DVDanilo Vendraminetto

Danilo Vendraminetto

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Danilo Vendraminetto has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Model-Checking Speculation-Dependent Security Properties: Abstracting and Reducing Processor Models for Sound and Complete Verification

    by Gianpiero Cabodi, Paolo Camurati, Fabrizio Finocchiaro, Danilo Vendraminetto

    Spectre and Meltdown attacks in modern microprocessors represent a new class of attacks that have been difficult to deal with. They underline vulnerabilities in hardware design that have been going unnoticed for years. This shows the weakness of the state-of-the-art verification process and design practices. These attacks are OS-independent, and they do not exploit any software vulnerabilities. Moreover, they violate all security assumptions ensured by standard security procedures, (e.g., address space isolation), and, as a result, every security mechanism built upon these guarantees. These vulnerabilities allow the attacker to retrieve leaked data without accessing the secret directly. Indeed, they make use of covert channels, which are mechanisms of hidden communication that convey sensitive information without any visible information flow between the malicious party and the victim. The root cause of this type of side-channel attacks lies within the speculative and out-of-order execution of modern high-performance microarchitectures. Since modern processors are hard to verify with standard formal verification techniques, we present a methodology that shows how to transform a realistic model of a speculative and out-of-order processor into an abstract one. Following related formal verification approaches, we simplify the model under consideration by abstraction and refinement steps. We also present an approach to formally verify the abstract model using a standard model checker. The theoretical flow, reliant on established formal verification results, is introduced and a sketch of proof is provided for soundness and correctness. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, by applying it on a pipelined DLX RISC-inspired processor architecture. We show preliminary experimental results to support our claim, performing Bounded Model-Checking with a state-of-the-art model checker.


  • Reducing Interpolant Circuit Size Through SAT-Based Weakening

    by G. Cabodi, P. E. Camurati, M. Palena, P. Pasini, D. Vendraminetto

    We address the problem of reducing the size of Craig’s interpolants used in SAT-based Model Checking. Whereas it is well known that interpolants are highly redundant, their compaction is typically tackled by reducing the proof graph and/or by exploiting standard logic synthesis techniques. Furthermore, strengthening and weakening have been studied as options to control interpolant quality. In this paperSome of the techniques here described were presented in a preliminary version at FMCAD’16 Cabodi2016 we propose a SAT-based interpolant weakening/strengthening technique, for interpolant compaction, where the UNSAT core extracted from an additional SAT query is used to obtain a gate-level abstraction of the interpolant. The abstraction introduces fresh new variables at gate cuts that must be quantified out in order to obtain a valid interpolant. We show how to efficiently quantify them out, by working on an NNF representation of the circuit. The paper includes an experimental evaluation, showing the benefits of the proposed approach, on a set of benchmark interpolants arising from hardware model checking problems.


  • Interpolation-Based Learning as a Mean to Speed-Up Bounded Model Checking (Short Paper)

    by Gianpiero Cabodi, Paolo Camurati, Marco Palena, Paolo Pasini, Danilo Vendraminetto


  • Embedded Systems Secure Path Verification at the Hardware/Software Interface

    by Gianpiero Cabodi, Paolo Camurati, Sebastiano F. Finocchiaro, Francesco Savarese, Danilo Vendraminetto

    The article presents a case study comparing two types of properties for formal verification of security requirements in embedded systems. —Wen Chen, NXP


  • Reducing interpolant circuit size by ad-hoc logic synthesis and SAT-based weakening

    by G. Cabodi, P. E. Camurati, M. Palena, P. Pasini, D. Vendraminetto

    We address the problem of reducing the size of Craig interpolants used in SAT-based Model Checking. Craig interpolants are AND-OR circuits, generated by post-processing refutation proofs of SAT solvers. Whereas it is well known that interpolants are highly redundant, their compaction is typically tackled by reducing the proof graph and/or by exploiting standard logic synthesis techniques. Furthermore, strengthening and weakening have been studied as an option to control interpolant quality. In this paper we propose two interpolant compaction techniques: (1) A set of ad-hoc logic synthesis functions that, revisiting known logic synthesis approaches, specifically address speed and scalability. Though general and not restricted to interpolants, these techniques target the main sources of redundancy in interpolant circuits. (2) An interpolant weakening technique, where the UNSAT core extracted from an additional SAT query is used to obtain a gate-level abstraction of the interpolant. The abstraction introduces fresh new variables at gate cuts that must be quantified out in order to obtain a valid interpolant. We show how to efficiently quantify them out, by working on an NNF representation of the circuit. The paper includes an experimental evaluation, showing the benefits of the proposed techniques, on a set of benchmark interpolants arising from both hardware and software model checking problems.


  • Secure Path Verification

    by G. Cabodi, P. Camurati, S.F. Finocchiaro, C. Loiacono, F. Savarese, D. Vendraminetto

    Many embedded systems, like medical, sensing, automotive, military, require basic security functions, often referred to as "secure communications". Nowadays, interest has been growing around defining new security related properties, expressing relationships with information flow and access control. In particular, novel research works are focused on formalizing generic security requirements as propagation properties. These kinds of properties, we name them Path properties, are used to see whether it is possible to leak secure data via unexpected paths. In this paper we compare Path properties, described above, with formal security properties expressed in CTL Logic, named Taint properties. We also compare two verification techniques used to verify Path and Taint properties considering an abstraction of a Secure Embedded Architecture discussing the advantages and drawbacks of each approach.


  • Secure embedded architectures: Taint properties verification

    by G. Cabodi, P. Camurati, S. F. Finocchiaro, C. Loiacono, F. Savarese, D. Vendraminetto

    Nowadays embedded devices collect various kinds of information and provide it to communication networks for further processing. These devices often provide critical functionalities that could be exploited by malicious parties. Using formal techniques is a natural way to increase the confidence in the overall embedded system security. However, the major research focus is on verifying only the correctness of encryption algorithms and their implementation in software and hardware and not the whole security process. Following novel research studies, many security requirements of an embedded architecture can be specified as Taint Properties, expressing properties related to information flow and access control. In this paper we define Taint Properties as a way to find out whether there is a path from src to dest, where src is an RTL signal seeded with the Taint and dest is a signal not to be reached by the Taint in order to satisfy the security requirements. In our scenario a Taint is an untrusted code following an illegal path from src to dest. We present a systematic approach to formalize generic security requirements, referring to a model abstraction, and their related Taint Properties of an embedded architecture. First, we present our model abstraction of two selected embedded secure architectures, then we define a portfolio of Taint Properties to verify key secrecy, isolation, attestation, confidentiality and availability features. We finally perform verification of previously defined formal security properties, hence presenting results on two selected embedded architectures proving the effectiveness of our approach.


  • Open Access

    Hardware Model Checking Competition 2014: An Analysis and Comparison of Model Checkers and Benchmarks

    by Gianpiero Cabodi, Carmelo Loiacono, Marco Palena, Paolo Pasini, Denis Patti, Stefano Quer, Danilo Vendraminetto, Armin Biere, Keijo Heljanko

    Model checkers and sequential equivalence checkers have become essential tools for the semiconductor industry in recent years. The Hardware Model Checking Competition (HWMCC) was founded in 2006 with the purpose of intensifying research interest in t