Yannick Seurin
Research Subjects
Yannick Seurin has a total of 37 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Benoît Cogliati
Thales DIS France SAS
4 shared publications Rodolphe Lampe
University of Versailles
2 shared publications- Rodolphe Lampe
University of Versailles
2 shared publications - Stefano Tessaro
University of California
2 shared publications - Thomas Peyrin
Nanyang technological university, Singapore, Singapore
2 shared publications Andrew Poelstra
Blockstream
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 215-245
DahLIAS: Discrete Logarithm-Based Interactive Aggregate Signatures
- 8 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 215-245
DahLIAS: Discrete Logarithm-Based Interactive Aggregate Signatures
- Open Access
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2037-2044
Zorya: Automated Concolic Execution of Single-Threaded Go Binaries
- 23 March 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2037-2044
Open AccessZorya: Automated Concolic Execution of Single-Threaded Go Binaries
- Open Access
- 8 July 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (2)
A Long Tweak Goes a Long Way: High Multi-user Security Authenticated Encryption from Tweakable Block Ciphers
We analyze the multi-user (mu) security of a family of nonce-based authentication encryption (nAE) schemes based on a tweakable block cipher (TBC). The starting point of our work is an analysis of the mu security of the SCT-II mode which underlies the nAE scheme Deoxys-II, winner of the CAESAR competition for the defense-in-depth category. We extend this analysis in two directions, as we detail now. First, we investigate the mu security of several TBC-based variants of the counter encryption mode (including CTRT, the encryption mode used within SCT-II) that differ by the way a nonce, a random value, and a counter are combined as tweak and plaintext inputs to the TBC to produce the keystream blocks that will mask the plaintext blocks. Then, we consider the authentication part of SCT-II and study the mu security of the nonce-based MAC Nonce-as-Tweak (NaT) built from a TBC and an almost universal (AU) hash function. We also observe that the standard construction of an AU hash function from a (T)BC can be proven secure under the assumption that the underlying TBC is unpredictable rather than pseudorandom, allowing much better conjectures on the concrete AU advantage. This allows us to derive the mu security of the family of nAE modes obtained by combining these encryption/MAC building blocks through the NSIV composition method. Some of these modes require an underlying TBC with a larger tweak length than what is usually available for existing ones. We then show the practicality of our modes by instantiating them with two new TBC constructions, Deoxys-TBC-512 and Deoxys-TBC-640, which can be seen as natural extensions of the Deoxys-TBC family to larger tweak input sizes. Designing such TBCs with unusually large tweaks is prone to pitfalls: Indeed, we show that a large-tweak proposal for SKINNY published at EUROCRYPT 2020 presents an inherent construction flaw. We therefore provide a sound design strategy to construct large-tweak TBCs within the Superposition Tweakey (STK) framework, leading to new Deoxys-TBC and SKINNY variants. We provide software benchmarks indicating that while ensuring a very high security level, the performances of our proposals remain very competitive.
- 8 July 2024
- Published by International Association for Cryptologic Research in IACR Communications in Cryptology
- Vol. 1 (2)
Open AccessA Long Tweak Goes a Long Way: High Multi-user Security Authenticated Encryption from Tweakable Block Ciphers
We analyze the multi-user (mu) security of a family of nonce-based authentication encryption (nAE) schemes based on a tweakable block cipher (TBC). The starting point of our work is an analysis of the mu security of the SCT-II mode which underlies the nAE scheme Deoxys-II, winner of the CAESAR competition for the defense-in-depth category. We extend this analysis in two directions, as we detail now. First, we investigate the mu security of several TBC-based variants of the counter encryption mode (including CTRT, the encryption mode used within SCT-II) that differ by the way a nonce, a random value, and a counter are combined as tweak and plaintext inputs to the TBC to produce the keystream blocks that will mask the plaintext blocks. Then, we consider the authentication part of SCT-II and study the mu security of the nonce-based MAC Nonce-as-Tweak (NaT) built from a TBC and an almost universal (AU) hash function. We also observe that the standard construction of an AU hash function from a (T)BC can be proven secure under the assumption that the underlying TBC is unpredictable rather than pseudorandom, allowing much better conjectures on the concrete AU advantage. This allows us to derive the mu security of the family of nAE modes obtained by combining these encryption/MAC building blocks through the NSIV composition method. Some of these modes require an underlying TBC with a larger tweak length than what is usually available for existing ones. We then show the practicality of our modes by instantiating them with two new TBC constructions, Deoxys-TBC-512 and Deoxys-TBC-640, which can be seen as natural extensions of the Deoxys-TBC family to larger tweak input sizes. Designing such TBCs with unusually large tweaks is prone to pitfalls: Indeed, we show that a large-tweak proposal for SKINNY published at EUROCRYPT 2020 presents an inherent construction flaw. We therefore provide a sound design strategy to construct large-tweak TBCs within the Superposition Tweakey (STK) framework, leading to new Deoxys-TBC and SKINNY variants. We provide software benchmarks indicating that while ensuring a very high security level, the performances of our proposals remain very competitive.
