Mihai Mutascu

This paper develops a game-theoretic and dynamic framework to analyse how judicial manipulation by governing parties alters political incentives in multi-party systems. The model shows that biased legal enforcement can prompt politicians - even if innocent - to switch allegiance to the ruling party to avoid penalties, with decisions shaped by reputational, voter and institutional frictions. Strong frictions can sustain pluralistic equilibria despite judicial asymmetry, while weaker frictions or stronger incentives lead to a single-party convergence. Moreover, not only formal institutions limit the judicial weaponization but also by voters’ responsiveness to imbalances in enforcement. The model therefore highlights how even modest judicial biases can erode political pluralism over time, while also identifying the political and electoral conditions under which such dynamics can be contained.

Driven by the recent revival of the debate about the role of money in explaining inflation, this paper provides new insights into the dynamic relationship between money growth and inflation in the United States. The relationship is investigated using the wavelet methodology over 1960–2024. The paper reveals three noticeable findings. First, money growth and inflation were never in phase over the whole period investigated, thereby questioning purely quantity theoretic viewpoints related to monetary policy. The second finding is the absence of any co‐movement between money growth and inflation at very high and, as a novelty, low frequencies over the investigable timespan. This suggests that the recent resurgence of inflation should be attributed to the interaction of many different factors on the demand and supply sides of the economy, including the large monetary expansion during the pandemic. Third, we highlight different episodes where inflation negatively drives money growth in the short to medium run, in line with the Federal Reserve monetary policy operating procedure and the implications of the DSGE model.

Building on Robinson & Acemoglu’s (Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2006) framework, this paper theoretically examines the interplay between tax evasion and bribery, focusing on the trade-off between tax evasion penalties and the deterrent effects of bribery sanctions in democratic societies with redistributive politics. The paper introduces the concept of the "tax evasion-bribery paradox" as a novelty. In this paradox, low detection probabilities of tax evasion caused by an under-resourced government make bribery less attractive but also prevent effective tax collection. Bribing tax officials is a high-stakes action that provides no added benefit if tax evasion is already going undetected. Otherwise, a similar mitigating effect on bribery is observed when the tax authority is well-resourced to enforce compliance. The high probability of detection discourages bribery as strong monitoring and auditing make it more likely that illegal activities will be uncovered. The study also emphasises that a greater likelihood of detecting bribery considerably decreases the occurrence of bribery. In this case, the tax evasion rate is limited to the tax rate level, while the tax penalty conditions the bribe. Moreover, wealthier individuals are more likely to engage in bribery due to their ability to absorb the associated costs. At the same time, lump-sum transfers can reduce bribery incentives compared to non-lump-sum transfers.

This paper investigates the global influence of Earth's pole motion on CO ₂ emissions through global warming. Empirical evidence is provided using cointegration techniques and the Vector Error‐Correction estimator, covering 1962–2022. Additionally, panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag models are utilised, incorporating data from 1990 to 2020 across 144 countries to bolster the findings. The first set of results evidences that Earth's pole motion positively influences global warming dynamics in the short‐term, particularly in the X coordinate, on global warming dynamics. Further, the pole motion shock can be indirectly transmitted to CO ₂ emissions, with global warming mediating. EKC effect and renewable energy are also considered. The second set of findings refers to the influence of global warming on CO ₂ emissions. Herein, global warming reduces CO ₂ emissions in the short‐term, especially during sinusoidal periods of pole motion. In contrast, long‐term trends show a positive relationship between global warming and CO ₂ emissions, highlighting ecosystem modifications like sea‐level rise and the non‐linear relationship between economic growth and emissions. Moreover, the study identifies indirect pathways linking Earth's pole motion, global warming, and CO ₂ emissions, underscoring the role of factors like the Coriolis Effect and pole motion in influencing ecosystem responses across hemispheres. In summary, the pole motion shock boosts global warming in the short term, mitigating CO ₂ emissions, but has an expansive emissions tendency in the long term. The policy implications primarily involve adaptive frameworks to address dynamic geo‐environmental conditions, the development of renewable energy to reduce dependence on fossil fuels by fostering a low‐carbon economy through innovation and cost reduction, long‐term climate resilience measures, and the implementation of effective monitoring systems to track pole motion and CO ₂ emissions.