Yoram Gutfreund
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Yoram Gutfreund has a total of 41 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Arkadeb Dutta
Department of Biomedical Science and Technology, Ramakrishna Mission Vivekananda Educational and Research Institute (RKMVERI), Kolkata, IND
4 shared publications Hadar Beeri
The Bruce and Ruth Rappaport Institue and Faculty of Medicine, the Technion, Haifa, Israel
4 shared publications- Tidhar Lev-Ari
Biomedical Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology and Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 30332, USA
4 shared publications Yael Zahar
Department of Neuroscience, Ruth and Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine and Research Institute, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, 31096, Israel
4 shared publicationsAmit Reches
The Department of Physiology and Biophysics, The Ruth and Bruce Rappaport Faculty of Medicine, Technion, Haifa 31096, Israel
3 shared publicationsDori Derdikman
Department of Neurobiology, Rappaport Research Institute and Faculty of Medicine, Technion, Haifa 3525428, Israel
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 25 December 2024
- Published by WellBeing International Publications in Animal Sentience
- Vol. 9 (35) , 12
Can animal consciousness be resolved scientifically?
Carolyn Ristau's biography of Donald Griffin is a comprehensive work that sheds light on a seminal chapter in the history of ethology—the ambitious attempt to establish a research field dedicated to animal consciousness. Although Donald Griffin's endeavor ultimately fell short of its revolutionary goals, it catalyzed significant progress in understanding evolution and mechanisms of animal cognition.
- 25 December 2024
- Published by WellBeing International Publications in Animal Sentience
- Vol. 9 (35) , 12
Open AccessCan animal consciousness be resolved scientifically?
Carolyn Ristau's biography of Donald Griffin is a comprehensive work that sheds light on a seminal chapter in the history of ethology—the ambitious attempt to establish a research field dedicated to animal consciousness. Although Donald Griffin's endeavor ultimately fell short of its revolutionary goals, it catalyzed significant progress in understanding evolution and mechanisms of animal cognition.
- Open Access
- 9 October 2024
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 15, 1456403
Neuroscience of animal consciousness: still agnostic after all
The question of animal consciousness, also known as the distribution question (Niikawa, 2020), is the question of which animal species share with us humans the enigmatic capability for conscious awareness. This is a philosophical question (Nagel, 1980) that stems from the "other minds problem" (Harnad, 2016). The implications of this question may influence ethical considerations and policy-making in human-animal interactions (Yeates, 2022) as well as challenges in diagnosing human consciousness in cases like lockedin syndrome (Bayne et al., 2024), and questions about machine consciousness (Schneider, 2020). Despite its importance and long-history of research, the distribution question is still highly debated among biologists and philosophers. The main problem is that consciousness in other animals cannot be directly observed, only inferred. Determining whether it is possible to scientifically infer consciousness in nonhuman animals, and how, is not trivial, with strong philosophical and scientific reasons to support an agnostic stance, implying that the question is unresolvable through scientific methods (Dawkins, 2017;Gutfreund, 2017;2018;Hampton, 2021;Roige, 2023) . However, objections to the agnostic stance are also common (Birch et al., 2022), and a recent consortium of animal scientists and philosophers endorsed the "New-York declaration on animal consciousness" (Andrews et al., 2024) which asserts, contrary to the agnostic stance, robust scientific evidence supporting the attribution of conscious experiences to other mammals and birds. The declaration also suggests a plausible likelihood of conscious experience across all vertebrates, including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes, as well as in many invertebrates, such as cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects.In this opinion paper, I critically assess the scientific claims for conscious experience in non-human animals, by reviewing two seminal studies published in leading journals (Nieder et al., 2020;Ben-Haim et al., 2021). These studies propose evidence of consciousness through observed neural activity and behavioral responses in non-human animals. The first, published in Science, argues for sensory consciousness in crows based on neural activity reflecting internal decisions. The second delineates perceptual awareness in rhesus monkeys, by exposing behavioral responses that are akin to subliminal versus conscious perceptions in humans. These studies exemplify the primary means for inferring animal consciousness: (1) identifying neural structures and activities akin to human neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) (Seth et al., 2005), and (2) recognizing behaviors in animals that resemble conscious behaviors in humans (Zlomuzica & Dere, 2022). I review the approaches and arguments presented in both studies and conclude that, while they provide novel, solid and general insights on animal cognition, the studies fall short of distinguishing cognitive abilities accompanied by conscious awareness from those that are