Scott K. Aberegg
Research Subjects
Scott K. Aberegg has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- James M. O'Brien
Division of Pulmonary, Allergy, Critical Care and Sleep Medicine, Center for Critical Care, The Ohio State University Medical Center, College of Public Health, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
3 shared publications Andrew M. Hersh
Brooke Army Medical Center, San Antonio, TX, USA
2 shared publications- Nora’aIni Ali
Faculty of Ocean Engineering Technology, Universiti Malaysia Terengganu, Kuala Nerus, Terengganu, Malaysia
2 shared publications Sean J. Callahan
Division of Pulmonary and Critical Care Medicine, Department of Internal Medicine University of Utah School of Medicine Salt Lake City Utah USA
2 shared publications- Stanley Lemeshow
College of Public Health, The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
2 shared publications Andrew M Hersh
The University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of General Internal Medicine
- p. 1-8
Hickam’s Dictum: An Analysis of Multiple Diagnoses
Background: Hickam’s dictum (“a patient can have as many diseases as he damn well pleases”) has been touted as a counterargument to Ockham’s razor, which enjoins clinicians to seek a single, simple, or unifying diagnosis. Yet the phenomenon of multiple diagnoses has not been formally analyzed. Methods: We evaluated multiple diagnoses using three methods of inquiry: (1) a review of 83 case reports; (2) a review of 220 cases from the New England Journal of Medicine; and (3) an online survey of providers’ intuitions. Results: Eighty-three published case reports claimed to instantiate Hickam’s dictum or violate Ockham’s razor. All reported a primary diagnosis that explained the presenting illness, and one or more additional diagnoses which could be classified into four categories: (1) an incidentaloma (n = 21; 25.3%); (2) a pre-existing disease (n = 26; 31.3%); (3) a disease causally linked to the primary diagnosis (n = 33, 39.8%); and (4) a causally unrelated second disease contributing to the acute presentation (n = 3, 3.6%). Among 220 cases from the New England Journal of Medicine, all reported a unifying final diagnosis. In an online survey, 265 respondents recruited using social media evaluated four hypothetical cases with multiple diagnoses representing this categorization scheme. A majority of respondents (79%; 95% CI, 74–84%) chose the case representing category 4 — a coincident, causally unrelated second diagnosis — as the most unlikely or surprising diagnostic combination. Conclusion: Multiple diagnoses commonly occur. However, the majority of the multiple diagnoses we analyzed were causally linked, or represented incidentalomas or known pre-existing diseases. These diagnostic combinations were unsurprising to a majority of surveyed providers. We show that multiple diagnoses can be arranged in a framework that considers time, probability, and causation. This framework reconciles the alleged conflict between Hickam’s dictum and Ockham’s razor and has greater practical and pedagogical utility.
- 28 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of General Internal Medicine
- p. 1-8
Open AccessHickam’s Dictum: An Analysis of Multiple Diagnoses
Background: Hickam’s dictum (“a patient can have as many diseases as he damn well pleases”) has been touted as a counterargument to Ockham’s razor, which enjoins clinicians to seek a single, simple, or unifying diagnosis. Yet the phenomenon of multiple diagnoses has not been formally analyzed. Methods: We evaluated multiple diagnoses using three methods of inquiry: (1) a review of 83 case reports; (2) a review of 220 cases from the New England Journal of Medicine; and (3) an online survey of providers’ intuitions. Results: Eighty-three published case reports claimed to instantiate Hickam’s dictum or violate Ockham’s razor. All reported a primary diagnosis that explained the presenting illness, and one or more additional diagnoses which could be classified into four categories: (1) an incidentaloma (n = 21; 25.3%); (2) a pre-existing disease (n = 26; 31.3%); (3) a disease causally linked to the primary diagnosis (n = 33, 39.8%); and (4) a causally unrelated second disease contributing to the acute presentation (n = 3, 3.6%). Among 220 cases from the New England Journal of Medicine, all reported a unifying final diagnosis. In an online survey, 265 respondents recruited using social media evaluated four hypothetical cases with multiple diagnoses representing this categorization scheme. A majority of respondents (79%; 95% CI, 74–84%) chose the case representing category 4 — a coincident, causally unrelated second diagnosis — as the most unlikely or surprising diagnostic combination. Conclusion: Multiple diagnoses commonly occur. However, the majority of the multiple diagnoses we analyzed were causally linked, or represented incidentalomas or known pre-existing diseases. These diagnostic combinations were unsurprising to a majority of surveyed providers. We show that multiple diagnoses can be arranged in a framework that considers time, probability, and causation. This framework reconciles the alleged conflict between Hickam’s dictum and Ockham’s razor and has greater practical and pedagogical utility.
