Joseph J. Gerakos
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Joseph J. Gerakos has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gavin Cassar
INSEAD
6 shared publications Juhani T. Linnainmaa
University of Southern California and NBER
6 shared publicationsAndrei Kovrijnykh
Arizona State University (ASU)
3 shared publicationsChad Syverson
University of Chicago Booth School of Business and NBER
3 shared publicationsBrian J. Bushee
2 shared publicationsChristopher D. Ittner
University of Pennsylvania - Accounting Department
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Do forecasts of bankruptcy cause bankruptcy? A machine learning sensitivity analysis
It is widely speculated that auditors' public forecasts of bankruptcy are, at least in part, self-fulfilling prophecies in the sense that they might actually cause bankruptcies that would not have otherwise occurred. This conjecture is hard to prove, however, because the strong association between bankruptcies and bankruptcy forecasts could simply indicate that auditors are skillful forecasters with unique access to highly predictive covariates. In this paper, we investigate the causal effect of bankruptcy forecasts on bankruptcy using nonparametric sensitivity analysis. We contrast our analysis with two alternative approaches: a linear bivariate probit model with an endogenous regressor, and a recently developed bound on risk ratios called E-values. Additionally, our machine learning approach incorporates a monotonicity constraint corresponding to the assumption that bankruptcy forecasts do not make bankruptcies less likely. Finally, a tree-based posterior summary of the treatment effect estimates allows us to explore which observable firm characteristics moderate the inducement effect.
Open AccessDo forecasts of bankruptcy cause bankruptcy? A machine learning sensitivity analysis
It is widely speculated that auditors' public forecasts of bankruptcy are, at least in part, self-fulfilling prophecies in the sense that they might actually cause bankruptcies that would not have otherwise occurred. This conjecture is hard to prove, however, because the strong association between bankruptcies and bankruptcy forecasts could simply indicate that auditors are skillful forecasters with unique access to highly predictive covariates. In this paper, we investigate the causal effect of bankruptcy forecasts on bankruptcy using nonparametric sensitivity analysis. We contrast our analysis with two alternative approaches: a linear bivariate probit model with an endogenous regressor, and a recently developed bound on risk ratios called E-values. Additionally, our machine learning approach incorporates a monotonicity constraint corresponding to the assumption that bankruptcy forecasts do not make bankruptcies less likely. Finally, a tree-based posterior summary of the treatment effect estimates allows us to explore which observable firm characteristics moderate the inducement effect.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Moving Beyond Histogram Bin Frequencies as Prima Facie Evidence of Earnings Management (Or a Discussion of 'Understanding the 'Numbers Game'')
Bird, Karolyi, and Ruchti (2019) estimate a structural model of earnings management in the setting of meeting-or-beating the analyst consensus forecast. I provide an overview of their methods and findings, and then discuss the assumptions, benefits, and limitations of their approach.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMoving Beyond Histogram Bin Frequencies as Prima Facie Evidence of Earnings Management (Or a Discussion of 'Understanding the 'Numbers Game'')
Bird, Karolyi, and Ruchti (2019) estimate a structural model of earnings management in the setting of meeting-or-beating the analyst consensus forecast. I provide an overview of their methods and findings, and then discuss the assumptions, benefits, and limitations of their approach.
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 31 (5) , 1825-1854
Decomposing Value
Firms move between growth and value because of changes in either size or book value of equity. The value premium is specific to variation in book-to-market that emanates from size changes. A factor based on this variation earns the entire value premium; one based on the remaining variation earns no premium. Hence, not all high book-to-market firms earn the value premium, and some low book-to-market firms earn value-like returns. Many models price portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market. None distinguish firms that earn the value premium from those that have a high book-to-market but do not earn the premium.
- 1 May 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 31 (5) , 1825-1854
Decomposing Value
Firms move between growth and value because of changes in either size or book value of equity. The value premium is specific to variation in book-to-market that emanates from size changes. A factor based on this variation earns the entire value premium; one based on the remaining variation earns no premium. Hence, not all high book-to-market firms earn the value premium, and some low book-to-market firms earn value-like returns. Many models price portfolios sorted by size and book-to-market. None distinguish firms that earn the value premium from those that have a high book-to-market but do not earn the premium.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 65 (2-3) , 358-379
Corporate jets and private meetings with investors
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 65 (2-3) , 358-379
Top Cited PapersCorporate jets and private meetings with investors
- Open Access
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Institutional Horizontal Shareholdings and Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies often file lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers that challenge the monopoly status of patent-protected drugs. Institutional horizontal shareholdings, measured by the generic shareholders' ownership in the brand-name company relative to their ownership in the generic manufacturer, are significantly positively associated with the likelihood that the two parties enter into a settlement agreement in which the brand pays the generic manufacturer to stay out of the market. Horizontal shareholdings are also positively associated with the brand's daily abnormal stock returns around the settlement agreement. Generic manufacturers who settle with the brand-name company are more likely to delay the sale of generic substitutes if they have higher horizontal shareholdings with the brand-name firm. These delays preclude other generic firms from entering the market.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInstitutional Horizontal Shareholdings and Generic Entry in the Pharmaceutical Industry
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies often file lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers that challenge the monopoly status of patent-protected drugs. Institutional horizontal shareholdings, measured by the generic shareholders' ownership in the brand-name company relative to their ownership in the generic manufacturer, are significantly positively associated with the likelihood that the two parties enter into a settlement agreement in which the brand pays the generic manufacturer to stay out of the market. Horizontal shareholdings are also positively associated with the brand's daily abnormal stock returns around the settlement agreement. Generic manufacturers who settle with the brand-name company are more likely to delay the sale of generic substitutes if they have higher horizontal shareholdings with the brand-name firm. These delays preclude other generic firms from entering the market.
