Lucia Quaglia
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Lucia Quaglia has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Howarth
Department of Social Sciences, University of Luxembourg, Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg
17 shared publications - Amy Verdun
Department of Political Science, University of Victoria
8 shared publications - Scott James
King’s College London, London, UK
7 shared publications - Aneta Spendzharova
Maastricht University Maastricht The Netherlands
5 shared publications David Howarth
University of Luxembourg
4 shared publications- Enrico Borghetto
Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Florence
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- p. 1-20
The geoeconomics of wholesale central bank digital currencies: great power rivalry
Wholesale central bank digital currencies (wCBDCs) are digital forms of money issued by central banks to be utilised by financial institutions and large corporates for high-value transactions. Alth...
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Political Economy
- p. 1-20
Open AccessThe geoeconomics of wholesale central bank digital currencies: great power rivalry
Wholesale central bank digital currencies (wCBDCs) are digital forms of money issued by central banks to be utilised by financial institutions and large corporates for high-value transactions. Alth...
- Open Access
- 29 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
Geofinance and Fragmentation: Wholesale Central Bank Digital Currencies
Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), especially wholesale ones, were initially hailed as tools for frictionless global financial flows. Paradoxically, however, they are contributing to the fragmentation of the international financial system through the emergence of minilateral blocs of ‘friendly’ jurisdictions that have established, or sought to establish, interoperability among their wholesale CBDCs, while remaining disconnected from rival arrangements. This outcome is difficult to reconcile with existing explanations. Indeed, international financial institutions mobilised early to promote interoperability, and much of the financial industry has favoured more integrated cross‐border payment infrastructures. This paper argues that geofinance, and specifically efforts by major jurisdictions to preserve sovereignty over critical financial infrastructures and promote their currencies internationally, provides a more convincing explanation. Through an analysis of initiatives led by China (mBridge and Ensemble), Russia (BRICS Bridge), the European Union (Pontes and Appia) and the Bank for International Settlements (Agorá, in which the United States also participates), the paper shows how geopolitical and monetary rivalries are reshaping the architecture of global finance. Empirical evidence is drawn from public documents, media coverage and 28 elite interviews.
- 29 September 2026
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
Open AccessGeofinance and Fragmentation: Wholesale Central Bank Digital Currencies
Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), especially wholesale ones, were initially hailed as tools for frictionless global financial flows. Paradoxically, however, they are contributing to the fragmentation of the international financial system through the emergence of minilateral blocs of ‘friendly’ jurisdictions that have established, or sought to establish, interoperability among their wholesale CBDCs, while remaining disconnected from rival arrangements. This outcome is difficult to reconcile with existing explanations. Indeed, international financial institutions mobilised early to promote interoperability, and much of the financial industry has favoured more integrated cross‐border payment infrastructures. This paper argues that geofinance, and specifically efforts by major jurisdictions to preserve sovereignty over critical financial infrastructures and promote their currencies internationally, provides a more convincing explanation. Through an analysis of initiatives led by China (mBridge and Ensemble), Russia (BRICS Bridge), the European Union (Pontes and Appia) and the Bank for International Settlements (Agorá, in which the United States also participates), the paper shows how geopolitical and monetary rivalries are reshaping the architecture of global finance. Empirical evidence is drawn from public documents, media coverage and 28 elite interviews.
- Open Access
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-28
From sanctions to incentives: the impact of NextGenerationEU on the European Semester
How do international institutions persuade national governments to reform? For decades, global actors, from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to regional unions, have relied on conditionality, ...
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- p. 1-28
Open AccessFrom sanctions to incentives: the impact of NextGenerationEU on the European Semester
How do international institutions persuade national governments to reform? For decades, global actors, from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to regional unions, have relied on conditionality, ...
- Top Cited Papers
- 16 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (10) , 1-20
‘Show me the money!’ - The Changing Dynamics of Economic Governance in the European Union
- 16 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 33 (10) , 1-20
Top Cited Papers‘Show me the money!’ - The Changing Dynamics of Economic Governance in the European Union
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
From Capital Markets Union to Savings and Investments Union: The Shifting Policy Narratives on European Financial Market Integration
Financial market integration has been a major European Union (EU) policy goal since the earliest days of European integration in the 1950s and the subject of hundreds of pieces of EU legislation. Yet, competing economic interests and disagreements about suitable regulatory templates have stalled progress in this area, promoting new proposals, repeated relaunches and relabelling: inter alia, the Capital Markets Union project launched in early 2015, relaunched in 2020 and then relabelled as Savings and Investments Union in February 2025. Combining an actor‐centred strategic constructivism and policy narratives approach and using a quantitative and qualitative text analysis methodology, this article examines the shift in the policy narratives deployed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the three European Supervisory Authorities with a view to mobilising political support for financial market integration in all its guises and overcoming entrenched opposition to it. This article explains why and how EU supranational actors have wielded five different policy narratives portraying financial market integration as an instrument to achieve other sought‐after economic policy goals, with a view to eliciting wider political and public support.
