Achille Basile
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Achille Basile has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Surekha Rao
School of Business and Economics, Indiana University Northwest, Gary, IN 46408, United States of America
6 shared publications - K. P. S. Bhaskara Rao
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche Università Federico II 80126 Napoli Italy
5 shared publications - Maria Gabriella Graziano
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche and CSEF, Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, Napoli, Italy
4 shared publications - Vincenzo Scalzo
Department of Economics and Statistics (DISES), University of Naples Federico II, via Cinthia 21, 80126 Napoli, Italy
3 shared publications - Anna De Simone
Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni R. Caccioppoli, Università Federico II di Napoli, 80126 Napoli, Italy
2 shared publications - Ciro Tarantino
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, Complesso Monte S. Angelo, Via Cintia, 80126 Napoli, Italy
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- p. 1-2
Preface: special issue on contributions in game theory and optimization
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- p. 1-2
Preface: special issue on contributions in game theory and optimization
- Open Access
Isotone Classes of Social Choice Functions with Binary Range
Recently, it has been shown that the characterizations of different classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with binary range can be reduced to a common functional form. In the present paper, we investigate the reasons why this happens. We show that all the classes considered share a common mathematical property. We name this property, which is lattice theoretical in nature, isotonicity.
Open AccessIsotone Classes of Social Choice Functions with Binary Range
Recently, it has been shown that the characterizations of different classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with binary range can be reduced to a common functional form. In the present paper, we investigate the reasons why this happens. We show that all the classes considered share a common mathematical property. We name this property, which is lattice theoretical in nature, isotonicity.
- Open Access
- 3 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 64 (3) , 529-555
The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
We consider classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with range of cardinality at most two within a set of at least two alternatives. We provide the functional form for each of the classes we consider. This functional form is a characterization that explicitly describes how a social choice function of that particular class selects the collective choice corresponding to a profile. We provide a unified formulation of these characterizations using the new concept of “character”. The choice of the character, depending on the class of social choice functions, gives the functional form of all social choice functions of the class.
- 3 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 64 (3) , 529-555
Open AccessThe character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
We consider classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with range of cardinality at most two within a set of at least two alternatives. We provide the functional form for each of the classes we consider. This functional form is a characterization that explicitly describes how a social choice function of that particular class selects the collective choice corresponding to a profile. We provide a unified formulation of these characterizations using the new concept of “character”. The choice of the character, depending on the class of social choice functions, gives the functional form of all social choice functions of the class.
- Open Access
The character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
We consider classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with range of cardinality at most two within a set of at least two alternatives. We provide the functional form for each of the classes we consider. This functional form is a characterization that explicitly describes how a social choice function of that particular class selects the collective choice corresponding to a profile. We provide a unified formulation of these characterizations using the new concept of "character". The choice of the character, depending on the class of social choice functions, gives the functional form of all social choice functions of the class.
Open AccessThe character of non-manipulable collective choices between two alternatives
We consider classes of non-manipulable social choice functions with range of cardinality at most two within a set of at least two alternatives. We provide the functional form for each of the classes we consider. This functional form is a characterization that explicitly describes how a social choice function of that particular class selects the collective choice corresponding to a profile. We provide a unified formulation of these characterizations using the new concept of "character". The choice of the character, depending on the class of social choice functions, gives the functional form of all social choice functions of the class.
- Open Access
A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
Let be the set of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions referred to a group of n voters who are allowed to declare indifference between the alternatives. We provide a recursive way to obtain the set from the set . Computing the cardinalities presents difficulties as the computation of the Dedekind numbers. The latter give the analogous number of social choice functions when only strict preferences are admitted. A comparison is given for the known values. Based on our results, we present a graphical description of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions in the case of three voters.Open AccessA Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions
Let be the set of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions referred to a group of n voters who are allowed to declare indifference between the alternatives. We provide a recursive way to obtain the set from the set . Computing the cardinalities presents difficulties as the computation of the Dedekind numbers. The latter give the analogous number of social choice functions when only strict preferences are admitted. A comparison is given for the known values. Based on our results, we present a graphical description of the binary strategy-proof social choice functions in the case of three voters. - 1 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 73 (2-3) , 807-826
Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
- 1 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 73 (2-3) , 807-826
Binary strategy-proof social choice functions with indifference
- 16 September 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 208, 110083
Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
- 16 September 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 208, 110083
Preference reversal and strategy-proofness with more than three alternatives
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 95
The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
- 1 August 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 95
The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions
- Open Access
- 12 July 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 206, 109992
On the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness
- 12 July 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 206, 109992
Open AccessOn the relation between preference reversal and strategy-proofness
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 71 (3) , 1085-1119
The Core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour
- 1 April 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 71 (3) , 1085-1119
The Core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour