Mingping Qi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Mingping Qi has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jianhua Chen
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Wuhan University, Wuhan, People’s Republic of China
6 shared publications- Jianhua Chen
Wuhan University
4 shared publications - Wei Hu
Northwestern Polytechnical University
4 shared publications Chenyu Lin
Northwestern Polytechnical University
1 shared publication- Chi Chen
Fudan University, Shanghai, China
1 shared publication - Dejun Mu
Northwestern Polytechnical University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 13 (13) , 29357-29365
VTBSAE: Provably Secure Verifier-Based Password Authenticated Key Exchange for IIoT
- 1 July 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 13 (13) , 29357-29365
VTBSAE: Provably Secure Verifier-Based Password Authenticated Key Exchange for IIoT
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 12 (19) , 40449-40457
TBSAE: Tightly Secure One-Round SAE Variant for Securing Peer-to-Peer Networks
password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows involved participants to establish cryptographically strong keys over insecure channels by using a low-entropy password as credential. SAE as a widely deployed PAKE in Wi-Fi networks, has no tight security proof and requires the use of the hash-to-curve (H2C) function to map password into an elliptic curve point that is challenging to implement securely. To this end, in this article, we present a tightly secure one-round SAE variant, called as TBSAE for Two-Basis Simultaneous Authentication of Equals. TBSAE can work in both multiplicative and elliptic curve additive groups, and it uses two random group elements as the common reference strings to circumvent the use of Hash-to-Group (Curve) function. In the elliptic curve setting, avoiding the use of H2C function will bring ease-of-implementation advantages over its predecessor SAE and some other H2C-based PAKE protocols since H2C is actually not easy to be implemented securely in practice over a commonly used elliptic curve additive group. TBSAE is peer-to-peer, supporting simultaneous initiation in the authenticated key exchange phase, which makes it also suitable for mesh networks besides the traditional client-server setting. It is secure against the tricky off-line dictionary attack, and further supports the intended forward secrecy. Moreover, we provide a tight formal security proof for TBSAE in the random oracle model using the gap computational Diffie–Hellman (GDH) security assumption, which implies that compared to nontightly secure password-AKE (PAKE) protocols, it can achieve the expected security level with relatively small parameters in practice, making it gain more practical performance advantages.
- 16 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 12 (19) , 40449-40457
TBSAE: Tightly Secure One-Round SAE Variant for Securing Peer-to-Peer Networks
password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows involved participants to establish cryptographically strong keys over insecure channels by using a low-entropy password as credential. SAE as a widely deployed PAKE in Wi-Fi networks, has no tight security proof and requires the use of the hash-to-curve (H2C) function to map password into an elliptic curve point that is challenging to implement securely. To this end, in this article, we present a tightly secure one-round SAE variant, called as TBSAE for Two-Basis Simultaneous Authentication of Equals. TBSAE can work in both multiplicative and elliptic curve additive groups, and it uses two random group elements as the common reference strings to circumvent the use of Hash-to-Group (Curve) function. In the elliptic curve setting, avoiding the use of H2C function will bring ease-of-implementation advantages over its predecessor SAE and some other H2C-based PAKE protocols since H2C is actually not easy to be implemented securely in practice over a commonly used elliptic curve additive group. TBSAE is peer-to-peer, supporting simultaneous initiation in the authenticated key exchange phase, which makes it also suitable for mesh networks besides the traditional client-server setting. It is secure against the tricky off-line dictionary attack, and further supports the intended forward secrecy. Moreover, we provide a tight formal security proof for TBSAE in the random oracle model using the gap computational Diffie–Hellman (GDH) security assumption, which implies that compared to nontightly secure password-AKE (PAKE) protocols, it can achieve the expected security level with relatively small parameters in practice, making it gain more practical performance advantages.
