Raffaele Calabretta
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Raffaele Calabretta has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Domenico Parisi
Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies
7 shared publicationsC Gallina
4 shared publicationsC Giordano
4 shared publicationsR Scandurra
4 shared publicationsStefano Nolfi
Department of Neural Systems and Artificial Life Institute of Psychology, C.N.R. Rome, Italy
4 shared publicationsV Consalvi
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 14 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Neural Processing Letters
- Vol. 42 (2) , 257-274
Adaptive Agents in Changing Environments, the Role of Modularity
- 14 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Neural Processing Letters
- Vol. 42 (2) , 257-274
Adaptive Agents in Changing Environments, the Role of Modularity
- Open Access
- 1 October 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sage Open
- Vol. 1 (3)
Doparies
The failings of parties are one of the central problems of contemporary democracies. What can be done to revive citizen participation? In this article, we present a novel party participatory decision-making mechanism named “doparies”. They are procedures that are nationally or locally implemented within and by parties, and permit any voter who declares to be an elector of that party (open doparies) or party members (internal doparies) to vote regarding crucial and controversial decisions during the period between one election and another. Whereas primaries are done before elections for choosing party candidates, doparies are done after elections for making party choices on issues. Doparies represent a bidirectional communication system between voters and representatives, and would retain the advantages of primaries (party–voters relationship) and referenda (debate before the vote), but would limit the excessive personalization of politics focusing on issues and not on people. There are both propositional doparies, allowing citizens to raise problems that are absent from their party political agenda, and consultative ones, allowing parties to hear the true voice of their voters, who, differently from what happens in polls, are informed by debates in party circles. We suggest that doparies are a new combination of deliberative and aggregative processes, and hypothesize that they can counteract parties’ crisis and abstention. Procedures similar to doparies are now part of the Italian Democratic Party statute and prominent national leaders have gathered signatures to organize local consultations. The use of primaries by Italian left-wing parties has had a contagious effect on right-wing ones as well as European ones. The same could happen with doparies.
- 1 October 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sage Open
- Vol. 1 (3)
Open AccessDoparies
The failings of parties are one of the central problems of contemporary democracies. What can be done to revive citizen participation? In this article, we present a novel party participatory decision-making mechanism named “doparies”. They are procedures that are nationally or locally implemented within and by parties, and permit any voter who declares to be an elector of that party (open doparies) or party members (internal doparies) to vote regarding crucial and controversial decisions during the period between one election and another. Whereas primaries are done before elections for choosing party candidates, doparies are done after elections for making party choices on issues. Doparies represent a bidirectional communication system between voters and representatives, and would retain the advantages of primaries (party–voters relationship) and referenda (debate before the vote), but would limit the excessive personalization of politics focusing on issues and not on people. There are both propositional doparies, allowing citizens to raise problems that are absent from their party political agenda, and consultative ones, allowing parties to hear the true voice of their voters, who, differently from what happens in polls, are informed by debates in party circles. We suggest that doparies are a new combination of deliberative and aggregative processes, and hypothesize that they can counteract parties’ crisis and abstention. Procedures similar to doparies are now part of the Italian Democratic Party statute and prominent national leaders have gathered signatures to organize local consultations. The use of primaries by Italian left-wing parties has had a contagious effect on right-wing ones as well as European ones. The same could happen with doparies.
- 24 June 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 114-133
Evolution, (sequential) learning and generalisation in modular and nonmodular visual neural networks
Introduction In general terms, modular systems are systems that can be decomposed in functional and/or structural independent parts. In cognitive science, modularity of mind (Fodor, 1983) is the controversial cognitivist view according to which human mind is made up of specialised innate modules. In contrast, the connectionist view tends to conceive of mind as a more homogeneous system that results from development and learning during life (see Karmiloff-Smith, 2000). What is a module? Are modules innate? What is the relationship between modularity, robustness and evolvability? And what is the role of nonmodularity? These are only a few of the open central questions in the nature–nurture debate. In a paper published in the journal Cognition, Gary Marcus (2006) deals with the vexata quaestio of modularity of mind from an enlightening point of view. He does not offer a detailed definition of modularity, nor an answer to the controversial issue of what is innate and what is learned during life. More simply, he identifies and contrasts two competing ‘hypothetical conceptions of modularity’, which would represent distinct perspectives about modularity of mind, implicitly present in the scientific literature and different in their implications: a ‘sui generis modularity’ and a ‘descent with modification modularity’. According to the former conception, ‘each cognitive (or neural) domain would be an entity entirely unto itself’; according to the latter conception, ‘current cognitive (or neural) modules are to be understood as being the product of evolutionary changes from ancestral cognitive (or neural) modules’.
