Gerald T. Garvey
Research Subjects
Gerald T. Garvey has a total of 46 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Peter Lawrence Swan
University of New South Wales (UNSW Sydney; Financial Research Network (FIRN)
2 shared publications Todd T. Milbourn
2 shared publications- Andrew Robinson
Is a director at BlackRock in San Francisco, California
1 shared publication - Christopher Mauger
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication E. Chauveau
1 shared publicationE. Iwai
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 February 2026
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 52 (6) , 99-107
The Impressive Markets Hypothesis: Prices (Still) Forecast Fundamentals
Despite concerns about reduced market efficiency due to social media herding and information overload, stock prices still contain substantial information about future company fundamentals. Using data from over 3,000 US equities annually between 2004 and 2024, the authors find that market valuations reliably predict future cash flows and continue to do so even when value spreads are wide. A detailed analysis shows that market prices have become better at forecasting revenues but weaker at forecasting margins. The results reinforce the enduring informational power of market prices and suggest that cost-side modeling offers new opportunities for active investors.
- 12 February 2026
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 52 (6) , 99-107
The Impressive Markets Hypothesis: Prices (Still) Forecast Fundamentals
Despite concerns about reduced market efficiency due to social media herding and information overload, stock prices still contain substantial information about future company fundamentals. Using data from over 3,000 US equities annually between 2004 and 2024, the authors find that market valuations reliably predict future cash flows and continue to do so even when value spreads are wide. A detailed analysis shows that market prices have become better at forecasting revenues but weaker at forecasting margins. The results reinforce the enduring informational power of market prices and suggest that cost-side modeling offers new opportunities for active investors.
- 7 April 2021
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 47 (6) , 22-32
Real Economy Portfolio: The Market Risk Premium as a Source of Alpha
We all know that the stock market does not perfectly reflect the overall economy. The author shows that this fact has exciting implications for active equity management. If standard cap-weighted benchmarks fail to reflect the economy, they contain uncompensated risks and will underperform the true market portfolio. Although we can never hold the true market portfolio because of nontraded human capital and other constraints, the author builds a sector-level model that captures returns to labor, capital, and intermediate inputs in the entire US economy. A portfolio designed to replicate these exposures generates statistically significant alpha that is distinct from existing factors. TOPICS: Security analysis and valuation, portfolio construction, performance measurement Key Findings ▪ The market risk premium refers to all assets in the economy, and even broad stock market indexes are an imperfect proxy. ▪ We leverage classic results from input–output analysis and international trade theory to construct a real economy portfolio from listed equities that better replicates the underlying economy. The key is to upweight labor-intensive and under-represented economic activities. ▪ The real economy portfolio has delivered significant alpha that is distinct from known factors.
- 7 April 2021
- Published by With Intelligence LLC in The Journal of Portfolio Management
- Vol. 47 (6) , 22-32
Real Economy Portfolio: The Market Risk Premium as a Source of Alpha
We all know that the stock market does not perfectly reflect the overall economy. The author shows that this fact has exciting implications for active equity management. If standard cap-weighted benchmarks fail to reflect the economy, they contain uncompensated risks and will underperform the true market portfolio. Although we can never hold the true market portfolio because of nontraded human capital and other constraints, the author builds a sector-level model that captures returns to labor, capital, and intermediate inputs in the entire US economy. A portfolio designed to replicate these exposures generates statistically significant alpha that is distinct from existing factors. TOPICS: Security analysis and valuation, portfolio construction, performance measurement Key Findings ▪ The market risk premium refers to all assets in the economy, and even broad stock market indexes are an imperfect proxy. ▪ We leverage classic results from input–output analysis and international trade theory to construct a real economy portfolio from listed equities that better replicates the underlying economy. The key is to upweight labor-intensive and under-represented economic activities. ▪ The real economy portfolio has delivered significant alpha that is distinct from known factors.
- Open Access
Status Report (BKG measurement): A Search for Sterile Neutrino at J-PARC MLF
At the 17th J-PARC PAC, which was held on September 2013, we proposed the sterile neutrino search at J-PARC MLF. After reviewing the proposal, PAC recommended to have a background measurement at the detector's candidate site location in their report to investigate whether the background rates can be manageable for the real experiment or not. Therefore, we have performed the background measurements (MLF; 2013BU1301 test experiment) during the summer of 2014, also following the 18th J-PARC PAC recommendations, and the measurements results are described here.
