Brian Bell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Brian Bell has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Stephen Machin
London School of Economics
5 shared publicationsJohn Van Reenen
London School of Economics, CEPR and NBER
3 shared publications- Stephen Machin
London School of Economics
2 shared publications Stephen Nickell
Bank of England
2 shared publicationsAnna Bindler
University of Gothenburg
1 shared publication- Anna Rita Giovagnoli
Department of Diagnostics and Technology, Fondazione IRCCS Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta, Milan, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 February 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 19 (5) , 2513-2542
Ceo Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts: A Question of Governance?
We exploit the large rise in relative performance awards in the United Kingdom over the last two decades to investigate whether these contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and firm performance. We first document that corporate governance appears to be stronger when institutional ownership is greater. Then, using hand-collected data from annual reports on explicit contracts, we show that (1) CEO pay still responds more to increases in the firms’ stock performance than to decreases, and, importantly, this asymmetry is stronger when corporate governance is weak as measured by low institutional ownership; and (2) “pay for luck” persists as remuneration increases with random positive shocks, even when the CEO has equity awards that explicitly condition on firm performance relative to peer firms in the same sector. A major reason why relative performance contracts do not eliminate pay for luck is that CEOs who fail to meet the terms of their past performance awards are able to obtain more generous new equity rewards in the future in weakly governed firms. We show the mechanism operates both through the quantum of shares and the structure of new contracts. These findings suggest that reforms to the formal structure of CEO pay contracts are unlikely to align incentives in the absence of strong corporate governance.
- 4 February 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 19 (5) , 2513-2542
Open AccessCeo Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts: A Question of Governance?
We exploit the large rise in relative performance awards in the United Kingdom over the last two decades to investigate whether these contracts improve the alignment between CEO pay and firm performance. We first document that corporate governance appears to be stronger when institutional ownership is greater. Then, using hand-collected data from annual reports on explicit contracts, we show that (1) CEO pay still responds more to increases in the firms’ stock performance than to decreases, and, importantly, this asymmetry is stronger when corporate governance is weak as measured by low institutional ownership; and (2) “pay for luck” persists as remuneration increases with random positive shocks, even when the CEO has equity awards that explicitly condition on firm performance relative to peer firms in the same sector. A major reason why relative performance contracts do not eliminate pay for luck is that CEOs who fail to meet the terms of their past performance awards are able to obtain more generous new equity rewards in the future in weakly governed firms. We show the mechanism operates both through the quantum of shares and the structure of new contracts. These findings suggest that reforms to the formal structure of CEO pay contracts are unlikely to align incentives in the absence of strong corporate governance.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2018
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 100 (3) , 392-404
Crime Scars: Recessions and the Making of Career Criminals
Recessions lead to short-term job loss, lower happiness, and decreasing income levels. There is growing evidence that workers who first join the labor market during economic downturns suffer from poor job matches that can have sustained detrimental effects on wages and career progressions. This paper uses U.S. and U.K. data to document a more disturbing long-run effect of recessions: young people who leave school during recessions are significantly more likely to lead a life of crime than those entering a buoyant labor market. Thus, crime scars resulting from higher entry-level unemployment rates prove to be long lasting and substantial.
- 1 July 2018
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 100 (3) , 392-404
Open AccessCrime Scars: Recessions and the Making of Career Criminals
Recessions lead to short-term job loss, lower happiness, and decreasing income levels. There is growing evidence that workers who first join the labor market during economic downturns suffer from poor job matches that can have sustained detrimental effects on wages and career progressions. This paper uses U.S. and U.K. data to document a more disturbing long-run effect of recessions: young people who leave school during recessions are significantly more likely to lead a life of crime than those entering a buoyant labor market. Thus, crime scars resulting from higher entry-level unemployment rates prove to be long lasting and substantial.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 36 (1) , 159-195
Minimum Wages and Firm Value
- 1 January 2018
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Labor Economics
- Vol. 36 (1) , 159-195
Minimum Wages and Firm Value
- Open Access
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 47, 107-123
Top earnings inequality and the gender pay gap: Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Labour Economics
- Vol. 47, 107-123
Open AccessTop earnings inequality and the gender pay gap: Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom
- Open Access
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Economics of Education Review
- Vol. 54, 214-226
Crime, compulsory schooling laws and education
- 1 October 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Economics of Education Review
- Vol. 54, 214-226
Open AccessCrime, compulsory schooling laws and education
- Open Access
- 22 February 2016
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Hematology
- Vol. 91 (3) , 351-353
Between a rock and a hard place
- 22 February 2016
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Hematology
- Vol. 91 (3) , 351-353
Open AccessBetween a rock and a hard place
- 23 May 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 124 (576) , 480-506
Crime Deterrence: Evidence From the London 2011 Riots
- 23 May 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 124 (576) , 480-506
Crime Deterrence: Evidence From the London 2011 Riots
- Open Access
- 1 February 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 124 (574) , F1-F21
Bankers and Their Bonuses
- 1 February 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 124 (574) , F1-F21
Open AccessBankers and Their Bonuses
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH in IZA World of Labor
Crime and immigration
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH in IZA World of Labor
Crime and immigration
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 October 2013
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 95 (4) , 1278-1290
Crime and Immigration: Evidence from Large Immigrant Waves
This paper focuses on empirical connections between crime and immigration, studying two large waves of recent U.K. immigration (the late 1990s/early 2000s asylum seekers and the post-2004 inflow from EU accession countries). The first wave led to a modest but significant rise in property crime, while the second wave had a small negative impact. There was no effect on violent crime; arrest rates were not different, and changes in crime cannot be ascribed to crimes against immigrants. The findings are consistent with the notion that differences in labor market opportunities of different migrant groups shape their potential impact on crime.
- 1 October 2013
- Published by MIT Press in Review of Economics and Statistics
- Vol. 95 (4) , 1278-1290
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessCrime and Immigration: Evidence from Large Immigrant Waves
This paper focuses on empirical connections between crime and immigration, studying two large waves of recent U.K. immigration (the late 1990s/early 2000s asylum seekers and the post-2004 inflow from EU accession countries). The first wave led to a modest but significant rise in property crime, while the second wave had a small negative impact. There was no effect on violent crime; arrest rates were not different, and changes in crime cannot be ascribed to crimes against immigrants. The findings are consistent with the notion that differences in labor market opportunities of different migrant groups shape their potential impact on crime.