Candice Michelle Mills
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Candice Michelle Mills has a total of 57 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Judith Harmony Danovitch
University of Louisville
10 shared publications - Asheley R. Landrum
Walter Cronkite School of Journalism & Mass Communication, Arizona State University , Phoenix, AZ
8 shared publications - Anthony Joseph Monroe
The University of Texas at Dallas
6 shared publications Judith H. Danovitch
5 shared publicationsFadwa B. Elashi
Educational Studies, Arab Open University, Amman 11953, Jordan
4 shared publicationsMeridith G. Grant
The University of Texas at Dallas
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 30 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Development
- Vol. 79
Individual differences in children’s recognition of contradictory evidence
- 30 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Development
- Vol. 79
Individual differences in children’s recognition of contradictory evidence
- Open Access
- 17 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Current Psychology
- Vol. 45 (7)
Developing intellectual humility: questions, dilemmas, and future directions
- 17 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Current Psychology
- Vol. 45 (7)
Open AccessDeveloping intellectual humility: questions, dilemmas, and future directions
- 1 August 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 154 (8) , 2272-2284
Does intellectual humility transmit intergenerationally? Examining relations between parent and child measures.
People vary drastically in their intellectual humility (i.e., their ability to recognize gaps in their knowledge). Little is known about how intellectual humility develops or why some children might demonstrate more intellectual humility than others. The present study examines the possibility of parent-to-child transmission of intellectual humility. Parents (N = 108; 88% college graduates; 56% with household income over $100,000) of children ages 7-10 completed two primary measures of intellectual humility: a self-report measure (i.e., the Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016) and a behavioral measure (i.e., the Prompted Explanation Task; Mills, Danovitch, Mugambi, Sands, & Monroe, 2022), which measured how often parents referenced knowledge limits or how to handle uncertainty. Separately, children (N = 108; M = 8.2 years; 51% girls, 49% boys; 70% White; 86% non-Hispanic) completed a knowledge estimation task where they rated their ability to answer explanatory questions about animals and vehicles. Contrary to expectations, self-report and behavioral measures of intellectual humility in parents were not correlated. Moreover, parents who self-reported higher levels of intellectual humility had children who were less humble in their knowledge ratings. That said, consistent with predictions, parents who were less humble in the way they indicated knowledge gaps had children who were less humble in the way they assessed their knowledge. These findings support that there are links between parent and child intellectual humility, but the pattern may depend on how parent intellectual humility is measured. Implications for understanding the development of intellectual humility are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 August 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 154 (8) , 2272-2284
Does intellectual humility transmit intergenerationally? Examining relations between parent and child measures.
People vary drastically in their intellectual humility (i.e., their ability to recognize gaps in their knowledge). Little is known about how intellectual humility develops or why some children might demonstrate more intellectual humility than others. The present study examines the possibility of parent-to-child transmission of intellectual humility. Parents (N = 108; 88% college graduates; 56% with household income over $100,000) of children ages 7-10 completed two primary measures of intellectual humility: a self-report measure (i.e., the Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016) and a behavioral measure (i.e., the Prompted Explanation Task; Mills, Danovitch, Mugambi, Sands, & Monroe, 2022), which measured how often parents referenced knowledge limits or how to handle uncertainty. Separately, children (N = 108; M = 8.2 years; 51% girls, 49% boys; 70% White; 86% non-Hispanic) completed a knowledge estimation task where they rated their ability to answer explanatory questions about animals and vehicles. Contrary to expectations, self-report and behavioral measures of intellectual humility in parents were not correlated. Moreover, parents who self-reported higher levels of intellectual humility had children who were less humble in their knowledge ratings. That said, consistent with predictions, parents who were less humble in the way they indicated knowledge gaps had children who were less humble in the way they assessed their knowledge. These findings support that there are links between parent and child intellectual humility, but the pattern may depend on how parent intellectual humility is measured. Implications for understanding the development of intellectual humility are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Does intellectual humility transmit intergenerationally? Examining relations between parent and child measures
People vary drastically in their intellectual humility (i.e., their ability to recognize gaps in their knowledge). Little is known about how intellectual humility develops or why some children might demonstrate more intellectual humility than others. The current study examines the possibility of parent to child transmission of intellectual humility. Parents (N = 108; 88% college graduates; 56% with household income over $100,000) of children ages 7 to 10 completed two primary measures of intellectual humility: a self-report measure (i.e., the Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016), and a behavioral measure (i.e., the Prompted Explanation Task; Mills et al., 2022), which measured how often parents referenced knowledge limits or how to handle uncertainty. Separately, children (N = 108; M = 8.2 years; 51% girls, 49% boys; 70% White; 86% non-Hispanic) completed a knowledge estimation task where they rated their ability to answer explanatory questions about animals and vehicles. Contrary to expectations, self-report and behavioral measures of intellectual humility in parents were not correlated. Moreover, parents who self-reported higher levels of intellectual humility had children who were less humble in their knowledge ratings. That said, consistent with predictions, parents who were less humble in the way they indicated knowledge gaps had children who were less humble in the way they assessed their knowledge. These findings support that there are links between parent and child intellectual humility, but the pattern may depend on how parent intellectual humility is measured. Implications for understanding the development of intellectual humility are discussed.
