Svend-Erik Skaaning
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Svend-Erik Skaaning has a total of 60 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jørgen Møller
28 shared publications- Jørgen Møller
Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark
16 shared publications John Gerring
6 shared publicationsJan Teorell
Lund University, Sweden
5 shared publications- John Gerring
University of Texas at Austin, USA
5 shared publications - Staffan I. Lindberg
V-Dem Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- p. 1-24
Executive constraints and focal points: factors facilitating democratic breakdowns led by incumbents versus non-incumbents, 1789–2020
- 4 November 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- p. 1-24
Open AccessExecutive constraints and focal points: factors facilitating democratic breakdowns led by incumbents versus non-incumbents, 1789–2020
- 17 March 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 126-132
Democracy and Its Critics (1989), by Robert A. Dahl
- 17 March 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 126-132
Democracy and Its Critics (1989), by Robert A. Dahl
- 19 June 2025
- Published by The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - International IDEA
The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 9 (2025)
The Global State of Democracy is a Report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world. This document revises and updates the conceptual and measurement framework that guided the construction of Version 9 of the GSoD Indices, which depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2024. The data underlying the GSoD Indices is based on a total of 154 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of source, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.
- 19 June 2025
- Published by The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - International IDEA
The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 9 (2025)
The Global State of Democracy is a Report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world. This document revises and updates the conceptual and measurement framework that guided the construction of Version 9 of the GSoD Indices, which depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2024. The data underlying the GSoD Indices is based on a total of 154 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of source, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.
- Open Access
- 6 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
- Vol. 19 (4) , 457-489
More violent state repression in hybrid regimes?
This paper examines the relationship between regime types and violent state repression, focusing on hybrid regimes that combine democratic and autocratic features. It reassesses the dominant perspectives in the literature that suggest either an inverted U-shaped or threshold relationship. Previous studies are characterized by several shortcomings, including conceptual unclarity, one-sided theoretical accounts, and limited data coverage. A novel empirical analysis revisits the relationship by employing new datasets that cover most countries over more than two centuries and offer relevant both continuous and categorical regime distinctions. The results do not lend support to any of the predominant perspectives saying that hybrid regimes are characterized by more state violence or that the full package of democratic rights needs to be fulfilled to have effect. Both when using relatively new continuous measures and capturing hybrid regimes based on ordered categorical distinctions, hybrid regimes exhibit intermediate levels of repression compared to full democracies and full autocracies. More generally, the level of violence tends to be lower, the more democratic the type of regime is. These results are relevant for the debate about endangered democracies as they offer nuance to debates about the consequences of different regime types for violent state repression.
- 6 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
- Vol. 19 (4) , 457-489
Open AccessMore violent state repression in hybrid regimes?
This paper examines the relationship between regime types and violent state repression, focusing on hybrid regimes that combine democratic and autocratic features. It reassesses the dominant perspectives in the literature that suggest either an inverted U-shaped or threshold relationship. Previous studies are characterized by several shortcomings, including conceptual unclarity, one-sided theoretical accounts, and limited data coverage. A novel empirical analysis revisits the relationship by employing new datasets that cover most countries over more than two centuries and offer relevant both continuous and categorical regime distinctions. The results do not lend support to any of the predominant perspectives saying that hybrid regimes are characterized by more state violence or that the full package of democratic rights needs to be fulfilled to have effect. Both when using relatively new continuous measures and capturing hybrid regimes based on ordered categorical distinctions, hybrid regimes exhibit intermediate levels of repression compared to full democracies and full autocracies. More generally, the level of violence tends to be lower, the more democratic the type of regime is. These results are relevant for the debate about endangered democracies as they offer nuance to debates about the consequences of different regime types for violent state repression.
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 606-622
Measuring electoral democracy with observables
Most cross‐national indices of democracy rely centrally on coder judgments, which are susceptible to bias and error, and require expensive and time‐consuming coding by experts. We present an approach to measurement based on observables that aim to preserve the nuanced quality of subjectively coded democracy indices. Our observable‐to‐subjective score mapping is free of idiosyncratic coder errors arising from misinformation, slack, or biases. It is less susceptible to systematic bias that may arise from coders’ inferences about a country's regime, for example, from the ideology of the ruler. The data collection procedure and mode of analysis are fully transparent and replicable, and the procedure is based on random forests and is cheap to produce, easy to update, and offers coverage for all polities with sovereign or semisovereign status, surpassing the sample of any existing index. We show that this expansive coverage makes a big difference to our understanding of some causal questions.
- 23 April 2025
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 70 (2) , 606-622
Measuring electoral democracy with observables
Most cross‐national indices of democracy rely centrally on coder judgments, which are susceptible to bias and error, and require expensive and time‐consuming coding by experts. We present an approach to measurement based on observables that aim to preserve the nuanced quality of subjectively coded democracy indices. Our observable‐to‐subjective score mapping is free of idiosyncratic coder errors arising from misinformation, slack, or biases. It is less susceptible to systematic bias that may arise from coders’ inferences about a country's regime, for example, from the ideology of the ruler. The data collection procedure and mode of analysis are fully transparent and replicable, and the procedure is based on random forests and is cheap to produce, easy to update, and offers coverage for all polities with sovereign or semisovereign status, surpassing the sample of any existing index. We show that this expansive coverage makes a big difference to our understanding of some causal questions.
