Ferdinand Eibl
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ferdinand Eibl has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Halfdan Lynge
Univ Oxford, Oxford, England
3 shared publications- Steffen Hertog
London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
2 shared publications - Alessandra Minello
University of Padova
1 shared publication Antonio Schizzerotto
University of Trento, Trento, Italy
1 shared publicationDan Slater
Department of Political Science, University of Michigan
1 shared publication- Erzsébet Bukodi
Department of Social Policy and Intervention and Nuffield College, University of Oxford
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (3) , 1324-1343
From Rents to Welfare: Why Are Some Oil-Rich States Generous to Their People?
Why do some, but not all oil-rich states provide generous welfare to their populations? Building on a case study of Oman in the 1960s and 1970s, we argue that anti-systemic subversive threats motivate ruling elites in oil states to use welfare as a tool of mass co-optation. We use the generalized synthetic control method and difference-in-difference regressions for a global quantitative test of our argument, assessing the effect of different types of subversion on a range of long-term welfare outcomes in oil-rich and oil-poor states. We demonstrate that the positive effect of subversion appears limited to center-seeking subversive threats in oil-rich countries. The paper addresses a key puzzle in the literature on resource-rich states, which makes contradictory predictions about the impact of resource rents on welfare provision.
- 29 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 118 (3) , 1324-1343
Open AccessFrom Rents to Welfare: Why Are Some Oil-Rich States Generous to Their People?
Why do some, but not all oil-rich states provide generous welfare to their populations? Building on a case study of Oman in the 1960s and 1970s, we argue that anti-systemic subversive threats motivate ruling elites in oil states to use welfare as a tool of mass co-optation. We use the generalized synthetic control method and difference-in-difference regressions for a global quantitative test of our argument, assessing the effect of different types of subversion on a range of long-term welfare outcomes in oil-rich and oil-poor states. We demonstrate that the positive effect of subversion appears limited to center-seeking subversive threats in oil-rich countries. The paper addresses a key puzzle in the literature on resource-rich states, which makes contradictory predictions about the impact of resource rents on welfare provision.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Studies in Comparative International Development
- Vol. 58 (4) , 706
Correction to: Electoral Confidence and Political Budget Cycles in Non-OECD Countries
- 29 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Studies in Comparative International Development
- Vol. 58 (4) , 706
Open AccessCorrection to: Electoral Confidence and Political Budget Cycles in Non-OECD Countries
- 22 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice
- Vol. 24 (6) , 629-630
Social Policy in the Islamic World
Cross-regional, large-scale typologies are very common in the welfare state literature. Conservative central European welfare states are routinely contrasted with Scandinavian social-democratic one...
- 22 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice
- Vol. 24 (6) , 629-630
Social Policy in the Islamic World
Cross-regional, large-scale typologies are very common in the welfare state literature. Conservative central European welfare states are routinely contrasted with Scandinavian social-democratic one...
- 13 December 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 51 (3) , 1002-1023
War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide
War can make states, but can it also make regimes? This article brings the growing literatures on authoritarianism and coups into conversation with the older research tradition analyzing the interplay between war and state formation. The authors offer a global empirical test of the argument that regional rebellions are especially likely to give rise to militarized authoritarian regimes. While this argument was initially developed in the context of Southeast Asia, the article deepens the original theory by furnishing a deductively grounded framework embedded in rational actor approaches in the coup and civil–military literatures. In support of the argument, quantitative tests confirm that regional rebellions make political militarization more likely not simply in a single region, but more generally.
- 13 December 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 51 (3) , 1002-1023
War Makes the Regime: Regional Rebellions and Political Militarization Worldwide
War can make states, but can it also make regimes? This article brings the growing literatures on authoritarianism and coups into conversation with the older research tradition analyzing the interplay between war and state formation. The authors offer a global empirical test of the argument that regional rebellions are especially likely to give rise to militarized authoritarian regimes. While this argument was initially developed in the context of Southeast Asia, the article deepens the original theory by furnishing a deductively grounded framework embedded in rational actor approaches in the coup and civil–military literatures. In support of the argument, quantitative tests confirm that regional rebellions make political militarization more likely not simply in a single region, but more generally.
- 13 April 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 62 (2) , 315-328
How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups
What are the most efficient strategies to prevent military coups d’état? The answer depends on coup agency, that is, who attempts to overthrow the regime: elite officers or lower-ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower-ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities when it comes to perpetrating coups. Using original data on coup agency, public spending, and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find that counterbalancing—a strategy designed to increase barriers for coup plotters’ coordination efforts—and higher shares of defense spending prove more effective at preventing coups by elite officers. However, higher social spending reduces the risk of coups by combat officers. Political liberalization has mixed effects on military agents. It decreases the risk of coups by combat officers, but makes elite officers more likely to mount coups. Our findings suggest that the study of coups needs to better incorporate variation and that we need to rethink the image of coups as purely elite-led power grabs.
