Feida Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Feida Zhang has a total of 49 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jamie Y. Tong
University of Western Australia
4 shared publications - Kam C. Chan
Research Center of Finance Shanghai Business School Shanghai China
4 shared publications - Henrik Cronqvist
University of Miami - Department of Finance
3 shared publications - Annie Yuansha Li
University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell, USA
2 shared publications Jamie Y. Tong
2 shared publicationsSerene Xu Ni
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Unraveling The Puzzle: Reexamining The Relation between CEO Incentives and Accounting Manipulation
Although CEO equity incentives are commonly believed to be positively associated with accounting manipulation, the empirical evidence is mixed (Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2010; Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter 2017). We revisit this relation by first recognizing that accounting manipulation ranges from permissible interpretation of GAAP to outright fraud. While equity incentives motivate CEOs to present more favorable performance through accrual earnings management, they do not inherently lead to fraud, largely because of the substantially higher costs of fraudulent behavior. Instead, fraud arises when CEOs face heightened pressure, such as prolonged poor performance. The positive relation between equity incentives and fraud emerges only under these conditions and is concentrated when equity incentives are excessive. We thus reestablish the positive relation between equity incentives and accounting manipulation, but with a distinction prior work has overlooked. The relation is unconditional for within-GAAP earnings management and conditional on heightened pressure for accounting fraud.
- 4 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessUnraveling The Puzzle: Reexamining The Relation between CEO Incentives and Accounting Manipulation
Although CEO equity incentives are commonly believed to be positively associated with accounting manipulation, the empirical evidence is mixed (Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 2010; Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter 2017). We revisit this relation by first recognizing that accounting manipulation ranges from permissible interpretation of GAAP to outright fraud. While equity incentives motivate CEOs to present more favorable performance through accrual earnings management, they do not inherently lead to fraud, largely because of the substantially higher costs of fraudulent behavior. Instead, fraud arises when CEOs face heightened pressure, such as prolonged poor performance. The positive relation between equity incentives and fraud emerges only under these conditions and is concentrated when equity incentives are excessive. We thus reestablish the positive relation between equity incentives and accounting manipulation, but with a distinction prior work has overlooked. The relation is unconditional for within-GAAP earnings management and conditional on heightened pressure for accounting fraud.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Lost in Conversion: Money Illusion and Corporate Investment
We examine whether money illusion reaches the corporate allocation of capital. Our natural experiment is the European currency changeover, which rescaled firms' accounts at predetermined conversion rates that varied widely in nominal magnitude. We find that investment rises with the magnitude of the rescaling, controlling for the real channels of monetary union. A one-standard deviation larger conversion rate corresponds to roughly 15% of mean investment. The gradient survives an exclusion design, a geographic regression discontinuity, and an instrumental variables design. The illusion enters through cash-flow projections in capital budgeting, strengthens with conversion complexity and anchor stability, and weakens with managerial experience. The evidence is consistent with managers anchoring on legacy-currency magnitudes in the new nominal frame.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLost in Conversion: Money Illusion and Corporate Investment
We examine whether money illusion reaches the corporate allocation of capital. Our natural experiment is the European currency changeover, which rescaled firms' accounts at predetermined conversion rates that varied widely in nominal magnitude. We find that investment rises with the magnitude of the rescaling, controlling for the real channels of monetary union. A one-standard deviation larger conversion rate corresponds to roughly 15% of mean investment. The gradient survives an exclusion design, a geographic regression discontinuity, and an instrumental variables design. The illusion enters through cash-flow projections in capital budgeting, strengthens with conversion complexity and anchor stability, and weakens with managerial experience. The evidence is consistent with managers anchoring on legacy-currency magnitudes in the new nominal frame.
- Open Access
- 20 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
CEO Underpayment and Earnings Management
We examine earnings management of underpaid CEOs compared with overpaid CEOs. We find that underpaid CEOs are more likely to manipulate earnings up than overpaid CEOs. This is consistent with the argument that underpaid CEOs are inclined to withdraw from current positions for a better placement and thus have strong motivation to manipulate their reported earnings up. Our further tests indicate that the association between CEO underpayment and earnings management is stronger when the CEO is younger, in an industry with friendly turnover culture, and in an industry with more job opportunities, strengthening our argument that underpaid CEOs manipulate earnings for a better placement on the job market.
- 20 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCEO Underpayment and Earnings Management
We examine earnings management of underpaid CEOs compared with overpaid CEOs. We find that underpaid CEOs are more likely to manipulate earnings up than overpaid CEOs. This is consistent with the argument that underpaid CEOs are inclined to withdraw from current positions for a better placement and thus have strong motivation to manipulate their reported earnings up. Our further tests indicate that the association between CEO underpayment and earnings management is stronger when the CEO is younger, in an industry with friendly turnover culture, and in an industry with more job opportunities, strengthening our argument that underpaid CEOs manipulate earnings for a better placement on the job market.
