Benjamin Zala
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Benjamin Zala has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew Futter
University of Leicester
3 shared publications - Edward Newman
School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
2 shared publications Andrew Futter
University of Leeds
1 shared publicationBernice Lee
Environment and Resource Governance, Chatham House, UK
1 shared publication- Cristina G. Stefan
Associate Professor of International Relations and Co-Director of The European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom
1 shared publication Felix Preston
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
- Vol. 7 (1) , 1-16
Nuclear-Conventional Entanglement in Northeast Asia: The Case for Crisis Management Interoperability
- 26 June 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament
- Vol. 7 (1) , 1-16
Open AccessNuclear-Conventional Entanglement in Northeast Asia: The Case for Crisis Management Interoperability
- Open Access
- 20 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Review of International Studies
- Vol. 49 (5) , 795-812
‘No one around to shut the dead eyes of the human race’: Sartre, Aron, and the limits of existentialism in the Nuclear Age
The Nuclear Age is said to be defined by the notion of existential threat. The ability to destroy human societies in their entirety with a single class of weaponry raises profound questions about human existence. It even gives us a new form of species extinction – ‘thermonuclear omnicide’. Unsurprisingly, existentialism was a philosophy that found its feet in the shadow of the bomb. This article explores the possibilities and limits of an existentialist approach to nuclear dangers. It contrasts the views of two figures central to early existentialism: Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron. Sartre responded to the existential threat of nuclear war with moral outrage about the ‘unreality’ of the Cold War politics driving the arms race and an existentialist call to reject militaristic social norms. Aron, a key figure in early IR realism, famously rejected existentialism and turned instead to outlining norms for an international society that might better restrain nuclear-armed decision-makers. Bringing Sartre’s and Aron’s post-Second World War discussions into the new century, this article argues that the ongoing, and even growing, threats posed by nuclear weapons highlight the limits of Sartre’s approach as a guide to authentic existence in modern life. Instead, it supports Aron’s more conservative approach but also draws on Existentialism to extend it, strengthening the nuclear taboo for the sake of human survival as a persistent but urgent political project. At a moment in IR when scholars and other analysts are once again critiquing the fragile norms of global order and speculating about the dawn of a ‘Third Nuclear Age’, theoretical reflection on the politics of existential threats and the hard choices they entail remain indispensable aspects of IR’s theoretical toolkit. While Sartre and other existentialists argued convincingly that existence precedes essence, Aron reminds us that survival remains a precondition for both.
- 20 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Review of International Studies
- Vol. 49 (5) , 795-812
Open Access‘No one around to shut the dead eyes of the human race’: Sartre, Aron, and the limits of existentialism in the Nuclear Age
The Nuclear Age is said to be defined by the notion of existential threat. The ability to destroy human societies in their entirety with a single class of weaponry raises profound questions about human existence. It even gives us a new form of species extinction – ‘thermonuclear omnicide’. Unsurprisingly, existentialism was a philosophy that found its feet in the shadow of the bomb. This article explores the possibilities and limits of an existentialist approach to nuclear dangers. It contrasts the views of two figures central to early existentialism: Jean-Paul Sartre and Raymond Aron. Sartre responded to the existential threat of nuclear war with moral outrage about the ‘unreality’ of the Cold War politics driving the arms race and an existentialist call to reject militaristic social norms. Aron, a key figure in early IR realism, famously rejected existentialism and turned instead to outlining norms for an international society that might better restrain nuclear-armed decision-makers. Bringing Sartre’s and Aron’s post-Second World War discussions into the new century, this article argues that the ongoing, and even growing, threats posed by nuclear weapons highlight the limits of Sartre’s approach as a guide to authentic existence in modern life. Instead, it supports Aron’s more conservative approach but also draws on Existentialism to extend it, strengthening the nuclear taboo for the sake of human survival as a persistent but urgent political project. At a moment in IR when scholars and other analysts are once again critiquing the fragile norms of global order and speculating about the dawn of a ‘Third Nuclear Age’, theoretical reflection on the politics of existential threats and the hard choices they entail remain indispensable aspects of IR’s theoretical toolkit. While Sartre and other existentialists argued convincingly that existence precedes essence, Aron reminds us that survival remains a precondition for both.