- 4 June 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessDoes intellectual humility transmit intergenerationally? Examining relations between parent and child measures
People vary drastically in their intellectual humility (i.e., their ability to recognize gaps in their knowledge). Little is known about how intellectual humility develops or why some children might demonstrate more intellectual humility than others. The current study examines the possibility of parent to child transmission of intellectual humility. Parents (N = 108; 88% college graduates; 56% with household income over $100,000) of children ages 7 to 10 completed two primary measures of intellectual humility: a self-report measure (i.e., the Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016), and a behavioral measure (i.e., the Prompted Explanation Task; Mills et al., 2022), which measured how often parents referenced knowledge limits or how to handle uncertainty. Separately, children (N = 108; M = 8.2 years; 51% girls, 49% boys; 70% White; 86% non-Hispanic) completed a knowledge estimation task where they rated their ability to answer explanatory questions about animals and vehicles. Contrary to expectations, self-report and behavioral measures of intellectual humility in parents were not correlated. Moreover, parents who self-reported higher levels of intellectual humility had children who were less humble in their knowledge ratings. That said, consistent with predictions, parents who were less humble in the way they indicated knowledge gaps had children who were less humble in the way they assessed their knowledge. These findings support that there are links between parent and child intellectual humility, but the pattern may depend on how parent intellectual humility is measured. Implications for understanding the development of intellectual humility are discussed.
- Open Access
- 15 April 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The Role of Truth and Bias in Parents’ Judgments of Children’s Science Interests
Parents’ judgments about their children’s level of interest in different science topics may impact the science-learning opportunities they provide their children. However, little is known about how parents judge these interests. We used the Truth and Bias Model of Judgment (West & Kenny, 2011) to examine factors that may affect parents’ judgments of their children’s science interests, such as the truth (children’s self-reported interest) and potential sources of parental bias. We also investigated whether several individual difference measures moderated the effect of truth or bias on judgments. Children (N = 139, ages 7-11) rated their level of interest in 5 science and 5 non-science topics. Separately, parents (N = 139) judged their child's interest in the same topics. Overall, parents accurately judged their children’s science interests, but we also found evidence of some forms of bias: Parents generally underestimated their children’s science interests. Also, parents’ personal science attitudes were related to judgments of science interests, such that parents more favorable of science tended to rate their children’s interest in science topics higher than parents with a less favorable view. We did not find evidence that individual differences among parents moderated the effect of truth or bias on judgments; however, parents were more accurate at judging the non-science interests of older children than younger children. Parents should be aware that they may be underestimating their children’s interest in science topics and that their personal attitudes about science may be influencing their judgments of their children’s science interests.
