Tatiana Babkina
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tatiana Babkina has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Anastasia Peshkovskaya
Russian Mental Health Research Centre
2 shared publications Mikhail Myagkov
Tomsk State University
2 shared publicationsAlexsandr V. Shklover
Department of Control and Applied Mathematics, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (State University), Moscow, Moscow Region, Russian Federation
1 shared publicationAnna Sedush
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (State University)
1 shared publication- Evgeniya Lukinova
N/LAB, University of Nottingham, Jubilee Campus
1 shared publication - Ivan A. Kulikov
Laboratory of Experimental Methods in Cognitive and Social Sciences, Tomsk State University, Tomsk, Tomsk Region, Russian Federation
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 145-157
Sociality is a Mechanism for Collective Action Dilemma Resolution
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 145-157
Sociality is a Mechanism for Collective Action Dilemma Resolution
- 22 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Bioeconomics
- Vol. 20 (2) , 213-225
Social context reveals gender differences in cooperative behavior
- 22 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Bioeconomics
- Vol. 20 (2) , 213-225
Social context reveals gender differences in cooperative behavior
- Open Access
- 30 November 2017
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 12 (11) , e0180754
From rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma prior to social interaction. However, quantal response equilibrium does not explain of participants’ behavior after social interaction. As an alternative theoretical approach, an examination was conducted of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game in Markov strategies. We built a totally mixed Nash equilibrium in this game; the equilibrium agrees with the results of the experiments both before and after social interaction.
- 30 November 2017
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 12 (11) , e0180754
Open AccessFrom rationality to cooperativeness: The totally mixed Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In this research, the social behavior of the participants in a Prisoner's Dilemma laboratory game is explained on the basis of the quantal response equilibrium concept and the representation of the game in Markov strategies. In previous research, we demonstrated that social interaction during the experiment has a positive influence on cooperation, trust, and gratefulness. This research shows that the quantal response equilibrium concept agrees only with the results of experiments on cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma prior to social interaction. However, quantal response equilibrium does not explain of participants’ behavior after social interaction. As an alternative theoretical approach, an examination was conducted of iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game in Markov strategies. We built a totally mixed Nash equilibrium in this game; the equilibrium agrees with the results of the experiments both before and after social interaction.
- Open Access
- 10 April 2017
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 12 (4) , e0175492
The socialization effect on decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An eye-tracking study
We used a mobile eye-tracking system (in the form of glasses) to study the characteristics of visual perception in decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In each experiment, one of the 12 participants was equipped with eye-tracking glasses. The experiment was conducted in three stages: an anonymous Individual Game stage against a randomly chosen partner (one of the 12 other participants of the experiment); a Socialization stage, in which the participants were divided into two groups; and a Group Game stage, in which the participants played with partners in the groups. After each round, the respondent received information about his or her personal score in the last round and the overall winner of the game at the moment. The study proves that eye-tracking systems can be used for studying the process of decision making and forecasting. The total viewing time and the time of fixation on areas corresponding to noncooperative decisions is related to the participants’ overall level of cooperation. The increase in the total viewing time and the time of fixation on the areas of noncooperative choice is due to a preference for noncooperative decisions and a decrease in the overall level of cooperation. The number of fixations on the group attributes is associated with group identity, but does not necessarily lead to cooperative behavior.
- 10 April 2017
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 12 (4) , e0175492
Open AccessThe socialization effect on decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An eye-tracking study
We used a mobile eye-tracking system (in the form of glasses) to study the characteristics of visual perception in decision making in the Prisoner's Dilemma game. In each experiment, one of the 12 participants was equipped with eye-tracking glasses. The experiment was conducted in three stages: an anonymous Individual Game stage against a randomly chosen partner (one of the 12 other participants of the experiment); a Socialization stage, in which the participants were divided into two groups; and a Group Game stage, in which the participants played with partners in the groups. After each round, the respondent received information about his or her personal score in the last round and the overall winner of the game at the moment. The study proves that eye-tracking systems can be used for studying the process of decision making and forecasting. The total viewing time and the time of fixation on areas corresponding to noncooperative decisions is related to the participants’ overall level of cooperation. The increase in the total viewing time and the time of fixation on the areas of noncooperative choice is due to a preference for noncooperative decisions and a decrease in the overall level of cooperation. The number of fixations on the group attributes is associated with group identity, but does not necessarily lead to cooperative behavior.
- 20 April 2015
- Published by Academic Star Publishing Company in Journal of Business and Economics
- Vol. 6 (4) , 673-687
Inequity Aversion Alters Risk Attitudes
Academic Star Publishing Company
- 20 April 2015
- Published by Academic Star Publishing Company in Journal of Business and Economics
- Vol. 6 (4) , 673-687
Inequity Aversion Alters Risk Attitudes
Academic Star Publishing Company