- Open Access
- 13 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
- Vol. 19 (2) , 175-199
A global, historical rule of law index
This article introduces the V-Dem Rule of Law Index, capturing formal-procedural aspects of de facto adherence to rule of law principles. It relies on information from fifteen V-Dem indicators based on systematic expert assessments. The measure covers almost all sovereign and semi-sovereign polities from 1789 until today, which means that its scope by far surpasses that of extant alternatives. All country-year point estimates are supplemented by confidence intervals. The conceptual framework underlying the index builds on a survey of established, thin understandings of the rule of law. Empirical dimensionality tests reveal that the indicators tap into a common trait, which supports the use of Bayesian factor analysis to construct the index values. Comparisons with established rule of law measures demonstrate a very high co-variation. In addition, descriptive overviews and correlations with measures of neighboring concepts indicate that the new measure is able to discriminate between the rule of law performance over time and between countries on the one hand and between adherence to the rule of law and neighboring features of good governance on the other hand. The article closes with an empirical examination of the association between de jure constitutional provisions and de facto observance of the rule of law. The findings, based on a conventional country and year fixed effects regression analysis covering most independent countries from 1850 to 2010, identify a negative, substantively weak association. Hence, the results indicate that constitutional provisions, by themselves, do not promote the rule of law in all contexts, such as under autocratic rule.
- 13 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft
- Vol. 19 (2) , 175-199
Open AccessA global, historical rule of law index
This article introduces the V-Dem Rule of Law Index, capturing formal-procedural aspects of de facto adherence to rule of law principles. It relies on information from fifteen V-Dem indicators based on systematic expert assessments. The measure covers almost all sovereign and semi-sovereign polities from 1789 until today, which means that its scope by far surpasses that of extant alternatives. All country-year point estimates are supplemented by confidence intervals. The conceptual framework underlying the index builds on a survey of established, thin understandings of the rule of law. Empirical dimensionality tests reveal that the indicators tap into a common trait, which supports the use of Bayesian factor analysis to construct the index values. Comparisons with established rule of law measures demonstrate a very high co-variation. In addition, descriptive overviews and correlations with measures of neighboring concepts indicate that the new measure is able to discriminate between the rule of law performance over time and between countries on the one hand and between adherence to the rule of law and neighboring features of good governance on the other hand. The article closes with an empirical examination of the association between de jure constitutional provisions and de facto observance of the rule of law. The findings, based on a conventional country and year fixed effects regression analysis covering most independent countries from 1850 to 2010, identify a negative, substantively weak association. Hence, the results indicate that constitutional provisions, by themselves, do not promote the rule of law in all contexts, such as under autocratic rule.
- 9 September 2024
- Published by The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - International IDEA
The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 8 (2024)
The Global State of Democracy is a Report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world. This document revises and updates the conceptual and measurement framework that guided the construction of Version 8 of the GSoD Indices, which depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2023. The data underlying the GSoD Indices is based on a total of 165 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of source, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.
- 9 September 2024
- Published by The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance - International IDEA
The Global State of Democracy Indices Methodology: Conceptualization and Measurement Framework, Version 8 (2024)
The Global State of Democracy is a Report that aims to provide policymakers with an evidence-based analysis of the state of global democracy, supported by the Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices, in order to inform policy interventions and identify problem-solving approaches to trends affecting the quality of democracy around the world. This document revises and updates the conceptual and measurement framework that guided the construction of Version 8 of the GSoD Indices, which depicts democratic trends at the country, regional and global levels across a broad range of different attributes of democracy in the period 1975–2023. The data underlying the GSoD Indices is based on a total of 165 indicators developed by various scholars and organizations using different types of source, including expert surveys, standards-based coding by research groups and analysts, observational data and composite measures.
- Open Access
- 11 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 57 (2) , 216-223
Measuring Backsliding with Observables: Observable-to-Subjective Score Mapping
Multiple well-known democracy-rating projects—including Freedom House, Polity, and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)—have identified apparent global regression in recent years. These measures rely on partly subjective indicators, which—in principle—could suffer from rater bias. For instance, Little and Meng (2023) argue that shared beliefs driven by the current zeitgeist could lead to shared biases that produce the appearance of democratic backsliding in subjectively coded measures. To assess this argument and the strength of the evidence for global democratic backsliding, we propose an observable-to-subjective score mapping (OSM) methodology that uses only easily observable features of democracy to predict existing indices of democracy. Applying this methodology to three prominent democracy indices, we find evidence of backsliding—but beginning later and not as pronounced as suggested by some of the original indices. Our approach suggests that the Freedom House measure particularly does not track with the recent patterns in observable indicators and that there has been a stasis or—at most—a modest decline in the average level of democracy.