Open AccessStatus Report (BKG measurement): A Search for Sterile Neutrino at J-PARC MLF
At the 17th J-PARC PAC, which was held on September 2013, we proposed the sterile neutrino search at J-PARC MLF. After reviewing the proposal, PAC recommended to have a background measurement at the detector's candidate site location in their report to investigate whether the background rates can be manageable for the real experiment or not. Therefore, we have performed the background measurements (MLF; 2013BU1301 test experiment) during the summer of 2014, also following the 18th J-PARC PAC recommendations, and the measurements results are described here.
- 4 March 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 13 (2) , 292-294
Discussion of “On the relation between predictable market returns and predictable analyst forecast errors”
- 4 March 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 13 (2) , 292-294
Discussion of “On the relation between predictable market returns and predictable analyst forecast errors”
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 82 (1) , 197-225
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad
- 1 October 2006
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 82 (1) , 197-225
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad
- 15 July 2003
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 58 (4) , 1557-1582
Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section
Little evidence exists that firms index executive compensation to remove the influence of marketwide factors. We argue that executives can, in principle, replicate such indexation in their private portfolios. In support, we find that market risk has little effect on the use of stock‐based pay for the average executive. But executives' ability to “undo” excessive market risk can be hindered by wealth constraints and inalienability of human capital. We replicate the standard result that there is little relative performance evaluation (RPE) for the average executive, but find strong evidence of RPE for younger executives and executives with less financial wealth.
- 15 July 2003
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 58 (4) , 1557-1582
Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section
Little evidence exists that firms index executive compensation to remove the influence of marketwide factors. We argue that executives can, in principle, replicate such indexation in their private portfolios. In support, we find that market risk has little effect on the use of stock‐based pay for the average executive. But executives' ability to “undo” excessive market risk can be hindered by wealth constraints and inalienability of human capital. We replicate the standard result that there is little relative performance evaluation (RPE) for the average executive, but find strong evidence of RPE for younger executives and executives with less financial wealth.
- 27 March 2003
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 47 (2) , 231-250
Myopic Corporate Behaviour with Optimal Management Incentives
- 27 March 2003
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 47 (2) , 231-250
Myopic Corporate Behaviour with Optimal Management Incentives
- 1 January 2000
- Published by JSTOR in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 38, 209
EVA versus Earnings: Does It Matter Which Is More Highly Correlated with Stock Returns?
Dissatisfaction with traditional accounting-based performance measures has spawned a number of alternatives, of which Economic Value Added (EVA) is currently th...
- 1 January 2000
- Published by JSTOR in Journal of Accounting Research
- Vol. 38, 209
EVA versus Earnings: Does It Matter Which Is More Highly Correlated with Stock Returns?
Dissatisfaction with traditional accounting-based performance measures has spawned a number of alternatives, of which Economic Value Added (EVA) is currently th...
- 1 April 1999
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 54 (2) , 519-546
Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage
We find that firms protected by “second generation” state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This result supports recent models in which the threat of hostile takeover motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. An implication is that legal barriers to takeovers may increase corporate slack.
- 1 April 1999
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 54 (2) , 519-546
Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage
We find that firms protected by “second generation” state antitakeover laws substantially reduce their use of debt, and that unprotected firms do the reverse. This result supports recent models in which the threat of hostile takeover motivates managers to take on debt they would otherwise avoid. An implication is that legal barriers to takeovers may increase corporate slack.
- 1 January 1998
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 16 (1) , 1-25
Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence
Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers' performance through “helping” efforts. This article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation. The model is tested with Australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups. The evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced, while individual efforts are increased, when promotion incentives are strong. Piece rates and profit‐sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts, while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated.
- 1 January 1998
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 16 (1) , 1-25
Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence
Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers' performance through “helping” efforts. This article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation. The model is tested with Australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups. The evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced, while individual efforts are increased, when promotion incentives are strong. Piece rates and profit‐sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts, while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated.