CYChristopher G. Yust

Christopher G. Yust

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Christopher G. Yust has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Secondhand Scandal, Firsthand Reform: The Effect of Directors' Post-Fraud Experience on Interlocked-Firm Transparency

    by Antonis Kartapanis, Jeremy Lee, Christopher Yust

    Firms undergo a challenging process to remediate fraud. We examine whether directors who join firms during remediation learn lessons that help improve transparency at the non-fraud firms where they already serve as directors. We find that interlocked firms increase disclosure after directors join fraud firms, relative to directors joining non-fraud firms. Consistent with a learning mechanism, this effect is stronger when the experience is more relevant (i.e., disclosure-related) and more extensive (i.e., fraud firms have weaker prior governance) but weaker when directors have prior remediation experience. Results are also stronger for higher-status directors, who have greater ability to implement the changes on other boards. Finally, bid-ask spreads narrow, 10-K filings become more readable, and corporate websites become more detailed, consistent with improved transparency at interlocked firms. Thus, although fraud remediation consumes significant director time, we document a positive externality: it creates a rich learning opportunity that improves interlocked-firm transparency.

  • Open Access

    Disclosure Management: Evidence from Regulatory Threshold Avoidance

    by Dain C. Donelson, Christian M. Hutzler, Brian Monsen, Christopher Yust

    Numeric thresholds are a pervasive but understudied aspect of disclosure regulation. We examine firms’ responses to a recent SEC rule that requires firms with risk factor disclosures exceeding 15 pages to provide a summary. Although the final rule imposes minimal disclosure preparation costs, the SEC’s initial proposal appeared substantially more burdensome and drew substantial criticism. Given that firms often begin compliance efforts before rules are finalized, their responses likely reflect the higher expected costs and greater uncertainty associated with the proposed rule. Consistent with this, we find a substantial discontinuity in risk factor page lengths just below 15 pages after the rule’s adoption, indicating that many firms incurred the costs of shortening risk factor disclosures to avoid the summary. Firms’ decisions to strategically manage disclosure length below the threshold appear to be driven by legal and regulatory uncertainty, as firms that recently received an SEC comment letter unrelated to risk factors and with powerful general counsel are more likely to reduce disclosure length. While some firms only altered formatting, most cut sentences and words, with some eliminating entire risk factors. Firms that cut disclosure length to avoid the summary receive fewer SEC comment letters, implying these reductions helped firms avoid scrutiny. Examining multiple measures of the market response to these reductions, we find no evidence that they help or harm investors. Collectively, it does not appear that the SEC’s objective of improving the usefulness of the risk factor disclosure was met.

  • Open Access

    The Cost of Control: Board Structure and Firm Value in Controlled Companies

    by Dain C. Donelson, Jennifer L. Glenn, Christopher Yust

    The major stock exchanges define controlled companies as public firms in which an individual, group, or company holds over half the voting power. Despite agency concerns that controlling shareholders may not act in minority shareholders’ interests, controlled companies can opt out of many board independence requirements. Independent directors at controlled companies are less experienced, have fewer connections, and are paid less than those at similar firms. Thus, these independent directors have little power and less financial reward. In contrast, inside directors are more experienced and have more connections. Firms claiming the controlled company exemption also exhibit lower firm value, greater information asymmetry, and underinvestment. Our results are consistent with reduced monitoring and advising from less qualified independent directors outweighing any potential positive effects from insiders’ greater qualifications. These findings are timely given the rise of controlled companies and recent court cases dealing with agency issues in these firms.

  • “No comment”: Language frictions and the IASB 's due process

    by Eduardo Flores, Brian R. Monsen, Emily Shafron, Christopher G. Yust

    The IASB asserts that global stakeholder participation in the standard‐setting process is critical for developing and maintaining high‐quality accounting standards. However, the myriad languages used in countries that apply IFRS may impede this participation. We find that the IASB is less likely to receive comment letters from stakeholders in countries with languages that are linguistically distant from English. We also find that comment letters from more linguistically distant stakeholders are less likely to be quoted in IASB staff‐prepared comment letter summaries, suggesting that they have less influence in the redeliberation process. Path analyses show that this result arises from language frictions being associated with reduced writing quality and originality. We also find that language frictions prevent participation in other standard‐setting communication channels. Collectively, language frictions appear to impede the IASB's efforts to equitably obtain and consider valuable global feedback.


  • Open Access

    Current Issues Faced by Controllers

    by Anthony C. Bucaro, T. Jeffrey Wilks, Christopher G. Yust

    SYNOPSIS: We conduct a series of semistructured interviews with controllers and chief accounting officers from large public and private companies—over half are Fortune 500—to identify the current issues faced by the controllership function. We map these issues into the Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) Management Accounting Competencies and highlight recent research that addresses these issues and where there are gaps. Our findings suggest three IMA competencies that weigh heavily on controllers’ minds: (1) collaboration, teamwork, and relationship management; (2) information systems and technology; and (3) talent management. Finally, we describe how the insights from controllers suggest important improvements to accounting curriculum that can better prepare students for the rapidly changing profession. JEL Classifications: J00; L00; M10; M12; M14; M15; M40; M48.