- Open Access
- 27 June 2022
- Published by American Medical Association (AMA) in JAMA Network Open
- Vol. 5 (6) , e2218804
Analysis of Physicians’ Probability Estimates of a Medical Outcome Based on a Sequence of Events
In 3 published studies,1-3 physicians or medical students judged the probability of having both a typical symptom and an atypical symptom of a disease to be more probable than having only the atypical symptom of that disease. Such judgments are mathematically incoherent (ie, formally illogical and mathematically incorrect). The probability of a conjunction of 2 independent events is the product of the probabilities of the 2 components and therefore cannot exceed the probability of either component. A violation of this basic law of probability is called the conjunction fallacy.1
- 27 June 2022
- Published by American Medical Association (AMA) in JAMA Network Open
- Vol. 5 (6) , e2218804
Open AccessAnalysis of Physicians’ Probability Estimates of a Medical Outcome Based on a Sequence of Events
In 3 published studies,1-3 physicians or medical students judged the probability of having both a typical symptom and an atypical symptom of a disease to be more probable than having only the atypical symptom of that disease. Such judgments are mathematically incoherent (ie, formally illogical and mathematically incorrect). The probability of a conjunction of 2 independent events is the product of the probabilities of the 2 components and therefore cannot exceed the probability of either component. A violation of this basic law of probability is called the conjunction fallacy.1
- 2 December 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1213-1217
Common things are common, but what is common? Incorporating probability information into differential diagnosis
The well‐known clinical axiom declaring that ‘common things are common’ attests to the pivotal role of probability in diagnosis. Despite the popularity of this and related axioms, there is no operationalized definition of a common disease, and no practicable way of incorporating actual disease frequencies into differential diagnosis. In this essay, we aim to disambiguate the definition of a common (or rare) disease and show that incidence—not prevalence—is the proper metric of disease frequency for differential diagnosis. We explore how numerical estimates of disease frequencies based on incidence can be incorporated into differential diagnosis as well as the inherent limitations of this method. These concepts have important implications for diagnostic decision making and medical education, and hold promise as a method to improve diagnostic accuracy.
- 2 December 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
- Vol. 28 (6) , 1213-1217
Common things are common, but what is common? Incorporating probability information into differential diagnosis
The well‐known clinical axiom declaring that ‘common things are common’ attests to the pivotal role of probability in diagnosis. Despite the popularity of this and related axioms, there is no operationalized definition of a common disease, and no practicable way of incorporating actual disease frequencies into differential diagnosis. In this essay, we aim to disambiguate the definition of a common (or rare) disease and show that incidence—not prevalence—is the proper metric of disease frequency for differential diagnosis. We explore how numerical estimates of disease frequencies based on incidence can be incorporated into differential diagnosis as well as the inherent limitations of this method. These concepts have important implications for diagnostic decision making and medical education, and hold promise as a method to improve diagnostic accuracy.
- Open Access
- 7 July 2021
- Published by Wiley
Common things are common, but what is common? A foundation for probabilistic diagnosis.
