David P. Redlawsk

Research shows that politicians are often not electorally punished for immoral behavior. Yet, voters may still desire to see politicians punished outside of the election context for committing moral transgressions. Moreover, these desires may be conditioned by the partisanship of the voter, the transgressor, and voters’ perceptions of moral violation severity. To examine such effects, we conduct a vignette study asking 2997 U. S. respondents to consider politicians’ moral violations. We randomly varied the moral principle violated (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, Sanctity, and a social norm violation) and the partisanship of the politician (Republic/Democrat/Nonpartisan). When voters perceive the severity of a moral violation to be low, Republicans express a stronger desire to punish than do Democrats. Republicans’ desire for punishment depends on the group of the transgressor, with higher levels of punitiveness desired for out-party transgressors than in-party. However, when voters perceive severity to be moderate or high, Democrats have the stronger desire to punish the politician involved, but they show no in-party bias. Across the moral violations presented, Republicans and Democrats differ in perceptions of severity of politicians’ immoral behavior. Results show partisan voters’ heterogeneity in punitiveness, with the relationship strongly mediated by perceived severity of the moral violation.

Political candidates choose to highlight morality in their campaign speeches in various ways. In particular, we expect presidential candidates to highlight moral principles in introducing themselves to voters early in the campaign. However, usage may not be the same across candidates. Existing research suggests that, in general, women focus on different moral values than men. The question is whether such findings in the mass public translate into rhetorical differences between men and women presidential candidates. We know little about whether such gender differences exist, and if so, how they might influence voters. We examine a unique data set of presidential candidate speeches given in Iowa in the 2016 and 2020 nomination campaigns, developing and testing hypotheses about gender, the use of moral language, and its effects on vote outcomes. Using automated text analysis, we find that all else equal, while women candidates do not use more moral language overall, they do emphasize care and fairness more than men, and in doing so, they may be disadvantaging themselves, especially when using language related to fairness.

In recent decades, political psychologists have given a lot of attention to the role of emotions in politics. While there have been several different research programs, the dominant paradigm has been set by affective intelligence theory (AIT), developed by George Marcus, Russell Neuman, and Michael Mackuen. AIT has helped explain many puzzles in understanding how emotions influence political decisions, as any good paradigm should. At the same time, I argue it has also had the effect of limiting broader research into the range of discrete emotions, especially contempt. While recognizing the value of AIT, I call for more research that goes beyond its boundaries, showing through several recent studies how a focus on the additional effects of contempt can improve our understanding of voter decision-making.

Existing empirical research on voters’ responses to individual politicians’ moral transgressions pays limited attention to moral emotions, although moral emotions are an integral part of voters’ moral judgment. This study looks at U.S. voters’ discrete moral emotional responses to politician’s moral violations and examines how these discrete moral emotional responses are dependent on voters’ own moral principles and the extent to which they identify with a political party. We report on a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment where 2026 U.S. respondents reacted to politicians’ violations of one of five moral foundations defined by Moral Foundations Theory. We randomly vary which moral foundation is violated and the partisanship of the politician. While voters’ own moral principles somewhat condition moral emotional responses, we find that voters’ moral emotional responses mostly depend on partisan identification. When voters share party identity with a politician committing a moral violation, they respond with less anger, contempt, disgust and shame than when they do not share party identity. The effect is greater among strong partisans. However, we find limited evidence that specific moral emotions are activated by violations of particular moral foundations, thereby challenging Moral Foundations Theory.