- 7 February 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 2122-2131
HPQKE: Hybrid Post-Quantum Key Exchange Protocol for SSH Transport Layer From CSIDH
Secure Shell (SSH) is a robust cryptographic network protocol designed to establish a secure and encrypted connection over potentially insecure networks, which is typically used for remote login and command-line execution on remote systems. As its core foundation, SSH Transport Layer Protocol relies on the classic (Elliptic Curve) Diffie-Hellman ((EC)DH) key exchange protocol to achieve session key establishment, whose security is essentially based on the (EC) discrete logarithm problem ((EC)DLP). However, the classic (EC)DLP problem could be broken using sufficiently powerful quantum computers when it comes to the post-quantum era, which implies that the traditional SSH protocol will be insecure against the quantum computer attacks. To this end, this paper presents a hybrid post-quantum alternative for the SSH Transport Layer Protocol, called as HPQKE, which combines the supersingular isogeny based post-quantum CSIDH (Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman) and the classic ECDH key exchange protocols together. The security of each individual key exchange protocol within the presented HPQKE operates independently, ensuring that the overall security of the HPQKE remains at least as robust as the most secure key exchange protocol employed during its key exchange processes. Moreover, we formally prove that if the used MAC scheme is EUF-CMA secure, then (1) HPQKE is a post-quantum secure key exchange protocol if the CSIDH based Gap Computational Diffie-Hellman (CSI-GDH) security assumption holds, and (2) HPQKE is a classically secure key exchange protocol if the traditional GDH security assumption holds. In addition, we provide a prototype implementation for the HPQKE in a real network environment, and the corresponding experimental results intuitively demonstrate its practical feasibility.
- 7 February 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 2122-2131
HPQKE: Hybrid Post-Quantum Key Exchange Protocol for SSH Transport Layer From CSIDH
Secure Shell (SSH) is a robust cryptographic network protocol designed to establish a secure and encrypted connection over potentially insecure networks, which is typically used for remote login and command-line execution on remote systems. As its core foundation, SSH Transport Layer Protocol relies on the classic (Elliptic Curve) Diffie-Hellman ((EC)DH) key exchange protocol to achieve session key establishment, whose security is essentially based on the (EC) discrete logarithm problem ((EC)DLP). However, the classic (EC)DLP problem could be broken using sufficiently powerful quantum computers when it comes to the post-quantum era, which implies that the traditional SSH protocol will be insecure against the quantum computer attacks. To this end, this paper presents a hybrid post-quantum alternative for the SSH Transport Layer Protocol, called as HPQKE, which combines the supersingular isogeny based post-quantum CSIDH (Commutative Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman) and the classic ECDH key exchange protocols together. The security of each individual key exchange protocol within the presented HPQKE operates independently, ensuring that the overall security of the HPQKE remains at least as robust as the most secure key exchange protocol employed during its key exchange processes. Moreover, we formally prove that if the used MAC scheme is EUF-CMA secure, then (1) HPQKE is a post-quantum secure key exchange protocol if the CSIDH based Gap Computational Diffie-Hellman (CSI-GDH) security assumption holds, and (2) HPQKE is a classically secure key exchange protocol if the traditional GDH security assumption holds. In addition, we provide a prototype implementation for the HPQKE in a real network environment, and the corresponding experimental results intuitively demonstrate its practical feasibility.
- 13 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Wireless Personal Communications
- Vol. 139 (3) , 1607-1621
New One-Pass Universal AKE Protocol for Anonymous Wireless Roaming
- 13 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Wireless Personal Communications
- Vol. 139 (3) , 1607-1621
New One-Pass Universal AKE Protocol for Anonymous Wireless Roaming
- 4 March 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 3906-3913
SAE+: One-Round Provably Secure Asymmetric SAE Protocol for Client-Server Model
SAE, short for Simultaneous Authentication of Equals, is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol, by which the two involved parties can achieve mutual authentication and derive high-entropy keys via a memorable password. Currently, the SAE protocol has been standardized and integrated into the latest WPA3 (Wi-Fi Protected Access 3) specifications for protecting Wi-Fi network access. Whereas, SAE is a symmetric PAKE protocol unable to resist the server compromise attacks, and it involves explicit key confirmation flows which may be redundant for usage in existing protocols such as the TLS 1.3, etc. So, we naturally wonder that if we can construct a provably secure one-round asymmetric PAKE from the distinguished SAE. This paper affirms this by presenting an efficient asymmetric variant of SAE, called SAE+, and backing it up with a formal security proof under the widely accepted BPR security model. The new SAE+ is designed to enable a single round-trip execution, with the client initiating the communication, making it an ideal fit for integration into IETF protocols such as TLS 1.3. This feature aligns with the requirements set forth in the “Usage of PAKE with TLS 1.3" document. The SAE+ is secure against the off-line dictionary and server compromise attacks, and supports the desired forward secrecy, i.e., compromising the long-term secret password does not compromise the secrecy of the previously established session keys. In addition, the performance evaluation results presented in this paper demonstrate that the new SAE+ has comparable computational efficiency with some existing outstanding PAKE protocols while outperforms many of them in terms of communication flows.