not. Consequently, I argue that consciousness in non-human animals remains a subject of belief, beyond the reach of scientific validation.A neural correlate of sensory consciousness in a corvid bird. Nieder et al., Science; 2020.Nieder and colleagues define sensory consciousness as "the ability to have subjective experience that can be explicitly accessed and thus reported." They continue by convincingly showing that the activity of neurons in the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) predicts the crow's behavioral choices in a delayed detection task at near-threshold stimulus, where the crows occasionally fail to detect a present visual stimulus or mistakenly detect a stimulus when it is absent. They then argue that "a difference between the neuronal activities of one reported perceptual state versus the other for equal visual stimuli is considered to be a neural correlate of visual consciousness". Hence, they conclude that the neural activity in NCL is correlated with subjective experiences (consciousness) of the crow. This line of reasoning has several problems. The first is that the crows do not report their subjective experiences, rather they make a behavioral decision as whether to respond according to a stimulus in sight or no stimulus in sight. This is commonly called a perceptual decision. Indeed, detection tasks like the one used in this paper have been used in primates and other species to study the neural correlates of perceptual decisions (Costello et al., 2016;Kwon et al., 2016). The subjective experience of the crow is hidden from us (Dennett, 1995;Staddon, 2000;Dawkins, 2017;Gutfreund, 2017;Hampton, 2021). Hence, a perceptual decision without a felt subjective experience (David et al., 2011) is a possibility that is equally consistent with the data and cannot be disregarded. Second, their argument that brain activity that changes systematically with the subject's report of whether it had perceived the stimulus is a testament of neural correlate of consciousness is problematic because the essence of all perceptual decisions is choosing one way or the other given the same sensory input (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). Therefore, it remains unclear how the authors of the paper can distinguish neural correlates of perceptual decision from neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), and what, in their findings, is different from similar findings in other species that did not provoke claims of NCC (Horwitz et al., 2004;Kwon et al., 2016). The third problem is that if their assumption about NCC is true, all active organisms' behaviors should be indicative of consciousness, as all animals make choices that are determined by the integration of noisy sensory evidence with internal states (Gordus et al., 2015) and a behavioral choice must be represented somehow in the neural activity of the brain.An intriguing aspect of the experiment is that the crows were trained to respond conditionally, depending on the color of...
- 9 October 2024
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 15, 1456403
Open AccessNeuroscience of animal consciousness: still agnostic after all
The question of animal consciousness, also known as the distribution question (Niikawa, 2020), is the question of which animal species share with us humans the enigmatic capability for conscious awareness. This is a philosophical question (Nagel, 1980) that stems from the "other minds problem" (Harnad, 2016). The implications of this question may influence ethical considerations and policy-making in human-animal interactions (Yeates, 2022) as well as challenges in diagnosing human consciousness in cases like lockedin syndrome (Bayne et al., 2024), and questions about machine consciousness (Schneider, 2020). Despite its importance and long-history of research, the distribution question is still highly debated among biologists and philosophers. The main problem is that consciousness in other animals cannot be directly observed, only inferred. Determining whether it is possible to scientifically infer consciousness in nonhuman animals, and how, is not trivial, with strong philosophical and scientific reasons to support an agnostic stance, implying that the question is unresolvable through scientific methods (Dawkins, 2017;Gutfreund, 2017;2018;Hampton, 2021;Roige, 2023) . However, objections to the agnostic stance are also common (Birch et al., 2022), and a recent consortium of animal scientists and philosophers endorsed the "New-York declaration on animal consciousness" (Andrews et al., 2024) which asserts, contrary to the agnostic stance, robust scientific evidence supporting the attribution of conscious experiences to other mammals and birds. The declaration also suggests a plausible likelihood of conscious experience across all vertebrates, including reptiles, amphibians, and fishes, as well as in many invertebrates, such as cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects.In this opinion paper, I critically assess the scientific claims for conscious experience in non-human animals, by reviewing two seminal studies published in leading journals (Nieder et al., 2020;Ben-Haim et al., 2021). These studies propose evidence of consciousness through observed neural activity and behavioral responses in non-human animals. The first, published in Science, argues for sensory consciousness in crows based on neural activity reflecting internal decisions. The second delineates perceptual awareness in rhesus monkeys, by exposing behavioral responses that