- 13 April 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 62 (2) , 315-328
How to Keep Officers in the Barracks: Causes, Agents, and Types of Military Coups
What are the most efficient strategies to prevent military coups d’état? The answer depends on coup agency, that is, who attempts to overthrow the regime: elite officers or lower-ranking combat officers. Elite officers and lower-ranking combat officers have different incentives, opportunities, and capacities when it comes to perpetrating coups. Using original data on coup agency, public spending, and officer salaries in the Middle East and North Africa, we find that counterbalancing—a strategy designed to increase barriers for coup plotters’ coordination efforts—and higher shares of defense spending prove more effective at preventing coups by elite officers. However, higher social spending reduces the risk of coups by combat officers. Political liberalization has mixed effects on military agents. It decreases the risk of coups by combat officers, but makes elite officers more likely to mount coups. Our findings suggest that the study of coups needs to better incorporate variation and that we need to rethink the image of coups as purely elite-led power grabs.
- 15 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 12597-12615
Social Policies in the Middle East and North Africa
- 15 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 12597-12615
Social Policies in the Middle East and North Africa
- 5 June 2017
- Published by MIT Press in European Societies
- Vol. 20 (1) , 26-64
Linking the macro to the micro: a multidimensional approach to educational inequalities in four European countries
Recent research into educational inequalities has shown the importance of decomposing social origins into parental class, status and education, representing economic, socio-cultural and educational family resources, respectively. But we know little about how inequalities in educational attainment at the micro-level map onto institutional characteristics of educational systems at the macro-level, if we treat social origins in a multidimensional way. Drawing on the rich over-time variation in educational systems in four European countries – Britain, Sweden, Germany and Italy – this paper develops and tests a number of hypotheses regarding the effects of various components of social origins on individuals’ educational attainment in different institutional contexts. It is evident from our results that a great deal of similarity exists across nations with different educational systems in the persisting importance for individuals’ educational attainment of parental class, status and education. But our findings also indicate that changes in the institutional features of educational systems have, in some instances although not in others, served to reinforce or to offset the social processes generating educational inequalities at the micro level.
- 5 June 2017
- Published by MIT Press in European Societies
- Vol. 20 (1) , 26-64
Linking the macro to the micro: a multidimensional approach to educational inequalities in four European countries
Recent research into educational inequalities has shown the importance of decomposing social origins into parental class, status and education, representing economic, socio-cultural and educational family resources, respectively. But we know little about how inequalities in educational attainment at the micro-level map onto institutional characteristics of educational systems at the macro-level, if we treat social origins in a multidimensional way. Drawing on the rich over-time variation in educational systems in four European countries – Britain, Sweden, Germany and Italy – this paper develops and tests a number of hypotheses regarding the effects of various components of social origins on individuals’ educational attainment in different institutional contexts. It is evident from our results that a great deal of similarity exists across nations with different educational systems in the persisting importance for individuals’ educational attainment of parental class, status and education. But our findings also indicate that changes in the institutional features of educational systems have, in some instances although not in others, served to reinforce or to offset the social processes generating educational inequalities at the micro level.
- 30 September 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 9 (4) , 629-656
Constraints, competition, and competitiveness: explaining the non-linear effect of democratization on political budget cycles
The literature on political budget cycles (PBCs) does not offer a full-fledged theory about the effect of democratization. However, it does imply a non-linear effect along the regime spectrum: positive at the autocratic end, negative at the democratic end. We theoretically develop and empirically test this implication by pointing to two countervailing effects of democratization:executive constraintsandpolitical competition. While the former contains PBCs, the latter stimulates them. Because of their empirical covariation, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes where the decision-making powers of the executive are relatively unrestricted and politics is relatively competitive. We also show that while executive constraints and political competition condition PBCs, what triggers the fluctuations iselectoral competitiveness. Only when incumbents fear electoral defeat, do they create PBCs. The study is based on novel data on public spending in 112 countries, covering the entire regime spectrum over the period from 1960 to 2006.
- 30 September 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 9 (4) , 629-656
Constraints, competition, and competitiveness: explaining the non-linear effect of democratization on political budget cycles
The literature on political budget cycles (PBCs) does not offer a full-fledged theory about the effect of democratization. However, it does imply a non-linear effect along the regime spectrum: positive at the autocratic end, negative at the democratic end. We theoretically develop and empirically test this implication by pointing to two countervailing effects of democratization:executive constraintsandpolitical competition. While the former contains PBCs, the latter stimulates them. Because of their empirical covariation, PBCs occur primarily in hybrid regimes where the decision-making powers of the executive are relatively unrestricted and politics is relatively competitive. We also show that while executive constraints and political competition condition PBCs, what triggers the fluctuations iselectoral competitiveness. Only when incumbents fear electoral defeat, do they create PBCs. The study is based on novel data on public spending in 112 countries, covering the entire regime spectrum over the period from 1960 to 2006.
- 23 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Studies in Comparative International Development
- Vol. 52 (1) , 45-63
Electoral Confidence and Political Budget Cycles in Non-OECD Countries
- 23 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Studies in Comparative International Development
- Vol. 52 (1) , 45-63
Electoral Confidence and Political Budget Cycles in Non-OECD Countries