Mandy M. Cheng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mandy M. Cheng has a total of 42 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kerry A. Humphreys
UNSW Sydney
4 shared publications - Habib Mahama
Department of Accounting and Information Systems, Qatar University, Doha, Qatar
3 shared publications Ken T. Trotman
UNSW Australia
3 shared publications- Linda J. Chang
UNSW Sydney
3 shared publications Peter F. Luckett
School of Accounting, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2052, Australia
3 shared publicationsWendy J. Green
School of Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, UNSW Business School, UNSW Sydney, Sydney, Australia
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 117
Do bonus deferral and bonus recovery affect employee effort?
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 117
Open AccessDo bonus deferral and bonus recovery affect employee effort?
- 1 January 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-28
Tough Ratings, Tougher Sell: How Different Types of Adjustment Affect Managers’ Asymmetric Algorithm Use in Performance Evaluation Judgments
Despite the potential of algorithms to improve judgment quality, recent research suggests that individuals may be averse to algorithmic use. We experimentally examine whether and how managers’ use of an algorithm-advised performance rating is influenced by rating valence and the decision rights managers have to adjust the algorithm. We find that managers are less willing to use an algorithm to evaluate subordinate performance when it advises a low, rather than high, rating. We further show that when the algorithm-advised rating is low, allowing managers to adjust how the algorithm computes the rating, compared with adjusting the rating itself or not allowing any adjustment, increases algorithmic use. Further analyses show this effect to be consistent with managers’ increased understanding of an algorithm when involved in its computation. Our findings inform organizations’ implementation of performance evaluation algorithms by showing how rating valence and decision rights jointly influence managers’ use of the algorithms.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-28
Tough Ratings, Tougher Sell: How Different Types of Adjustment Affect Managers’ Asymmetric Algorithm Use in Performance Evaluation Judgments
Despite the potential of algorithms to improve judgment quality, recent research suggests that individuals may be averse to algorithmic use. We experimentally examine whether and how managers’ use of an algorithm-advised performance rating is influenced by rating valence and the decision rights managers have to adjust the algorithm. We find that managers are less willing to use an algorithm to evaluate subordinate performance when it advises a low, rather than high, rating. We further show that when the algorithm-advised rating is low, allowing managers to adjust how the algorithm computes the rating, compared with adjusting the rating itself or not allowing any adjustment, increases algorithmic use. Further analyses show this effect to be consistent with managers’ increased understanding of an algorithm when involved in its computation. Our findings inform organizations’ implementation of performance evaluation algorithms by showing how rating valence and decision rights jointly influence managers’ use of the algorithms.
- 19 November 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 334-353
Doing experimental research on performance measurement (with a little help from technology)
In experiments researchers can create a research setting that is uniquely suitable to examining the phenomena of interest, thus enabling them to draw strong causal inferences. Experiments are also helpful to those of us interested in studying performance measurement systems because it is often difficult to locate suitable research data from practice. Technology advances, such as more accessible programming software, improved research facilities, and new participant recruitment avenues, have further upgraded experimental researchers’ toolkits. At the same time, technology advancements have led to exciting new research avenues regarding performance measurement. In this chapter, I will discuss “artificiality” as a source of power in experiments and reflect on how technology advances have lent a helping hand to researchers by further amplifying experiments’ power to study issues relating to performance measurement systems. I will also suggest some future research possibilities that are particularly suitable to experimental research.
- 19 November 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 334-353
Doing experimental research on performance measurement (with a little help from technology)
In experiments researchers can create a research setting that is uniquely suitable to examining the phenomena of interest, thus enabling them to draw strong causal inferences. Experiments are also helpful to those of us interested in studying performance measurement systems because it is often difficult to locate suitable research data from practice. Technology advances, such as more accessible programming software, improved research facilities, and new participant recruitment avenues, have further upgraded experimental researchers’ toolkits. At the same time, technology advancements have led to exciting new research avenues regarding performance measurement. In this chapter, I will discuss “artificiality” as a source of power in experiments and reflect on how technology advances have lent a helping hand to researchers by further amplifying experiments’ power to study issues relating to performance measurement systems. I will also suggest some future research possibilities that are particularly suitable to experimental research.
- Open Access
- 4 October 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (3) , 135-152
Keeping Up with the Joneses during an Economic Crisis: The Effect of Different Types of Pay Cuts on Employee Performance
Many firms implement pay cuts to reduce labor costs during organizational crises and there are different ways to distribute pay cuts among employees. We experimentally investigate how employees respond to equal-share pay cuts compared to performance-based pay cuts. We predict and find that the effect of different ways of allocating pay cuts is moderated by employees’ relative performance before the pay cuts. Compared to equal-share pay cuts, performance-based pay cuts lead to higher performance but only for employees who underperform their peers before the pay cuts. Performance-based pay cuts also result in higher team performance. Interestingly, we also find that when pay cuts are caused by an organizational crisis, low performers do not perceive it as unfair to receive a larger share of pay reduction. Our findings contribute to both literature and practice on pay reduction during organizational crises. Data availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: D91; J33; M40.