are akin to subliminal versus conscious perceptions in humans. These studies exemplify the primary means for inferring animal consciousness: (1) identifying neural structures and activities akin to human neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) (Seth et al., 2005), and (2) recognizing behaviors in animals that resemble conscious behaviors in humans (Zlomuzica & Dere, 2022). I review the approaches and arguments presented in both studies and conclude that, while they provide novel, solid and general insights on animal cognition, the studies fall short of distinguishing cognitive abilities accompanied by conscious awareness from those that are not. Consequently, I argue that consciousness in non-human animals remains a subject of belief, beyond the reach of scientific validation.A neural correlate of sensory consciousness in a corvid bird. Nieder et al., Science; 2020.Nieder and colleagues define sensory consciousness as "the ability to have subjective experience that can be explicitly accessed and thus reported." They continue by convincingly showing that the activity of neurons in the nidopallium caudolaterale (NCL) predicts the crow's behavioral choices in a delayed detection task at near-threshold stimulus, where the crows occasionally fail to detect a present visual stimulus or mistakenly detect a stimulus when it is absent. They then argue that "a difference between the neuronal activities of one reported perceptual state versus the other for equal visual stimuli is considered to be a neural correlate of visual consciousness". Hence, they conclude that the neural activity in NCL is correlated with subjective experiences (consciousness) of the crow. This line of reasoning has several problems. The first is that the crows do not report their subjective experiences, rather they make a behavioral decision as whether to respond according to a stimulus in sight or no stimulus in sight. This is commonly called a perceptual decision. Indeed, detection tasks like the one used in this paper have been used in primates and other species to study the neural correlates of perceptual decisions (Costello et al., 2016;Kwon et al., 2016). The subjective experience of the crow is hidden from us (Dennett, 1995;Staddon, 2000;Dawkins, 2017;Gutfreund, 2017;Hampton, 2021). Hence, a perceptual decision without a felt subjective experience (David et al., 2011) is a possibility that is equally consistent with the data and cannot be disregarded. Second, their argument that brain activity that changes systematically with the subject's report of whether it had perceived the stimulus is a testament of neural correlate of consciousness is problematic because the essence of all perceptual decisions is choosing one way or the other given the same sensory input (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). Therefore, it remains unclear how the authors of the paper can distinguish neural correlates of perceptual decision from neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), and what, in their findings, is different from similar findings in other species that did not provoke claims of NCC (Horwitz et al., 2004;Kwon et al., 2016). The third problem is that if their assumption about NCC is true, all active organisms' behaviors should be indicative of consciousness, as all animals make choices that are determined by the integration of noisy sensory evidence with internal states (Gordus et al., 2015) and a behavioral choice must be represented somehow in the neural activity of the brain.An intriguing aspect of the experiment is that the crows were trained to respond conditionally, depending on the color of...
- 27 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Neuroscience Methods
- Vol. 411, 110272
Small animal brain surgery with neither a brain atlas nor a stereotaxic frame
- 27 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Neuroscience Methods
- Vol. 411, 110272
Small animal brain surgery with neither a brain atlas nor a stereotaxic frame
- Open Access
Small animal brain surgery with neither a brain atlas nor a stereotaxic frame
Stereotaxic surgery is a cornerstone in brain research for the precise positioning of electrodes and probes, but its application is limited to species with available brain atlases and tailored stereotaxic frames. Addressing this limitation, we introduce an alternative technique for small animal brain surgery that requires neither an aligned brain atlas nor a standard stereotaxic frame. This method requires a high-contrast MRI scan of a specimen and access to a microCT scanner. The process involves attaching miniature markers to the skull, followed by CT scanning of the head. Subsequently, MRI and CT images are co-registered using standard image processing software and the targets for recordings in the brain are marked in the MRI image. During surgery, the animal's head is stabilized in any convenient orientation, and the probe's 3D position and angle are tracked using a multi-camera system. We have developed a software that utilizes the on-skull markers as fiducial points to align the CT/MRI 3D model with the surgical positioning system, and in turn instructs the surgeon how to move the probe to reach the targets within the brain. Our technique allows the execution of insertion tracks connecting two points in the brain. We successfully applied this method for neuropixels probe positioning in owls, quails, and mice, demonstrating its versatility and its potential to open new avenues for research in non-standard and novel animal models.
