Jingtao Shi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jingtao Shi has a total of 46 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zhen Wu
School of Mathematics, State Key Laboratory of Cryptography and Digital Economy Security, Shandong University, Jinan, China
7 shared publications - Yueyang Zheng
School of Mathematics Shandong University 250100 Jinan P.R.China
5 shared publications Yu Si
Shandong University
4 shared publications- Zixuan Li
School of Mathematics Shandong University 250100 Jinan P.R. China
4 shared publications - Guangchen Wang
School of Control Science and Engineering, Shandong University, Jinan, China
3 shared publications - Jingtao Lin
School of Mathematics Shandong University 250100 Jinan P.R. China
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Control
- Vol. 99 (10) , 3240-3262
A general maximum principle for progressive optimal control of fully coupled forward-backward stochastic systems with jumps
1. Pardoux and Peng are the pioneers to introduce the concept of a nonlinear backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) in their paper (Pardoux & Peng, 1990). And then Peng (1990) obtained th...
- 12 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Control
- Vol. 99 (10) , 3240-3262
A general maximum principle for progressive optimal control of fully coupled forward-backward stochastic systems with jumps
1. Pardoux and Peng are the pioneers to introduce the concept of a nonlinear backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) in their paper (Pardoux & Peng, 1990). And then Peng (1990) obtained th...
- 9 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
- Vol. 94 (1) , 27
The Optimal Control Problem of Fully Coupled FBSDEs Driven by Sub-diffusion with Applications
- 9 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
- Vol. 94 (1) , 27
The Optimal Control Problem of Fully Coupled FBSDEs Driven by Sub-diffusion with Applications
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
- Vol. 563 (2)
Backward linear-quadratic mean field stochastic differential game: A direct method
- 5 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications
- Vol. 563 (2)
Backward linear-quadratic mean field stochastic differential game: A direct method
- 2 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Systems & Control Letters
- Vol. 211
General linear–quadratic mean field stochastic differential game with common noise: A direct method
- 2 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Systems & Control Letters
- Vol. 211
General linear–quadratic mean field stochastic differential game with common noise: A direct method
- Open Access
Relationship between MP and DPP for Risk-Sensitive Stochastic Optimal Control Problems: Viscosity Solution Framework
In this paper, we study the relationship between general maximum principle and dynamic programming principle for risk-sensitive stochastic optimal control problems, where the control domain is not necessarily convex. The original problem is equivalent to a stochastic recursive optimal control problem of a forward-backward system with quadratic generators. Relations among the adjoint processes, the generalized Hamiltonian function and the value function are proved under the framework of viscosity solutions. Some examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results.
Open AccessRelationship between MP and DPP for Risk-Sensitive Stochastic Optimal Control Problems: Viscosity Solution Framework
In this paper, we study the relationship between general maximum principle and dynamic programming principle for risk-sensitive stochastic optimal control problems, where the control domain is not necessarily convex. The original problem is equivalent to a stochastic recursive optimal control problem of a forward-backward system with quadratic generators. Relations among the adjoint processes, the generalized Hamiltonian function and the value function are proved under the framework of viscosity solutions. Some examples are given to illustrate the theoretical results.
- Open Access
A Partially Observed Stochastic Linear Stackelberg Differential Game with Poisson Jumps under Mean-Variance Criteria
In this paper, a partially observed stochastic linear Stackelberg differential game with mean-variance criteria is studied. Randomness comes from Brownian motions and Poisson random measures. which leads to a circular dependency. We follow the orthogonal decomposition method to overcome the circular dependency of the control and state processes. Both original problems of the follower and leader are decomposed into several fully observed problems with mean-variance criteria. During these processes, non-linear stochastic filtering with Poisson random measures, developed in this paper, plays an important role. Besides the follower's problem is embedded into a class of auxiliary stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of stochastic differential equations with Poisson jumps, the leader's problem is also embedded into a class of auxiliary stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of forward-backward stochastic differential equations with Poisson jumps. Observable state feedback Stackelberg equilibria are obtained, via some Riccati equations.
Open AccessA Partially Observed Stochastic Linear Stackelberg Differential Game with Poisson Jumps under Mean-Variance Criteria
In this paper, a partially observed stochastic linear Stackelberg differential game with mean-variance criteria is studied. Randomness comes from Brownian motions and Poisson random measures. which leads to a circular dependency. We follow the orthogonal decomposition method to overcome the circular dependency of the control and state processes. Both original problems of the follower and leader are decomposed into several fully observed problems with mean-variance criteria. During these processes, non-linear stochastic filtering with Poisson random measures, developed in this paper, plays an important role. Besides the follower's problem is embedded into a class of auxiliary stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of stochastic differential equations with Poisson jumps, the leader's problem is also embedded into a class of auxiliary stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of forward-backward stochastic differential equations with Poisson jumps. Observable state feedback Stackelberg equilibria are obtained, via some Riccati equations.