- 4 October 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (3) , 135-152
Open AccessKeeping Up with the Joneses during an Economic Crisis: The Effect of Different Types of Pay Cuts on Employee Performance
Many firms implement pay cuts to reduce labor costs during organizational crises and there are different ways to distribute pay cuts among employees. We experimentally investigate how employees respond to equal-share pay cuts compared to performance-based pay cuts. We predict and find that the effect of different ways of allocating pay cuts is moderated by employees’ relative performance before the pay cuts. Compared to equal-share pay cuts, performance-based pay cuts lead to higher performance but only for employees who underperform their peers before the pay cuts. Performance-based pay cuts also result in higher team performance. Interestingly, we also find that when pay cuts are caused by an organizational crisis, low performers do not perceive it as unfair to receive a larger share of pay reduction. Our findings contribute to both literature and practice on pay reduction during organizational crises. Data availability: Data are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: D91; J33; M40.
- 1 October 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 35 (3) , 1-11
Sustainability and Management Accounting Research
This article provides an overview of the papers accepted in the Special Interest Forum of Journal of Management Accounting Research focused on sustainability. The discussion outlines topics and contributions from the selected papers and positions them in relation to prior research and ongoing discussions in the field. Drawing on the “three-legged stool” model that captures the relationships between performance measurement system, incentives, and organizational structure/corporate governance, we suggest potential research avenues on sustainability in management accounting and related fields.
- 1 October 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 35 (3) , 1-11
Sustainability and Management Accounting Research
This article provides an overview of the papers accepted in the Special Interest Forum of Journal of Management Accounting Research focused on sustainability. The discussion outlines topics and contributions from the selected papers and positions them in relation to prior research and ongoing discussions in the field. Drawing on the “three-legged stool” model that captures the relationships between performance measurement system, incentives, and organizational structure/corporate governance, we suggest potential research avenues on sustainability in management accounting and related fields.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 98 (4) , 435-456
Reducing Strategy Surrogation: The Effects of Performance Measurement System Flexibility and Environmental Dynamism
Prior research shows that individuals exhibit a propensity to surrogate performance measures for their underlying strategy, resulting in suboptimal strategic decisions. We investigate whether the incorporation of flexibility in contemporary performance measurement systems (PMSs) reduces surrogation propensity in the context of product innovation and whether this effect varies depending on environmental dynamism. We conduct a 2 × 2 experiment and find that PMS flexibility significantly lowers managers' surrogation propensity when the business environment is more dynamic and when the investment decisions have opportunity costs. Our study contributes to the literature by identifying a viable way to reduce managers' surrogation propensity.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 98 (4) , 435-456
Reducing Strategy Surrogation: The Effects of Performance Measurement System Flexibility and Environmental Dynamism
Prior research shows that individuals exhibit a propensity to surrogate performance measures for their underlying strategy, resulting in suboptimal strategic decisions. We investigate whether the incorporation of flexibility in contemporary performance measurement systems (PMSs) reduces surrogation propensity in the context of product innovation and whether this effect varies depending on environmental dynamism. We conduct a 2 × 2 experiment and find that PMS flexibility significantly lowers managers' surrogation propensity when the business environment is more dynamic and when the investment decisions have opportunity costs. Our study contributes to the literature by identifying a viable way to reduce managers' surrogation propensity.
- Open Access
- 29 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Accounting Review
- Vol. 33 (4) , 1-28
Stakeholder Focus or Strategy Focus? An Eye-Tracker Study on the Effect of Presentation Format on Nonprofessional Investors’ Information Processing Patterns
Using eye-tracking technology, we examine whether the information processing patterns of nonprofessional investors with a directional investment preference are affected by performance information presented based on either a focus on stakeholders (stakeholder format) or on strategic goals (strategic theme format). We find that when a company’s financial performance has declined but nonfinancial performance has improved, a strategic theme (stakeholder) format causes investors in a long investment position to focus on negative financial information to a lesser (greater) extent than those in a short investment position. These results indicate that a strategic theme format encourages biased investors to draw on favorable nonfinancial information to support their position, whereas a stakeholder format causes them to closely scrutinize unfavorable financial information. We also find that the level of bias in investors’ earnings forecasts is lower when information is presented in a strategic theme format than in a stakeholder format; however, a supplementary experiment finds that this result is reversed when a company’s financial performance has improved but its nonfinancial performance has declined. Our results have implications for external report preparers, standard setters, and analysts.
