Andrew Kenan Rose

What does the macroeconomy look like in the aftermath of tariff changes This study estimates impulse response functions from local projections using a panel of annual data that spans 151 countries from 1963 to 2014. Tariff increases are associated with persistent, economically and statistically significant declines in domestic output and productivity, as well as higher unemployment and inequality, real exchange rate appreciation, and insignificant changes to the trade balance. Output and productivity impacts are magnified when tariffs rise during expansions and when they are imposed by more advanced or smaller (as opposed to developing or larger) economies; effects are asymmetric, being larger when tariffs go up than when they fall. While firmly establishing causality is always a challenge, the results are robust to a large number of perturbations to the baseline methodology, and they hold using both macroeconomic and industry-level data.

I investigate whether countries that use unconventional monetary policy (UMP) experience export booms. I use a popular gravity model of trade which requires neither the exogeneity of UMP, nor instrumental variables for UMP. In practice, countries that engage in UMP experience a drop in exports vis‐à‐vis countries that are not engaged in such policies, holding other things constant. Quantitative easing is associated with exports that are about 10% lower to countries not engaged in UMP; this amount is significantly different from zero and similar to the effect of negative nominal interest rates. Thus, there is no evidence that countries have gained export markets through UMP; currency wars that have been launched have also been lost. UMP is also associated with a comparable drop in imports and exchange rates, suggesting that countries engage in UMP when they are experiencing adverse macroeconomic shocks concurrent with those that eviscerate international trade.

This paper seeks to help establish a stylized fact: a country’s exports rise when its leadership is approved by other countries. I show this using a standard gravity model of bilateral exports, a panel of data from 2006 through 2017, and an annual Gallup survey that asks people in up to 157 countries whether they approve of the job performance of the leadership of China, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Holding other things constant, a country’s exports are higher if its leadership is approved by the importer—“soft power” promotes exports. The soft power effect is statistically and economically significant; a 1% increase in leadership approval raises exports by around two‐thirds of a percent. This effect is reasonably robust, and different measures of soft power deliver similar results. I conservatively estimate that the >20 percentage point decline in foreign approval of American leadership between 2016 (the final year of Obama’s presidency) and 2017 (Trump’s first year) lowered American exports by at least U.S.$3 billion.

We study political influences on private banks receiving government funds. Using spatial discontinuities associated with congressional district borders, we show that recipient banks of the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) program increased mortgage and small business lending by 23–60% more in census tracts located just inside their home-representative’s district than just outside; the effect also shows up in higher loan acceptance rates, and mortgages more likely to be impaired or in default. The effect is stronger when the representative voted for TARP, is politically powerful, connected to the financial industry, and when the bank is important in the district. These findings suggest that obtaining public funds subjects firms to political influences, which affects the quantity and quality of corporate investment because of political considerations.

We examine the effect of negative nominal interest rates on bank profitability and behavior using a cross-country panel of over 5,100 banks in 27 countries. Our data set includes annual observations for Japanese and European banks between 2010 and 2016, which covers all advanced economies that have experienced negative nominal rates, including currency union members as well as both fixed and floating exchange rates countries. When we compare negative nominal interest rates with low positive rates, banks experience losses in interest income that are almost exactly offset by savings on deposit expenses and gains in non-interest income, including capital gains on securities and fees. We find heterogeneous effects of negative rates: floating exchange rates, small banks, and banks with low deposit ratios drive most of our results. Low-deposit banks have enjoyed particularly striking gains in non-interest income, likely from capital gains on securities. There have only been modest differences between high and low deposit-ratio banks’ changes in interest expenses; high deposit banks do not seem disproportionately vulnerable to negative rates. Overall, our results indicate surprisingly benign implications of negative rates for commercial banks thus far.

This paper examines exchange rate behaviour during the recent period with negative nominal interest rates. We use a daily panel of data of 61 currencies from January 2010 to May 2016; during this time five economies (Denmark, EMU, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland) experienced negative nominal interest rates. We examine both effective exchange rates and bilateral rates, the latter typically measured against the Swiss franc because Switzerland has had the longest period of negative nominal rates. We examine exchange rate volatility, exchange rate changes, deviations from uncovered interest parity, and profits from the carry trade. We find that negative interest rates seem to have little effect on observable exchange rate behaviour.