Shun Kurokawa
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Shun Kurokawa has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yasuo Ihara
Department of Biological Sciences, the University of Tokyo, Hongo 7-3-1, Bunkyoku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan
5 shared publications Jie-Ru Yu
College of Resources and Environmental Sciences, Gansu Agriculture University, Lanzhou, China
1 shared publicationJoe Yuichiro Wakano
1 shared publication- Joe Yuichiro Wakano
School of Interdisciplinary Mathematical Sciences, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan
1 shared publication Masao Fukutomi
1 shared publicationSabin Lessard
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Montreal, Montreal, QC, H3C 3J7, Canada
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 166, 107-115
The asymmetry between spite and altruism
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 166, 107-115
Open AccessThe asymmetry between spite and altruism
- Open Access
- 31 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 158, 109-120
Persistence in repeated games encourages the evolution of spite
- 31 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 158, 109-120
Open AccessPersistence in repeated games encourages the evolution of spite
- Open Access
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 156, 131-147
Evolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 156, 131-147
Open AccessEvolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism
- Open Access
- 29 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Animal Behaviour
- Vol. 209, 143-153
Successful conditional altruistic strategies and successful conditional spiteful strategies are different
- 29 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Animal Behaviour
- Vol. 209, 143-153
Open AccessSuccessful conditional altruistic strategies and successful conditional spiteful strategies are different
- Open Access
- 6 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 154, 79-93
Disbandment rules that most facilitate the evolution of cooperation
- 6 September 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 154, 79-93
Open AccessDisbandment rules that most facilitate the evolution of cooperation
- Open Access
- 27 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 572, 111585
Evolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option
- 27 July 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 572, 111585
Open AccessEvolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option
- Open Access
Evolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism
Altruism and spite are costly to the actor; therefore, from the perspective of natural selection, the existence of them is a mysterious phenomenon and require explanation. If altruistic individuals are more likely to be recipients for altruism than non-altruistic individuals, then altruism can be favored by natural selection. Similarly, if spiteful individuals are less likely to be recipients for spite than non-spiteful individuals, then spite can be favored by natural selection. Spite is altruism’s evil twin or ugly sister of altruism. In some mechanisms (e.g. repeated interaction), if altruism is favored by natural selection, then spite is also favored by natural selection. In contrast, there is a situation which facilitates the evolution of altruism but is unlikely to facilitate the evolution of spite. Population structure is one typical example. Here we focus on the mechanism in which individuals choose to keep the interaction or stop the interaction according to the opponent’s behavior. We, by using evolutionary game theory, investigate the evolution of altruism and the evolution of spite under this mechanism. Our model shows that the evolution of spite is less likely than the evolution of altruism. This main result provides a nice intuition for why altruism is more abundant than spite in general in the real world.
Open AccessEvolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism
Altruism and spite are costly to the actor; therefore, from the perspective of natural selection, the existence of them is a mysterious phenomenon and require explanation. If altruistic individuals are more likely to be recipients for altruism than non-altruistic individuals, then altruism can be favored by natural selection. Similarly, if spiteful individuals are less likely to be recipients for spite than non-spiteful individuals, then spite can be favored by natural selection. Spite is altruism’s evil twin or ugly sister of altruism. In some mechanisms (e.g. repeated interaction), if altruism is favored by natural selection, then spite is also favored by natural selection. In contrast, there is a situation which facilitates the evolution of altruism but is unlikely to facilitate the evolution of spite. Population structure is one typical example. Here we focus on the mechanism in which individuals choose to keep the interaction or stop the interaction according to the opponent’s behavior. We, by using evolutionary game theory, investigate the evolution of altruism and the evolution of spite under this mechanism. Our model shows that the evolution of spite is less likely than the evolution of altruism. This main result provides a nice intuition for why altruism is more abundant than spite in general in the real world.
- Open Access
- 28 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Behavioural Processes
- Vol. 203, 104754
Evolution of cooperation in an n-player game with opting out
- 28 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Behavioural Processes
- Vol. 203, 104754
Open AccessEvolution of cooperation in an n-player game with opting out
- Open Access
- 24 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 145, 63-79
Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent
- 24 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 145, 63-79
Open AccessEvolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 392, 125678
Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Applied Mathematics and Computation
- Vol. 392, 125678
Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance