RWRachel Wetts

Rachel Wetts

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Rachel Wetts has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    The Breadth and Depth of Opposition to Antiracism: How Resistance to Antiracist Claims and Activism Shapes White Americans’ Political Attitudes

    by Rachel Wetts, Robb Willer

    Previous scholarship has most often examined White Americans’ opposition to antiracist claims, policies, and movements as a dependent variable, shaped by forces such as racial prejudice and Whites’ group interests. However, little research has examined the consequences of these attitudes, despite recent events suggesting the importance of these views in conservative mobilization. Across two surveys and three experiments, we explore how opposition to antiracism (or anti-antiracism) shapes the political views of White Americans (total N=6,495). We find anti-antiracism has broad endorsement and effects: it is prevalent among Whites and is a powerful predictor of many policy positions, including being more strongly related to support for Donald Trump than several measures of racial prejudice or political ideology. At the same time, anti-antiracism is especially strongly related with Trump-related attitudes among religious, conservative, White Republicans (Studies 1a-b). Next, across two pre-registered survey-experiments (Studies 2a-b), we find anti-antiracism predicts Whites’ responses to policy frames and political candidates that invoke issues of race. Finally, we find opposition to antiracism is resistant to counterevidence: a factual intervention correcting misperceptions of anti-Black hiring discrimination influenced perceived rates of discrimination, but did not influence more general anti-antiracist attitudes (Study 3). These findings suggest opposition to antiracist claims and activism is a powerful coalitional resource for the Republican Party, allowing them to draw broad-based support while activating an even stronger response from their base, via attitudes that persist in the face of counter-evidence.

  • “Let them eat kale!”: Appeals to class-based resentment in American conservative opposition to climate change solutions

    by Loredana Loy, Rachel Wetts

    How do conservative media commentators provoke public opposition to climate change solutions in the US? We provide evidence that appeals to class-based resentment against cultural elites are one prominent strategy to urge publics to reject climate mitigation strategies, particularly individual-level changes in diet and consumption. Analyzing media coverage of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change from 1988–2021 across liberal, centrist, and conservative American outlets (N = 1788), we examine how commentators discuss the consumption of meat and animal products as contributors to climate change and dietary transition as a climate mitigation initiative. We find conservative rhetoric around this topic features class-based populism and ridicule of plant-based diets and vegetarianism as displays of cultural capital. Rather than relying on spreading misinformation or promoting scientific counter-claims, conservative commentators discredited these proposals by associating them with a rejected out-group, using moral and emotional language to stoke anger, resentment, but also humor. These findings suggest conservative rhetoric about dietary change as a climate solution appeals to class-based resentment, a strategy that may be becoming more prevalent as the Democratic Party becomes the party of highly-educated Americans. Our findings shed light on the important but often overlooked role of identity appeals in contemporary strategies of climate obstruction.

  • Who believes in science? A computational tool for identifying language invoking or disputing scientific knowledge

    by Rachel Wetts, Dan Kitson

    From disputes over COVID-19 to contestation over climate science, questions of the value and legitimacy of mainstream scientific knowledge have become matters of high-stakes political struggle. Here, we introduce a novel computational tool to identify and track the emergence, proliferation, and historical variations of discourses that either seek to invoke the authority of scientific expertise or to criticize scientific claims, institutions, and experts. We describe the tool’s development, demonstrate its predictive and convergent validity, and illustrate its potential across three case studies shedding light on how elite rhetoric may drive political polarization around science in the United States. Among other findings, we find that political statements invoking scientific expertise have historically been more likely to receive coverage in mainstream American newspapers than statements that do not invoke expertise. However, this apparent advantage disappears over time, suggesting the discursive authority associated with the invocation of scientific methods, credentials, and institutions may be diminishing.

  • Climate Politics as Status Politics: Struggles over the Symbolic Worth of Educational Credentials in the US Climate Change Debate

    by Rachel Wetts

    Here, I propose a novel conceptualization of American climate politics as a form of status politics, where contestation around climate can be partly viewed as a struggle over the symbolic worth of educational credentials and academic knowledge in American society. Environmental activists have cast climate action as a matter of deference to scientific experts at the same time as educational attainment increasingly divides partisan groups, with the Democratic Party becoming the party of highly educated Americans. In this environment, I argue contestation over the status value of education has emerged historically to shape public attitudes and discourse around climate. As initial evidence, I find educational polarization around climate has increased over time in time-series survey data, driven by divergence between high-education Democrats and low-education Republicans ( N = 13,138). Additionally, analyzing nationally representative survey data from 2020, I find evidence suggesting the relationship between Americans’ educational identities and their climate attitudes can be partly explained by their feelings about educated elites and experts ( N = 6,720). This work calls attention to educational identity as an emotionally charged site of disagreement in the climate debate, with implications for other political debates as well.