- Open Access
The Optimal Control Problem of Stochastic Differential System with Extended Mixed Delays and Applications
This paper investigates an optimal control problem where the system is described by a stochastic differential equation with extended mixed delays that contain point delay, extended distributed delay, and extended noisy memory. The model is general in that the extended mixed delays of the state variable and control variable are components of all the coefficients, in particular, the diffusion term and the terminal cost. To address the difficulties induced by the extended noisy memory, by stochastic Fubini theorem, we transform the delay variational equation into a Volterra integral equation without delay, and then a kind of backward stochastic Volterra integral equation with Malliavin derivatives is introduced by the developed coefficient decomposition method and the generalized duality principle. Therefore, the stochastic maximum principle and the verification theorem are established. Subsequently, with Clark-Ocone formula, the adjoint equation is expressed as a set of anticipated backward stochastic differential equations. Finally, a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with extended mixed delays and a linear-quadratic solvable example are discussed, as applications.
Open AccessThe Optimal Control Problem of Stochastic Differential System with Extended Mixed Delays and Applications
This paper investigates an optimal control problem where the system is described by a stochastic differential equation with extended mixed delays that contain point delay, extended distributed delay, and extended noisy memory. The model is general in that the extended mixed delays of the state variable and control variable are components of all the coefficients, in particular, the diffusion term and the terminal cost. To address the difficulties induced by the extended noisy memory, by stochastic Fubini theorem, we transform the delay variational equation into a Volterra integral equation without delay, and then a kind of backward stochastic Volterra integral equation with Malliavin derivatives is introduced by the developed coefficient decomposition method and the generalized duality principle. Therefore, the stochastic maximum principle and the verification theorem are established. Subsequently, with Clark-Ocone formula, the adjoint equation is expressed as a set of anticipated backward stochastic differential equations. Finally, a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game with extended mixed delays and a linear-quadratic solvable example are discussed, as applications.
- Open AccessStochastic Linear-Quadratic Optimal Control Problems with Markovian Regime Switching and $H_\infty$ Constraint under Partial InformationThis paper is concerned with a stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of Markovian regime switching system with model uncertainty and partial information, where the information available to the control is based on a sub-$σ$-algebra of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motion and the Markov chain. Based on $H_\infty$ control theory, we turn to deal with a soft-constrained zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential game with Markov chain and partial information. By virtue of the filtering technique, the Riccati equation approach, the method of orthogonal decomposition, and the completion-of-squares method, we obtain the closed-loop saddle point of the zero-sum game via the optimal feedback control-strategy pair. Subsequently, we prove that the corresponding outcome of the closed-loop saddle point satisfies the $H_\infty$ performance criterion. Finally, the obtained theoretical results are applied to a stock market investment problem to further illustrate the practical significance and effectiveness.Open AccessStochastic Linear-Quadratic Optimal Control Problems with Markovian Regime Switching and $H_\infty$ Constraint under Partial InformationThis paper is concerned with a stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem of Markovian regime switching system with model uncertainty and partial information, where the information available to the control is based on a sub-$σ$-algebra of the filtration generated by the underlying Brownian motion and the Markov chain. Based on $H_\infty$ control theory, we turn to deal with a soft-constrained zero-sum linear-quadratic stochastic differential game with Markov chain and partial information. By virtue of the filtering technique, the Riccati equation approach, the method of orthogonal decomposition, and the completion-of-squares method, we obtain the closed-loop saddle point of the zero-sum game via the optimal feedback control-strategy pair. Subsequently, we prove that the corresponding outcome of the closed-loop saddle point satisfies the $H_\infty$ performance criterion. Finally, the obtained theoretical results are applied to a stock market investment problem to further illustrate the practical significance and effectiveness.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 17, 375-413
Linear-quadratic mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game with partial information and common noise
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game with partial information and common noise, which contains a leader and a large number of followers. To be specific, the followers face a large population Nash game after the leader first announces his strategy, while the leader will then optimize his own cost functional on consideration of the followers' reactions. The state equation of the leader and followers are both general stochastic differential equations, where the diffusion terms contain both the control and state variables. However, the followers' average state terms enter into the drift term of the leader's state equation, reflecting that the leader's state is influenced by the followers' states. By virtue of stochastic maximum principle with partial information and optimal filter technique, we deduce the open-loop adapted decentralized strategies and feedback decentralized strategies of this leader-followers system, and demonstrate that the decentralized strategies are the corresponding $ \varepsilon $-Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Mathematical Control and Related Fields
- Vol. 17, 375-413
Linear-quadratic mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game with partial information and common noise
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game with partial information and common noise, which contains a leader and a large number of followers. To be specific, the followers face a large population Nash game after the leader first announces his strategy, while the leader will then optimize his own cost functional on consideration of the followers' reactions. The state equation of the leader and followers are both general stochastic differential equations, where the diffusion terms contain both the control and state variables. However, the followers' average state terms enter into the drift term of the leader's state equation, reflecting that the leader's state is influenced by the followers' states. By virtue of stochastic maximum principle with partial information and optimal filter technique, we deduce the open-loop adapted decentralized strategies and feedback decentralized strategies of this leader-followers system, and demonstrate that the decentralized strategies are the corresponding $ \varepsilon $-Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium.