Hamish D. Anderson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Hamish D. Anderson has a total of 53 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ben R. Marshall
School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand
9 shared publicationsJing Chi
7 shared publications- Ben R. Marshall
Massey Business School Massey University Palmerston North New Zealand
6 shared publications - Jing Chi
School of Accountancy, Economics and Finance Massey University Palmerston North New Zealand
6 shared publications Lawrence C. Rose
6 shared publicationsJianguo Chen
School of Economics and Finance Massey University Palmerston North New Zealand
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
Sustained Higher Education Expansion and Firms' Productivity: Evidence From China
This study investigates the relationship between China's sustained higher education expansion and the productivity of A‐share listed firms from 2004 to 2020. We find that a larger supply of university graduates is associated with significantly higher firm total factor productivity (TFP) on average, a result robust to extensive testing. Mechanism analysis points to three plausible channels: an increased share of skilled labor, strengthened innovation, and accelerated digital transformation. However, the relationship is asymmetric. While graduate inflows are linked to higher TFP in large, R&D‐intensive, and high‐intangible‐asset firms, they are linked to lower productivity in small firms. Specifically, this negative association is concentrated among small enterprises that are non‐state‐owned, labor‐intensive, and financially constrained, with low intangible assets. These findings provide new micro‐level evidence on the heterogeneous value of human capital, offering policy implications for better alignment of graduate supply with firm capabilities.
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
Open AccessSustained Higher Education Expansion and Firms' Productivity: Evidence From China
This study investigates the relationship between China's sustained higher education expansion and the productivity of A‐share listed firms from 2004 to 2020. We find that a larger supply of university graduates is associated with significantly higher firm total factor productivity (TFP) on average, a result robust to extensive testing. Mechanism analysis points to three plausible channels: an increased share of skilled labor, strengthened innovation, and accelerated digital transformation. However, the relationship is asymmetric. While graduate inflows are linked to higher TFP in large, R&D‐intensive, and high‐intangible‐asset firms, they are linked to lower productivity in small firms. Specifically, this negative association is concentrated among small enterprises that are non‐state‐owned, labor‐intensive, and financially constrained, with low intangible assets. These findings provide new micro‐level evidence on the heterogeneous value of human capital, offering policy implications for better alignment of graduate supply with firm capabilities.
- Open Access
- 22 January 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 19 (1) , 94
Breaking Free from Managerial Myopia: Government and Corporate Governance as Catalysts for Firm Innovation
Employing textual analysis of the “short-term vision” vocabulary in annual reports, we investigate the impact of managerial myopia on firm innovation and performance. Our results indicate that managerial myopia hampers innovation, and this result remains robust across a battery of robustness checks. Managerial myopia also weakens the positive impact of innovation on firm growth, and value in the long run. We find that state ownership and good corporate governance mitigate the negative impact of managerial myopia. The evidence supports the upper echelon theory and time orientation theoretical framework. This paper enriches the research on the influencing factors of corporate innovation, by providing evidence that people’s perception of time affects decision making and provides support for government ownership and strong corporate governance practices in alleviating the negative consequences of managerial myopia.
- 22 January 2026
- Published by MDPI AG in Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- Vol. 19 (1) , 94
Open AccessBreaking Free from Managerial Myopia: Government and Corporate Governance as Catalysts for Firm Innovation
Employing textual analysis of the “short-term vision” vocabulary in annual reports, we investigate the impact of managerial myopia on firm innovation and performance. Our results indicate that managerial myopia hampers innovation, and this result remains robust across a battery of robustness checks. Managerial myopia also weakens the positive impact of innovation on firm growth, and value in the long run. We find that state ownership and good corporate governance mitigate the negative impact of managerial myopia. The evidence supports the upper echelon theory and time orientation theoretical framework. This paper enriches the research on the influencing factors of corporate innovation, by providing evidence that people’s perception of time affects decision making and provides support for government ownership and strong corporate governance practices in alleviating the negative consequences of managerial myopia.