- 15 April 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe Role of Truth and Bias in Parents’ Judgments of Children’s Science Interests
Parents’ judgments about their children’s level of interest in different science topics may impact the science-learning opportunities they provide their children. However, little is known about how parents judge these interests. We used the Truth and Bias Model of Judgment (West & Kenny, 2011) to examine factors that may affect parents’ judgments of their children’s science interests, such as the truth (children’s self-reported interest) and potential sources of parental bias. We also investigated whether several individual difference measures moderated the effect of truth or bias on judgments. Children (N = 139, ages 7-11) rated their level of interest in 5 science and 5 non-science topics. Separately, parents (N = 139) judged their child's interest in the same topics. Overall, parents accurately judged their children’s science interests, but we also found evidence of some forms of bias: Parents generally underestimated their children’s science interests. Also, parents’ personal science attitudes were related to judgments of science interests, such that parents more favorable of science tended to rate their children’s interest in science topics higher than parents with a less favorable view. We did not find evidence that individual differences among parents moderated the effect of truth or bias on judgments; however, parents were more accurate at judging the non-science interests of older children than younger children. Parents should be aware that they may be underestimating their children’s interest in science topics and that their personal attitudes about science may be influencing their judgments of their children’s science interests.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Developmental Psychology
- Vol. 60 (1) , 1-16
Debunking the Santa myth: The process and aftermath of becoming skeptical about Santa.
Two studies examined the process and aftermath of coming to disbelieve in the myth of Santa Claus. In Study 1, 48 children ages 6-15 answered questions about how they discovered Santa was not real and how the discovery made them feel, and 44 of their parents shared their perspectives and how they promoted Santa. In Study 2, 383 adults reflected on their experiences shifting to disbelief in Santa Claus. In both studies, the average age of disbelief was around 8, but with significant variability. Most participants reported testimony from others contributed to their disbelief, and some reported skepticism as a result of either experience (e.g., observation) or logical reasoning. About a third of children and half of adults reported some negative emotions upon discovering the truth. Higher levels of parental Santa promotion were associated with experiencing some negative emotions upon discovering the truth in both studies. Additionally, adults who reported feeling only negative emotions tended to be older when they discovered the truth, more likely to have reported learning the truth abruptly, and more likely to have reported learning the truth through testimony. That said, experiences of negative emotions were generally short-lived, and the vast majority of both children and adults reported they would celebrate Santa with their own children or were already doing so. Implications of these findings for how to approach children's transition to skepticism regarding Santa are discussed, including timing, the role of parents, and popular notions of discovery for children's trust toward their parents. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Developmental Psychology
- Vol. 60 (1) , 1-16
Debunking the Santa myth: The process and aftermath of becoming skeptical about Santa.
Two studies examined the process and aftermath of coming to disbelieve in the myth of Santa Claus. In Study 1, 48 children ages 6-15 answered questions about how they discovered Santa was not real and how the discovery made them feel, and 44 of their parents shared their perspectives and how they promoted Santa. In Study 2, 383 adults reflected on their experiences shifting to disbelief in Santa Claus. In both studies, the average age of disbelief was around 8, but with significant variability. Most participants reported testimony from others contributed to their disbelief, and some reported skepticism as a result of either experience (e.g., observation) or logical reasoning. About a third of children and half of adults reported some negative emotions upon discovering the truth. Higher levels of parental Santa promotion were associated with experiencing some negative emotions upon discovering the truth in both studies. Additionally, adults who reported feeling only negative emotions tended to be older when they discovered the truth, more likely to have reported learning the truth abruptly, and more likely to have reported learning the truth through testimony. That said, experiences of negative emotions were generally short-lived, and the vast majority of both children and adults reported they would celebrate Santa with their own children or were already doing so. Implications of these findings for how to approach children's transition to skepticism regarding Santa are discussed, including timing, the role of parents, and popular notions of discovery for children's trust toward their parents. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 25 September 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Debunking the Santa Myth: The Process and Aftermath of Becoming Skeptical about Santa
Two studies examined the process and aftermath of coming to disbelieve in the myth of Santa Claus. In Study 1, 48 children ages 6 to 15 answered questions about how they discovered Santa was not real and how the discovery made them feel, and 44 of their parents shared their perspectives and how they promoted Santa. In Study 2, 383 adults reflected on their experiences shifting to disbelief in Santa Claus. In both studies, the average age of disbelief was around 8, but with significant variability. Most participants reported testimony from others contributed to their disbelief, and some reported skepticism as a result of either experience (e.g., observation) or logical reasoning. About a third of children and half of adults reported some negative emotions upon discovering the truth. Higher levels of parental Santa promotion were associated with experiencing some negative emotions upon discovering the truth in both studies. Additionally, adults who reported feeling only negative emotions tended to be older when they discovered the truth, more likely to have reported learning the truth abruptly, and more likely to have reported learning the truth through testimony. That said, experiences of negative emotions were generally short-lived, and the vast majority of both children and adults reported they would celebrate Santa with their own children or were already doing so. Implications of these findings for how to approach children’s transition to skepticism regarding Santa are discussed, including timing, the role of parents, and popular notions of discovery for children’s trust towards their parents.
