Søren Serritzlew
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Søren Serritzlew has a total of 62 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jens Blom-Hansen
Aarhus University
16 shared publications - Martin Baekgaard
Department of Political Science Aarhus University Aarhus Denmark
8 shared publications Martin Baekgaard
4 shared publications- Morten Jakobsen
Aarhus University
4 shared publications - David Dreyer Lassen
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
3 shared publications - Gert Tinggaard Svendsen
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University Aarhus Denmark
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Public Budgeting & Finance
Dynamic Effects of Public Expenditure: The Challenge of Multi‐Level Governance Systems
The public economy literature shows that dynamic effects of public expenditure vary across programs, giving governments incentives to allocate spending with precision. However, this may be difficult in multi‐level governance, where centrally funded expenditure is implemented locally. While largely ignored in the dynamic effects literature, this problem is central to fiscal federalism research. We draw on these insights to argue that it is difficult for central government to control expenditure at the local level. Empirically, we study intergovernmental grants in Denmark and find that local governments spend only part of the funds as intended. We discuss implications for future research.
- 8 June 2026
- Published by Wiley in Public Budgeting & Finance
Open AccessDynamic Effects of Public Expenditure: The Challenge of Multi‐Level Governance Systems
The public economy literature shows that dynamic effects of public expenditure vary across programs, giving governments incentives to allocate spending with precision. However, this may be difficult in multi‐level governance, where centrally funded expenditure is implemented locally. While largely ignored in the dynamic effects literature, this problem is central to fiscal federalism research. We draw on these insights to argue that it is difficult for central government to control expenditure at the local level. Empirically, we study intergovernmental grants in Denmark and find that local governments spend only part of the funds as intended. We discuss implications for future research.
- Open Access
- 15 January 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- p. 1-17
Does universal conscription impose a civic penalty? Individual-level evidence from a randomized conscription lottery
Conscription has gained renewed relevance after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Beyond its military purpose, conscription has historically been linked to citizenship and may significantly influence civic outcomes. Drawing on classic arguments about the civic effects of conscription, alongside recent studies suggesting a negative impact on institutional trust and increased authoritarian attitudes, we investigate whether conscription shapes a broad spectrum of outcomes, including national attachment, prosocial motivation, trust, political preferences, political interest, and authoritarian attitudes. To test this, we use the Danish conscription lottery in combination with survey data, assessing the causal effects of peacetime conscription on these key civic outcomes at the individual level. The results indicate only limited effects, suggesting that peacetime conscription does not impose a general civic penalty. These results contribute to the literature on conscription and are relevant for debates in many European countries about its potential reintroduction.
- 15 January 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- p. 1-17
Open AccessDoes universal conscription impose a civic penalty? Individual-level evidence from a randomized conscription lottery
Conscription has gained renewed relevance after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Beyond its military purpose, conscription has historically been linked to citizenship and may significantly influence civic outcomes. Drawing on classic arguments about the civic effects of conscription, alongside recent studies suggesting a negative impact on institutional trust and increased authoritarian attitudes, we investigate whether conscription shapes a broad spectrum of outcomes, including national attachment, prosocial motivation, trust, political preferences, political interest, and authoritarian attitudes. To test this, we use the Danish conscription lottery in combination with survey data, assessing the causal effects of peacetime conscription on these key civic outcomes at the individual level. The results indicate only limited effects, suggesting that peacetime conscription does not impose a general civic penalty. These results contribute to the literature on conscription and are relevant for debates in many European countries about its potential reintroduction.
- Open Access
- 27 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 85 (6) , 1788-1803
Reducing horizontal neglect in local government: The role of informal institutions
The problem of “horizontal neglect” is fundamental to decentralization. However, while individual local authorities may lack incentives to consider the benefits and costs that their actions have on others, they are not always indifferent to these spillover effects. The study focuses on a clear case of horizontal neglect, namely the tendency of local authorities to overspend prior to merging. By employing a survey experiment involving Norwegian local elected officials, the article demonstrates that horizontal neglect can be alleviated through informal institutions, specifically through prosocial norms and the framing of decisions in a way that encourages officials to consider the impact on other jurisdictions. Priming local politicians with reminders of their broader responsibilities reduces both horizontal neglect and the overspending effect of social norms that stem from local politicians’ opposition to the merger of their own municipality.
- 27 December 2024
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 85 (6) , 1788-1803
Open AccessReducing horizontal neglect in local government: The role of informal institutions
The problem of “horizontal neglect” is fundamental to decentralization. However, while individual local authorities may lack incentives to consider the benefits and costs that their actions have on others, they are not always indifferent to these spillover effects. The study focuses on a clear case of horizontal neglect, namely the tendency of local authorities to overspend prior to merging. By employing a survey experiment involving Norwegian local elected officials, the article demonstrates that horizontal neglect can be alleviated through informal institutions, specifically through prosocial norms and the framing of decisions in a way that encourages officials to consider the impact on other jurisdictions. Priming local politicians with reminders of their broader responsibilities reduces both horizontal neglect and the overspending effect of social norms that stem from local politicians’ opposition to the merger of their own municipality.
