Katya Le Blanc

The objective of this report is examine anticipated advanced reactor designs that incorporate high levels of autonomy in operation of advanced reactor systems or facilities, and to begin identifying the human factors engineering (HFE) considerations relevant to those designs. The insights gained will help identify areas where U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) may need to develop or update review guidance to adequately address HFE considerations essential for safe operation. The adequacy of existing guidance, along with recommendations for updates or new guidance, may be addressed in future reports. We use the term “landscape analysis” to describe the review, analysis, and characterization of publicly available information on the anticipated future state of the industry regarding particular technologies or operational concepts. This landscape analysis considers the potential range of advanced reactor automation concepts that may be used for monitoring and controlling nuclear systems and facilities, including the potential for highly automated, near autonomous, or fully autonomous operation of advanced nuclear reactors. Nine reactor concepts were characterized by their design characteristics and concept of operation (ConOps) with respect to level of autonomy. The analysis presented in this report considers how aspects of advanced reactor design such as design simplicity and passive safety may enable higher levels of automation. Simple designs may have fewer actions needed to maintain operability, may have fewer active components, and hence are likely to have fewer human actions. In addition to design simplicity, passive safety features and inherent safety characteristics such as natural circulation also reduce the number of active components that need to be monitored and maintained and the actions that humans need to take to maintain safety functions. These characteristics, and others, may be considered as technical arguments when considering if a particular design is safe to use in a highly automated or autonomous manner. We describe the levels of autonomy for each reactor design in the context of elements of a ConOps presented in the draft Interim Staff Guidance, “Development of Scalable Human Factors Engineering (HFE) Review Plans,” (DRO-ISG-2023-03, NRC, 2023a; NRC, 2022) which include: • Plant Mission and Goals • Agent’s Roles and Responsibilities • Staffing, Qualifications, and Training • Management of Plant Conditions: ? Normal Operations ? Off-Normal Conditions and Emergencies ? Maintenance and Modifications ? Tests, Inspections, and Surveillances The design characteristics informed evaluation of the human-automation interaction characteristics of the ConOps. The ConOps were evaluated hierarchically with plant mission and goals informing tasks and functions needed for normal and off-normal operations, maintenance, and testing and surveillance operations. Agents’ roles and responsibilities and training and qualifications were evaluated for each function for the different operating conditions and plant activities. Finally, we reviewed the reactor concepts analyzed in the landscape analysis to identify human factors considerations related to autonomy based on their proposed design characteristics and ConOps. These include situation awareness, trust and automation reliability, workload, teaming, training, skill and knowledge retention, and novel human error types, which are discussed based on characterizations of autonomy for anticipated concepts. Based on a review of publicly available information including designer websites, promotional materials, publicly available presentations, and preapplication documents, there are several general themes and conclusions related to autonomy and several human factors considerations that emerge. One key overarching gap is a clear description of what a human operator’s role and authority will be when they serve a monitoring and “backup” function. The human-automation interaction literature and experience from other industries underscore that when operators do not have an active role in day-to-day operations, they may struggle to maintain vigilance and situation awareness. Moreover, situations in which a human is needed as backup are likely to be the most complex and difficult to plan for, further complicating the process of effectively preparing the human to act as backup. This can be addressed with careful thought put into the tasking, human-systems interfaces, and training; however, these considerations are not yet documented in publicly available materials for most designs. To make a determination of reasonable assurance of safety, it will be critical for NRC staff to understand the human’s role in future design applications proposing near-autonomous operation, as variability in human performance can be highest when human involvement is infrequent.

When process operators anticipate an alarm prior to its annunciation, that alarm loses information value and becomes a nuisance. This study investigated using eye trackers to measure and adjust the salience of alarms with three methods of gaze-based acknowledgement (GBA) of alarms that estimate operator anticipation. When these methods detected possible alarm anticipation, the alarm’s audio and visual salience was reduced. A total of 24 engineering students (male = 14, female = 10) aged between 18 and 45 were recruited to predict alarms and control a process parameter in three scenario types (parameter near threshold, trending, or fluctuating). The study evaluated whether behaviors of the monitored parameter affected how frequently the three GBA methods were utilized and whether reducing alarm salience improved control task performance. The results did not show significant task improvement with any GBA methods (F(3,69) = 1.357, p = 0.263, partial η² = 0.056). However, the scenario type affected which GBA method was more utilized (X² (2, N = 432) = 30.147, p < 0.001). Alarm prediction hits with gaze-based acknowledgements coincided more frequently than alarm prediction hits without gaze-based acknowledgements (X² (1, N = 432) = 23.802, p < 0.001, OR = 3.877, 95% CI 2.25–6.68, p < 0.05). Participant ratings indicated an overall preference for the three GBA methods over a standard alarm design (F(3,63) = 3.745, p = 0.015, partial η² = 0.151). This study provides empirical evidence for the potential of eye tracking in alarm management but highlights the need for additional research to increase validity for inferring alarm anticipation.

