Friedel Bolle
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Friedel Bolle has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Philipp E. Otto
European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany
3 shared publications - Simon Kemp
Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
2 shared publications - Yves Breitmoser
EUV Frankfurt (Oder)
2 shared publications Alexander Kritikos
1 shared publication- Axel Ockenfels
Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics
1 shared publication Claudia Vogel
Universität Bern
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 24 (1) , 30-57
Voting with abstention
Most voting models in the literature neglect abstention, but is such a simplification justified? I investigate this question in a model with outside pressure on voters. For sequential voting (e.g., roll call votes), with and without an abstention option, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which implies that true majorities always succeed. Abstention can be an equilibrium strategy for some voters, in particular under complex decision rules (e.g., weighted voting, double majorities). Simultaneous voting often has a unique pure strategy equilibrium but also a plethora of mixed and pure/mixed strategy equilibria. Therefore, only with equilibrium selection, can we evaluate the consequences of neglecting abstention. For equal weight voting, equilibria selected by the procedure of Harsanyi and Selten change completely with an abstention option, even if abstention itself is not or rarely used. With small enough outside pressure, however, the selected equilibrium honors true majorities in both cases.
- 16 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 24 (1) , 30-57
Open AccessVoting with abstention
Most voting models in the literature neglect abstention, but is such a simplification justified? I investigate this question in a model with outside pressure on voters. For sequential voting (e.g., roll call votes), with and without an abstention option, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which implies that true majorities always succeed. Abstention can be an equilibrium strategy for some voters, in particular under complex decision rules (e.g., weighted voting, double majorities). Simultaneous voting often has a unique pure strategy equilibrium but also a plethora of mixed and pure/mixed strategy equilibria. Therefore, only with equilibrium selection, can we evaluate the consequences of neglecting abstention. For equal weight voting, equilibria selected by the procedure of Harsanyi and Selten change completely with an abstention option, even if abstention itself is not or rarely used. With small enough outside pressure, however, the selected equilibrium honors true majorities in both cases.
- Open Access
Deterrence by Collective Punishment May Work against Criminals but Never against Freedom Fighters
The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future “wrong-doing” by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the enemy. CP could consist of the lockout of workers, additional training units for football teams, increased control of athletes and firms, up to the shooting of fellow villagers of assassins. I investigate two classes of problems. In one class, resistance against an authority is individually costly, but enough resistance can be successful (the production of a public good, for example, higher wages after a strike). In the other case, “resistance” is individually profitable (a criminal activity as pollution) and enough “resistance” produces a public bad. We find that, in the first situation, the announcement of CP never decreases the level of resistance. In the second situation, CP can be successful.
Open AccessDeterrence by Collective Punishment May Work against Criminals but Never against Freedom Fighters
The main goal of collective punishment (CP) is the deterrence of future “wrong-doing” by freedom fighters or terrorists, protesters against an authoritative government, polluters, students playing pranks on their teacher, football teams lacking enthusiasm, or soldiers showing cowardice to the enemy. CP could consist of the lockout of workers, additional training units for football teams, increased control of athletes and firms, up to the shooting of fellow villagers of assassins. I investigate two classes of problems. In one class, resistance against an authority is individually costly, but enough resistance can be successful (the production of a public good, for example, higher wages after a strike). In the other case, “resistance” is individually profitable (a criminal activity as pollution) and enough “resistance” produces a public bad. We find that, in the first situation, the announcement of CP never decreases the level of resistance. In the second situation, CP can be successful.
- Open Access
- 22 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 59 (3) , 904-924
Cooperation against all predictions
- 22 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 59 (3) , 904-924
Open AccessCooperation against all predictions
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Centre of Sociological Research, NGO in Economics & Sociology
- Vol. 13 (4) , 11-30
Power attitudes and stealing: Senses of responsibility
- 1 December 2020
- Published by Centre of Sociological Research, NGO in Economics & Sociology
- Vol. 13 (4) , 11-30
Power attitudes and stealing: Senses of responsibility
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 102, 24-34
When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
- 1 November 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 102, 24-34
When will party whips succeed? Evidence from almost symmetric voting games
- 1 August 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 30 (4) , 477-488
Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the ‘true majority’ . If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the ‘true majority’ prevails. It is shown that the result for sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders), with multiple necessary majorities (European Union decision-making), or even more general rules. Simultaneous voting in the general model has more differentiated results.
- 1 August 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 30 (4) , 477-488
Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of benefits. Voting with respect to (arbitrarily small) costs alone, however, often results in voting against the ‘true majority’ . If voting is sequential as in the roll call votes of the US Senate then, in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the ‘true majority’ prevails. It is shown that the result for sequential voting holds also with different weights of voters (shareholders), with multiple necessary majorities (European Union decision-making), or even more general rules. Simultaneous voting in the general model has more differentiated results.
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 71 (1) , 86-101
Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 71 (1) , 86-101
Passing the Buck On the acceptance of responsibility
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 65, 49-57
The advantage of hierarchy: Inducing responsibility and selecting ability?
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 65, 49-57
The advantage of hierarchy: Inducing responsibility and selecting ability?
- 29 October 2015
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Review of Behavioral Economics
- Vol. 2 (3) , 307-330
Solidarity, Responsibility and In-Group Bias
In the Solidarity game lucky winners of a lottery can transfer part of their income to unlucky losers. Will losers get smaller transfers if they can be assumed to be responsible for their zero income because they have chosen riskier lotteries? Or will risk-lovers and risk-averters favor those who made the same risk-choice, leading to larger transfers within rather than between the risk-groups? While there is support for both motives in the literature, in an experiment we find that the effect of holding people responsible for their actions is overcome by behavior guided by in-group favoritism based on different levels of risk-taking. This behavior is successfully described by a variant of the social utility function suggested by Cappelen et al. (2013).
- 29 October 2015
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Review of Behavioral Economics
- Vol. 2 (3) , 307-330
Solidarity, Responsibility and In-Group Bias
In the Solidarity game lucky winners of a lottery can transfer part of their income to unlucky losers. Will losers get smaller transfers if they can be assumed to be responsible for their zero income because they have chosen riskier lotteries? Or will risk-lovers and risk-averters favor those who made the same risk-choice, leading to larger transfers within rather than between the risk-groups? While there is support for both motives in the literature, in an experiment we find that the effect of holding people responsible for their actions is overcome by behavior guided by in-group favoritism based on different levels of risk-taking. This behavior is successfully described by a variant of the social utility function suggested by Cappelen et al. (2013).
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 63, 170-185
An experiment on supply function competition
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 63, 170-185
An experiment on supply function competition