  • Open Access

    The effect of securities litigation risk on firm value and disclosure

    by Dain C. Donelson, Christian M. Hutzler, Brian R. Monsen, Christopher G. Yust

    Critics assert that securities class actions are economically burdensome and yield minimal recoveries, whereas proponents claim they deter wrongdoing. We examine key events in the recent Goldman Sachs Supreme Court case to test the net effect of securities litigation risk on shareholder value. We find that investors view securities class actions as value‐increasing. However, the strength of this effect varies based on external monitoring. Investors view securities class actions as more value‐enhancing when institutional ownership is low. We also use this setting to examine the effect of securities litigation risk on mandatory disclosure because the Goldman Sachs case focuses on mandatory disclosure properties. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find firm risk factor disclosures become shorter and less similar to industry peers, and they contain more uncertain and weak terms. Overall, our results show nuanced effects of securities litigation risk on shareholder value and firm disclosure.


  • Open Access

    The Effect of Securities Litigation Risk on Firm Value and Disclosure

    by Dain C. Donelson, Christian M. Hutzler, Brian Monsen, Christopher G. Yust

    Critics assert that securities class actions are economically burdensome and yield minimal recoveries, whereas proponents claim they deter wrongdoing. We examine key events in the recent Goldman Sachs Supreme Court case to test the net effect of securities litigation risk on shareholder value. We find that investors view securities class actions as value-increasing. However, the strength of this effect varies based on external monitoring. Investors view securities class actions as more value-enhancing when institutional ownership is low. We also use this setting to examine the effect of securities litigation risk on mandatory disclosure because the Goldman Sachs case focuses on mandatory disclosure properties. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find firm risk factor disclosures become shorter and less similar to industry peers, and they contain more uncertain and weak terms. Overall, our results show nuanced effects of securities litigation risk on shareholder value and firm disclosure.

  • Open Access

    The effect of shareholder scrutiny on corporate tax behavior: Evidence from shareholder tax litigation

    by Dain C. Donelson, Jennifer L. Glenn, Sean T. McGuire, Christopher G. Yust

    This study examines the effect ofshareholderscrutiny of corporate tax avoidance behavior and its related financial reporting. Specifically, we explore the factors associated with shareholder tax litigation and its effect on the future tax behavior of the sued firm and its peers. We find that sued firms have lower cash and GAAP effective tax rates (ETRs) and engage in extreme tax avoidance before litigation. After litigation, they decrease tax avoidance activities, relative to matched control firms. Peer firms in the same industry as sued firms similarly reduce their level of tax avoidance and the likelihood of extreme tax avoidance after the litigation, relative to control firms. Additional analyses suggest that sued firms change their tax avoidance behavior, rather than merely their tax financial reporting. Finally, the spillover results are strongest for peer firms with the most tax avoidance (i.e., the lowest cash ETRs) when the sued firm's alleged misconduct is revealed.


  • Open Access

    The merits of securities litigation and corporate reputation

    by Dain C. Donelson, Antonis Kartapanis, Christopher G. Yust

    We explore how securities litigation affects corporate reputation. Experts remain concerned that nonmeritorious securities class actions—those that will be dismissed or settled for nuisance amounts—cause reputational damage. Although several prior studies show reputational costs for nonmeritorious cases, they generally use indirect measures based on returns or total market losses, which are mechanically associated with securities litigation elements. In contrast, we use a relatively direct reputation measure from Fortune's “Most Admired Companies” list. We find significant reputational damage after meritorious litigation, with the strongest cases having the largest effects. However, we find no evidence of reputational damage after nonmeritorious litigation. We also find that Fortune's reputational damage measure is associated with more negative returns around the litigation filing date. We show possible mechanisms for our results, as initial legal filings contain information allowing market participants to assess case merits. Our results imply that reputational damage is primarily due to fraud, which securities litigation helps reveal to the market, rather than litigation itself. Thus, reputational damage is not an issue in over 70% of securities class actions due to the high frequency of nonmeritorious cases.


  • Open Access

    The Merits of Securities Litigation and Corporate Reputation

    by Dain C. Donelson, Antonis Kartapanis, Christopher G. Yust

    We explore how securities litigation affects corporate reputation. Experts remain concerned that nonmeritorious securities class actions - those that will be dismissed or settled for nuisance amounts - cause reputational damage. Although several prior studies show reputational costs for nonmeritorious cases, they generally use indirect measures based on returns or total market losses, which are mechanically associated with securities litigation elements. In contrast, we use a relatively direct reputation measure from Fortune’s “Most Admired Companies” list. We find significant reputational damage after meritorious litigation, with the strongest cases having the largest effects. However, we find no evidence of reputational damage after nonmeritorious litigation. We also find that Fortune’s reputational damage measure is associated with more negative returns around the litigation filing date. We show possible mechanisms for our results, as initial legal filings contain information allowing market participants to assess case merits. Our results imply that reputational damage is primarily due to fraud, which securities litigation helps reveal to the market, rather than litigation itself. Thus, reputational damage is not an issue in over 70% of securities class actions due to the high frequency of nonmeritorious cases.