Zhihai Rong
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Zhihai Rong has a total of 57 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Tao Zhou
Center for Pure Mathematics, School of Mathematical Sciences, Anhui University, Hefei 230601, Anhui, China
6 shared publications Zhi-Xi Wu
5 shared publications- Zhi-Xi Wu
Lanzhou University
5 shared publications - Wen Yang
East China University of Science and Technology
4 shared publications Xiongrui Xu
3 shared publications- Chi Kong Tse
City University of Hong Kong
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2026
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (10)
Emergence of cooperation in reactive strategy space through similarity-based interactions
Considering agents tend to interact preferentially with others adopting similar behaviors, this paper investigates the impact of similarity-based interaction mechanism on learning dynamics and evolution of strategies. We propose a novel evolution model for reactive strategies in which agents interact with similar partners within some threshold, forming a dynamically structural population. By combining exploitation and exploration, we analyze the evolution dynamics of cooperation under the influence of various payoff parameters and similarity thresholds. The results show that similarity-based interactions can efficiently protect cooperative strategies and promote their persistence. Robustness analysis further demonstrates that similarity-driven interactions sustain high cooperation across different population sizes and that moderate random exploration enhances cooperative evolution.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (10)
Emergence of cooperation in reactive strategy space through similarity-based interactions
Considering agents tend to interact preferentially with others adopting similar behaviors, this paper investigates the impact of similarity-based interaction mechanism on learning dynamics and evolution of strategies. We propose a novel evolution model for reactive strategies in which agents interact with similar partners within some threshold, forming a dynamically structural population. By combining exploitation and exploration, we analyze the evolution dynamics of cooperation under the influence of various payoff parameters and similarity thresholds. The results show that similarity-based interactions can efficiently protect cooperative strategies and promote their persistence. Robustness analysis further demonstrates that similarity-driven interactions sustain high cooperation across different population sizes and that moderate random exploration enhances cooperative evolution.
- Open Access
- 10 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Evolution of memory strategies in alternating stochastic games
Stochastic games provide a powerful theoretical framework for capturing the feedback between individual behavior and environmental states, yet most existing studies assume that players interact synchronously. Here, we investigate the evolution of classical pure memory-one strategies in alternating stochastic games, in which players take turns making decisions based on historical outcomes and subsequently altering the environmental state. By analyzing the equilibrium conditions of pure memory-one strategies, we show through theoretical and numerical results that environmental feedback can substantially promote cooperation under alternating interactions. In particular, sustaining cooperation relies primarily on the firm-but-fair (FBF) strategy rather than the celebrated win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS) strategy. Moreover, when the environmental transition mechanism incentivizes mutual cooperation by maintaining a good state and penalizes any defection by switching the environment to a bad state, the population can form a stable, multi-strategy cooperative alliance that collectively sustains cooperation. These findings remain robust under both rare and positive mutation rates, providing novel insights into how environmental feedback and sequential interactions jointly shape the evolution of cooperation.
- 10 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessEvolution of memory strategies in alternating stochastic games
Stochastic games provide a powerful theoretical framework for capturing the feedback between individual behavior and environmental states, yet most existing studies assume that players interact synchronously. Here, we investigate the evolution of classical pure memory-one strategies in alternating stochastic games, in which players take turns making decisions based on historical outcomes and subsequently altering the environmental state. By analyzing the equilibrium conditions of pure memory-one strategies, we show through theoretical and numerical results that environmental feedback can substantially promote cooperation under alternating interactions. In particular, sustaining cooperation relies primarily on the firm-but-fair (FBF) strategy rather than the celebrated win-stay, lose-shift (WSLS) strategy. Moreover, when the environmental transition mechanism incentivizes mutual cooperation by maintaining a good state and penalizes any defection by switching the environment to a bad state, the population can form a stable, multi-strategy cooperative alliance that collectively sustains cooperation. These findings remain robust under both rare and positive mutation rates, providing novel insights into how environmental feedback and sequential interactions jointly shape the evolution of cooperation.