In the run-up to a contentious 2020 presidential election, the much-maligned American voter may indeed be wondering, “How did we get here?” A Citizen’s Guide to the Political Psychology of Voting offers a way of thinking about how voters make decisions that provides both hope and concern. In many ways, voters may be able to effectively process vast amounts of information in order to decide which candidates to vote for in concert with their ideas, values, and priorities. But human limitations in information processing must give us pause. While we all might think we want to be rational information processors, political psychologists recognize that most of the time we do not have the time or the motivation to do so. The question is, can voters do a “good enough” job even if they fail to account for everything during the campaign? Evidence suggests that they can, but it isn’t easy. Here, Redlawsk and Habegger portray a wide variety of voter styles and approaches—from the most motivated and engaged to the farthest removed and disenchanted—in vignettes that connect the long tradition of voter survey research to real life voting challenges. They explore how voters search for political information and make use of it in evaluating candidates and their positions. Ultimately, they find that American voters are reasonably competent in making well-enough informed vote choices efficiently and responsibly. For citizen voters as well as students and scholars, these results should encourage regular turnout for elections now and in the future.

Politicians’ moral behaviors affect how voters evaluate them. But existing empirical research on the effects of politicians’ violations of moral standards pays little attention to the heterogeneous moral foundations of voters in assessing responses to violations. It also pays little attention to the ways partisan preferences shape responses. We examine voters’ heterogeneous evaluative and emotional responses to presumably immoral behaviors by politicians. We make use of moral foundation theory’s argument that people vary in the extent to which they endorse, value, and use the five universally available moral intuitions: care, fairness, loyalty, authority and sanctity. We report on a 5 × 3 between‐subjects experiment asking a random sample of 2,026 U.S. respondents to respond to politicians’ violations of different moral foundations. We randomly vary which of the five foundations is violated and the partisanship of the actor (Republic/Democrat/Nonpartisan). Results suggest that partisanship rather than moral foundations drives most of U.S. voters’ responses to moral foundations violations by politicians. These foundations seem malleable when partisan actors are involved. While Democrats in this sample show stronger negative emotional response to moral violations than Republicans, partisans of both parties express significantly greater negativity when a politician of the other party violates a moral foundation.

Efforts to educate the general public about global warming and the potential policy solutions that could mitigate its effects have relied on the diffusion of facts. But, cognitive scientists have documented that psychologically distant events like global warming elicit less concern and motivation to act relative to immediate, proximal and certain events. This paper documents a quasi-experiment that tested the effect on attitudes of a television campaign that emphasized the temporally, geographically and socially proximal impacts of global warming on the ecosystems and business activity of a historically conservative area of the United States. The campaign aired on one cable provider. Subscribers of that and of competing providers in the same zip-codes were polled after the campaign. Respondents exposed to the campaign were more likely to believe that global warming is happening, to accept the scientific consensus, to be more concerned about impacts and more supportive of policy solutions.

Theories of discrete emotions distinguish contempt from other negative emotions, and recent evidence shows that contempt toward candidates played a major role in two US Senate races in 2014. Contempt felt by respondents was the most significant emotion predicting voting against three of the four major party candidates, and had effects independent of other emotions, such as anger, anxiety, and hope. In the present paper, the 2016 Republican Iowa Caucus provides the opportunity to examine contempt in a different context: an intra-party primary campaign, where candidates share the important characteristic of party affiliation. We find that while voters perceived all leading GOP candidates as expressing at least some contempt, Donald Trump was seen as expressing the most contempt by far. Voters also felt contempt for at least some candidates of their own party. When they did so, it predicts significantly lowered probabilities of voting for Cruz, Trump, and Rubio, and increased probabilities of voting for one or more of their opponents. Implications of these findings for theory and research on the role of contempt and other specific emotions in voting behavior are discussed.

We compare sources of Donald Trump’s appeal in the 2016 US presidential campaign to the appeal of right-populists from Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. We compare the appeal of right-populist to center-right candidates in each case (as measured with feeling thermometers) and test hypotheses about how the appeal of right-populists differs from that of center-right candidates. Standard predictors of affect toward right-of-center candidates were generally less relevant as a basis of affect toward right-populist candidates. This comparative perspective demonstrates that Trump’s appeal was based on racial resentment, anti-immigration sentiments and anxiety. Affect toward Trump and other right-populists from these Anglo-democracies fits patterns previously observed in Europe, a pattern that appears to be world-wide.