- 4 March 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 3906-3913
SAE+: One-Round Provably Secure Asymmetric SAE Protocol for Client-Server Model
SAE, short for Simultaneous Authentication of Equals, is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol, by which the two involved parties can achieve mutual authentication and derive high-entropy keys via a memorable password. Currently, the SAE protocol has been standardized and integrated into the latest WPA3 (Wi-Fi Protected Access 3) specifications for protecting Wi-Fi network access. Whereas, SAE is a symmetric PAKE protocol unable to resist the server compromise attacks, and it involves explicit key confirmation flows which may be redundant for usage in existing protocols such as the TLS 1.3, etc. So, we naturally wonder that if we can construct a provably secure one-round asymmetric PAKE from the distinguished SAE. This paper affirms this by presenting an efficient asymmetric variant of SAE, called SAE+, and backing it up with a formal security proof under the widely accepted BPR security model. The new SAE+ is designed to enable a single round-trip execution, with the client initiating the communication, making it an ideal fit for integration into IETF protocols such as TLS 1.3. This feature aligns with the requirements set forth in the “Usage of PAKE with TLS 1.3" document. The SAE+ is secure against the off-line dictionary and server compromise attacks, and supports the desired forward secrecy, i.e., compromising the long-term secret password does not compromise the secrecy of the previously established session keys. In addition, the performance evaluation results presented in this paper demonstrate that the new SAE+ has comparable computational efficiency with some existing outstanding PAKE protocols while outperforms many of them in terms of communication flows.
- 12 September 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 11 (4) , 7071-7078
Provably Secure Asymmetric PAKE Protocol for Protecting IoT Access
Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows two parties who share a memorable password to securely establish a strong secret key. It has been deployed in many applications around us, such as iCloud service, Wi-Fi access, etc., to provide security assurance for us. In this paper, we present a secure and efficient asymmetric PAKE (aPAKE) protocol for protecting the access to the resource-constraint Internet of Things (IoT). Besides the general passive and active attacks, the new aPAKE protocol provides resilience to the offline dictionary attack, and the server compromise attack such that an adversary cannot impersonate the client to the server even if it has compromised the corresponding server and obtained the stored password file. The new aPAKE protocol is detailed in the elliptic curve setting in this paper, while it is also compatible with the multiplicative group over a finite field. The security proof for the new aPAKE protocol is carried out in the widely-accepted BPR security model under the basic CDH security assumption, which implies that our new aPAKE protocol has certain security advantages over some others whose security proofs need to be based on some stronger security assumptions. In addition, the new aPAKE protocol has computational efficiency and ease-of-implementation advantages over some existing asymmetric PAKE protocols whose constructions require the use of the hash-to-curve (H2C) function, and the performance evaluation results have definitely shown this fact.