- Open Access
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Physics
Heterogeneity in trustworthiness reshapes the spatial evolution of trust
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Communications Physics
Open AccessHeterogeneity in trustworthiness reshapes the spatial evolution of trust
- 23 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 208
Evolutionary dynamics of reactive partner strategy in stochastic games
- 23 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 208
Evolutionary dynamics of reactive partner strategy in stochastic games
- 12 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (3) , 5199-5213
Stealthy Attacks and Defense Countermeasures in Average Consensus Networks
This paper investigates the security issues of average consensus networks under false data injection attacks. Based on the intention of the adversary, the attacks to be analyzed are categorized into two types. The first type aims to rapidly diverge the states of the agents to infinity, while the second type seeks to mislead the states towards the adversary's desired values. A necessary and sufficient condition for Type-I attacks to bypass the anomaly detector is first provided, along with an algorithm for generating false data sequences. Subsequently, for Type-II attacks, the closed-form expression of the optimal attack is derived using dynamic programming. To address these vulnerabilities, a watermarking-based data transmission strategy is proposed by resorting to cryptographic pseudo-random sequences. The influence of watermarking parameters on detection performance across different attack scenarios is analyzed. It is demonstrated that the proposed strategy can effectively assist the anomaly detector in identifying stealthy attacks or mitigate its impact on the consensus networks by adjusting the watermarking parameters. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate the validity of the developed results.
- 12 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (3) , 5199-5213
Stealthy Attacks and Defense Countermeasures in Average Consensus Networks
This paper investigates the security issues of average consensus networks under false data injection attacks. Based on the intention of the adversary, the attacks to be analyzed are categorized into two types. The first type aims to rapidly diverge the states of the agents to infinity, while the second type seeks to mislead the states towards the adversary's desired values. A necessary and sufficient condition for Type-I attacks to bypass the anomaly detector is first provided, along with an algorithm for generating false data sequences. Subsequently, for Type-II attacks, the closed-form expression of the optimal attack is derived using dynamic programming. To address these vulnerabilities, a watermarking-based data transmission strategy is proposed by resorting to cryptographic pseudo-random sequences. The influence of watermarking parameters on detection performance across different attack scenarios is analyzed. It is demonstrated that the proposed strategy can effectively assist the anomaly detector in identifying stealthy attacks or mitigate its impact on the consensus networks by adjusting the watermarking parameters. A numerical example is provided to demonstrate the validity of the developed results.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (1)
Introduction to focus issue: Intelligent game on networked systems: Optimization, evolution and control
Networked systems—from smart grids and autonomous fleets to social networks—are ubiquitous yet complex, with agents interacting amid topological dependencies and challenges like dynamic environments or malicious attacks. Game theory, control theory, and optimization offer tools to model these systems, but bridging theory with real-world complexity remains a key gap. This Chaos Focus Issue tackles this by exploring intelligent game theory in networked systems, featuring 26 papers across four themes: cooperation promotion, distributed systems, complex structures, and game applications. It links theoretical insights (e.g., cooperative dynamics in structured populations) to practical solutions (e.g., epidemic control, infrastructure protection), advancing resilient, efficient networked system design.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 36 (1)
Introduction to focus issue: Intelligent game on networked systems: Optimization, evolution and control
Networked systems—from smart grids and autonomous fleets to social networks—are ubiquitous yet complex, with agents interacting amid topological dependencies and challenges like dynamic environments or malicious attacks. Game theory, control theory, and optimization offer tools to model these systems, but bridging theory with real-world complexity remains a key gap. This Chaos Focus Issue tackles this by exploring intelligent game theory in networked systems, featuring 26 papers across four themes: cooperation promotion, distributed systems, complex structures, and game applications. It links theoretical insights (e.g., cooperative dynamics in structured populations) to practical solutions (e.g., epidemic control, infrastructure protection), advancing resilient, efficient networked system design.
