Takahiko Koike
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Takahiko Koike has a total of 98 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Norihiro Sadato
Research Organization of Science and Technology, Ritsumeikan University
19 shared publications Eri Nakagawa
Division of Cerebral Integration, Department of System Neuroscience, National Institute for Physiological Sciences (NIPS), Okazaki 444-8585, Japan
8 shared publicationsShuntaro Okazaki
Division of Cerebral Integration, Department of System Neuroscience, National Institute for Physiological Sciences (NIPS), Okazaki 444-8585, Japan
8 shared publications- Motofumi Sumiya
Research Center for Child Mental Development, Hamamatsu University School of Medicine, Hamamatsu, Japan
7 shared publications - Shigeyuki Kan
Research Organization of Science and Technology, Ritsumeikan University , 1-1-1, Noji-higashi, Kusatsu, Shiga 525-8577
7 shared publications Satoru Miyauchi
Advanced ICT Research Institute, National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Hyogo, 651-2492, Japan
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 November 2026
- Published by MIT Press in Imaging Neuroscience
Beyond shared input: verbal communication transmits partner-specific perceptual representations across brains
Language allows us to communicate what we perceive, but the degree to which such exchanges produce shared perceptual representations between interlocutors is unclear. In particular, whether verbal communication gives rise to interaction-specific neural alignment that reflects the speaker's perceptual experience remains untested. Here we combined fMRI hyperscanning with inter-brain spatial pattern similarity analyses to address this question. Senders viewed face images and described them to receivers via a real-time audio link while both underwent fMRI. Each trial comprised an utter–listen period, in which the sender described a face while the receiver listened, followed by a silent view–imagery period, in which the sender re-viewed the face while the receiver imagined it. Sender-receiver neural similarity was assessed by comparing true communicative dyads with pseudo pairs matched for stimulus content and timing. True pairs exhibited greater describe-to-imagery spatial pattern similarity than pseudo pairs across a left-lateralized frontoparietal network, indicating that the receiver's neural representation partially reflected the sender's verbal encoding in a pair-specific manner (describe-to-imagery similarity). Pair-specific similarity was also observed between patterns from the post-description view–imagery period (view-to-imagery similarity). Across both analyses, effects were concentrated in higher-order integrative and semantic regions, with limited evidence in early visual and face-selective cortex. Furthermore, sender–receiver similarity increased more steeply over the course of each description in true than in pseudo pairs (within-trial temporal accumulation). These findings provide neural evidence that verbal communication is associated with partner-specific representational alignment in the receiver's brain, emerging at an integrated, conceptual level and building over the course of each communicative exchange.
- 13 November 2026
- Published by MIT Press in Imaging Neuroscience
Open AccessBeyond shared input: verbal communication transmits partner-specific perceptual representations across brains
Language allows us to communicate what we perceive, but the degree to which such exchanges produce shared perceptual representations between interlocutors is unclear. In particular, whether verbal communication gives rise to interaction-specific neural alignment that reflects the speaker's perceptual experience remains untested. Here we combined fMRI hyperscanning with inter-brain spatial pattern similarity analyses to address this question. Senders viewed face images and described them to receivers via a real-time audio link while both underwent fMRI. Each trial comprised an utter–listen period, in which the sender described a face while the receiver listened, followed by a silent view–imagery period, in which the sender re-viewed the face while the receiver imagined it. Sender-receiver neural similarity was assessed by comparing true communicative dyads with pseudo pairs matched for stimulus content and timing. True pairs exhibited greater describe-to-imagery spatial pattern similarity than pseudo pairs across a left-lateralized frontoparietal network, indicating that the receiver's neural representation partially reflected the sender's verbal encoding in a pair-specific manner (describe-to-imagery similarity). Pair-specific similarity was also observed between patterns from the post-description view–imagery period (view-to-imagery similarity). Across both analyses, effects were concentrated in higher-order integrative and semantic regions, with limited evidence in early visual and face-selective cortex. Furthermore, sender–receiver similarity increased more steeply over the course of each description in true than in pseudo pairs (within-trial temporal accumulation). These findings provide neural evidence that verbal communication is associated with partner-specific representational alignment in the receiver's brain, emerging at an integrated, conceptual level and building over the course of each communicative exchange.