Open AccessSmall animal brain surgery with neither a brain atlas nor a stereotaxic frame
Stereotaxic surgery is a cornerstone in brain research for the precise positioning of electrodes and probes, but its application is limited to species with available brain atlases and tailored stereotaxic frames. Addressing this limitation, we introduce an alternative technique for small animal brain surgery that requires neither an aligned brain atlas nor a standard stereotaxic frame. This method requires a high-contrast MRI scan of a specimen and access to a microCT scanner. The process involves attaching miniature markers to the skull, followed by CT scanning of the head. Subsequently, MRI and CT images are co-registered using standard image processing software and the targets for recordings in the brain are marked in the MRI image. During surgery, the animal's head is stabilized in any convenient orientation, and the probe's 3D position and angle are tracked using a multi-camera system. We have developed a software that utilizes the on-skull markers as fiducial points to align the CT/MRI 3D model with the surgical positioning system, and in turn instructs the surgeon how to move the probe to reach the targets within the brain. Our technique allows the execution of insertion tracks connecting two points in the brain. We successfully applied this method for neuropixels probe positioning in owls, quails, and mice, demonstrating its versatility and its potential to open new avenues for research in non-standard and novel animal models.
- Open Access
- 4 April 2023
- Published by WellBeing International Publications in Animal Sentience
- Vol. 8 (33) , 4
Questions about sentience are not scientific but cultural
The findings of complex cognitive-like behaviours in plants are surprising and exciting. However, they do not provide a scientific reason for ascribing sentience to plants. The target article, in trying to provide evidence for sentience in plants, exposes the weakness of the science of animal consciousness in general. In this commentary, I try to explain why the scientific method is incapable of resolving the question of which organisms or systems are sentient.
- 4 April 2023
- Published by WellBeing International Publications in Animal Sentience
- Vol. 8 (33) , 4
Open AccessQuestions about sentience are not scientific but cultural
The findings of complex cognitive-like behaviours in plants are surprising and exciting. However, they do not provide a scientific reason for ascribing sentience to plants. The target article, in trying to provide evidence for sentience in plants, exposes the weakness of the science of animal consciousness in general. In this commentary, I try to explain why the scientific method is incapable of resolving the question of which organisms or systems are sentient.
- Open Access
- 24 January 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (5)
Spatial coding in the hippocampus and hyperpallium of flying owls
The elucidation of spatial coding in the hippocampus requires exploring diverse animal species. While robust place-cells are found in the mammalian hippocampus, much less is known about spatial coding in the hippocampus of birds. Here we used a wireless-electrophysiology system to record single neurons in the hippocampus and other two dorsal pallial structures from freely flying barn owls ( Tyto alba ), a central-place nocturnal predator species with excellent navigational abilities. The owl’s 3D position was monitored while it flew between perches. We found place cells—neurons that fired when the owl flew through a spatially restricted region in at least one direction—as well as neurons that encoded the direction of flight, and neurons that represented the owl’s perching position between flights. Many neurons encoded combinations of position, direction, and perching. Spatial coding was maintained stable and invariant to lighting conditions. Place cells were observed in owls performing two different types of flying tasks, highlighting the generality of the result. Place coding was found in the anterior hippocampus and in the posterior part of the hyperpallium apicale, and to a lesser extent in the visual Wulst. The finding of place-cells in flying owls suggests commonalities in spatial coding across mammals and birds.