- 25 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 192
Equalizing payoffs of a structured population in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
- 25 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 192
Equalizing payoffs of a structured population in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game
- 20 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 188
Coevolution of extortion strategies with mixed imitation and aspiration learning dynamics in spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game
- 20 September 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
- Vol. 188
Coevolution of extortion strategies with mixed imitation and aspiration learning dynamics in spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma game
- Open Access
- 26 April 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Physics: Complexity
- Vol. 5 (2) , 025006
The emergence of cooperation via Q-learning in spatial donation game
Decision-making often overlooks the feedback between agents and the environment. Reinforcement learning is widely employed through exploratory experimentation to address problems related to states, actions, rewards, decision-making in various contexts. This work considers a new perspective, where individuals continually update their policies based on interactions with the spatial environment, aiming to maximize cumulative rewards and learn the optimal strategy. Specifically, we utilize the Q-learning algorithm to study the emergence of cooperation in a spatial population playing the donation game. Each individual has a Q-table that guides their decision-making in the game. Interestingly, we find that cooperation emerges within this introspective learning framework, and a smaller learning rate and higher discount factor make cooperation more likely to occur. Through the analysis of Q-table evolution, we disclose the underlying mechanism for cooperation, which may provide some insights to the emergence of cooperation in the real-world systems.
- 26 April 2024
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Physics: Complexity
- Vol. 5 (2) , 025006
Open AccessThe emergence of cooperation via Q-learning in spatial donation game
Decision-making often overlooks the feedback between agents and the environment. Reinforcement learning is widely employed through exploratory experimentation to address problems related to states, actions, rewards, decision-making in various contexts. This work considers a new perspective, where individuals continually update their policies based on interactions with the spatial environment, aiming to maximize cumulative rewards and learn the optimal strategy. Specifically, we utilize the Q-learning algorithm to study the emergence of cooperation in a spatial population playing the donation game. Each individual has a Q-table that guides their decision-making in the game. Interestingly, we find that cooperation emerges within this introspective learning framework, and a smaller learning rate and higher discount factor make cooperation more likely to occur. Through the analysis of Q-table evolution, we disclose the underlying mechanism for cooperation, which may provide some insights to the emergence of cooperation in the real-world systems.
- 10 January 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks
- Vol. 10, 59-68
Channel Pricing and Sensor Scheduling for Distributed Estimation Based on a Stackelberg Game Framework
Since communication quality between sensors can directly affect distributed estimation, we consider the communication channel pricing and sensor scheduling problem for distributed estimation over a wireless sensor network with limited resources. Each sensor's choice of channels depends on its estimation performance and the channel communication cost which sets by a communication network server. Thus, there exists a tradeoff between the estimation accuracy and the channel communication cost. To solve this decision-making process, a Stackelberg game framework is builded, where the server firstly sets pricing strategy, then sensors schedule communication channels under limited resources. In this scenario, the existence of the optimal stationary decision-making process of sensors is provided after observing the server's stationary and deterministic pricing policy. Firstly, we analyze the impact of channel pricing on the convergence of the system. Then, the server's optimal pricing strategy is proposed after observing the sensors' channel scheduling policy under a Stackelberg game framework. The property of the equilibrium pair in the Stackelberg game framework is investigated and finally an optimal channel pricing and scheduling schemes based on the equilibrium pair is proposed. Finally, simulation results verify the optimality of the channel pricing and scheduling mechanisms.
- 10 January 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Signal and Information Processing over Networks
- Vol. 10, 59-68
Channel Pricing and Sensor Scheduling for Distributed Estimation Based on a Stackelberg Game Framework
Since communication quality between sensors can directly affect distributed estimation, we consider the communication channel pricing and sensor scheduling problem for distributed estimation over a wireless sensor network with limited resources. Each sensor's choice of channels depends on its estimation performance and the channel communication cost which sets by a communication network server. Thus, there exists a tradeoff between the estimation accuracy and the channel communication cost. To solve this decision-making process, a Stackelberg game framework is builded, where the server firstly sets pricing strategy, then sensors schedule communication channels under limited resources. In this scenario, the existence of the optimal stationary decision-making process of sensors is provided after observing the server's stationary and deterministic pricing policy. Firstly, we analyze the impact of channel pricing on the convergence of the system. Then, the server's optimal pricing strategy is proposed after observing the sensors' channel scheduling policy under a Stackelberg game framework. The property of the equilibrium pair in the Stackelberg game framework is investigated and finally an optimal channel pricing and scheduling schemes based on the equilibrium pair is proposed. Finally, simulation results verify the optimality of the channel pricing and scheduling mechanisms.