Rengong Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Rengong Zhang has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Claire Y. C. Liang
Maine Business School, University of Maine, Orono, USA
1 shared publication - Cuili Qian
Naveen Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, Texas 75080
1 shared publication - Donal Crilly
London Business School, London NW1 4SA, United Kingdom
1 shared publication - Heather A. Wier
University of Alberta
1 shared publication - Keyuan Zhang
Shanghai Jiao Tong University
1 shared publication - Manpreet Hora
Georgia Institute of Technology
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 34 (1) , 358-379
Short-Selling Pressure and Workplace Safety: Curbing Short-Termism Through Stakeholder Interdependencies
We advance a multistakeholder framework that highlights the influence of stakeholders in tempering short-termist responses to capital market pressures. When firms face pressure from short sellers in the capital market, they sometimes shift attention to short-term stock performance and neglect critical investments that pay off in the long run. Relying on a quasi-natural experiment and establishment-level data on workplace injuries, we find that short-selling pressure causes an increase in employee injuries. Critically, however, the degree to which the response is short-termist depends on the salience of multiple stakeholders (analysts, shareholders, employees, and managers). We discuss the implications for understanding firms’ relations with their stakeholders and, particularly, how these stakeholders influence corporate responses to capital market pressures in ways that matter for long-term value creation. This study also contributes to strategy research by highlighting the downside of capital market deregulation.Funding: Rengong Zhang acknowledges the financial support from the CityU Strategic Research Grant.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1576 .
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 34 (1) , 358-379
Short-Selling Pressure and Workplace Safety: Curbing Short-Termism Through Stakeholder Interdependencies
We advance a multistakeholder framework that highlights the influence of stakeholders in tempering short-termist responses to capital market pressures. When firms face pressure from short sellers in the capital market, they sometimes shift attention to short-term stock performance and neglect critical investments that pay off in the long run. Relying on a quasi-natural experiment and establishment-level data on workplace injuries, we find that short-selling pressure causes an increase in employee injuries. Critically, however, the degree to which the response is short-termist depends on the salience of multiple stakeholders (analysts, shareholders, employees, and managers). We discuss the implications for understanding firms’ relations with their stakeholders and, particularly, how these stakeholders influence corporate responses to capital market pressures in ways that matter for long-term value creation. This study also contributes to strategy research by highlighting the downside of capital market deregulation.Funding: Rengong Zhang acknowledges the financial support from the CityU Strategic Research Grant.Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2022.1576 .
- 26 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Operations Management
- Vol. 68 (8) , 855-880
Competition and slack: The role of tariffs on cost stickiness
Slack exists when entities hold resources in excess of those required to support current operations. “Sticky” spending is a specific type of slack spending that occurs when a firm reduces spending by less when sales fall than it increases spending when sales rise by an equivalent amount. Changes in a firm's environment affect its propensity to engage in sticky spending. We examine how competition influences sticky spending, positing two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that competition will be positively associated with firms' investment in sticky spending both for cost of goods manufactured (COGM) and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A). Second, we hypothesize that competition moderates the relation between sticky spending and firm performance. Utilizing variations of tariff rates as exogenous shocks to reflect competition, we measure sticky spending in the firm's COGM and SG&A spending. To empirically verify our hypotheses, we draw data from three different sources, industry‐level tariff data, Compustat, and the Hoberg–Phillips data library, for firms in the manufacturing sector from 1974 through 2017. Our regression analyses confirm that managers maintain more stickiness in spending as competition increases. The market's assessment of firm performance (as measured by Tobin's Q) is largely positively associated with sticky spending as competition increases. This expectation of higher performance is evidenced by immediate improvements in the firm's return on assets (ROA) when we consider COGM spending, but not when we consider SG&A spending.
- 26 October 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Operations Management
- Vol. 68 (8) , 855-880
Competition and slack: The role of tariffs on cost stickiness
Slack exists when entities hold resources in excess of those required to support current operations. “Sticky” spending is a specific type of slack spending that occurs when a firm reduces spending by less when sales fall than it increases spending when sales rise by an equivalent amount. Changes in a firm's environment affect its propensity to engage in sticky spending. We examine how competition influences sticky spending, positing two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that competition will be positively associated with firms' investment in sticky spending both for cost of goods manufactured (COGM) and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A). Second, we hypothesize that competition moderates the relation between sticky spending and firm performance. Utilizing variations of tariff rates as exogenous shocks to reflect competition, we measure sticky spending in the firm's COGM and SG&A spending. To empirically verify our hypotheses, we draw data from three different sources, industry‐level tariff data, Compustat, and the Hoberg–Phillips data library, for firms in the manufacturing sector from 1974 through 2017. Our regression analyses confirm that managers maintain more stickiness in spending as competition increases. The market's assessment of firm performance (as measured by Tobin's Q) is largely positively associated with sticky spending as competition increases. This expectation of higher performance is evidenced by immediate improvements in the firm's return on assets (ROA) when we consider COGM spending, but not when we consider SG&A spending.
- 25 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 55 (2) , 695-738
Post-earnings announcement drift and parameter uncertainty: evidence from industry and market news
- 25 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 55 (2) , 695-738
Post-earnings announcement drift and parameter uncertainty: evidence from industry and market news