- 24 January 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (5)
Open AccessSpatial coding in the hippocampus and hyperpallium of flying owls
The elucidation of spatial coding in the hippocampus requires exploring diverse animal species. While robust place-cells are found in the mammalian hippocampus, much less is known about spatial coding in the hippocampus of birds. Here we used a wireless-electrophysiology system to record single neurons in the hippocampus and other two dorsal pallial structures from freely flying barn owls ( Tyto alba ), a central-place nocturnal predator species with excellent navigational abilities. The owl’s 3D position was monitored while it flew between perches. We found place cells—neurons that fired when the owl flew through a spatially restricted region in at least one direction—as well as neurons that encoded the direction of flight, and neurons that represented the owl’s perching position between flights. Many neurons encoded combinations of position, direction, and perching. Spatial coding was maintained stable and invariant to lighting conditions. Place cells were observed in owls performing two different types of flying tasks, highlighting the generality of the result. Place coding was found in the anterior hippocampus and in the posterior part of the hyperpallium apicale, and to a lesser extent in the visual Wulst. The finding of place-cells in flying owls suggests commonalities in spatial coding across mammals and birds.
- 24 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Current Biology
- Vol. 32 (20) , R1085-R1089
Spatial cognition in birds
- 24 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Current Biology
- Vol. 32 (20) , R1085-R1089
Spatial cognition in birds
- Open Access
- 20 October 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers for Young Minds
- Vol. 10
What the Barn Owl Can Teach Us About Human Visual Attention
Visual attention is the brain’s process of extracting information we receive through the eyes. It guides our gaze to the most important things around us. How do scientists research such a complicated subject? And can birds, which are separated from humans by 300 million years of evolution, help us understand attention in the human brain? The barn owl is a member of the owl family, and its extremely sharp vision and hearing allow it to hunt in total darkness. Researchers can use the barn owl to learn about attention, both in animals and humans. This article will explain the visual attention experiments we performed using barn owls and what we learned from them. An understanding of visual attention may help doctors and scientists to treat important brain disorders and may also help with the development of technologies that need to “pay attention,” like self-driving cars.
- 20 October 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers for Young Minds
- Vol. 10
Open AccessWhat the Barn Owl Can Teach Us About Human Visual Attention
Visual attention is the brain’s process of extracting information we receive through the eyes. It guides our gaze to the most important things around us. How do scientists research such a complicated subject? And can birds, which are separated from humans by 300 million years of evolution, help us understand attention in the human brain? The barn owl is a member of the owl family, and its extremely sharp vision and hearing allow it to hunt in total darkness. Researchers can use the barn owl to learn about attention, both in animals and humans. This article will explain the visual attention experiments we performed using barn owls and what we learned from them. An understanding of visual attention may help doctors and scientists to treat important brain disorders and may also help with the development of technologies that need to “pay attention,” like self-driving cars.
- Open Access
- 21 March 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience
- Vol. 16, 856207
The Ecological View of Selective Attention
Accumulating evidence is supporting the hypothesis that our selective attention is a manifestation of mechanisms that evolved early in evolution and are shared by many organisms from different taxa. This surge of new data calls for the re-examination of our notions about attention, which have been dominated mostly by human psychology. Here, we present an hypothesis that challenges, based on evolutionary grounds, a common view of attention as a means to manage limited brain resources. We begin by arguing that evolutionary considerations do not favor the basic proposition of the limited brain resources view of attention, namely, that the capacity of the sensory organs to provide information exceeds the capacity of the brain to process this information. Moreover, physiological studies in animals and humans show that mechanisms of selective attention are highly demanding of brain resources, making it paradoxical to see attention as a means to release brain resources. Next, we build on the above arguments to address the question why attention evolved in evolution. We hypothesize that, to a certain extent, limiting sensory processing is adaptive irrespective of brain capacity. We call this hypothesis the ecological view of attention (EVA) because it is centered on interactions of an animal with its environment rather than on internal brain resources. In its essence is the notion that inherently noisy and degraded sensory inputs serve the animal’s adaptive, dynamic interactions with its environment. Attention primarily functions to resolve behavioral conflicts and false distractions. Hence, we evolved to focus on a particular target at the expense of others, not because of internal limitations, but to ensure that behavior is properly oriented and committed to its goals. Here, we expand on this notion and review evidence supporting it. We show how common results in human psychophysics and physiology can be reconciled with an EVA and discuss possible implications of the notion for interpreting current results and guiding future research.