- Open Access
- 30 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
SPECIAL ISSUE: Technology, Nature, and Wellbeing in Contemporary Societies
EditoriaOver the past three decades, the concept of “being in the world” has progressively shifted toward that of “being in multiple worlds”—a transformation induced by technological innovations, including virtual reality, and social networks, which have expanded the modalities through which individuals relate to external reality. This thematic collection explores how these transformations challenge traditional notions of embodiment, cognition, and moral responsibility, raising new philosophical, psychological, and ethical questions about what it means to act, relate, and exist in technologically mediated environments. The contributions collected in this issue examine how contemporary research engages with these challenges across diverse contexts, ranging from the ethical implications of datafication and algorithmic agency, to the psychological and embodied effects of immersive technologies, and the evolving relationship between ageing, cognition, and digital tools, revealing the complexity of adapting human life to a digitally augmented reality.l
- 30 July 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessSPECIAL ISSUE: Technology, Nature, and Wellbeing in Contemporary Societies
EditoriaOver the past three decades, the concept of “being in the world” has progressively shifted toward that of “being in multiple worlds”—a transformation induced by technological innovations, including virtual reality, and social networks, which have expanded the modalities through which individuals relate to external reality. This thematic collection explores how these transformations challenge traditional notions of embodiment, cognition, and moral responsibility, raising new philosophical, psychological, and ethical questions about what it means to act, relate, and exist in technologically mediated environments. The contributions collected in this issue examine how contemporary research engages with these challenges across diverse contexts, ranging from the ethical implications of datafication and algorithmic agency, to the psychological and embodied effects of immersive technologies, and the evolving relationship between ageing, cognition, and digital tools, revealing the complexity of adapting human life to a digitally augmented reality.l
- Open Access
- 7 January 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 13 (1) , 111
The Role of the Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus in Introspection during Verbal Communication
Conversation enables the sharing of our subjective experiences through verbalizing introspected thoughts and feelings. The mentalizing network represents introspection, and successful conversation is characterized by alignment through imitation mediated by the mirror neuron system (MNS). Therefore, we hypothesized that the interaction between the mentalizing network and MNS mediates the conversational exchange of introspection. To test this, we performed hyperscanning functional magnetic resonance imaging during structured real-time conversations between 19 pairs of healthy participants. The participants first evaluated their preference for and familiarity with a presented object and then disclosed it. The control was the object feature identification task. When contrasted with the control, the preference/familiarity evaluation phase activated the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, left hippocampus, right cerebellum, and orbital portion of the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which represents introspection. The left IFG was activated when the two participants’ statements of introspection were mismatched during the disclosure. Disclosing introspection enhanced the functional connectivity of the left IFG with the bilateral superior temporal gyrus and primary motor cortex, representing the auditory MNS. Thus, the mentalizing system and MNS are hierarchically linked in the left IFG during a conversation, allowing for the sharing of introspection of the self and others.
- 7 January 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Brain Sciences
- Vol. 13 (1) , 111
Open AccessThe Role of the Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus in Introspection during Verbal Communication
Conversation enables the sharing of our subjective experiences through verbalizing introspected thoughts and feelings. The mentalizing network represents introspection, and successful conversation is characterized by alignment through imitation mediated by the mirror neuron system (MNS). Therefore, we hypothesized that the interaction between the mentalizing network and MNS mediates the conversational exchange of introspection. To test this, we performed hyperscanning functional magnetic resonance imaging during structured real-time conversations between 19 pairs of healthy participants. The participants first evaluated their preference for and familiarity with a presented object and then disclosed it. The control was the object feature identification task. When contrasted with the control, the preference/familiarity evaluation phase activated the dorso-medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, left hippocampus, right cerebellum, and orbital portion of the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), which represents introspection. The left IFG was activated when the two participants’ statements of introspection were mismatched during the disclosure. Disclosing introspection enhanced the functional connectivity of the left IFG with the bilateral superior temporal gyrus and primary motor cortex, representing the auditory MNS. Thus, the mentalizing system and MNS are hierarchically linked in the left IFG during a conversation, allowing for the sharing of introspection of the self and others.
