do not detect an association between comprehensive background check policies and state-level firearm violence rates. These findings highlight the need to understand how the design, implementation, and enforcement of these laws can be improved.
- 16 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1)
Open AccessA synthetic control study of the effects of comprehensive background check policies on non-fatal firearm crime in five states
Background: Research on the effectiveness of comprehensive background check requirements for firearm purchases often finds individual-level associations that do not translate to the population level. However, few studies assess the effects of these policies on nonfatal firearm violence. Methods: First, several imputation strategies were compared to mitigate the effects of systematic missingness of crime data reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by law enforcement agencies. Next, the imputed data and the augmented synthetic control method, adapted for multiple treated units, were used to estimate the effects of implementing comprehensive background check policies on nonfatal firearm violence in five states. The study period began 15 years prior to the enactment date for each state and extended through 2020. Results: The results were largely null across multiple specifications and sensitivity analyses. Conclusions: Background checks are central to many firearm policies in the United States, yet several studies, including this one, do not detect an association between comprehensive background check policies and state-level firearm violence rates. These findings highlight the need to understand how the design, implementation, and enforcement of these laws can be improved.
- Open Access
- 27 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1)
Life events and change in support for political violence in the United States: findings from a 2023 nationally representative survey
Background: A nationally representative longitudinal survey in the USA found a decrease in population-level support for political violence from 2022 to 2023. This individual-level analysis of those data examines associations between the occurrence of 18 specified life events and subsequent change in views on political violence. Methods: Participants in the Life in America Survey were members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Wave 2 of the survey was fielded online May 18-June 8, 2023; all respondents to 2022’s Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. We calculated individual scores for 2022 and 2023 on 35 political violence measures from the first component of an ordinal principal components analysis and computed the difference in scores for individual respondents from 2022 to 2023 to represent a 1-year change in these measures. Our principal outcomes are adjusted mean differences in change scores from 2022 to 2023 between individuals experiencing and not experiencing the 18 life events. Results: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. Support for political violence decreased for 19.9% of respondents, increased for 14.2%, and remained unchanged for 65.9%. When events were considered individually in a model that adjusted for sociodemographic characteristics and other life events, only “things improved for me financially” was associated with decreased support for political violence among respondents as a whole; “I gave up on politics” was associated with an increase. No event was associated with change among both men and women when they were analyzed separately. Among respondents who reported in 2022 that violence was usually or always justified for at least 1 political objective, no events were associated with change in support for political violence. Among those who strongly approved in 2022 of left-wing violent extremist organizations or movements, “my political beliefs changed a lot” was associated with a large decrease. Conclusions: In this cohort, few life events were associated with changes in support for political violence across the entire population, but there were important subset findings. The findings support interventions to improve measures of economic well-being across the population and to encourage belief change among extremists as political violence prevention measures.
- 27 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 13 (1)
Open AccessLife events and change in support for political violence in the United States: findings from a 2023 nationally representative survey
Background: A nationally representative longitudinal survey in the USA found a decrease in population-level support for political violence from 2022 to 2023. This individual-level analysis of those data examines associations between the occurrence of 18 specified life events and subsequent change in views on political violence. Methods: Participants in the Life in America Survey were members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel. Wave 2 of the survey was fielded online May 18-June 8, 2023; all respondents to 2022’s Wave 1 who remained in KnowledgePanel were invited to participate. We calculated individual scores for 2022 and 2023 on 35 political violence measures from the first component of an ordinal principal components analysis and computed the difference in scores for individual respondents from 2022 to 2023 to represent a 1-year change in these measures. Our principal outcomes are adjusted mean differences in change scores from 2022 to 2023 between individuals experiencing and not experiencing the 18 life events. Results: The completion rate was 84.2%; there were 9385 respondents. Support for political violence decreased for 19.9% of respondents, increased for 14.2%, and remained unchanged for 65.9%. When events were considered individually in a model that adjusted for sociodemographic characteristics and other life events, only “things improved for me financially” was associated with decreased support for political violence among respondents as a whole; “I gave up on politics” was associated with an increase. No event was associated with change among both men and women when they were analyzed separately. Among respondents who reported in 2022 that violence was usually or always justified for at least 1 political objective, no events were associated with change in support for political violence. Among those who strongly approved in 2022 of left-wing violent extremist organizations or movements, “my political beliefs changed a lot” was associated with a large decrease. Conclusions: In this cohort, few life events were associated with changes in support for political violence across the entire population, but there were important subset findings. The findings support interventions to improve measures of economic well-being across the population and to encourage belief change among extremists as political violence prevention measures.