- 3 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 204 (2) , 273-308
Social Credit and Trade Credit: A Coevolutionary Perspective
- 3 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 204 (2) , 273-308
Social Credit and Trade Credit: A Coevolutionary Perspective
- 8 September 2022
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 19 (4) , 853-889
State control and stock price crash risk: new evidence of the conservatism of state-owned enterprises
Purpose: This paper examines the impact of state control on stock price crash risk given whether and how ownership structure affects stock price crash risk is relatively underexplored.Design/methodology/approach: The sample includes 2,285 Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Panel data is used for conducting the analysis and endogeneity is addressed with instrumental variable estimation and by testing how stock price crash risk is affected when the ultimate controller changes from a private-owned company to a state-owned enterprise.Findings: The authors find that state control is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. The mechanism analysis shows that state control reduces stock price crash risk through the implementation of conservative corporate policies. Furthermore, the impact of state control is more pronounced with more intensive state involvement, e.g. in strategic industries and when a company's ultimate controller is a non-corporate government agency or the central government.Originality/value: This paper enriches the literature on the controversy of the role of state control and the results of this study highlight the importance of the conservatism of state control on reducing stock return tail risk. The authors also add to the literature on the importance of the policy-risk sharing effect of state ownership.
- 8 September 2022
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 19 (4) , 853-889
State control and stock price crash risk: new evidence of the conservatism of state-owned enterprises
Purpose: This paper examines the impact of state control on stock price crash risk given whether and how ownership structure affects stock price crash risk is relatively underexplored.Design/methodology/approach: The sample includes 2,285 Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. Panel data is used for conducting the analysis and endogeneity is addressed with instrumental variable estimation and by testing how stock price crash risk is affected when the ultimate controller changes from a private-owned company to a state-owned enterprise.Findings: The authors find that state control is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk. The mechanism analysis shows that state control reduces stock price crash risk through the implementation of conservative corporate policies. Furthermore, the impact of state control is more pronounced with more intensive state involvement, e.g. in strategic industries and when a company's ultimate controller is a non-corporate government agency or the central government.Originality/value: This paper enriches the literature on the controversy of the role of state control and the results of this study highlight the importance of the conservatism of state control on reducing stock return tail risk. The authors also add to the literature on the importance of the policy-risk sharing effect of state ownership.
- 2 May 2022
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 19 (3) , 491-518
Powerful political corporate appointments and firm bribery channels
Purpose: The authors examine the influence of powerful political corporate appointments on the usage of firm bribery channels. Party Secretaries within Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may simultaneously hold top management positions, thereby endowing powerful firm-level decision rights on those appointees, hereafter referred to as powerful dual role Party Secretaries.Design/methodology/approach: This study employs panel data analysis with industry and year fixed effects. The authors use a sample of 1,143 Chinese SOEs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2004 to 2015.Findings: The authors find that powerful dual role Party Secretaries are associated with greater bribery channel usage. Following the ongoing anticorruption campaign, SOEs with the powerful appointments significantly reduce their usage of both transparent (entertainment and travel costs) and opaque bribery (abnormal management expenses) channels. However, in general, Chinese SOEs respond to the anticorruption shock by switching from the more transparent to the opaquer bribery channel.Originality/value: The authors contribute to the ongoing debate of politicians on corporate boards by examining the relatively unexplored area of government appointed top management and their influence on bribery at the firm level.