- Open Access
- 28 June 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 16 (12) , 1264-1275
Neural substrates of shared visual experiences: a hyperscanning fMRI study
Sharing experience is a fundamental human social cognition. Since visual experience is a mental state directed toward the world, we hypothesized that sharing visual experience is mediated by joint attention (JA) for sharing directedness and mentalizing for mental state inferences. We conducted a hyperscanning functional magnetic resonance imaging with 44 healthy adult volunteers to test this hypothesis. We employed spoken-language-cued spatial and feature-based JA tasks. The initiator attracts the partner’s attention by a verbal command to a spatial location or an object feature to which the responder directs their attention. Pair-specific inter-individual neural synchronization of task-specific activities was found in the right anterior insular cortex (AIC)–inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) complex, the core node of JA and salience network, and the right posterior superior temporal sulcus, which represents the shared categories of the target. The right AIC-IFG also showed inter-individual synchronization of the residual time-series data, along with the right temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex—the core components for mentalization and the default mode network (DMN). This background synchronization represents sharing the belief of sharing the situation. Thus, shared visual experiences are represented by coherent coordination between the DMN and salience network linked through the right AIC-IFG.
- 28 June 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 16 (12) , 1264-1275
Open AccessNeural substrates of shared visual experiences: a hyperscanning fMRI study
Sharing experience is a fundamental human social cognition. Since visual experience is a mental state directed toward the world, we hypothesized that sharing visual experience is mediated by joint attention (JA) for sharing directedness and mentalizing for mental state inferences. We conducted a hyperscanning functional magnetic resonance imaging with 44 healthy adult volunteers to test this hypothesis. We employed spoken-language-cued spatial and feature-based JA tasks. The initiator attracts the partner’s attention by a verbal command to a spatial location or an object feature to which the responder directs their attention. Pair-specific inter-individual neural synchronization of task-specific activities was found in the right anterior insular cortex (AIC)–inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) complex, the core node of JA and salience network, and the right posterior superior temporal sulcus, which represents the shared categories of the target. The right AIC-IFG also showed inter-individual synchronization of the residual time-series data, along with the right temporoparietal junction and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex—the core components for mentalization and the default mode network (DMN). This background synchronization represents sharing the belief of sharing the situation. Thus, shared visual experiences are represented by coherent coordination between the DMN and salience network linked through the right AIC-IFG.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage
- Vol. 233, 117916
Neural substrates for sharing intention in action during face-to-face imitation
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage
- Vol. 233, 117916
Open AccessNeural substrates for sharing intention in action during face-to-face imitation
- Open Access
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage
- Vol. 224, 117375
Frequency-specific task modulation of human brain functional networks: A fast fMRI study
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage
- Vol. 224, 117375
Open AccessFrequency-specific task modulation of human brain functional networks: A fast fMRI study
- Open Access
- 6 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-11
Achieving affective human–virtual agent communication by enabling virtual agents to imitate positive expressions
Affective communication, communicating with emotion, during face-to-face communication is critical for social interaction. Advances in artificial intelligence have made it essential to develop affective human–virtual agent communication. A person’s belief during human–virtual agent interaction that the agent is a computer program affects social-cognitive processes. Whether this belief interferes with affective communication is an open question. We hypothesized that the imitation of a positive emotional expression by a virtual agent induces a positive emotion, regardless of the belief. To test this hypothesis, we conducted an fMRI study with 39 healthy volunteers, who were made to believe that a virtual agent was either a person or a computer. They were instructed to smile, and immediately afterwards, the virtual agent displayed a positive, negative, or neutral expression. The participants reported a positive emotion only when their smile was imitated by the agent’s positive expression regardless of their belief. This imitation activated the participants’ medial prefrontal cortex and precuneus, which are involved in anthropomorphism and contingency, respectively. These results suggest that a positive congruent response by a virtual agent can overcome the effect of believing that the agent is a computer program and thus contribute to achieving affective human–virtual agent communication.