- Open Access
- 8 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 12 (1) , 82
Approval of extreme right-wing organizations and social movements and support for political violence in the United States: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: Concern for political violence in the United States remains high. The limited information available indicates that approval of specific extreme right-wing organizations and social movements is associated with support for and willingness to engage in political violence, but systematic data are lacking. The study objective is to quantify those associations at the individual level in a nationally representative survey sample. Methods: Cross-sectional analysis from Wave 1 of a nationally representative survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May-June 2022. The exposure is approval (categorized from non-approval to strong approval) of 8 named organizations and social movements, considered individually and together. Principal outcomes are justification for political violence, in general and to advance specific political objectives; willingness to engage in political violence, by type of violence and target population; and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted percentages and adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs, expressed in absolute percentage points (pp)). Results: The completion rate was 55.8%; there were 8,620 respondents. After weighting, 50.6% of respondents (95% CI 49.4%, 51.7%) were female, and 62.6% (95% CI 61.4%, 63.9%) were white, non-Hispanic; the weighted mean (SD) age was 48.4 (18.0) years. Few respondents (1.4%, 95% CI 1.0%, 1.8%) strongly approved of the organizations and movements considered together. However, strong approvers were much more likely than non-approvers to consider violence usually or always justified to advance specific political objectives and much more willing to engage in political violence; aPDs frequently exceeded 30% points. To advance a political objective, 29.1% (95% CI 18.4%, 39.8%) of strong approvers were very or completely willing to kill someone, and 18.1% (95% CI 8.5%, 27.7%) thought it very or extremely likely that they would shoot someone; prevalences among non-approvers were 0.9% (95% CI 0.5%, 1.2%) and 0.6% (95% CI 0.3%, 0.9%), respectively. Conclusions: Approval of extreme right-wing organizations and social movements is strongly associated with support for and willingness to engage in political violence. Given continued concern for political violence in the United States and the new possibility that such individuals might join federal law enforcement in large numbers, focused prevention measures are urgently needed.
- 8 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Injury Epidemiology
- Vol. 12 (1) , 82
Open AccessApproval of extreme right-wing organizations and social movements and support for political violence in the United States: findings from a nationally representative survey
Background: Concern for political violence in the United States remains high. The limited information available indicates that approval of specific extreme right-wing organizations and social movements is associated with support for and willingness to engage in political violence, but systematic data are lacking. The study objective is to quantify those associations at the individual level in a nationally representative survey sample. Methods: Cross-sectional analysis from Wave 1 of a nationally representative survey of members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, conducted May-June 2022. The exposure is approval (categorized from non-approval to strong approval) of 8 named organizations and social movements, considered individually and together. Principal outcomes are justification for political violence, in general and to advance specific political objectives; willingness to engage in political violence, by type of violence and target population; and expectation of firearm use in political violence. Outcomes are expressed as weighted percentages and adjusted prevalence differences (aPDs, expressed in absolute percentage points (pp)). Results: The completion rate was 55.8%; there were 8,620 respondents. After weighting, 50.6% of respondents (95% CI 49.4%, 51.7%) were female, and 62.6% (95% CI 61.4%, 63.9%) were white, non-Hispanic; the weighted mean (SD) age was 48.4 (18.0) years. Few respondents (1.4%, 95% CI 1.0%, 1.8%) strongly approved of the organizations and movements considered together. However, strong approvers were much more likely than non-approvers to consider violence usually or always justified to advance specific political objectives and much more willing to engage in political violence; aPDs frequently exceeded 30% points. To advance a political objective, 29.1% (95% CI 18.4%, 39.8%) of strong approvers were very or completely willing to kill someone, and 18.1% (95% CI 8.5%, 27.7%) thought it very or extremely likely that they would shoot someone; prevalences among non-approvers were 0.9% (95% CI 0.5%, 1.2%) and 0.6% (95% CI 0.3%, 0.9%), respectively. Conclusions: Approval of extreme right-wing organizations and social movements is strongly associated with support for and willingness to engage in political violence. Given continued concern for political violence in the United States and the new possibility that such individuals might join federal law enforcement in large numbers, focused prevention measures are urgently needed.