- 24 June 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 114-133
Evolution, (sequential) learning and generalisation in modular and nonmodular visual neural networks
Introduction In general terms, modular systems are systems that can be decomposed in functional and/or structural independent parts. In cognitive science, modularity of mind (Fodor, 1983) is the controversial cognitivist view according to which human mind is made up of specialised innate modules. In contrast, the connectionist view tends to conceive of mind as a more homogeneous system that results from development and learning during life (see Karmiloff-Smith, 2000). What is a module? Are modules innate? What is the relationship between modularity, robustness and evolvability? And what is the role of nonmodularity? These are only a few of the open central questions in the nature–nurture debate. In a paper published in the journal Cognition, Gary Marcus (2006) deals with the vexata quaestio of modularity of mind from an enlightening point of view. He does not offer a detailed definition of modularity, nor an answer to the controversial issue of what is innate and what is learned during life. More simply, he identifies and contrasts two competing ‘hypothetical conceptions of modularity’, which would represent distinct perspectives about modularity of mind, implicitly present in the scientific literature and different in their implications: a ‘sui generis modularity’ and a ‘descent with modification modularity’. According to the former conception, ‘each cognitive (or neural) domain would be an entity entirely unto itself’; according to the latter conception, ‘current cognitive (or neural) modules are to be understood as being the product of evolutionary changes from ancestral cognitive (or neural) modules’.
- 1 June 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Biological Theory
- Vol. 5 (2) , 102-105
A Hypertextual Novel That Dramatizes the Process of Its Creation and Proposes Techniques to Increase Creativity
- 1 June 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Biological Theory
- Vol. 5 (2) , 102-105
A Hypertextual Novel That Dramatizes the Process of Its Creation and Proposes Techniques to Increase Creativity
- 20 March 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Biological Theory
- Vol. 3 (1) , 30-41
How to Learn Multiple Tasks
- 20 March 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Biological Theory
- Vol. 3 (1) , 30-41
How to Learn Multiple Tasks
- 15 January 2007
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 362 (1479) , 403-410
Genetic interference reduces the evolvability of modular and non-modular visual neural networks
The aim of this paper is to propose an interdisciplinary evolutionary connectionism approach for the study of the evolution of modularity. It is argued that neural networks as a model of the nervous system and genetic algorithms as simulative models of biological evolution would allow us to formulate a clear and operative definition of module and to simulate the different evolutionary scenarios proposed for the origin of modularity. I will present a recent model in which the evolution of primate cortical visual streams is possible starting from non-modular neural networks. Simulation results not only confirm the existence of the phenomenon of neural interference in non-modular network architectures but also, for the first time, reveal the existence of another kind of interference at the genetic level, i.e. genetic interference, a new population genetic mechanism that is independent from the network architecture. Our simulations clearly show that genetic interference reduces the evolvability of visual neural networks and sexual reproduction can at least partially solve the problem of genetic interference. Finally, it is shown that entrusting the task of finding the neural network architecture to evolution and that of finding the network connection weights to learning is a way to completely avoid the problem of genetic interference. On the basis of this evidence, it is possible to formulate a new hypothesis on the origin of structural modularity, and thus to overcome the traditional dichotomy between innatist and empiricist theories of mind.
