Lukas Heinrich Meyer

Limiting global warming to well below 2 °C requires that countries and subnational regions align their net-zero targets with coherent carbon budgets. While the fair division of the global carbon budget across nations is well studied, we develop a distributive justice framework for allocating a national carbon budget among subnational regions. Grounded in individuals’ equal claims to well-being benefits from emissions-generating activities, our framework distinguishes between consumption- and production-based emissions budgets. For consumption-based emissions, we propose a qualified equal-per-capita allocation that accounts for regional basic needs, historical responsibility, and benefits from past emissions. For production-based emissions, we introduce the Equal Transition Opportunity Production-Based Allocation (ETOPA) mechanism, which accounts for heterogeneous regional economic structures and transition risks. Applying our framework to the European Union, we quantify subnational distributions of production- and consumption-based emissions budgets and reflect on their potential to inform political processes and guide equitable carbon-neutral transformations.

This article discusses Klaus Steigleder's rights-based risk ethics through the lens of a risk-averse basic needs sufficientarianism. Both approaches belong to the same family of views: Both are rights-based positions, both substantively justify the attribution of rights as important for people being able to live an autonomous life, and both refer to the equal rights of all people. However, basic needs sufficientarianism is a version of rights consequentialism that endorses a weighted aggregation of the rights of all, while Steigleder aims at developing a Kantian approach, which proposes limits to the aggregation of rights and privileges agents’ rights. Second, Steigleder's account does not include a threshold conception, while sufficientarianism systematically specifies which rights must be fulfilled in order to lead a minimally autonomous life. Third, it is not clear how Steigleder wants to account for probabilities, while risk-averse sufficientarianism relies on weighted expected outcomes also in the context of climate change policies. Fourth, to overcome the charge of being overdemanding, Steigleder prioritizes current equal agent rights, while weak sufficientarianism endorses a weighted impartial assessment of the rights of all affected so that not even the protection of sub-threshold rights constitutes absolute restrictions to what is owed to future people. This, however, does not speak against risk-averse basic needs sufficientarianism.

This paper discusses how legitimate expectations should be treated during transitional processes. It examines whether the state may frustrate those expectations which, although legitimate at time T1, are no longer legitimate at time T2 due to changed circumstances. It also discusses the conditions under which those whose expectations may be frustrated during transitional processes should receive compensation. First, we argue that legitimate expectations reflect a legitimate interest in receiving the benefits of the basic structure of society. We then distinguish between legitimate expectations that are protected by rights and those that are not. We argue that while the former type of legitimate expectation may be justifiably frustrated when doing so is necessary to achieve a more just society, the range of cases in which it is permissible to frustrate the latter type of expectation is broader. Finally, we argue that when someone is committed to a particular life plan based on an expectation that was legitimate at T1 but is no longer legitimate at T2 because of changed circumstances, the value of personal autonomy gives rise to a meta-expectation that people will be given some time to adjust their life plans to new circumstances. We also argue that the frustration of expectations that are no longer legitimate during transitions may still require compensation after the change in circumstances, if the agent responsible for creating the expectation frustrates it and the expectation holder has done nothing wrong in relying on it.

Spätestens seit der Corona-Krise wird über schwindendes Vertrauen in die Wissenschaft geklagt. Das Klimaforschungsnetzwerk Climate Change Centre Austria (CCCA) stellt grundlegende Fragen etwa zu Verantwortung der und Vertrauen in die Wissenschaft und diskutiert mögliche Antworten. Diese sollen als Handlungsorientierung für die Forschenden des Netzwerks dienen und Impulse für den gesellschaftlichen Diskurs geben. Das CCCA versteht seine Bemühungen um ein gemeinsames Wissenschaftsverständnis auch als Beitrag zur Stärkung der Demokratie, die zur Realisierung ihrer fundamentalen Werte auch auf unabhängige, kritische Reflexion angewiesen ist.

Legitimate expectations should be considered in the transition to a low-carbon society. After explaining under what conditions and circumstances expectations are legitimate, this paper shows that those expectations whose frustration undermines the ability to plan, infringes basic moral rights, or is extremely costly for its bearer might justify a deviation in the baseline of justice in favour of the expectation holder. People should be notified about the likely frustration of their expectations so that they can avoid the frustration of their expectations, adapt their life plans and minimise costs. Since the frustration of legitimate expectations seems unavoidable in the transformation to a low-carbon society, priority should be given to the protection of the expectations of those who cannot be materially compensated. Still, if two groups are eligible for material compensation, we should give priority to protecting the expectation of those who cannot continue with the same life plan as before if their expectations are frustrated.

In implementing the European Green Deal to align with the Paris Agreement, the EU has raised its climate ambition and in 2022 is negotiating the distribution of increased mitigation effort among Member States. Such partitioning of targets among subsidiary entities is becoming a major challenge for implementation of climate policies around the globe. We contrast the 2021 European Commission proposal - an allocation based on a singular country attribute - with transparent and reproducible methods based on three ethical principles. We go beyond traditional effort-sharing literature and explore allocations representing an aggregated least regret compromise between different EU country perspectives on a fair allocation. While the 2021 proposal represents a nuanced compromise for many countries, for others a further redistribution could be considered equitable. Whereas we apply our approach within the setting of the EU negotiations, the framework can easily be adapted to inform debates worldwide on sharing mitigation effort among subsidiary entities.