- 29 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Accounting Review
- Vol. 33 (4) , 1-28
Open AccessStakeholder Focus or Strategy Focus? An Eye-Tracker Study on the Effect of Presentation Format on Nonprofessional Investors’ Information Processing Patterns
Using eye-tracking technology, we examine whether the information processing patterns of nonprofessional investors with a directional investment preference are affected by performance information presented based on either a focus on stakeholders (stakeholder format) or on strategic goals (strategic theme format). We find that when a company’s financial performance has declined but nonfinancial performance has improved, a strategic theme (stakeholder) format causes investors in a long investment position to focus on negative financial information to a lesser (greater) extent than those in a short investment position. These results indicate that a strategic theme format encourages biased investors to draw on favorable nonfinancial information to support their position, whereas a stakeholder format causes them to closely scrutinize unfavorable financial information. We also find that the level of bias in investors’ earnings forecasts is lower when information is presented in a strategic theme format than in a stakeholder format; however, a supplementary experiment finds that this result is reversed when a company’s financial performance has improved but its nonfinancial performance has declined. Our results have implications for external report preparers, standard setters, and analysts.
- 21 December 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (6) , 1-22
Influence of Control Precision and Prior Collaboration Experience on Trust and Cooperation in Inter-Organizational Relationships
We investigate whether prior collaboration experience affects a focal partner's response to the precision of monitoring controls adopted by a new partner, with consequences for their goodwill trust in, and subsequent cooperation with, the new partner. We expect the partner to interpret their new partner's adoption of precise monitoring controls as either an effort to limit their autonomy or to reduce information asymmetry. The partner's experience with past partners is posited to determine which interpretation is salient, with negative (positive) experiences favoring the former (latter). We find that partners with an uncooperative (cooperative) experience exhibit lower (higher) goodwill trust in the new partner when controls are more precise. Further, prior experience moderates the indirect relation between the precision of monitoring controls and partner cooperation acting through goodwill trust. The results demonstrate the importance of prior experiences in the design of interfirm controls for current partner relationships. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: M41.
- 21 December 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (6) , 1-22
Influence of Control Precision and Prior Collaboration Experience on Trust and Cooperation in Inter-Organizational Relationships
We investigate whether prior collaboration experience affects a focal partner's response to the precision of monitoring controls adopted by a new partner, with consequences for their goodwill trust in, and subsequent cooperation with, the new partner. We expect the partner to interpret their new partner's adoption of precise monitoring controls as either an effort to limit their autonomy or to reduce information asymmetry. The partner's experience with past partners is posited to determine which interpretation is salient, with negative (positive) experiences favoring the former (latter). We find that partners with an uncooperative (cooperative) experience exhibit lower (higher) goodwill trust in the new partner when controls are more precise. Further, prior experience moderates the indirect relation between the precision of monitoring controls and partner cooperation acting through goodwill trust. The results demonstrate the importance of prior experiences in the design of interfirm controls for current partner relationships. Data Availability: Contact the authors. JEL Classifications: M41.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 31 (2) , 31-49
The Effect of Bonus Deferral on Managers' Investment Decisions
We examine the impact of deferred bonus payments and employment horizon on managers' investment decisions. Bonus deferral is an important element of compensation schemes designed to mitigate managers' tendency to avoid long-term investments that can reduce their bonuses, i.e., the problem of managerial myopia. Consistent with construal-level theory in the psychology literature, we find that bonus deferral increases managers' willingness to make an investment that has detrimental effects on their current bonus but that provides long-term benefits to the firm. This is driven by managers placing greater importance on their responsibilities for advancing their firm's long-term interests and on improving their reputations within their firms. These mediation effects are moderated by participants' employment horizon. Our study contributes to the debate on effective managerial compensation by showing that a simple deferral of bonus payments can reduce the negative consequences related to managerial myopia. JEL Classifications: M40; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.
- 1 June 2019
- Published by American Accounting Association in Behavioral Research in Accounting
- Vol. 31 (2) , 31-49
The Effect of Bonus Deferral on Managers' Investment Decisions
We examine the impact of deferred bonus payments and employment horizon on managers' investment decisions. Bonus deferral is an important element of compensation schemes designed to mitigate managers' tendency to avoid long-term investments that can reduce their bonuses, i.e., the problem of managerial myopia. Consistent with construal-level theory in the psychology literature, we find that bonus deferral increases managers' willingness to make an investment that has detrimental effects on their current bonus but that provides long-term benefits to the firm. This is driven by managers placing greater importance on their responsibilities for advancing their firm's long-term interests and on improving their reputations within their firms. These mediation effects are moderated by participants' employment horizon. Our study contributes to the debate on effective managerial compensation by showing that a simple deferral of bonus payments can reduce the negative consequences related to managerial myopia. JEL Classifications: M40; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.