- 6 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-11
Open AccessAchieving affective human–virtual agent communication by enabling virtual agents to imitate positive expressions
Affective communication, communicating with emotion, during face-to-face communication is critical for social interaction. Advances in artificial intelligence have made it essential to develop affective human–virtual agent communication. A person’s belief during human–virtual agent interaction that the agent is a computer program affects social-cognitive processes. Whether this belief interferes with affective communication is an open question. We hypothesized that the imitation of a positive emotional expression by a virtual agent induces a positive emotion, regardless of the belief. To test this hypothesis, we conducted an fMRI study with 39 healthy volunteers, who were made to believe that a virtual agent was either a person or a computer. They were instructed to smile, and immediately afterwards, the virtual agent displayed a positive, negative, or neutral expression. The participants reported a positive emotion only when their smile was imitated by the agent’s positive expression regardless of their belief. This imitation activated the participants’ medial prefrontal cortex and precuneus, which are involved in anthropomorphism and contingency, respectively. These results suggest that a positive congruent response by a virtual agent can overcome the effect of believing that the agent is a computer program and thus contribute to achieving affective human–virtual agent communication.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage: Clinical
- Vol. 26, 102249
Attenuated activation of the anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex on self-relevant social reward processing in individuals with autism spectrum disorder
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage: Clinical
- Vol. 26, 102249
Open AccessAttenuated activation of the anterior rostral medial prefrontal cortex on self-relevant social reward processing in individuals with autism spectrum disorder
- Open Access
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 14 (10) , 1131-1145
Role of the right anterior insular cortex in joint attention-related identification with a partner
Understanding others as intentional agents is critical in social interactions. We perceive others’ intentions through identification, a categorical judgment that others should work like oneself. The most primitive form of understanding others’ intentions is joint attention (JA). During JA, an initiator selects a shared object through gaze (initiative joint attention, IJA), and the responder follows the direction of the initiator’s gaze (reactive joint attention, RJA). Therefore, both participants share the intention of object selection. However, the neural underpinning of shared intention through JA remains unknown. In this study, we hypothesized that JA is represented by inter-individual neural synchronization of the intention-related activity. Additionally, JA requires eye contact that activates the limbic mirror system; therefore, we hypothesized that this system is involved in shared attention through JA. To test these hypotheses, participants underwent hyperscanning fMRI while performing JA tasks. We found that IJA-related activation of the right anterior insular cortex of participants was positively correlated with RJA-related activation of homologous regions in their partners. This area was activated by volitional selection of the target during IJA. Therefore, identification with others by JA is likely accomplished by the shared intentionality of target selection represented by inter-individual synchronization of the right anterior insular cortex.
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 14 (10) , 1131-1145
Open AccessRole of the right anterior insular cortex in joint attention-related identification with a partner
Understanding others as intentional agents is critical in social interactions. We perceive others’ intentions through identification, a categorical judgment that others should work like oneself. The most primitive form of understanding others’ intentions is joint attention (JA). During JA, an initiator selects a shared object through gaze (initiative joint attention, IJA), and the responder follows the direction of the initiator’s gaze (reactive joint attention, RJA). Therefore, both participants share the intention of object selection. However, the neural underpinning of shared intention through JA remains unknown. In this study, we hypothesized that JA is represented by inter-individual neural synchronization of the intention-related activity. Additionally, JA requires eye contact that activates the limbic mirror system; therefore, we hypothesized that this system is involved in shared attention through JA. To test these hypotheses, participants underwent hyperscanning fMRI while performing JA tasks. We found that IJA-related activation of the right anterior insular cortex of participants was positively correlated with RJA-related activation of homologous regions in their partners. This area was activated by volitional selection of the target during IJA. Therefore, identification with others by JA is likely accomplished by the shared intentionality of target selection represented by inter-individual synchronization of the right anterior insular cortex.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage
- Vol. 191, 150-161
Neural correlates of online cooperation during joint force production
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in NeuroImage
- Vol. 191, 150-161
Open AccessNeural correlates of online cooperation during joint force production