- 21 March 2022
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience
- Vol. 16, 856207
Open AccessThe Ecological View of Selective Attention
Accumulating evidence is supporting the hypothesis that our selective attention is a manifestation of mechanisms that evolved early in evolution and are shared by many organisms from different taxa. This surge of new data calls for the re-examination of our notions about attention, which have been dominated mostly by human psychology. Here, we present an hypothesis that challenges, based on evolutionary grounds, a common view of attention as a means to manage limited brain resources. We begin by arguing that evolutionary considerations do not favor the basic proposition of the limited brain resources view of attention, namely, that the capacity of the sensory organs to provide information exceeds the capacity of the brain to process this information. Moreover, physiological studies in animals and humans show that mechanisms of selective attention are highly demanding of brain resources, making it paradoxical to see attention as a means to release brain resources. Next, we build on the above arguments to address the question why attention evolved in evolution. We hypothesize that, to a certain extent, limiting sensory processing is adaptive irrespective of brain capacity. We call this hypothesis the ecological view of attention (EVA) because it is centered on interactions of an animal with its environment rather than on internal brain resources. In its essence is the notion that inherently noisy and degraded sensory inputs serve the animal’s adaptive, dynamic interactions with its environment. Attention primarily functions to resolve behavioral conflicts and false distractions. Hence, we evolved to focus on a particular target at the expense of others, not because of internal limitations, but to ensure that behavior is properly oriented and committed to its goals. Here, we expand on this notion and review evidence supporting it. We show how common results in human psychophysics and physiology can be reconciled with an EVA and discuss possible implications of the notion for interpreting current results and guiding future research.
- Open Access
Spatial coding in the hippocampus of flying owls
Summary: The elucidation of spatial coding in the hippocampus requires exploring diverse animal species. While robust place-cells are found in the mammalian hippocampus, much less is known about spatial coding in the hippocampus of birds – and nothing is known about avian spatial representation during flight. Here we used a wireless-electrophysiology system to record single neurons in the hippocampus and related pallial structures from freely flying barn owls ( Tyto alba ) – a central-place nocturnal predator species with excellent navigational abilities. The owl’s 3D position was monitored while it flew back and forth between two perches. We found place cells – neurons that robustly represented the owl’s location during flight, and its flight-direction – as well as neurons that coded the owl’s perching position between flights. Spatial coding was invariant to changes in lighting conditions and to the position of a salient object in the room. Place cells were found in the anterior hippocampus and in the adjacent posterior hyperpallium apicale, and to a much lesser extent in the visual Wulst (visual-cortex homologue). The finding of place-cells in flying owls suggests commonalities in spatial coding across a variety of species – including rodents, bats and owls.
Open AccessSpatial coding in the hippocampus of flying owls
Summary: The elucidation of spatial coding in the hippocampus requires exploring diverse animal species. While robust place-cells are found in the mammalian hippocampus, much less is known about spatial coding in the hippocampus of birds – and nothing is known about avian spatial representation during flight. Here we used a wireless-electrophysiology system to record single neurons in the hippocampus and related pallial structures from freely flying barn owls ( Tyto alba ) – a central-place nocturnal predator species with excellent navigational abilities. The owl’s 3D position was monitored while it flew back and forth between two perches. We found place cells – neurons that robustly represented the owl’s location during flight, and its flight-direction – as well as neurons that coded the owl’s perching position between flights. Spatial coding was invariant to changes in lighting conditions and to the position of a salient object in the room. Place cells were found in the anterior hippocampus and in the adjacent posterior hyperpallium apicale, and to a much lesser extent in the visual Wulst (visual-cortex homologue). The finding of place-cells in flying owls suggests commonalities in spatial coding across a variety of species – including rodents, bats and owls.