- 15 January 2007
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 362 (1479) , 403-410
Genetic interference reduces the evolvability of modular and non-modular visual neural networks
The aim of this paper is to propose an interdisciplinary evolutionary connectionism approach for the study of the evolution of modularity. It is argued that neural networks as a model of the nervous system and genetic algorithms as simulative models of biological evolution would allow us to formulate a clear and operative definition of module and to simulate the different evolutionary scenarios proposed for the origin of modularity. I will present a recent model in which the evolution of primate cortical visual streams is possible starting from non-modular neural networks. Simulation results not only confirm the existence of the phenomenon of neural interference in non-modular network architectures but also, for the first time, reveal the existence of another kind of interference at the genetic level, i.e. genetic interference, a new population genetic mechanism that is independent from the network architecture. Our simulations clearly show that genetic interference reduces the evolvability of visual neural networks and sexual reproduction can at least partially solve the problem of genetic interference. Finally, it is shown that entrusting the task of finding the neural network architecture to evolution and that of finding the network connection weights to learning is a way to completely avoid the problem of genetic interference. On the basis of this evidence, it is possible to formulate a new hypothesis on the origin of structural modularity, and thus to overcome the traditional dichotomy between innatist and empiricist theories of mind.
- 1 February 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Neural Processing Letters
- Vol. 19 (1) , 37-48
Ecological Neural Networks for Object Recognition and Generalization
- 1 February 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Neural Processing Letters
- Vol. 19 (1) , 37-48
Ecological Neural Networks for Object Recognition and Generalization
- 1 May 2003
- Published by Elsevier in BioSystems
- Vol. 69 (2-3) , 245-262
What does it take to evolve behaviorally complex organisms?
- 1 May 2003
- Published by Elsevier in BioSystems
- Vol. 69 (2-3) , 245-262
What does it take to evolve behaviorally complex organisms?
- 1 January 2001
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 253-262
Evolving Modular Architectures for Neural Networks
- 1 January 2001
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 253-262
Evolving Modular Architectures for Neural Networks
- 1 January 2000
- Published by MIT Press in Artificial Life
- Vol. 6 (1) , 69-84
Duplication of Modules Facilitates the Evolution of Functional Specialization
The evolution of simulated robots with three different architectures is studied in this article. We compare a nonmodular feed-forward network, a hardwired modular, and a duplication-based modular motor control network. We conclude that both modular architectures outperform the non-modular architecture, both in terms of rate of adaptation as well as the level of adaptation achieved. The main difference between the hardwired and duplication-based modular architectures is that in the latter the modules reached a much higher degree of functional specialization of their motor control units with regard to high-level behavioral functions. The hardwired architectures reach the same level of performance, but have a more distributed assignment of functional tasks to the motor control units. We conclude that the mechanism through which functional specialization is achieved is similar to the mechanism proposed for the evolution of duplicated genes. It is found that the duplication of multifunctional modules first leads to a change in the regulation of the module, leading to a differentiation of the functional context in which the module is used. Then the module adapts to the new functional context. After this second step the system is locked into a functionally specialized state. We suggest that functional specialization may be an evolutionary absorption state.
- 1 January 2000
- Published by MIT Press in Artificial Life
- Vol. 6 (1) , 69-84
Duplication of Modules Facilitates the Evolution of Functional Specialization
The evolution of simulated robots with three different architectures is studied in this article. We compare a nonmodular feed-forward network, a hardwired modular, and a duplication-based modular motor control network. We conclude that both modular architectures outperform the non-modular architecture, both in terms of rate of adaptation as well as the level of adaptation achieved. The main difference between the hardwired and duplication-based modular architectures is that in the latter the modules reached a much higher degree of functional specialization of their motor control units with regard to high-level behavioral functions. The hardwired architectures reach the same level of performance, but have a more distributed assignment of functional tasks to the motor control units. We conclude that the mechanism through which functional specialization is achieved is similar to the mechanism proposed for the evolution of duplicated genes. It is found that the duplication of multifunctional modules first leads to a change in the regulation of the module, leading to a differentiation of the functional context in which the module is used. Then the module adapts to the new functional context. After this second step the system is locked into a functionally specialized state. We suggest that functional specialization may be an evolutionary absorption state.