- 2 May 2022
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 19 (3) , 491-518
Powerful political corporate appointments and firm bribery channels
Purpose: The authors examine the influence of powerful political corporate appointments on the usage of firm bribery channels. Party Secretaries within Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may simultaneously hold top management positions, thereby endowing powerful firm-level decision rights on those appointees, hereafter referred to as powerful dual role Party Secretaries.Design/methodology/approach: This study employs panel data analysis with industry and year fixed effects. The authors use a sample of 1,143 Chinese SOEs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2004 to 2015.Findings: The authors find that powerful dual role Party Secretaries are associated with greater bribery channel usage. Following the ongoing anticorruption campaign, SOEs with the powerful appointments significantly reduce their usage of both transparent (entertainment and travel costs) and opaque bribery (abnormal management expenses) channels. However, in general, Chinese SOEs respond to the anticorruption shock by switching from the more transparent to the opaquer bribery channel.Originality/value: The authors contribute to the ongoing debate of politicians on corporate boards by examining the relatively unexplored area of government appointed top management and their influence on bribery at the firm level.
- 25 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
- Vol. 73, 101753
Does directors' and officers' liability insurance induce empire building? Evidence from corporate labor investment
- 25 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
- Vol. 73, 101753
Does directors' and officers' liability insurance induce empire building? Evidence from corporate labor investment
- 16 August 2021
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 18 (3) , 562-593
Financial expert CEOs, political intervention, and corporate investment decisions: evidence from the anti-corruption campaign
Purpose: Employing the anti-corruption campaign as an exogenous political shock, this paper examines how political intervention shapes the impact of financial expert CEOs on firm investment decisions.Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses a sample of 2,808 Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2016. Panel data is used for conducting the analysis controlling for firm, industry, and year fixed effects.Findings: The authors found that CEOs with financial expertise are sensitive to political intervention when making investment decisions. First, financial expert CEOs spend more on R&D expenditure in private-owned companies and they are associated with less R&D expenditure in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Second, financial expert CEOs are associated with higher investment expenditure in general, but they become less likely to invest more in the post-anti-corruption period. The reduction in investment expenditure due to the anti-corruption campaign is more pronounced in SOEs than in private-owned companies. Third, the anti-corruption campaign promotes R&D investment in general, but in SOEs, expert CEOs tend to be less likely to invest more on R&D after the anti-corruption shock.Originality/value: This paper enriches the growing literature on the impact of political intervention and the role of the anti-corruption campaign on corporate behaviour.
- 16 August 2021
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Managerial Finance
- Vol. 18 (3) , 562-593
Financial expert CEOs, political intervention, and corporate investment decisions: evidence from the anti-corruption campaign
Purpose: Employing the anti-corruption campaign as an exogenous political shock, this paper examines how political intervention shapes the impact of financial expert CEOs on firm investment decisions.Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses a sample of 2,808 Chinese firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2003 to 2016. Panel data is used for conducting the analysis controlling for firm, industry, and year fixed effects.Findings: The authors found that CEOs with financial expertise are sensitive to political intervention when making investment decisions. First, financial expert CEOs spend more on R&D expenditure in private-owned companies and they are associated with less R&D expenditure in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Second, financial expert CEOs are associated with higher investment expenditure in general, but they become less likely to invest more in the post-anti-corruption period. The reduction in investment expenditure due to the anti-corruption campaign is more pronounced in SOEs than in private-owned companies. Third, the anti-corruption campaign promotes R&D investment in general, but in SOEs, expert CEOs tend to be less likely to invest more on R&D after the anti-corruption shock.Originality/value: This paper enriches the growing literature on the impact of political intervention and the role of the anti-corruption campaign on corporate behaviour.
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
- Vol. 67
VC fund preferences and exits of individual investors
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
- Vol. 67
VC fund preferences and exits of individual investors
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Emerging Markets Review
- Vol. 39, 34-49
Foreign strategic ownership and minority shareholder protection
- 1 June 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Emerging Markets Review
- Vol. 39, 34-49
Foreign strategic ownership and minority shareholder protection
- 1 March 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 100, 234-251
Does residual state ownership increase stock return volatility? Evidence from China's secondary privatization
- 1 March 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 100, 234-251
Does residual state ownership increase stock return volatility? Evidence from China's secondary privatization