- Open Access
- 2 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (6) , 1378-1406
What is the folk concept of discrimination? Discriminators and comparators
- 2 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (6) , 1378-1406
Open AccessWhat is the folk concept of discrimination? Discriminators and comparators
- 2 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Performance & Management Review
- Vol. 47 (1) , 89-113
Gaming Over: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Competition on Gaming
- 2 January 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Public Performance & Management Review
- Vol. 47 (1) , 89-113
Gaming Over: Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Effect of Competition on Gaming
- 17 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (7) , 1927-1954
The core of organisational reputation: taking multidimensionality, audience multiplicity, and agency subunits seriously
Reputational theory holds that an agency’s reputation is a valuable political asset. However, since Daniel Carpenter’s influential contributions, reputational studies have focused on reactions to reputational threats, rather than on reputation as such. Therefore, there is a curious lacuna at the heart of reputation studies: A lot is known about reactions to reputational threats, but fundamental questions about reputation per se are left unexplored. This paper investigates the dimensionality of the reputational concept, its variation across types of audiences, and its consistency across agency subunits. This is done in the context of the EU Commission, the core executive institution of the European Union. While this case is interesting in itself, its main value is to suggest what a research agenda focusing on the core building blocks of reputational theory might look like. Our survey of actors in the EU’s Transparency Register provides mixed, but mostly supportive evidence.
- 17 March 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (7) , 1927-1954
The core of organisational reputation: taking multidimensionality, audience multiplicity, and agency subunits seriously
Reputational theory holds that an agency’s reputation is a valuable political asset. However, since Daniel Carpenter’s influential contributions, reputational studies have focused on reactions to reputational threats, rather than on reputation as such. Therefore, there is a curious lacuna at the heart of reputation studies: A lot is known about reactions to reputational threats, but fundamental questions about reputation per se are left unexplored. This paper investigates the dimensionality of the reputational concept, its variation across types of audiences, and its consistency across agency subunits. This is done in the context of the EU Commission, the core executive institution of the European Union. While this case is interesting in itself, its main value is to suggest what a research agenda focusing on the core building blocks of reputational theory might look like. Our survey of actors in the EU’s Transparency Register provides mixed, but mostly supportive evidence.
- 5 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 30 (6) , 1142-1162
Stakeholder consultations in the EU Commission: instruments of involvement or legitimacy?
Governmental entities such as the EU Commission regularly consult societal stakeholders. In such consultations, a variety of different tools are used ranging from open online consultations over stakeholder conferences to discussions in closed policy fora. Recent research has demonstrated how the range and diversity of the consulted actors vary across these consultation formats. Yet, we know little about the value societal stakeholders attach to their participation in consultations. In this paper, we argue that some consultation formats facilitate an insider match between the motives of societal stakeholders and the Commission with clear potential for also affecting Commission initiatives. Other consultation instruments are more likely to facilitate an outsider match where stakeholders may draw public attention to their views and the Commission enhance the perceived legitimacy of its decisions. We find support for these expectations based on data from a survey administered to stakeholders registered in the EU transparency register.
- 5 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 30 (6) , 1142-1162
Stakeholder consultations in the EU Commission: instruments of involvement or legitimacy?
Governmental entities such as the EU Commission regularly consult societal stakeholders. In such consultations, a variety of different tools are used ranging from open online consultations over stakeholder conferences to discussions in closed policy fora. Recent research has demonstrated how the range and diversity of the consulted actors vary across these consultation formats. Yet, we know little about the value societal stakeholders attach to their participation in consultations. In this paper, we argue that some consultation formats facilitate an insider match between the motives of societal stakeholders and the Commission with clear potential for also affecting Commission initiatives. Other consultation instruments are more likely to facilitate an outsider match where stakeholders may draw public attention to their views and the Commission enhance the perceived legitimacy of its decisions. We find support for these expectations based on data from a survey administered to stakeholders registered in the EU transparency register.
- 28 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 99 (4) , 658-678
How bureaucrats shape political decisions: The role of policy information
Studies of bureaucracy have been very concerned about whether the bureaucracy exploits its informational advantage vis‐à‐vis politicians to influence policy decisions. Yet, little theorizing has been undertaken about how such influence takes place. We identify and test three mechanisms that must be at work in order for policy information to function as a vehicle for political influence of bureaucrats. Using data from politicians and bureaucrats in five different political systems and survey experimental methods to deal with endogeneity and social desirability bias, we find evidence supporting all three mechanisms: bureaucrats are generally willing to use policy information to influence political decisions, politicians rely on policy information from bureaucrats when making such decisions, and the way policy information is presented matters for the policy preferences of politicians. We discuss the implications of the results and factors that are important for the mechanisms to apply.