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
From Capital Markets Union to Savings and Investments Union: The Shifting Policy Narratives on European Financial Market Integration
Financial market integration has been a major European Union (EU) policy goal since the earliest days of European integration in the 1950s and the subject of hundreds of pieces of EU legislation. Yet, competing economic interests and disagreements about suitable regulatory templates have stalled progress in this area, promoting new proposals, repeated relaunches and relabelling: inter alia, the Capital Markets Union project launched in early 2015, relaunched in 2020 and then relabelled as Savings and Investments Union in February 2025. Combining an actor‐centred strategic constructivism and policy narratives approach and using a quantitative and qualitative text analysis methodology, this article examines the shift in the policy narratives deployed by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the three European Supervisory Authorities with a view to mobilising political support for financial market integration in all its guises and overcoming entrenched opposition to it. This article explains why and how EU supranational actors have wielded five different policy narratives portraying financial market integration as an instrument to achieve other sought‐after economic policy goals, with a view to eliciting wider political and public support.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Policy and Society
- Vol. 45 (1) , 71-93
Alignment and asymmetry: European and national crisis governance under the Recovery and Resilience Facility
The European Union (EU) and its member states are a paradigmatic case of governance at multiple levels, whose interpretation and resolution of crises may or may not be aligned. This paper explores such alignment by perusing how the European Union’s NextGenerationEU (NGEU) plan and its centerpiece, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), contributed to shaping national crisis governance during the COVID-19 pandemic. Focusing on the political dimension of crisis governance, it conceptualizes the EU response as a supranational driver of crisis-induced policy change and interprets National Recovery and Resilience Plans as domestic expressions of this logic. Through the comparative analysis of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the study assesses the degree of correspondence between EU and national strategies. The findings suggest that Italy and Spain, which had higher RRF allocations, embraced a “governing by the crisis” approach that transposed the transformative aims of NGEU, resulting in accelerated policy change. In contrast, France and Germany followed a more traditional “governing the crisis” strategy, leading to policy normalization and limited reform progress. The analysis highlights that EU fiscal support played a key role in shaping national priorities and reform trajectories in response to the pandemic.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Policy and Society
- Vol. 45 (1) , 71-93
Open AccessAlignment and asymmetry: European and national crisis governance under the Recovery and Resilience Facility
The European Union (EU) and its member states are a paradigmatic case of governance at multiple levels, whose interpretation and resolution of crises may or may not be aligned. This paper explores such alignment by perusing how the European Union’s NextGenerationEU (NGEU) plan and its centerpiece, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), contributed to shaping national crisis governance during the COVID-19 pandemic. Focusing on the political dimension of crisis governance, it conceptualizes the EU response as a supranational driver of crisis-induced policy change and interprets National Recovery and Resilience Plans as domestic expressions of this logic. Through the comparative analysis of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the study assesses the degree of correspondence between EU and national strategies. The findings suggest that Italy and Spain, which had higher RRF allocations, embraced a “governing by the crisis” approach that transposed the transformative aims of NGEU, resulting in accelerated policy change. In contrast, France and Germany followed a more traditional “governing the crisis” strategy, leading to policy normalization and limited reform progress. The analysis highlights that EU fiscal support played a key role in shaping national priorities and reform trajectories in response to the pandemic.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of International Economic Law
- Vol. 28 (3) , 490-504
Geoeconomics and financial statecraft in the European Union: the case of critical market infrastructures
The European Union is an important player in global finance. We examine how and why it deploys ‘financial statecraft’, defined as the intentional use of financial capabilities for the purpose of achieving geoeconomic goals. The European Union has long deployed its market size and regulatory capacity in finance to support the competitiveness of the European Union financial industry and to safeguard financial stability primarily through multilateral institutions. Over the past decade, however, the European Union has increasingly engaged in unilateral and defensive forms of financial statecraft to advance more explicitly geoeconomic goals. We illustrate our argument by analysing the use of financial statecraft in two areas of critical market infrastructure: central counterparties for clearing securities and derivatives and the provision of financial services by large digital platforms or ‘Bigtechs’. In both cases, we argue that the European Union’s geoeconomic turn has been motivated by a concern to reduce its dependence on third countries, and companies based in those jurisdictions, for the provision of critical market infrastructure. Yet, statecraft has also been deployed instrumentally to defend the interests of existing European Union financial institutions and financial centres, and to support the development of European Union companies and sectors capable of challenging (predominantly US-based) rivals.