- 24 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1582-1594
Audit firms face downward-sloping demand curves and the audit market is far from perfectly competitive
- 24 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1582-1594
Audit firms face downward-sloping demand curves and the audit market is far from perfectly competitive
- Open Access
- 5 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Audit Firms Face Downward-Sloping Demand Curves and the Audit Market Is Far from Perfectly Competitive
We explore how demand estimation can be applied in auditing research and review insights into the market that it has already provided. We set the foundation for the discussion by analyzing difficulties in the interpretation of the audit fee regression, a commonly applied tool in the auditing literature. We then discuss the mechanics of the discrete choice demand estimation approach used by Gerakos and Syverson (2015) and Guo, Koch, and Zhu (2017). We go on to explain how the findings from this work imply that audit firms have market power. That is, the market is not perfectly competitive, and indeed is far from it.
- 5 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAudit Firms Face Downward-Sloping Demand Curves and the Audit Market Is Far from Perfectly Competitive
We explore how demand estimation can be applied in auditing research and review insights into the market that it has already provided. We set the foundation for the discussion by analyzing difficulties in the interpretation of the audit fee regression, a commonly applied tool in the auditing literature. We then discuss the mechanics of the discrete choice demand estimation approach used by Gerakos and Syverson (2015) and Guo, Koch, and Zhu (2017). We go on to explain how the findings from this work imply that audit firms have market power. That is, the market is not perfectly competitive, and indeed is far from it.
- 1 June 2017
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 93 (2) , 117-135
Hedge Fund Voluntary Disclosure
Using a dataset of 3,234 letters sent by 434 hedge funds to their investors during 1995–2011, we study what motivates hedge fund managers to make voluntary disclosures. Contrary to the hedge fund industry's reputation for opacity, we observe that managers provide their investors with an array of quantitative and qualitative information about fund returns, risk exposures, holdings, benchmarks, performance attribution, and future prospects. We find that the tensions between the agency costs faced by investors and the proprietary costs faced by managers affect fund disclosures. Consistent with managers reducing proprietary costs, better-performing funds disclose less quantitative data about performance and holdings, and consistent with the presence of agency costs, riskier funds disclose less quantitative information about performance and assets under management.
- 1 June 2017
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 93 (2) , 117-135
Hedge Fund Voluntary Disclosure
Using a dataset of 3,234 letters sent by 434 hedge funds to their investors during 1995–2011, we study what motivates hedge fund managers to make voluntary disclosures. Contrary to the hedge fund industry's reputation for opacity, we observe that managers provide their investors with an array of quantitative and qualitative information about fund returns, risk exposures, holdings, benchmarks, performance attribution, and future prospects. We find that the tensions between the agency costs faced by investors and the proprietary costs faced by managers affect fund disclosures. Consistent with managers reducing proprietary costs, better-performing funds disclose less quantitative data about performance and holdings, and consistent with the presence of agency costs, riskier funds disclose less quantitative information about performance and assets under management.
- 1 June 2017
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 30 (2) , 105-130
Compensation Objectives and Business Unit Pay Strategy
This study investigates the effects of attraction, retention, and incentive objectives on business unit pay strategies in 173 European business units.Compensation theories provide conflicting implications regarding the use of various pay practices to achieve these objectives. We find that the positioning of cash pay levels relative to the labor market, the provision of benefits, and the breadth of employee eligibility for cash incentive plans and equity grants vary with the compensation objectives being pursued. Our evidence also suggests that some of these pay practices are complements while other are substitutes. Our ability to tie firms' objectives to elements of pay provides more direct evidence on how compensation policies are formed. Moreover, our evidence highlights the need to consider multiple compensation objectives when setting and studying pay strategies.
- 1 June 2017
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 30 (2) , 105-130
Compensation Objectives and Business Unit Pay Strategy
This study investigates the effects of attraction, retention, and incentive objectives on business unit pay strategies in 173 European business units.Compensation theories provide conflicting implications regarding the use of various pay practices to achieve these objectives. We find that the positioning of cash pay levels relative to the labor market, the provision of benefits, and the breadth of employee eligibility for cash incentive plans and equity grants vary with the compensation objectives being pursued. Our evidence also suggests that some of these pay practices are complements while other are substitutes. Our ability to tie firms' objectives to elements of pay provides more direct evidence on how compensation policies are formed. Moreover, our evidence highlights the need to consider multiple compensation objectives when setting and studying pay strategies.
- 12 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 22 (3) , 1084-1121
Do risk management practices work? Evidence from hedge funds
- 12 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 22 (3) , 1084-1121
Do risk management practices work? Evidence from hedge funds