Ulrich Sieberer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ulrich Sieberer has a total of 57 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Wolfgang C. Müller
University of Vienna
8 shared publications - Daniel Höhmann
University of Basel
3 shared publications - Michael Herrmann
University of Konstanz
3 shared publications - Peter Meißner
Software Developer, Drestedt Germany
3 shared publications - Thomas Saalfeld
Universität Bamberg
3 shared publications - David Schmuck
Chair of Empirical Political Science, University of Bamberg, Bamberg, Germany
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 368-381
Slicing the pie: Portfolio design and coalition governments
- 6 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 368-381
Slicing the pie: Portfolio design and coalition governments
- Open Access
- 10 December 2023
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 49 (3) , 649-671
Recorded Votes as Attention Booster: How Opposition Parties use Roll Calls and Nonrecorded Votes for Position Taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21
The article investigates roll‐call request and its effects on opposition‐voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll‐call votes (RCVs) as a position‐taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–21), the analysis shows that RCVs are more likely on high‐salience issues, more important motion types, and to some extent opposition motions. Voting conforms to the position‐taking model as opposition parties are less likely to vote with the government on their own motions and more important motion types. However, opposition behavior does not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes suggesting that parties act consistently across all votes. Thus, RCVs provide valid measures for studying interparty competition in parliament despite their selective sampling properties.
- 10 December 2023
- Published by Wiley in Legislative Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 49 (3) , 649-671
Open AccessRecorded Votes as Attention Booster: How Opposition Parties use Roll Calls and Nonrecorded Votes for Position Taking in the German Bundestag, 2017–21
The article investigates roll‐call request and its effects on opposition‐voting behavior. It argues that parties use roll‐call votes (RCVs) as a position‐taking instrument to boost public attention for issues they care about. This argument implies that RCVs are requested strategically but opposition behavior should not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes. Studying all voting activities of the 19th German Bundestag (2017–21), the analysis shows that RCVs are more likely on high‐salience issues, more important motion types, and to some extent opposition motions. Voting conforms to the position‐taking model as opposition parties are less likely to vote with the government on their own motions and more important motion types. However, opposition behavior does not differ systematically between recorded and nonrecorded votes suggesting that parties act consistently across all votes. Thus, RCVs provide valid measures for studying interparty competition in parliament despite their selective sampling properties.
- Open Access
- 14 April 2023
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 37 (2) , 517-536
Colleagues or adversaries: Ministerial coordination across party lines
- 14 April 2023
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 37 (2) , 517-536
Open AccessColleagues or adversaries: Ministerial coordination across party lines
- Open Access
- 6 February 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 47 (1) , 142-163
Rebuilding the coalition ship at sea: how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets
In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle.
- 6 February 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 47 (1) , 142-163
Open AccessRebuilding the coalition ship at sea: how uncertainty and complexity drive the reform of portfolio design in coalition cabinets
In the government formation process, coalition partners make decisions about the inner workings of their future government. However, whether the initial allocation of competencies has the desired effects is uncertain, and deals may therefore be subject to change when the government is in office. This study analyses the frequency of changes in portfolio design (i.e. the distribution of competencies among government ministries and office holders) for 112 coalition governments in eight West European democracies (1970–2015). Its central argument is that in uncertain and complex bargaining situations, coalition partners have greater difficulty finding mutually beneficial deals, and changes to the initial allocation of payoffs are therefore more likely. The results indicate that preference divergence and strenuous coalition negotiations make portfolio design reforms more likely, but show no consistent effect of the familiarity among government parties. These findings show how the bargaining context during government formation foreshadows coalition governance over the cabinet’s life-cycle.
- Open Access
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Politische Vierteljahresschrift
- Vol. 63 (3) , 383-404
Being Empowered or Feeling Like a Pawn?
Governments often reallocate administrative units among ministries to meet parties’ office and policy demands or to increase political control over the bureaucracy. How do such reforms affect the work motivation and performance of ministerial bureaucrats? Based on self-determination theory, this paper expects detrimental effects on bureaucrats’ ability to meet the basic psychological needs of competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which should reduce work motivation. This negative effect should be weaker when bureaucrats perceive a substantive rationale and long-term benefits of the reform compared to changes perceived as driven solely by party-political goals. We find support for these expectations in interviews with top-level ministerial bureaucrats in Germany working in two policy areas (public construction and consumer protection) that were frequently reallocated between ministries. The study shows that organizational change also affects work motivation among top-level bureaucrats and has broader implications for understanding civil servants’ motivations and performance as well as unintended consequences of public sector reforms.
- 25 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Politische Vierteljahresschrift
- Vol. 63 (3) , 383-404
Open AccessBeing Empowered or Feeling Like a Pawn?
Governments often reallocate administrative units among ministries to meet parties’ office and policy demands or to increase political control over the bureaucracy. How do such reforms affect the work motivation and performance of ministerial bureaucrats? Based on self-determination theory, this paper expects detrimental effects on bureaucrats’ ability to meet the basic psychological needs of competence, autonomy, and relatedness, which should reduce work motivation. This negative effect should be weaker when bureaucrats perceive a substantive rationale and long-term benefits of the reform compared to changes perceived as driven solely by party-political goals. We find support for these expectations in interviews with top-level ministerial bureaucrats in Germany working in two policy areas (public construction and consumer protection) that were frequently reallocated between ministries. The study shows that organizational change also affects work motivation among top-level bureaucrats and has broader implications for understanding civil servants’ motivations and performance as well as unintended consequences of public sector reforms.