- 4 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- Vol. 76 (2) , 138-160
For a progressive realism: Australian foreign policy in the 21st century
What ideas and concepts might be used to reinvigorate a progressive approach to Australian foreign policy? In contrast to the clarity of the international vision provided by right-wing movements, there is uncertainty about the contours of a progressive approach to contemporary Australian foreign policy. This article outlines the basis of a ‘progressive realism’ that can challenge right-wing accounts. Progressive realism combines a ‘realistic’ diagnosis of the key dynamics that underpin contemporary world politics with a ‘progressive’ focus on the redistribution of existing power configurations. Taken together, these two building blocks provide the foundations for a left-of-centre foreign policy agenda. We apply progressive realism to four policy areas: pandemic politics, aid and infrastructure in the Pacific, climate change, and a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. This analysis, in turn, highlights the challenges and opportunities for progressive political actors in crafting foreign policy both within and beyond Australia.
- 4 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- Vol. 76 (2) , 138-160
For a progressive realism: Australian foreign policy in the 21st century
What ideas and concepts might be used to reinvigorate a progressive approach to Australian foreign policy? In contrast to the clarity of the international vision provided by right-wing movements, there is uncertainty about the contours of a progressive approach to contemporary Australian foreign policy. This article outlines the basis of a ‘progressive realism’ that can challenge right-wing accounts. Progressive realism combines a ‘realistic’ diagnosis of the key dynamics that underpin contemporary world politics with a ‘progressive’ focus on the redistribution of existing power configurations. Taken together, these two building blocks provide the foundations for a left-of-centre foreign policy agenda. We apply progressive realism to four policy areas: pandemic politics, aid and infrastructure in the Pacific, climate change, and a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. This analysis, in turn, highlights the challenges and opportunities for progressive political actors in crafting foreign policy both within and beyond Australia.
- Open Access
- 9 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- Vol. 6 (3) , f1-f3
EIS volume 6 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- 9 July 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- Vol. 6 (3) , f1-f3
Open AccessEIS volume 6 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- 17 February 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of International Political Theory
- Vol. 16 (2) , 210-230
Interpreting great power rights in international society: Debating China’s right to a sphere of influence
The special rights and responsibilities of the great powers have traditionally been treated as a key component – even a primary institution – of international society in the English School literature. Recent interpretivist work has focused on the meanings of special responsibilities in contemporary international society with far less scholarly attention being given to the corollary of this – special rights. This article uses an interpretivist approach to attempt to uncover what recent debates over China’s right or otherwise to a sphere of influence in East Asia tells us about understandings of great power rights in contemporary international society. The argument advanced is that if Beijing’s right to a sphere of influence is successfully rejected by the rest of international society without repudiating its status as a great power more broadly, China will indeed be a great power without historical precedent.
- 17 February 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of International Political Theory
- Vol. 16 (2) , 210-230
Interpreting great power rights in international society: Debating China’s right to a sphere of influence
The special rights and responsibilities of the great powers have traditionally been treated as a key component – even a primary institution – of international society in the English School literature. Recent interpretivist work has focused on the meanings of special responsibilities in contemporary international society with far less scholarly attention being given to the corollary of this – special rights. This article uses an interpretivist approach to attempt to uncover what recent debates over China’s right or otherwise to a sphere of influence in East Asia tells us about understandings of great power rights in contemporary international society. The argument advanced is that if Beijing’s right to a sphere of influence is successfully rejected by the rest of international society without repudiating its status as a great power more broadly, China will indeed be a great power without historical precedent.
- 28 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asian Studies Review
- Vol. 44 (1) , 61-78
Regionalism and Great Power Management in the Asia–Pacific: Complementary or Competing Forces?
This article seeks to advance the recent turn in the literature on regionalism in the Asia–Pacific that considers the scope for an effective managerial role for the region’s great powers. Drawing on the work of the English School of International Relations on “great power management”, the article seeks to clarify the interaction between processes of regionalism and the special managerial rights and responsibilities of the great powers. It draws on both the lessons of historical instances of institutionalised great power management in the form of great power concerts and a theoretical reframing of the practice of great power management. The article argues in favour of a disaggregated approach that prioritises crisis management between the great powers over more expansive versions of great power management in the immediate term. Distinguishing between different types of great power management at both the global and regional levels and highlighting the different lessons that scholars have drawn from the history of great power concerts leads to three recommendations for aligning great power management with processes of regionalism. First, prioritising regular and purposely exclusive dialogue between the United States and China in the immediate term. Second, fostering ad-hoc regional power summits over the medium to long-term as the distribution of power in the region shifts from one of bipolarity to multipolarity. And third, throughout both phases, actively avoiding what is labelled “competitive minilateralism” that is likely to both compete with existing regional institutions and work against the order-building goals of great power management.
- 28 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asian Studies Review
- Vol. 44 (1) , 61-78
Regionalism and Great Power Management in the Asia–Pacific: Complementary or Competing Forces?