- 11 January 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in PS: Political Science & Politics
- Vol. 57 (2) , 216-223
Open AccessMeasuring Backsliding with Observables: Observable-to-Subjective Score Mapping
Multiple well-known democracy-rating projects—including Freedom House, Polity, and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)—have identified apparent global regression in recent years. These measures rely on partly subjective indicators, which—in principle—could suffer from rater bias. For instance, Little and Meng (2023) argue that shared beliefs driven by the current zeitgeist could lead to shared biases that produce the appearance of democratic backsliding in subjectively coded measures. To assess this argument and the strength of the evidence for global democratic backsliding, we propose an observable-to-subjective score mapping (OSM) methodology that uses only easily observable features of democracy to predict existing indices of democracy. Applying this methodology to three prominent democracy indices, we find evidence of backsliding—but beginning later and not as pronounced as suggested by some of the original indices. Our approach suggests that the Freedom House measure particularly does not track with the recent patterns in observable indicators and that there has been a stasis or—at most—a modest decline in the average level of democracy.
- 7 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 263-285
Crisis of democracy in developed countries?
Academics and public intellectuals have recently made strong declarations about a crisis of democracy in developed countries. However, crisis of democracy is frequently proclaimed in rather vague and diffuse ways, where ‘disliked’ trends in electoral outcomes, policies, behaviours, and opinions are confused with fundamental challenges to the political regime. We argue that the most appropriate understanding of a crisis of democracy is as a potential high-risk inflection point, where core electoral aspects of democracy are in danger. The most relevant indicators of democratic crisis capture trends in – and the quality of – core democratic institutions as well as restraints on executive power, acceptance of political opponents, and support for democratic norms and behaviours. An application of these yardsticks on the 38 OECD countries reveals that six of them are currently facing a substantial crisis of democracy. The remaining 32 do not show many signs of democratic crisis. In the final part of the chapter, we provide an overview of recent debates about popular support for democracy.
- 7 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 263-285
Crisis of democracy in developed countries?
Academics and public intellectuals have recently made strong declarations about a crisis of democracy in developed countries. However, crisis of democracy is frequently proclaimed in rather vague and diffuse ways, where ‘disliked’ trends in electoral outcomes, policies, behaviours, and opinions are confused with fundamental challenges to the political regime. We argue that the most appropriate understanding of a crisis of democracy is as a potential high-risk inflection point, where core electoral aspects of democracy are in danger. The most relevant indicators of democratic crisis capture trends in – and the quality of – core democratic institutions as well as restraints on executive power, acceptance of political opponents, and support for democratic norms and behaviours. An application of these yardsticks on the 38 OECD countries reveals that six of them are currently facing a substantial crisis of democracy. The remaining 32 do not show many signs of democratic crisis. In the final part of the chapter, we provide an overview of recent debates about popular support for democracy.
- 7 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 84-104
Regime changes in the twenty-first century: a new wave of autocratization?
Democratic optimism flourished in the early 1990s, but it was not long before it was replaced by pessimism. In this chapter, we investigate two claims: (1) that beginning around 1989, the third wave had come to be characterized by an increasing gap between electoral and liberal democracy and (2) that in recent decades, we have witnessed a large-scale global wave of autocratization. Our investigation leads us to nuance both claims. First, while we do find a growing grey zone of thinner types of democracy and multi-party autocracies, this does not seem to be the result of a gap between electoral and liberal elements of democracy. Second, a recent decline in the global level and share of democracy can be registered, but it began later than conventional wisdom has it, its magnitude varies greatly depending how the data are presented, and most ways of looking at it indicate only moderate regression. We also demonstrate how the massive third wave of democratization has been much stronger in some regions than in others, and how we even find one region which the wave has largely passed by. This chapter concludes that the democratic gains of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have proven relatively resilient.
- 7 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 84-104
Regime changes in the twenty-first century: a new wave of autocratization?
Democratic optimism flourished in the early 1990s, but it was not long before it was replaced by pessimism. In this chapter, we investigate two claims: (1) that beginning around 1989, the third wave had come to be characterized by an increasing gap between electoral and liberal democracy and (2) that in recent decades, we have witnessed a large-scale global wave of autocratization. Our investigation leads us to nuance both claims. First, while we do find a growing grey zone of thinner types of democracy and multi-party autocracies, this does not seem to be the result of a gap between electoral and liberal elements of democracy. Second, a recent decline in the global level and share of democracy can be registered, but it began later than conventional wisdom has it, its magnitude varies greatly depending how the data are presented, and most ways of looking at it indicate only moderate regression. We also demonstrate how the massive third wave of democratization has been much stronger in some regions than in others, and how we even find one region which the wave has largely passed by. This chapter concludes that the democratic gains of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s have proven relatively resilient.