- 12 September 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 11 (4) , 7071-7078
Provably Secure Asymmetric PAKE Protocol for Protecting IoT Access
Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows two parties who share a memorable password to securely establish a strong secret key. It has been deployed in many applications around us, such as iCloud service, Wi-Fi access, etc., to provide security assurance for us. In this paper, we present a secure and efficient asymmetric PAKE (aPAKE) protocol for protecting the access to the resource-constraint Internet of Things (IoT). Besides the general passive and active attacks, the new aPAKE protocol provides resilience to the offline dictionary attack, and the server compromise attack such that an adversary cannot impersonate the client to the server even if it has compromised the corresponding server and obtained the stored password file. The new aPAKE protocol is detailed in the elliptic curve setting in this paper, while it is also compatible with the multiplicative group over a finite field. The security proof for the new aPAKE protocol is carried out in the widely-accepted BPR security model under the basic CDH security assumption, which implies that our new aPAKE protocol has certain security advantages over some others whose security proofs need to be based on some stronger security assumptions. In addition, the new aPAKE protocol has computational efficiency and ease-of-implementation advantages over some existing asymmetric PAKE protocols whose constructions require the use of the hash-to-curve (H2C) function, and the performance evaluation results have definitely shown this fact.
- 20 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing
- Vol. 14 (12) , 16465-16476
An improved three-factor authentication and key agreement protocol for smart grid
- 20 May 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Ambient Intelligence and Humanized Computing
- Vol. 14 (12) , 16465-16476
An improved three-factor authentication and key agreement protocol for smart grid
- 12 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Supercomputing
- Vol. 78 (10) , 12815-12833
Provably secure post-quantum authenticated key exchange from supersingular isogenies
- 12 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Supercomputing
- Vol. 78 (10) , 12815-12833
Provably secure post-quantum authenticated key exchange from supersingular isogenies
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
- Vol. 16 (1) , 103-113
An efficient post-quantum KEM from CSIDH
The SIDH and CSIDH are now the two most well-known post-quantum key exchange protocols from the supersingular isogeny-based cryptography, which have attracted much attention in recent years and served as the building blocks of other supersingular isogeny-based cryptographic schemes. The famous SIKE is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) constructed on the SIDH, motivated by which, this article presents a new post-quantum KEM-based on the CSIDH, which is thereby named as CSIKE. The presented CSIKE has much higher computation efficiency in the decapsulation part by involving an additional tag in the encapsulation results. The new CSIKE is formally proved to be IND-CCA secure under the standard isogeny-based quantum resistant security assumption. Moreover, by comparing the new CSIKE with the only two existing CSIDH-based KEM schemes, i.e., CSIDH-PSEC-KEM and CSIDH-ECIES-KEM, it can be easily found that the new CSIKE has a slightly longer encapsulation size than CSIDH-PSEC-KEM and CSIDH-ECIES-KEM, but (i) it beats the CSIDH-PSEC-KEM by the improvement of approximately 50% in decapsulation speed, and (ii) it has a certain advantage over the CSIDH-ECIES-KEM in security since in the random oracle model, the security proof for CSIDH-ECIES-KEM needs to rely on the stronger CSI-GDH assumption, while the new CSIKE just needs to rely on the basic CSI-CDH assumption.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
- Vol. 16 (1) , 103-113
Open AccessAn efficient post-quantum KEM from CSIDH
The SIDH and CSIDH are now the two most well-known post-quantum key exchange protocols from the supersingular isogeny-based cryptography, which have attracted much attention in recent years and served as the building blocks of other supersingular isogeny-based cryptographic schemes. The famous SIKE is a post-quantum key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) constructed on the SIDH, motivated by which, this article presents a new post-quantum KEM-based on the CSIDH, which is thereby named as CSIKE. The presented CSIKE has much higher computation efficiency in the decapsulation part by involving an additional tag in the encapsulation results. The new CSIKE is formally proved to be IND-CCA secure under the standard isogeny-based quantum resistant security assumption. Moreover, by comparing the new CSIKE with the only two existing CSIDH-based KEM schemes, i.e., CSIDH-PSEC-KEM and CSIDH-ECIES-KEM, it can be easily found that the new CSIKE has a slightly longer encapsulation size than CSIDH-PSEC-KEM and CSIDH-ECIES-KEM, but (i) it beats the CSIDH-PSEC-KEM by the improvement of approximately 50% in decapsulation speed, and (ii) it has a certain advantage over the CSIDH-ECIES-KEM in security since in the random oracle model, the security proof for CSIDH-ECIES-KEM needs to rely on the stronger CSI-GDH assumption, while the new CSIKE just needs to rely on the basic CSI-CDH assumption.