This article seeks to advance the recent turn in the literature on regionalism in the Asia–Pacific that considers the scope for an effective managerial role for the region’s great powers. Drawing on the work of the English School of International Relations on “great power management”, the article seeks to clarify the interaction between processes of regionalism and the special managerial rights and responsibilities of the great powers. It draws on both the lessons of historical instances of institutionalised great power management in the form of great power concerts and a theoretical reframing of the practice of great power management. The article argues in favour of a disaggregated approach that prioritises crisis management between the great powers over more expansive versions of great power management in the immediate term. Distinguishing between different types of great power management at both the global and regional levels and highlighting the different lessons that scholars have drawn from the history of great power concerts leads to three recommendations for aligning great power management with processes of regionalism. First, prioritising regular and purposely exclusive dialogue between the United States and China in the immediate term. Second, fostering ad-hoc regional power summits over the medium to long-term as the distribution of power in the region shifts from one of bipolarity to multipolarity. And third, throughout both phases, actively avoiding what is labelled “competitive minilateralism” that is likely to both compete with existing regional institutions and work against the order-building goals of great power management.
- Open Access
- 6 December 2017
- Published by Wiley in Australian Journal of Politics & History
- Vol. 63 (4) , 610-623
Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2017
- 6 December 2017
- Published by Wiley in Australian Journal of Politics & History
- Vol. 63 (4) , 610-623
Open AccessIssues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2017
- 8 November 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Third World Quarterly
- Vol. 39 (5) , 871-888
Rising powers and order contestation: disaggregating the normative from the representational
A central theme of the literature on rising powers is that new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the literature, the nature and significance of rising powers for international order are imprecisely debated, in particular the concept and practice of ‘contestation’. In this article, we aim to establish a distinction between normative contestation and what can be thought of as ‘contestation over representation’: that is, contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. The paper engages with debates on international order and international society, and its empirical basis is provided by a thorough analysis of the discourse of rising power summitry.
- 8 November 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Third World Quarterly
- Vol. 39 (5) , 871-888
Rising powers and order contestation: disaggregating the normative from the representational
A central theme of the literature on rising powers is that new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the literature, the nature and significance of rising powers for international order are imprecisely debated, in particular the concept and practice of ‘contestation’. In this article, we aim to establish a distinction between normative contestation and what can be thought of as ‘contestation over representation’: that is, contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. The paper engages with debates on international order and international society, and its empirical basis is provided by a thorough analysis of the discourse of rising power summitry.
- 1 March 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 15 (2) , 287
Book Review: Maximilian Terhalle, The Transition of Global Order: Legitimacy and Contestation
- 1 March 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies Review
- Vol. 15 (2) , 287
Book Review: Maximilian Terhalle, The Transition of Global Order: Legitimacy and Contestation
- Open Access
- 27 January 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Global Security Studies
- Vol. 2 (1) , 2-17
Polarity Analysis and Collective Perceptions of Power: The Need for a New Approach
The literature on the current global order is confused over its polarity. Depictions of a current multipolarity are found alongside discussions of the longevity of US-led unipolarity, while others point to the early stages of US–Sino-dominated bipolarity. These competing visions of the interstate order sit uneasily within the existing literature that both defines polarity in terms of the distribution of material capabilities and makes system-level predictions based on the assumption that all actors perceive polarity objectively. This article outlines the need for a more analytically eclectic understanding of polarity. Exploring the possibilities of a deeper engagement between the realist literature on structural power and the constructivist literature on perception, agency, and performativity, it puts forward a redefinition of polarity in which perceptions of status replace a focus on the distribution of capabilities. An analysis of the Cold War period—normally depicted as a clear case of unbroken bipolarity—demonstrates the usefulness of this reconceptualization.
- 27 January 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Global Security Studies
- Vol. 2 (1) , 2-17
Open AccessPolarity Analysis and Collective Perceptions of Power: The Need for a New Approach
The literature on the current global order is confused over its polarity. Depictions of a current multipolarity are found alongside discussions of the longevity of US-led unipolarity, while others point to the early stages of US–Sino-dominated bipolarity. These competing visions of the interstate order sit uneasily within the existing literature that both defines polarity in terms of the distribution of material capabilities and makes system-level predictions based on the assumption that all actors perceive polarity objectively. This article outlines the need for a more analytically eclectic understanding of polarity. Exploring the possibilities of a deeper engagement between the realist literature on structural power and the constructivist literature on perception, agency, and performativity, it puts forward a redefinition of polarity in which perceptions of status replace a focus on the distribution of capabilities. An analysis of the Cold War period—normally depicted as a clear case of unbroken bipolarity—demonstrates the usefulness of this reconceptualization.