Electric grid operators are adept at handling complexity and uncertainty. However, with increasing introduction of renewable generation, distributed energy resources, and more frequent severe weather events, operators will experience new workload and challenging decision scenarios. This paper quantifies risks and benefits from an operator's perspective of introducing weather based forecast Dynamic Line Ratings (DLR) using variable wind conditions in addition to ambient temperature to relieve transmission congestion and facilitating more offshore wind (OSW). A concept of operations (CONOPS) applied to a forecast DLR implementation and its integration with OSW is defined. A method for evaluating tradeoffs of derating to make the rating more conservative but decreasing the benefit was developed and applied to a case study for two existing overhead transmission lines on Long Island, New York. The CONOPS uses historical day-ahead and hour-ahead High Resolution Rapid Refresh weather forecasts and weather station data to support planning and real-time operations. The analysis determines the risk of downgrades in real-time operational rating compared to the forecast and quantifies the frequency and severity of last-minute downgrades. The risk is compared against the benefits in increased capacity to provide insights on the additional amount of uncertainty DLR and OSW will add to the operator's workload.

The Ohio State University and Idaho National Laboratory organized the 4th Big Data for Nuclear Power Plants Workshop in November, 2023 in Columbus, Ohio. Workshop topics were chosen to understand the challenges and gaps that need to be addressed to maximize the impact of data on the nuclear industry, as well as the associated applications and risks. Discussions were focused around six specific application areas: Operation and Maintenance; Machine Learning in Nuclear Materials and Advanced Manufacturing; Cybersecurity; High-Performance Computing and Massive Computation; Big Data and Digital Twins; and Nuclear Non-Proliferation. The opportunities, challenges, and risks identified in the six focus areas explored in this workshop are diverse, but some common themes emerge, such as the importance of data integrity, quality, coverage, privacy, and traceability. Big data and AI/ML tools can be leveraged to reduce costs, optimize human tasking, and reduce human error across various application areas. In order for the nuclear industry to benefit from big data and advanced analytic capabilities, it is essential to address challenges and risks, such as data privacy, model reliability, and computational resource availability. Learning from other industries that have successfully implemented big data and AI/ML technologies, like the aerospace industry, can help the nuclear industry successfully integrate these technologies.

As energy infrastructure becomes more interconnected, understanding cybersecurity risks to production systems requires integrating operational and computer security knowledge. We interviewed 18 experts working in the field of energy critical infrastructure to compare what information they find necessary to assess the impact of computer vulnerabilities on energy operational technology. These experts came from two groups: 1) computer security experts and 2) energy sector operations experts. We find that both groups responded similarly for general categories of information and displayed knowledge about both domains, perhaps due to their interdisciplinary work at the same organization. Yet, we found notable differences in the details of their responses and in their stated perceptions of each group’s approaches to impact assessment. Their suggestions for collaboration across domains highlighted how these two groups can work together to help each other secure the energy grid. Our findings inform the development of interdisciplinary security approaches in critical-infrastructure contexts.

Considerable efforts are underway to ensure cybersecurity is integrated into the systems engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering and security-by-design frameworks are intended to identify and engineer out cybersecurity risks throughout the lifecycle. While these approaches are valuable for promoting the need to include cybersecurity considerations in early design phases to create more secure systems, they may not consider the entirety of digital risks. Digital risks in a digital instrumentation and control system include adversarial and unintentional risks from internal and external factors, such as human performance errors, design flaws, environmental conditions, and equipment degradation or failure. This report provides a detailed discussion on digital risk prior to describing the background and concept of operations for a small modular reactor-driven integrated energy system connected to industrial applications. The challenges of competing objectives and competing stakeholder requirements are discussed and the impacts on digital engineering, security considerations, and interdependencies are evaluated for mission-level, facility-level, and system-level decisions.

This report describes the foundational human factors principles needed to design user interfaces for accelerator control rooms. These principles are presented as recommendations for accelerator control system interface design and are illustrated with examples drawn from accelerator operations at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory (Fermilab). These high-level principles are intended to serve as design objectives that apply generally across all control system interfaces developed for the accelerator complex. This design philosophy document is a high-level roadmap to approach the general interface design for the accelerator complex. This philosophy applies state-of-the-art human factors principles and evidence-based design standards to an accelerator environment, which will transform the next era of accelerator interfaces as outlined by the Accelerator Controls Operations Research Network (ACORN) Project. Further work will include mapping the general design principles included in this report to more specific guidance in the form of a user interface style guide.

The U.S. nuclear industry has an urgent need to reduce operations and maintenance costs to remain economically competitive in today’s energy market. Measures to improve efficiency in operations will need to leverage technology in a way that safely transforms how plants are operated. This work describes the Evaluation of an integrated operations concept that draws together data from existing Instrumentation and Control (I&C) infrastructure, upgraded I&C systems, new sensors, and field technologies such as computer-based procedures to provide operators with centralized, streamlined instructions. The concept was developed to allow for an operator to remotely supervise many plant activities and to dramatically streamline plant operations and maintenance. This describes the methods, results, and design recommendations for the concept based on an operator workshop to evaluate the concept.