- 28 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 99 (4) , 658-678
How bureaucrats shape political decisions: The role of policy information
Studies of bureaucracy have been very concerned about whether the bureaucracy exploits its informational advantage vis‐à‐vis politicians to influence policy decisions. Yet, little theorizing has been undertaken about how such influence takes place. We identify and test three mechanisms that must be at work in order for policy information to function as a vehicle for political influence of bureaucrats. Using data from politicians and bureaucrats in five different political systems and survey experimental methods to deal with endogeneity and social desirability bias, we find evidence supporting all three mechanisms: bureaucrats are generally willing to use policy information to influence political decisions, politicians rely on policy information from bureaucrats when making such decisions, and the way policy information is presented matters for the policy preferences of politicians. We discuss the implications of the results and factors that are important for the mechanisms to apply.
- 12 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 60 (1) , 153-174
Jurisdiction size and local government effectiveness: Assessing the effects of municipal amalgamations on performance
The optimal jurisdiction size has been debated since Plato and Aristotle. A large literature has studied economic and democratic scale effects, but we have almost no knowledge of the effects of jurisdiction size on the effectiveness of local services. This is due to two methodological problems. First, selection bias and reverse causality often render change in jurisdiction size an endogenous variable. Second, there is a lack of empirical indicators of effectiveness, and most studies therefore focus on spending measures. Extant research thus studies economies of scale, leaving effectiveness of scale unexamined. We address both problems in a quasi‐experimental study of public schools. Our findings from the school area indicate that jurisdiction size does not have systematic effects on effectiveness. Our analysis therefore supports recent studies of economic and democratic scale effects that indicate that the search for the optimal jurisdiction size is futile.
- 12 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 60 (1) , 153-174
Jurisdiction size and local government effectiveness: Assessing the effects of municipal amalgamations on performance
The optimal jurisdiction size has been debated since Plato and Aristotle. A large literature has studied economic and democratic scale effects, but we have almost no knowledge of the effects of jurisdiction size on the effectiveness of local services. This is due to two methodological problems. First, selection bias and reverse causality often render change in jurisdiction size an endogenous variable. Second, there is a lack of empirical indicators of effectiveness, and most studies therefore focus on spending measures. Extant research thus studies economies of scale, leaving effectiveness of scale unexamined. We address both problems in a quasi‐experimental study of public schools. Our findings from the school area indicate that jurisdiction size does not have systematic effects on effectiveness. Our analysis therefore supports recent studies of economic and democratic scale effects that indicate that the search for the optimal jurisdiction size is futile.
- 19 September 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 23 (2) , 186-204
Citizens’ motivated reasoning about public performance: experimental findings from the US and Denmark
Recent studies find motivated reasoning in citizens’ processing of information about public performance. Using experiments in the US and Denmark, we examine effects on an accuracy-based task of two forms of motivated reasoning: partisan identity-based reasoning and reasoning from ideology-based governance preferences (favoring either the public or the private sector). The experiments incorporate a political prime, a health care needs prime (to reduce politicization), and a neutral, no-prime, condition. We find that priming citizens to think politically accentuates the influence of partisan identities and governance preferences on reasoning. In contrast, priming about the need for a service reduces these biases. These findings extend knowledge of motivated reasoning in an accuracy-based task and priming with a no-prime benchmark, and confirm some findings of previous studies. Reducing the salience of partisan identities or governance preferences in the presentation of information may help stimulate more accuracy-based reasoning about public performance.
- 19 September 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Public Management Journal
- Vol. 23 (2) , 186-204
Citizens’ motivated reasoning about public performance: experimental findings from the US and Denmark
Recent studies find motivated reasoning in citizens’ processing of information about public performance. Using experiments in the US and Denmark, we examine effects on an accuracy-based task of two forms of motivated reasoning: partisan identity-based reasoning and reasoning from ideology-based governance preferences (favoring either the public or the private sector). The experiments incorporate a political prime, a health care needs prime (to reduce politicization), and a neutral, no-prime, condition. We find that priming citizens to think politically accentuates the influence of partisan identities and governance preferences on reasoning. In contrast, priming about the need for a service reduces these biases. These findings extend knowledge of motivated reasoning in an accuracy-based task and priming with a no-prime benchmark, and confirm some findings of previous studies. Reducing the salience of partisan identities or governance preferences in the presentation of information may help stimulate more accuracy-based reasoning about public performance.