- 1 September 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of International Economic Law
- Vol. 28 (3) , 490-504
Open AccessGeoeconomics and financial statecraft in the European Union: the case of critical market infrastructures
The European Union is an important player in global finance. We examine how and why it deploys ‘financial statecraft’, defined as the intentional use of financial capabilities for the purpose of achieving geoeconomic goals. The European Union has long deployed its market size and regulatory capacity in finance to support the competitiveness of the European Union financial industry and to safeguard financial stability primarily through multilateral institutions. Over the past decade, however, the European Union has increasingly engaged in unilateral and defensive forms of financial statecraft to advance more explicitly geoeconomic goals. We illustrate our argument by analysing the use of financial statecraft in two areas of critical market infrastructure: central counterparties for clearing securities and derivatives and the provision of financial services by large digital platforms or ‘Bigtechs’. In both cases, we argue that the European Union’s geoeconomic turn has been motivated by a concern to reduce its dependence on third countries, and companies based in those jurisdictions, for the provision of critical market infrastructure. Yet, statecraft has also been deployed instrumentally to defend the interests of existing European Union financial institutions and financial centres, and to support the development of European Union companies and sectors capable of challenging (predominantly US-based) rivals.
- Open Access
- 15 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 26-48
Muscle Matters: An Integrationist Turn in Transatlantic Finance
After the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) issued new domestic rules across a variety of financial services. Different politics and policy-making processes generated regulatory incompatibilities, and conflicts emerged as each side insisted the other adapt to its approach. Yet our original data covering eleven sub-sectors show that in a predominant cluster of cases, the two jurisdictions had by 2020 made adjustments and adopted integrationist regulation, which fosters cross-jurisdictional interoperability for financial companies through harmonization (increasing similarity and compatibility) or deference (accepting the regulation of other jurisdictions). The pattern has broad and surprising implications for the future of global finance in an era of rising economic nationalism and populist politics. Why, then, did Washington and Brussels move beyond the standoffs? What accounts for the integrationist turn? Our novel explanation features a “mutual accommodation” causal mechanism driven by the development in both jurisdictions of “border-policing” capacities, builds on a new generation of IPE research that is attentive to complexity and temporal process in accounting for global governance outcomes, and provides a pathway for qualitative researchers seeking to balance many new methodological and transparency demands.
- 15 August 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 26-48
Open AccessMuscle Matters: An Integrationist Turn in Transatlantic Finance
After the Great Financial Crisis of 2008, the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU) issued new domestic rules across a variety of financial services. Different politics and policy-making processes generated regulatory incompatibilities, and conflicts emerged as each side insisted the other adapt to its approach. Yet our original data covering eleven sub-sectors show that in a predominant cluster of cases, the two jurisdictions had by 2020 made adjustments and adopted integrationist regulation, which fosters cross-jurisdictional interoperability for financial companies through harmonization (increasing similarity and compatibility) or deference (accepting the regulation of other jurisdictions). The pattern has broad and surprising implications for the future of global finance in an era of rising economic nationalism and populist politics. Why, then, did Washington and Brussels move beyond the standoffs? What accounts for the integrationist turn? Our novel explanation features a “mutual accommodation” causal mechanism driven by the development in both jurisdictions of “border-policing” capacities, builds on a new generation of IPE research that is attentive to complexity and temporal process in accounting for global governance outcomes, and provides a pathway for qualitative researchers seeking to balance many new methodological and transparency demands.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 63 (S1) , 146-152
Much More Than a Report: The Search for Europe's New Political Identity and the Politics of Competitiveness
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 63 (S1) , 146-152
Open AccessMuch More Than a Report: The Search for Europe's New Political Identity and the Politics of Competitiveness
- 13 May 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 230-242
The economic governance of financial services in the EU
- 13 May 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 230-242
The economic governance of financial services in the EU