Driss Ait Omar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Driss Ait Omar has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hamid Garmani
Sultan Moulay Slimane University
18 shared publications - Mohamed Baslam
TIAD Laboratory, FST, Sultan Moulay Sliman University, Beni Mellal, Morocco
18 shared publications Mohamed El Amrani
Information Processing and Decision Support Laboratory, Sultan Moulay Slimane University, Morocco
11 shared publications- Mohamed El Amrani
Sultan Moulay Slimane University, TIAD Laboratory, B.P523, Béni Mellal, Morocco
9 shared publications Mohamed Fakir
Information Processing and Decision Support Laboratory Sultan Moulay Slimane University, Morocco
9 shared publicationsMohamed Baslam
Sultan Moulay Slimane University
7 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 8 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 235-250
UAV-CacheTrace V1.0: A 140-Million-Row Synthetic Mobility–Content Trace for Aerial Edge-Caching and Trajectory Planning Research
- 8 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 235-250
UAV-CacheTrace V1.0: A 140-Million-Row Synthetic Mobility–Content Trace for Aerial Edge-Caching and Trajectory Planning Research
- Open Access
- 11 October 2022
- Published by Hindawi Limited in Journal of Computer Networks and Communications
- Vol. 2022, 1-12
Chaotic Dynamics in Joint Price QoS Game with Heterogeneous Internet Service Providers
This paper tries to investigate the complex characteristics of the communication market where Internet service providers (ISP) lease network access services and compete to serve a large pool of subscribers. For this purpose, we analyze the dynamics of a mixed duopoly game with two decision parameters: price and quality of service (QoS). We calculate and discuss the stability of each equilibrium solution by using the nonlinear system. A numerical simulation is used to show the flip bifurcation to chaos by the decisions of ISPs with different statuses. We discovered that the Nash equilibrium loses stability when the speed of adjustment and transmission fee increase. We show that the system parameter changes the stability of the communication market. In addition, we use a control method to keep the communication market in a stable state.
- 11 October 2022
- Published by Hindawi Limited in Journal of Computer Networks and Communications
- Vol. 2022, 1-12
Open AccessChaotic Dynamics in Joint Price QoS Game with Heterogeneous Internet Service Providers
This paper tries to investigate the complex characteristics of the communication market where Internet service providers (ISP) lease network access services and compete to serve a large pool of subscribers. For this purpose, we analyze the dynamics of a mixed duopoly game with two decision parameters: price and quality of service (QoS). We calculate and discuss the stability of each equilibrium solution by using the nonlinear system. A numerical simulation is used to show the flip bifurcation to chaos by the decisions of ISPs with different statuses. We discovered that the Nash equilibrium loses stability when the speed of adjustment and transmission fee increase. We show that the system parameter changes the stability of the communication market. In addition, we use a control method to keep the communication market in a stable state.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2022 (1)
Analysis of the Chaotic Dynamics Duopoly Game of ISPs Bounded Rational
We propose in this paper an investigation of the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two Internet services providers (ISPs). The competition between them is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and their number of cached items. According to the ISPs’ rationality level, we consider a scenario where both ISPs are bounded rational. Each ISP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamic system induced by bounded rationality and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Wiley in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
- Vol. 2022 (1)
Open AccessAnalysis of the Chaotic Dynamics Duopoly Game of ISPs Bounded Rational
We propose in this paper an investigation of the dynamical behaviors of a duopoly model with two Internet services providers (ISPs). The competition between them is assumed to take place in terms of their pricing decisions and their number of cached items. According to the ISPs’ rationality level, we consider a scenario where both ISPs are bounded rational. Each ISP in any period uses the marginal profit observed from the previous period to choose its strategies. We compute explicitly the steady states of the dynamic system induced by bounded rationality and establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of its Nash equilibrium (NE). Numerical simulations show that if some parameters of the model are varied, the stability of the NE point is lost and the complex (periodic or chaotic) behavior occurs. The chaotic behavior of the system is stabilized on the NE point by applying control.