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 135-154
Der Bundestag als Arena: Institutionelle Macht, Akteursanreize und selektive Nutzungsmuster
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 135-154
Der Bundestag als Arena: Institutionelle Macht, Akteursanreize und selektive Nutzungsmuster
- Open Access
- 1 April 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 28 (4) , 597-610
Do party system parameters explain differences in legislative organization? Fragmentation, polarization, and the density of regulation in European parliaments, 1945–2009
The article studies whether the party system characteristics fragmentation and ideological polarization increase the density of institutional regulation in parliaments. It introduces a comprehensive time-series-cross-sectional dataset of standing orders in 15 Western European parliaments that allows studying how densely various fields of legislative activity such as lawmaking, controlling the government, and creating publicity were regulated over a period of more than 60 years. Descriptively, the data show increased regulation in all areas but also some variation between countries. Dynamic panel regression analyses for non-stationary time series find no systematic effect of fragmentation or polarization on the density of regulation indicating that large parts of legislative organization change for reasons unrelated to party system dynamics. We identify changes in the environment of legislatures such as increasing complexity and professionalization of politics, technological change, and Europeanization as potential drivers of such Pareto-efficient reforms.
- 1 April 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 28 (4) , 597-610
Open AccessDo party system parameters explain differences in legislative organization? Fragmentation, polarization, and the density of regulation in European parliaments, 1945–2009
The article studies whether the party system characteristics fragmentation and ideological polarization increase the density of institutional regulation in parliaments. It introduces a comprehensive time-series-cross-sectional dataset of standing orders in 15 Western European parliaments that allows studying how densely various fields of legislative activity such as lawmaking, controlling the government, and creating publicity were regulated over a period of more than 60 years. Descriptively, the data show increased regulation in all areas but also some variation between countries. Dynamic panel regression analyses for non-stationary time series find no systematic effect of fragmentation or polarization on the density of regulation indicating that large parts of legislative organization change for reasons unrelated to party system dynamics. We identify changes in the environment of legislatures such as increasing complexity and professionalization of politics, technological change, and Europeanization as potential drivers of such Pareto-efficient reforms.
- 30 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in German Politics
- Vol. 31 (4) , 627-628
Politische Führung im Fraktionenparlament. Rolle und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten der Fraktionsvorsitzenden im Deutschen Bundestag
Danny Schindler's book – the published version of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Halle-Wittenberg – provides the first in-depth study of parliamentary party group (PPG) leaders in t...
- 30 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in German Politics
- Vol. 31 (4) , 627-628
Politische Führung im Fraktionenparlament. Rolle und Steuerungsmöglichkeiten der Fraktionsvorsitzenden im Deutschen Bundestag
Danny Schindler's book – the published version of his doctoral dissertation at the University of Halle-Wittenberg – provides the first in-depth study of parliamentary party group (PPG) leaders in t...
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 3 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 44 (5-6) , 1025-1051
Opposition in times of crisis: COVID-19 in parliamentary debates
The COVID-19 pandemic presents an exceptional crisis situation not only for governments, but also for politicians in opposition. This article analyses opposition party expressed sentiment vis-à-vis government actions and policies during the first six months of 2020. Based on an original content analysis of parliamentary debates in four established parliamentary democracies (Germany, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom), relatively positive opposition expressed sentiment in parliament early on during the crisis is observed, in line with a ‘rally effect’ observed in public opinion. Sentiment turned more negative as the first wave of the crisis abated. Larger opposition parties with considerable prior government experience were more positive than larger parties without such experience.
- 3 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 44 (5-6) , 1025-1051
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessOpposition in times of crisis: COVID-19 in parliamentary debates
The COVID-19 pandemic presents an exceptional crisis situation not only for governments, but also for politicians in opposition. This article analyses opposition party expressed sentiment vis-à-vis government actions and policies during the first six months of 2020. Based on an original content analysis of parliamentary debates in four established parliamentary democracies (Germany, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom), relatively positive opposition expressed sentiment in parliament early on during the crisis is observed, in line with a ‘rally effect’ observed in public opinion. Sentiment turned more negative as the first wave of the crisis abated. Larger opposition parties with considerable prior government experience were more positive than larger parties without such experience.
- 22 April 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 44 (4) , 921-945
Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag
This article argues that opposition veto power in institutional arenas such as second chambers can foster a more consensual relationship between government and opposition parties in parliament. This theoretical claim is supported in the article using data on legislative voting behaviour in the German Bundestag. The statistical analysis shows that opposition and government parties are much more likely to vote the same way, if the opposition controls a majority in the second chamber and this chamber enjoys veto power. This pattern holds even when controlling for policy-area specific ideological distances between government and opposition parties and electoral signalling incentives. The article’s findings suggest that government and opposition parties seek compromises early in the legislative process and that bicameral conflicts are often already resolved in the lower chamber. The results here support theoretical arguments on the absorption of institutional veto players and challenge the frequent claim that opposition veto power leads to more competitive behaviour and gridlock.
- 22 April 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 44 (4) , 921-945
Veto power fosters cooperative behaviour: institutional incentives and government-opposition voting in the German Bundestag
This article argues that opposition veto power in institutional arenas such as second chambers can foster a more consensual relationship between government and opposition parties in parliament. This theoretical claim is supported in the article using data on legislative voting behaviour in the German Bundestag. The statistical analysis shows that opposition and government parties are much more likely to vote the same way, if the opposition controls a majority in the second chamber and this chamber enjoys veto power. This pattern holds even when controlling for policy-area specific ideological distances between government and opposition parties and electoral signalling incentives. The article’s findings suggest that government and opposition parties seek compromises early in the legislative process and that bicameral conflicts are often already resolved in the lower chamber. The results here support theoretical arguments on the absorption of institutional veto players and challenge the frequent claim that opposition veto power leads to more competitive behaviour and gridlock.