- 25 September 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessDebunking the Santa Myth: The Process and Aftermath of Becoming Skeptical about Santa
Two studies examined the process and aftermath of coming to disbelieve in the myth of Santa Claus. In Study 1, 48 children ages 6 to 15 answered questions about how they discovered Santa was not real and how the discovery made them feel, and 44 of their parents shared their perspectives and how they promoted Santa. In Study 2, 383 adults reflected on their experiences shifting to disbelief in Santa Claus. In both studies, the average age of disbelief was around 8, but with significant variability. Most participants reported testimony from others contributed to their disbelief, and some reported skepticism as a result of either experience (e.g., observation) or logical reasoning. About a third of children and half of adults reported some negative emotions upon discovering the truth. Higher levels of parental Santa promotion were associated with experiencing some negative emotions upon discovering the truth in both studies. Additionally, adults who reported feeling only negative emotions tended to be older when they discovered the truth, more likely to have reported learning the truth abruptly, and more likely to have reported learning the truth through testimony. That said, experiences of negative emotions were generally short-lived, and the vast majority of both children and adults reported they would celebrate Santa with their own children or were already doing so. Implications of these findings for how to approach children’s transition to skepticism regarding Santa are discussed, including timing, the role of parents, and popular notions of discovery for children’s trust towards their parents.
- Open Access
- 17 April 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
"How do fish breathe underwater?": Young children's ability to evaluate and remember different types of explanations regarding biological phenomena
Four experiments (N = 239) examined the types of explanations children accept for how questions about biological processes and what children learn from these explanations. In Study 1, 4- to 6-year-olds rated mechanistic, teleological, circular, and non-explanations about biology. Only 6-year-olds rated mechanistic explanations as better and non-explanations as worse at answering questions. To simplify the study design for younger children, Study 2 asked 4- and 5-year-olds to sort non-explanations as well as mechanistic explanations into “helpful” and “not helpful” boxes. Studies 3 and 4 examined what children remembered from explanations they sorted. Studies 2 and 3 found that 4- and 5-year-olds recognized that mechanistic explanations were helpful, but they struggled to consistently sort non-explanations as “not helpful” and they remembered little from the explanations. In contrast, Study 4 found that 6- to 8-year-olds were effective at sorting both types of explanations and remembered more information from mechanistic explanations than non-explanations. Individual differences for each study are discussed.
- 17 April 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open Access"How do fish breathe underwater?": Young children's ability to evaluate and remember different types of explanations regarding biological phenomena
Four experiments (N = 239) examined the types of explanations children accept for how questions about biological processes and what children learn from these explanations. In Study 1, 4- to 6-year-olds rated mechanistic, teleological, circular, and non-explanations about biology. Only 6-year-olds rated mechanistic explanations as better and non-explanations as worse at answering questions. To simplify the study design for younger children, Study 2 asked 4- and 5-year-olds to sort non-explanations as well as mechanistic explanations into “helpful” and “not helpful” boxes. Studies 3 and 4 examined what children remembered from explanations they sorted. Studies 2 and 3 found that 4- and 5-year-olds recognized that mechanistic explanations were helpful, but they struggled to consistently sort non-explanations as “not helpful” and they remembered little from the explanations. In contrast, Study 4 found that 6- to 8-year-olds were effective at sorting both types of explanations and remembered more information from mechanistic explanations than non-explanations. Individual differences for each study are discussed.
