André Sant’aNna
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
André Sant’aNna has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kourken Michaelian
Centre for Philosophy of Memory, IPhiG, Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble, France
6 shared publications - Denis Perrin
Institut de Philosophie de Grenoble/Centre for Philosophy of Memory, UFR Arts Et Sciences Humaines (ARSH), Université Grenoble Alpes, Grenoble Cedex 9, France
2 shared publications - Catherine Legg
Philosophy Program, Deakin University, Burwood, Australia
1 shared publication - Christopher J.A. Moulin
Université Grenoble Alpes
1 shared publication - Christopher Jude McCarroll
Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University, Taipei, Taiwan
1 shared publication - James Openshaw
School of Humanities, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 December 2025
- Published by Universidad de Valparaiso Chile in Humanities Journal of Valparaiso
- No. 28,p. 36-44
The shifting explananda of philosophical theories of remembering
The philosophy of memory has grown significantly and very rapidly in the past decade. In this commentary, we draw on critical remarks that we have individually articulated in previous work to suggest that future research in the area would benefit from (i) making differences of theoretical projects more explicit, revealing diverse assumptions and methodological commitments, and (ii) identifying where disagreements at this level have been mistaken for univocal, first-order disputes about ‘the nature of remembering’. Zooming out at this stage of the philosophy of memory will give us a clearer idea of where we are, how far we have come, and where we ought to go from here.
- 24 December 2025
- Published by Universidad de Valparaiso Chile in Humanities Journal of Valparaiso
- No. 28,p. 36-44
Open AccessThe shifting explananda of philosophical theories of remembering
The philosophy of memory has grown significantly and very rapidly in the past decade. In this commentary, we draw on critical remarks that we have individually articulated in previous work to suggest that future research in the area would benefit from (i) making differences of theoretical projects more explicit, revealing diverse assumptions and methodological commitments, and (ii) identifying where disagreements at this level have been mistaken for univocal, first-order disputes about ‘the nature of remembering’. Zooming out at this stage of the philosophy of memory will give us a clearer idea of where we are, how far we have come, and where we ought to go from here.
- 8 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 4 (2) , 1-20
The debate about the accuracy conditions of episodic memory: a critical overview
- 8 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 4 (2) , 1-20
The debate about the accuracy conditions of episodic memory: a critical overview
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 63-83
Dream Memories, Metacognition, and the Nature of Dream Experiences
- 23 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 63-83
Dream Memories, Metacognition, and the Nature of Dream Experiences
- Open Access
- 22 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 24 (1) , 213-230
Pragmatic realism: towards a reconciliation of enactivism and realism
This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(3), 461–475, 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s manipulation-based enactivist realism to a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism.
- 22 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 24 (1) , 213-230
Open AccessPragmatic realism: towards a reconciliation of enactivism and realism
This paper addresses some apparent philosophical tensions between realism and enactivism by means of Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Enactivism’s Mind-Life Continuity thesis has been taken to commit it to some form of anti-realist ‘world-construction’ which has been considered controversial. Accordingly, a new realist enactivism is proposed by Zahidi (Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(3), 461–475, 2014), drawing on Ian Hacking’s ‘entity realism’, which places subjects in worlds comprised of the things that they can successfully manipulate. We review this attempt, and argue that whilst Zahidi rightly urges enactivists towards ‘internal realism’, he cannot sustain a non-negotiable aspect of realism that is crucial for scientific progress – the claim that multiple subjects inhabit the same world. We explore Peirce’s pragmatism as an alternative solution, foregrounding his distinction between existence and reality, and his inquiry-based account of cognition. These theoretical innovations, we argue, fruitfully generalize Zahidi’s manipulation-based enactivist realism to a richer, inquiry-based enactivist realism. We explore how this realism’s pan-species monism about truth encourages and supports the investigation of non-human animal cognition, and conclude by considering some implications of our discussion for long-standing realism debates within pragmatism.
- Open Access
- 8 January 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
- Vol. 5
Metacognition and the puzzle of alethic memory
Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness—if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory.
- 8 January 2024
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
- Vol. 5
Open AccessMetacognition and the puzzle of alethic memory
Alethism is the view that successful remembering only requires an accurate representation of a past event. It opposes the truth-and-authenticity view, according to which successful remembering requires both an accurate representation of a past event and an accurate representation of a past experience of that event. Alethism is able to handle problematic cases faced by the truth-and-authenticity view, but it faces an important challenge of its own: If successful remembering only requires accurately representing past events, then how is it possible that our memories are also experienced as originating in past experiences of those events? I call this the puzzle of alethic memory. I argue that alethism can be reconciled with the claim that memories are experienced as originating in past experiences of those events—what I call the experience of first-handedness—if we conceive of the phenomenology of remembering in metacognitive terms. According to the metacognitive approach that I favor, the phenomenology of remembering is partly explained by what memory represents and partly explained by the existence of a metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations. I argue that accounting for the feeling of first-handedness in terms of the metacognitive feeling that accompanies memory representations allows us to solve the puzzle of alethic memory.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 26 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-28
Is remembering constructive imagining?
The (dis)continuism debate—the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining. In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained, and hence controlled, in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds.
- 26 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-28
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessIs remembering constructive imagining?
The (dis)continuism debate—the debate over whether remembering is a form of imagining—is a prominent one in contemporary philosophy of memory. In recent work, Langland-Hassan (2021) has argued that this debate is best understood as a dispute over whether remembering is a form of constructive imagining. In this paper, I argue that remembering is not a form of constructive imagining because constructive processes in remembering and imagining are constrained, and hence controlled, in different ways at the level of consciousness. More specifically, I argue that remembering and imagining differ in terms of the interventions we can make on the constructive processes as they unfold. If this is correct, then a form of discontinuism is vindicated: remembering and imagining are, on this view, processes of different kinds.
- Open Access
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Wiley in WIREs Cognitive Science
- Vol. 15 (1) , e1665
Autonoesis and episodicity: Perspectives from philosophy of memory
The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy.This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Philosophy > Consciousness Psychology > Memory
- 9 August 2023
- Published by Wiley in WIREs Cognitive Science
- Vol. 15 (1) , e1665
Open AccessAutonoesis and episodicity: Perspectives from philosophy of memory
The idea that episodic memory is distinguished from semantic memory by the fact that it involves autonoetic consciousness, initially introduced by Tulving, has been influential not only in psychology but also in philosophy, where a variety of approaches to autonoesis and to its relationship to episodicity have been developed. This article provides a critical review of the available philosophical approaches. Distinguishing among representational, metacognitive, and epistemic accounts of autonoesis, it considers these in relation to objective and subjective conceptions of episodicity and assesses them against immediacy and source criteria that any philosophical account of autonoesis should arguably aim to satisfy.This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Philosophy > Consciousness Psychology > Memory
- 9 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (1) , 1-24
Cryptomnesia: a three-factor account
- 9 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (1) , 1-24
Cryptomnesia: a three-factor account
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (8) , 1-31
Déjà vécu is not déjà vu: An ability view
This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience.
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 37 (8) , 1-31
Déjà vécu is not déjà vu: An ability view
This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience.
- 4 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (2) , 641-664
Does Macbeth See a Dagger? An Empirical Argument for the Existence-Neutrality of Seeing
- 4 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (2) , 641-664
Does Macbeth See a Dagger? An Empirical Argument for the Existence-Neutrality of Seeing