Joana Pais
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Joana Pais has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Flip Klijn
Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE, Barcelona, Spain
4 shared publications - Marc Vorsatz
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED)
3 shared publications Ágnes Pintér
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
3 shared publications- José Pedro Pontes
ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa and UECE/REM Research Center
2 shared publications - Róbert Ferenc Veszteg
Waseda University, School of Political Science and Economics, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications Christine Halmenschlager
ERMES, Université Paris II
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 186
Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 186
Improving schools through school choice: An experimental study of deferred acceptance
- 1 April 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 23 (1) , 212-239
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment
In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.
- 1 April 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 23 (1) , 212-239
Decentralized matching markets with(out) frictions: a laboratory experiment
In a series of laboratory experiments, we explore the impact of different market features (the level of information, search costs, and the level of commitment) on agents’ behavior and on the outcome of decentralized matching markets. In our experiments, subjects on each side of the market actively search for a partner, make proposals, and are free to accept or reject any proposal received at any time throughout the game. Our results suggest that a low information level does not affect the stability or the efficiency of the final outcome, although it boosts market activity, unless coupled with search costs. Search costs have a significant negative impact on stability and on market activity. Finally, commitment harms stability slightly but acts as a disciplinary device to market activity and is associated with higher efficiency levels of the final outcome.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 113, 147-163
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 113, 147-163
Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment
- Open Access
- 24 July 2018
- Published by EnPress Publisher in Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development
- Vol. 2 (2) , 248-257
The role of infrastructure efficiency in economic development—The case of underused highways in Europe
In this paper, we establish a two-way causality between the phenomenon of infrastructure which is underused (the so-called “white elephant case”) and the aggregate productivity level (TFP) of the economy. On the one hand, the fact that a transport infrastructure is not used as much as it could be is itself a cause of low TFP because it represents low productivity for an important item of social capital. On the other hand, low aggregate productivity makes firms’ strategies founded on large scale of production and exports riskier, given the possibility that the political decision to build the required transport infrastructure may never be taken.
- 24 July 2018
- Published by EnPress Publisher in Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development
- Vol. 2 (2) , 248-257
Open AccessThe role of infrastructure efficiency in economic development—The case of underused highways in Europe
In this paper, we establish a two-way causality between the phenomenon of infrastructure which is underused (the so-called “white elephant case”) and the aggregate productivity level (TFP) of the economy. On the one hand, the fact that a transport infrastructure is not used as much as it could be is itself a cause of low TFP because it represents low productivity for an important item of social capital. On the other hand, low aggregate productivity makes firms’ strategies founded on large scale of production and exports riskier, given the possibility that the political decision to build the required transport infrastructure may never be taken.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 139, 72-75
Affirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice
- 1 February 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 139, 72-75
Open AccessAffirmative action through minority reserves: An experimental study on school choice
- Open Access
- 14 March 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 16 (1) , 1-22
Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment
We experimentally investigate in the laboratory prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools and study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play “safer” strategies under the Gale–Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for enrollment planning and the possible protection risk averse agents seek.
- 14 March 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 16 (1) , 1-22
Open AccessPreference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: a laboratory experiment
We experimentally investigate in the laboratory prominent mechanisms that are employed in school choice programs to assign students to public schools and study how individual behavior is influenced by preference intensities and risk aversion. Our main results show that (a) the Gale–Shapley mechanism is more robust to changes in cardinal preferences than the Boston mechanism independently of whether individuals can submit a complete or only a restricted ranking of the schools and (b) subjects with a higher degree of risk aversion are more likely to play “safer” strategies under the Gale–Shapley but not under the Boston mechanism. Both results have important implications for enrollment planning and the possible protection risk averse agents seek.
- Open Access
- 29 August 2011
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 52 (3) , 713-737
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*
- 29 August 2011
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 52 (3) , 713-737
Open AccessCOLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*
- 16 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Manchester School
- Vol. 79 (1) , 81-99
R&D AS A PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND R&D-AVOIDING CARTELS
- 16 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in The Manchester School
- Vol. 79 (1) , 81-99
R&D AS A PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND R&D-AVOIDING CARTELS
- 1 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 48 (5) , 991-1006
FRAGMENTATION AND CLUSTERING IN VERTICALLY LINKED INDUSTRIES*
- 1 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 48 (5) , 991-1006
FRAGMENTATION AND CLUSTERING IN VERTICALLY LINKED INDUSTRIES*
- 1 November 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 64 (2) , 632-649
Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- 1 November 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 64 (2) , 632-649
Incentives in decentralized random matching markets