- Open Access
- 19 January 2021
- Published by Hindawi Limited in Mobile Information Systems
- Vol. 2021, 1-16
Analyzing the Dynamic Data Sponsoring in the Case of Competing Internet Service Providers and Content Providers
With a sponsored content plan on the Internet market, a content provider (CP) negotiates with the Internet service providers (ISPs) on behalf of the end-users to remove the network subscription fees. In this work, we have studied the impact of data sponsoring plans on the decision-making strategies of the ISPs and the CPs in the telecommunications market. We develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers (CPs and ISPs), where the CPs sponsor content. We formulate the interactions between the ISPs and between the CPs as a noncooperative game. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning the Nash equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of the sponsoring content on providers policies.
- 19 January 2021
- Published by Hindawi Limited in Mobile Information Systems
- Vol. 2021, 1-16
Open AccessAnalyzing the Dynamic Data Sponsoring in the Case of Competing Internet Service Providers and Content Providers
With a sponsored content plan on the Internet market, a content provider (CP) negotiates with the Internet service providers (ISPs) on behalf of the end-users to remove the network subscription fees. In this work, we have studied the impact of data sponsoring plans on the decision-making strategies of the ISPs and the CPs in the telecommunications market. We develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers (CPs and ISPs), where the CPs sponsor content. We formulate the interactions between the ISPs and between the CPs as a noncooperative game. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We used the best response dynamic algorithm for learning the Nash equilibrium. Finally, extensive simulations show the convergence of a proposed schema to the Nash equilibrium and show the effect of the sponsoring content on providers policies.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Inderscience Publishers in International Journal of High Performance Systems Architecture
- Vol. 10 (1) , 43
Game theoretical approach for a fair and effective pricing strategy in cloud computing
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Inderscience Publishers in International Journal of High Performance Systems Architecture
- Vol. 10 (1) , 43
Game theoretical approach for a fair and effective pricing strategy in cloud computing
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Infocommunications Journal in Infocommunications journal
- Vol. 13 (1) , 58-67
Joint Beacon Power and Beacon Rate Control Based on Game Theoretic Approach in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Infocommunications Journal in Infocommunications journal
- Vol. 13 (1) , 58-67
Open AccessJoint Beacon Power and Beacon Rate Control Based on Game Theoretic Approach in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks
- 1 January 2021
- Published by IGI Global Scientific Publishing
- p. 328-343
Decision Choice Optimization With Genetic Algorithm in Communication Networks
Optimization is an essential tool in the field of decision support. In this chapter, the authors study an inverse problem applied in the telecommunication networks. Indeed, in the telecommunication networks, service providers have subscription offers to customers. Since competition is strong in this sector, most of these advertising offerings, totally or partially ambiguous, are prepared to attract the attention of consumers. For this reason, customers face problems in making decisions about the choice of the operators that gives them a better report price/QoS. Mathematical modeling of this decision support problem led to the resolution of an inverse problem. More precisely, the inverse problem is to find the function of the QoS real knowing the QoS theoretical or advertising. This model will help customers who seek to know the degree of sincerity of their operators, and it is an opportunity for operators who want to maintain their resources so that they gain the trust of customers.
- 1 January 2021
- Published by IGI Global Scientific Publishing
- p. 328-343
Decision Choice Optimization With Genetic Algorithm in Communication Networks
Optimization is an essential tool in the field of decision support. In this chapter, the authors study an inverse problem applied in the telecommunication networks. Indeed, in the telecommunication networks, service providers have subscription offers to customers. Since competition is strong in this sector, most of these advertising offerings, totally or partially ambiguous, are prepared to attract the attention of consumers. For this reason, customers face problems in making decisions about the choice of the operators that gives them a better report price/QoS. Mathematical modeling of this decision support problem led to the resolution of an inverse problem. More precisely, the inverse problem is to find the function of the QoS real knowing the QoS theoretical or advertising. This model will help customers who seek to know the degree of sincerity of their operators, and it is an opportunity for operators who want to maintain their resources so that they gain the trust of customers.