- Open Access
- 18 June 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Is secondhand information better read or said? Factors influencing children’s endorsements of text-based information
Research has extensively studied how children epistemically evaluate people as secondhand information sources, but less is known about how they evaluate knowledge artifacts, (nonhuman information sources; e.g., books). Recent studies indicate that many young children prefer to learn from text presented by puppet informants, but little is known as to why they display this preference. Across three studies, we examine factors that may influence the likelihood of text-trust preferences in U.S. children aged 4-6 (n = 234), including the epistemic authority they may assign to puppets, humans, or text; reading ability; and text informant preferences. Results indicate children’s informant preference, but not reading ability or informant type, reliably predict text-trust preferences. Moreover, this preference is associated with inferences about the epistemic authority of text rather than informants regardless of whether children evaluate puppets or humans. Implications for future research questions and methodology examining children’s learning from knowledge artifacts are discussed.
- 18 June 2022
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessIs secondhand information better read or said? Factors influencing children’s endorsements of text-based information
Research has extensively studied how children epistemically evaluate people as secondhand information sources, but less is known about how they evaluate knowledge artifacts, (nonhuman information sources; e.g., books). Recent studies indicate that many young children prefer to learn from text presented by puppet informants, but little is known as to why they display this preference. Across three studies, we examine factors that may influence the likelihood of text-trust preferences in U.S. children aged 4-6 (n = 234), including the epistemic authority they may assign to puppets, humans, or text; reading ability; and text informant preferences. Results indicate children’s informant preference, but not reading ability or informant type, reliably predict text-trust preferences. Moreover, this preference is associated with inferences about the epistemic authority of text rather than informants regardless of whether children evaluate puppets or humans. Implications for future research questions and methodology examining children’s learning from knowledge artifacts are discussed.
- 1 March 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Developmental Psychology
- Vol. 58 (3) , 417-424
Cognitive reflection and authoritarianism relate to how parents respond to children’s science questions.
When children ask questions about science, parents use a variety of strategies to answer them, including providing accurate information, connecting to prior knowledge, or simply saying "I do not know." This study examines the factors underlying individual differences in parental explanatory characteristics. Parents (N = 148; Mage = 38; 84% female, 16% male; 58% with White American children; 67% having completed college; 49% with household income over $75,000) of children ages 7 to 10 answered eight questions about biology as if they were responding to their child. They also completed three measures of different aspects of reasoning and values: the Picture Vocabulary Test (PVT) to measure verbal intelligence (Gershon et al., 2013), the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Toplak et al., 2014), which measures the tendency to override intuitive but incorrect responses to engage in reflective thinking, and the Authoritarianism Scale (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), which measures a parent's preference for encouraging obedience toward authority figures over encouraging their child's autonomy. Our findings support that different factors are associated with different explanatory characteristics. Parents high in reflective thinking tend to provide more connections to other knowledge in their explanations, while parents high in authoritarianism tend to provide fewer references to uncertainty and how to manage it. Implications for effective parent-child communication and children's scientific understanding will be discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 March 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Developmental Psychology
- Vol. 58 (3) , 417-424
Cognitive reflection and authoritarianism relate to how parents respond to children’s science questions.
When children ask questions about science, parents use a variety of strategies to answer them, including providing accurate information, connecting to prior knowledge, or simply saying "I do not know." This study examines the factors underlying individual differences in parental explanatory characteristics. Parents (N = 148; Mage = 38; 84% female, 16% male; 58% with White American children; 67% having completed college; 49% with household income over $75,000) of children ages 7 to 10 answered eight questions about biology as if they were responding to their child. They also completed three measures of different aspects of reasoning and values: the Picture Vocabulary Test (PVT) to measure verbal intelligence (Gershon et al., 2013), the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Toplak et al., 2014), which measures the tendency to override intuitive but incorrect responses to engage in reflective thinking, and the Authoritarianism Scale (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), which measures a parent's preference for encouraging obedience toward authority figures over encouraging their child's autonomy. Our findings support that different factors are associated with different explanatory characteristics. Parents high in reflective thinking tend to provide more connections to other knowledge in their explanations, while parents high in authoritarianism tend to provide fewer references to uncertainty and how to manage it. Implications for effective parent-child communication and children's scientific understanding will be discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).