  • Open Access

    Climate media amidst technopolitical change: challenges, transformations, and new directions for research

    by Rachel Wetts, Hanna E. Morris, Maxwell Boykoff, Brenda McNally, James Painter, Mary Sanford, Emily P. Diamond, Marc Esteve-Del-Valle, Loredana Loy, Kelly E. Perry, et al.

    In this essay, we seek to provide a meta-level view of research on mediated climate change communication, taking stock of its achievements, historical and contemporary challenges, and future directions. While existing climate media scholarship has generated important insights to guide research and practice, recent empirical developments and technopolitical transformations challenge the traditional structure of climate media research. Historically, this research developed a tripartite structure where scholars have tended to focus on one of three distinct phases of the mediated communication process: (1) the production of narratives, frames, images, and other forms of communication about climate change; (2) the content and dissemination of these communication artifacts by and across media industries and institutions; and (3) these artifacts’ reception by and effects on policymakers, partisans, and publics. However, recent developments in communication technologies, media ecosystems, and the broader political landscape—including the increasing importance of social media and AI, new forms of climate obstruction, and rising antidemocratic forces across borders—have made these traditional lines of demarcation increasingly unworkable. While the lines of demarcation between production, dissemination, and reception are increasingly blurred in important new empirical phenomena, each has remained central in many scholarly works and the development of research questions. This persistence of the tripartite model, we argue, has caused climate media research to be slow to reflect the shifting dynamics of mediated climate communication today. After describing and analyzing the structural challenges that make doing more comprehensive climate media research so challenging, we conclude with proposals for new directions for scholarship that can help future research more fully contend with recent technopolitical transformations and move towards actionable research that is capable of grappling with and motivating robust responses to the complexities of climate change amid mounting authoritarian threats.


  • In climate news, statements from large businesses and opponents of climate action receive heightened visibility

    by Rachel Wetts

    Whose voices are most likely to receive news coverage in the US debate about climate change? Elite cues embedded in mainstream media can influence public opinion on climate change, so it is important to understand whose perspectives are most likely to be represented. Here, I use plagiarism-detection software to analyze the media coverage of a large random sample of business, government, and social advocacy organizations’ press releases about climate change (n = 1,768), examining which messages are cited in all articles published about climate change in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and USA Today from 1985 to 2014 (n = 34,948). I find that press releases opposing action to address climate change are about twice as likely to be cited in national newspapers as are press releases advocating for climate action. In addition, messages from business coalitions and very large businesses are more likely than those from other types of organizations to receive coverage. Surprisingly, press releases from organizations providing scientific and technical services are less likely to receive news coverage than are other press releases in my sample, suggesting that messages from organizations with greater scientific expertise receive less media attention. These findings support previous scholars’ claims that journalistic norms of balance and objectivity have distorted the public debate around climate change, while providing evidence that the structural power of business interests lends them heightened visibility in policy debates. Significance Scholars and political commentators have often argued that business interests have privileged status in policy debates, particularly around questions of environmental degradation. However, few studies have been able to systematically compare business and advocacy organizations’ successful and unsuccessful attempts to influence political discourse, a key marker of interest group status. This study uses computational text analysis to fill this gap in the literature, examining the news coverage given to over 1,700 press releases about climate change from different types of organizations over an almost 30-y period. These results shed light on the social processes shaping the climate change debate in particular, while speaking to broader questions of how power is distributed in American democracy.


  • Open Access

    Who Is Called by the Dog Whistle? Experimental Evidence That Racial Resentment and Political Ideology Condition Responses to Racially Encoded Messages

    by Rachel Wetts, Robb Willer

    Do appeals that subtly invoke negative racial stereotypes shift whites’ political attitudes by harnessing their racial prejudice? Though widely cited in academic and popular discourse, prior work finds conflicting evidence for this “dog-whistle hypothesis.” Here we test the hypothesis in two experiments (total N = 1,797) in which white Americans’ racial attitudes were measured two weeks before they read political messages in which references to racial stereotypes were implicit, explicit, or not present at all. Our findings suggest that implicit racial appeals can harness racial resentment to influence policy views, though specifically among racially resentful white liberals. That dog-whistle effects would be concentrated among liberals was not predicted in advance, but this finding appears across two experiments testing effects of racial appeals in policy domains—welfare and gun control—that differ in the extent and ways they have been previously racialized. We also find evidence that the same group occasionally responded to explicit racial appeals even though these appeals were recognized as racially insensitive. We conclude by discussing implications for contemporary American politics, presenting representative survey data showing that racially resentful, white liberals were particularly likely to switch from voting for Barack Obama in 2012 to Donald Trump in 2016.