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 668-698
QCB: Efficient Quantum-Secure Authenticated Encryption
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 668-698
QCB: Efficient Quantum-Secure Authenticated Encryption
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 12106, 63-95
Blind Schnorr Signatures and Signed ElGamal Encryption in the Algebraic Group Model
The Schnorr blind signing protocol allows blind issuing of Schnorr signatures, one of the most widely used signatures. Despite its practical relevance, its security analysis is unsatisfactory. The only known security proof is informal and in the combination of the generic group model (GGM) and the random oracle model (ROM) assuming that the “ROS problem” is hard. The situation is similar for (Schnorr-)signed ElGamal encryption, a simple CCA2-secure variant of ElGamal. We analyze the security of these schemes in the algebraic group model (AGM), an idealized model closer to the standard model than the GGM. We first prove tight security of Schnorr signatures from the discrete logarithm assumption (DL) in the AGM+ROM. We then give a rigorous proof for blind Schnorr signatures in the AGM+ROM assuming hardness of the one-more discrete logarithm problem and ROS. As ROS can be solved in sub-exponential time using Wagner’s algorithm, we propose a simple modification of the signing protocol, which leaves the signatures unchanged. It is therefore compatible with systems that already use Schnorr signatures, such as blockchain protocols. We show that the security of our modified scheme relies on the hardness of a problem related to ROS that appears much harder. Finally, we give tight reductions, again in the AGM+ROM, of the CCA2 security of signed ElGamal encryption to DDH and signed hashed ElGamal key encapsulation to DL.
- 1 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 12106, 63-95
Blind Schnorr Signatures and Signed ElGamal Encryption in the Algebraic Group Model
The Schnorr blind signing protocol allows blind issuing of Schnorr signatures, one of the most widely used signatures. Despite its practical relevance, its security analysis is unsatisfactory. The only known security proof is informal and in the combination of the generic group model (GGM) and the random oracle model (ROM) assuming that the “ROS problem” is hard. The situation is similar for (Schnorr-)signed ElGamal encryption, a simple CCA2-secure variant of ElGamal. We analyze the security of these schemes in the algebraic group model (AGM), an idealized model closer to the standard model than the GGM. We first prove tight security of Schnorr signatures from the discrete logarithm assumption (DL) in the AGM+ROM. We then give a rigorous proof for blind Schnorr signatures in the AGM+ROM assuming hardness of the one-more discrete logarithm problem and ROS. As ROS can be solved in sub-exponential time using Wagner’s algorithm, we propose a simple modification of the signing protocol, which leaves the signatures unchanged. It is therefore compatible with systems that already use Schnorr signatures, such as blockchain protocols. We show that the security of our modified scheme relies on the hardness of a problem related to ROS that appears much harder. Finally, we give tight reductions, again in the AGM+ROM, of the CCA2 security of signed ElGamal encryption to DDH and signed hashed ElGamal key encapsulation to DL.
- Top Cited Papers
- 2 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 87 (9) , 2139-2164
Simple Schnorr multi-signatures with applications to Bitcoin
- 2 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 87 (9) , 2139-2164
Top Cited PapersSimple Schnorr multi-signatures with applications to Bitcoin
- 16 May 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptology
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1064-1119
Minimizing the Two-Round Even–Mansour Cipher
- 16 May 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptology
- Vol. 31 (4) , 1064-1119
Minimizing the Two-Round Even–Mansour Cipher
- 5 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 86 (12) , 2703-2723
Analysis of the single-permutation encrypted Davies–Meyer construction
- 5 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Designs, Codes and Cryptography
- Vol. 86 (12) , 2703-2723
Analysis of the single-permutation encrypted Davies–Meyer construction
- Open Access
- 19 June 2017
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- p. 27-58
New Constructions of MACs from (Tweakable) Block Ciphers
We propose new constructions of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) from tweakable or conventional block ciphers. Our new schemes are either stateless and deterministic, nonce-based, or randomized, and provably secure either in the standard model for tweakable block cipher-based ones, or in the ideal cipher model for block cipher-based ones. All our constructions are very efficient, requiring only one call to the underlying (tweakable) block cipher in addition to universally hashing the message. Moreover, the security bounds we obtain are quite strong: they are beyond the birthday bound, and nonce-based/randomized variants provide graceful security degradation in case of misuse, i.e., the security bound degrades linearly with the maximal number of repetitions of nonces/random values.
- 19 June 2017
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology
- p. 27-58
Open AccessNew Constructions of MACs from (Tweakable) Block Ciphers
We propose new constructions of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) from tweakable or conventional block ciphers. Our new schemes are either stateless and deterministic, nonce-based, or randomized, and provably secure either in the standard model for tweakable block cipher-based ones, or in the ideal cipher model for block cipher-based ones. All our constructions are very efficient, requiring only one call to the underlying (tweakable) block cipher in addition to universally hashing the message. Moreover, the security bounds we obtain are quite strong: they are beyond the birthday bound, and nonce-based/randomized variants provide graceful security degradation in case of misuse, i.e., the security bound degrades linearly with the maximal number of repetitions of nonces/random values.
- 21 July 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 2016, 121-149
EWCDM: An Efficient, Beyond-Birthday Secure, Nonce-Misuse Resistant MAC
- 21 July 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- Vol. 2016, 121-149
EWCDM: An Efficient, Beyond-Birthday Secure, Nonce-Misuse Resistant MAC