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
Board risk committees and risk factor disclosures tone
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
Board risk committees and risk factor disclosures tone
- 21 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
- Vol. 57 (6)
Information sharing and loan outcome: Evidence from CEO/CFO-bank links
- 21 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
- Vol. 57 (6)
Information sharing and loan outcome: Evidence from CEO/CFO-bank links
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Trademark Protection and Dividend Policy: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment
This paper examines how trademark protection affects corporate dividend policy using the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1996 as a quasi-natural experiment. We extend Miller and Rock's (1985) dividend signaling model to incorporate trademark protection, integrating signaling theory, agency theory, and life cycle theory of dividends. We predict that enhanced trademark protection increases dividend payments by improving cash flow stability and increasing market power, with stronger effects for firms with good information environments, high growth opportunities, and low retained earnings than for their counterparts. Our empirical results strongly support our predictions: firms with famous trademarks increased their dividend payments following FTDA's passage and reduced them after its subsequent nullification. Additional analysis shows that markets recognize these effects, as shown by the decreased marginal value of cash holdings for protected firms. Our findings demonstrate that intellectual property protection fundamentally alters corporate financial policies.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTrademark Protection and Dividend Policy: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment
This paper examines how trademark protection affects corporate dividend policy using the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1996 as a quasi-natural experiment. We extend Miller and Rock's (1985) dividend signaling model to incorporate trademark protection, integrating signaling theory, agency theory, and life cycle theory of dividends. We predict that enhanced trademark protection increases dividend payments by improving cash flow stability and increasing market power, with stronger effects for firms with good information environments, high growth opportunities, and low retained earnings than for their counterparts. Our empirical results strongly support our predictions: firms with famous trademarks increased their dividend payments following FTDA's passage and reduced them after its subsequent nullification. Additional analysis shows that markets recognize these effects, as shown by the decreased marginal value of cash holdings for protected firms. Our findings demonstrate that intellectual property protection fundamentally alters corporate financial policies.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Do Artificial Intelligence Technologies Complement or Displace Human Accountants? Evidence from Firms' Responses to Accounting Errors
This paper examines whether artificial intelligence (AI) complements or displaces human accountants in companies. We document that firms tend to increase their AI capacities and hiring of human accountants after the announcements of restatements due to accounting errors. The increase in AI capacity is more pronounced for firms that also hire more human accountants. These investments in AI and accounting expertise are associated with a significant decrease in the probability of future restatements. Importantly, the effect of jointly increasing both AI and accounting expertise on future restatements appears to be stronger than the sum of the effects of improving AI and accounting expertise individually, indicating potential synergies between AI and accounting expertise in improving financial reporting quality. Further analysis suggests that investing in AI and accounting expertise following a restatement can enhance market reactions to earnings surprises, particularly for firms that increase both types of expertise.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDo Artificial Intelligence Technologies Complement or Displace Human Accountants? Evidence from Firms' Responses to Accounting Errors
This paper examines whether artificial intelligence (AI) complements or displaces human accountants in companies. We document that firms tend to increase their AI capacities and hiring of human accountants after the announcements of restatements due to accounting errors. The increase in AI capacity is more pronounced for firms that also hire more human accountants. These investments in AI and accounting expertise are associated with a significant decrease in the probability of future restatements. Importantly, the effect of jointly increasing both AI and accounting expertise on future restatements appears to be stronger than the sum of the effects of improving AI and accounting expertise individually, indicating potential synergies between AI and accounting expertise in improving financial reporting quality. Further analysis suggests that investing in AI and accounting expertise following a restatement can enhance market reactions to earnings surprises, particularly for firms that increase both types of expertise.
- 6 December 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 59 (2) , 596-625
Do Capital Markets Punish Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Myopic Research and Development Cuts
The literature provides conflicting arguments and mixed results regarding whether capital markets punish managerial myopia. Using managers cutting research and development (R&D) investments to meet short-term earnings goals as a research setting, this study reveals that capital markets penalize managerial myopia, especially for firms with high investor sophistication. Moreover, the negative market reactions to managerial myopia are weaker for firms with overinvestment problems than for those without such problems. Overall, the results support the notion that security markets are not shortsighted. In further analysis, we document that compensation, especially earnings-based compensation, may cause managers to behave myopically. Our study contributes to the literature, reconciling previously mixed findings by capturing managers’ myopic behavior in a more targeted way and showing that markets punish myopic R&D cutting.
- 6 December 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 59 (2) , 596-625
Do Capital Markets Punish Managerial Myopia? Evidence from Myopic Research and Development Cuts
The literature provides conflicting arguments and mixed results regarding whether capital markets punish managerial myopia. Using managers cutting research and development (R&D) investments to meet short-term earnings goals as a research setting, this study reveals that capital markets penalize managerial myopia, especially for firms with high investor sophistication. Moreover, the negative market reactions to managerial myopia are weaker for firms with overinvestment problems than for those without such problems. Overall, the results support the notion that security markets are not shortsighted. In further analysis, we document that compensation, especially earnings-based compensation, may cause managers to behave myopically. Our study contributes to the literature, reconciling previously mixed findings by capturing managers’ myopic behavior in a more targeted way and showing that markets punish myopic R&D cutting.
- 14 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
- Vol. 54 (6) , 101132
Languages and dividends
- 14 October 2022
- Published by Elsevier in The British Accounting Review
- Vol. 54 (6) , 101132
Languages and dividends
- Open Access
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Managerial Flexibility Effect and Information Content of Dividend versus Stock Repurchase
This paper tests trade-off and pecking order predictions about stock repurchases and dividends by using a sample of publicly traded U.S. firms from 1983-2018. We find that stock repurchases have the characteristics of dynamic adjustment compared to cash dividends. Examination of the determinants and information content of dividend and repurchases provides evidence supportive of a managerial flexibility effect of stock repurchases in both time-series and cross-sectional tests. Our evidence shows that both the static tradeoff model and the pecking order model explain the stock repurchase behavior of publicly traded U.S. firms.
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessManagerial Flexibility Effect and Information Content of Dividend versus Stock Repurchase
This paper tests trade-off and pecking order predictions about stock repurchases and dividends by using a sample of publicly traded U.S. firms from 1983-2018. We find that stock repurchases have the characteristics of dynamic adjustment compared to cash dividends. Examination of the determinants and information content of dividend and repurchases provides evidence supportive of a managerial flexibility effect of stock repurchases in both time-series and cross-sectional tests. Our evidence shows that both the static tradeoff model and the pecking order model explain the stock repurchase behavior of publicly traded U.S. firms.