The well-known clinical axiom stating that “common things are common” attests to the pivotal role of probability in diagnosis. Despite the popularity of this and related axioms, there is no operationalized definition of a common disease, and no practicable way of incorporating actual disease frequencies into differential diagnosis. In this expository essay, we aim to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the definition of a common (or rare) disease and show that incidence – not prevalence – is the proper metric of disease frequency for diagnosis. We explore how a numerical estimates of disease frequencies based on incidence can be incorporated into differential diagnosis as well as the inherent limitations of this method. These concepts have important implications for diagnostic decision making and medical education, and hold promise as a method to improve diagnostic accuracy.
- 7 July 2021
- Published by Wiley
Open AccessCommon things are common, but what is common? A foundation for probabilistic diagnosis.
The well-known clinical axiom stating that “common things are common” attests to the pivotal role of probability in diagnosis. Despite the popularity of this and related axioms, there is no operationalized definition of a common disease, and no practicable way of incorporating actual disease frequencies into differential diagnosis. In this expository essay, we aim to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the definition of a common (or rare) disease and show that incidence – not prevalence – is the proper metric of disease frequency for diagnosis. We explore how a numerical estimates of disease frequencies based on incidence can be incorporated into differential diagnosis as well as the inherent limitations of this method. These concepts have important implications for diagnostic decision making and medical education, and hold promise as a method to improve diagnostic accuracy.
- Open Access
- 15 April 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine
- Vol. 203 (8) , 1043-1044
Aspergillosis in the ICU: Hidden Enemy or Bogeyman?
- 15 April 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine
- Vol. 203 (8) , 1043-1044
Open AccessAspergillosis in the ICU: Hidden Enemy or Bogeyman?
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Annals of the American Thoracic Society
- Vol. 17 (6) , 670-672
When Alternative Diagnoses Are More Likely Than Pulmonary Embolism: A Paradox
- 1 June 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Annals of the American Thoracic Society
- Vol. 17 (6) , 670-672
When Alternative Diagnoses Are More Likely Than Pulmonary Embolism: A Paradox
- Open Access
- 1 April 2020
- Published by American Medical Association (AMA) in JAMA Network Open
- Vol. 3 (4) , e202238
Marijuana Legislation and Electronic Cigarette– or Vaping–Associated Lung Injury
- 1 April 2020
- Published by American Medical Association (AMA) in JAMA Network Open
- Vol. 3 (4) , e202238
Open AccessMarijuana Legislation and Electronic Cigarette– or Vaping–Associated Lung Injury
- Open Access
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Annals of the American Thoracic Society
- Vol. 16 (10) , 1335-1336
Troponin in Sepsis
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Annals of the American Thoracic Society
- Vol. 16 (10) , 1335-1336
Open AccessTroponin in Sepsis
- Open Access
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Annals of the American Thoracic Society
- Vol. 16 (6) , 777
Carbon Dioxide Narcosis or Sleep Deprivation?
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Annals of the American Thoracic Society
- Vol. 16 (6) , 777
Open AccessCarbon Dioxide Narcosis or Sleep Deprivation?
- 23 April 2019
- Published by American Medical Association (AMA) in JAMA
- Vol. 321 (16) , 1631-1632
Post Hoc Bayesian Analyses
To the Editor Dr Goligher and colleagues1 used a Bayesian approach to reanalyze the negative ECMO [extracorporeal membrane oxygenation] to Rescue Lung Injury in Severe ARDS [acute respiratory distress syndrome] (EOLIA) trial. I believe this reanalysis is an example of confirmation bias2 and illustrates the common criticisms of Bayesian methodology.
- 23 April 2019
- Published by American Medical Association (AMA) in JAMA
- Vol. 321 (16) , 1631-1632
Post Hoc Bayesian Analyses
To the Editor Dr Goligher and colleagues1 used a Bayesian approach to reanalyze the negative ECMO [extracorporeal membrane oxygenation] to Rescue Lung Injury in Severe ARDS [acute respiratory distress syndrome] (EOLIA) trial. I believe this reanalysis is an example of confirmation bias2 and illustrates the common criticisms of Bayesian methodology.