- Open Access
- 9 December 2020
- Published by Croatian Communications and Information Society in Journal of Communications Software and Systems
- Vol. 16 (4) , 316-323
A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Sponsoring Content in the Internet Market
With a sponsored content plan on the internet market, a content provider (CP) can pay to the internet service providers (ISP) on behalf of the mobile users/subscribers to remove the network subscription fees for introduce an increase in the number of advertisements. As such, CP, ISP and end-users are all actively motivated to participate in the sponsored content plan. In this paper, we investigate the interactions between CPs as a non-cooperative game as a function of two market parameters credibility of content and number of sponsored content. In turn, the subscribers’ demand for the content of a CP depends not only on their strategies but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. Through rigorous mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Based on the analysis of the game properties, we propose an iterative algorithm, which guarantees to converge to the Nash equilibrium point in a distributed manner. Numerical investigation shows the convergence of a proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium point and corroborates the fact that sponsoring content may improve the CPs outcome.
- 9 December 2020
- Published by Croatian Communications and Information Society in Journal of Communications Software and Systems
- Vol. 16 (4) , 316-323
Open AccessA Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Framework for Sponsoring Content in the Internet Market
With a sponsored content plan on the internet market, a content provider (CP) can pay to the internet service providers (ISP) on behalf of the mobile users/subscribers to remove the network subscription fees for introduce an increase in the number of advertisements. As such, CP, ISP and end-users are all actively motivated to participate in the sponsored content plan. In this paper, we investigate the interactions between CPs as a non-cooperative game as a function of two market parameters credibility of content and number of sponsored content. In turn, the subscribers’ demand for the content of a CP depends not only on their strategies but also upon those proposed by all of its competitors. Through rigorous mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Based on the analysis of the game properties, we propose an iterative algorithm, which guarantees to converge to the Nash equilibrium point in a distributed manner. Numerical investigation shows the convergence of a proposed algorithm to the Nash equilibrium point and corroborates the fact that sponsoring content may improve the CPs outcome.
- Open Access
- 30 October 2020
- Published by Hindawi Limited in Mobile Information Systems
- Vol. 2020, 1-18
The Effect of Caching on CP and ISP Policies in Information-Centric Networks
Internet traffic volume is increasing, and this causes scalability issues in content delivery. Information-centric network has been introduced to support this increase in Internet traffic through caching. While collaborative caching in information-centric network is a crucial feature to improve network performance and reduce delivery costs in content distribution, the current pricing strategies on the Internet are not incentive compatible with information-centric network interconnection. In this paper, we focus on the economic incentive interactions in caching deployment between several types of information-centric network providers (content provider and Internet service provider). In particular, we develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers in an information-centric network model where the providers are motivated to cache and share content. We use a generalized Zipf distribution to model content popularity. We formulate the interactions between the Internet service providers and between the content providers as a noncooperative game. We use a Stackelberg game model to capture the interactions between the content provider and Internet service providers. Through mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. An iterative and distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the equilibrium point. The numerical simulations illustrate that our proposed game models result in a win-win solution.
- 30 October 2020
- Published by Hindawi Limited in Mobile Information Systems
- Vol. 2020, 1-18
Open AccessThe Effect of Caching on CP and ISP Policies in Information-Centric Networks
Internet traffic volume is increasing, and this causes scalability issues in content delivery. Information-centric network has been introduced to support this increase in Internet traffic through caching. While collaborative caching in information-centric network is a crucial feature to improve network performance and reduce delivery costs in content distribution, the current pricing strategies on the Internet are not incentive compatible with information-centric network interconnection. In this paper, we focus on the economic incentive interactions in caching deployment between several types of information-centric network providers (content provider and Internet service provider). In particular, we develop game-theoretic models to study the interaction between providers in an information-centric network model where the providers are motivated to cache and share content. We use a generalized Zipf distribution to model content popularity. We formulate the interactions between the Internet service providers and between the content providers as a noncooperative game. We use a Stackelberg game model to capture the interactions between the content provider and Internet service providers. Through mathematical analysis, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium under some conditions. An iterative and distributed algorithm based on best response dynamics is proposed to achieve the equilibrium point. The numerical simulations illustrate that our proposed game models result in a win-win solution.