Tor Håkon Jackson Inderberg

Public acceptance has influenced the evolution of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in Europe. To study the mechanisms behind this, we use evolutionary game theory where the governmental policy towards CCS, such as subsidies to the industry, is dependent on public acceptance. Public acceptance further depends on the perceived benefits and costs for individuals of CCS. We show that in this model, multiple equilibria may exist, and the starting point as well as the heterogeneity of firms will determine the equilibrium that will be reached over time. While the subsidy is tied to public acceptance, the government can affect development by correcting other imperfections in the market. Using such policy instruments, a new equilibrium may develop with a higher share of investments in CCS. The model also suggests an explanation of the different situations in many countries today with respect to CCS investments and investment plans.

What constitutes socially just or unjust energy systems or transitions can be derived from philosophy and theories of justice. Assessments of distributive justice and utilising them in modelling lead to great differences based on which justice principles are applied. From the limited research so far published in the intersection between energy systems modelling and justice, we find that comparisons between the two principles of utilitarianism and egalitarianism dominate in assessments of distributive justice, with the latter most often considered representing a ‘just energy system’. The lack of recognition of alternative and equally valid principles of justice, resting on e.g. capabilities, responsibilities and/or opportunities, leads to a narrow understanding of justice that fails to align with the views of different individuals, stakeholders and societies. More importantly, it can lead to the unjust design of future energy systems and energy systems analysis. In this work, we contribute to the growing amount of research on distributive justice in energy systems modelling by assessing the implications of different philosophical views on justice on modelling results. Through a modelling exercise with a power system model for Europe (highRES), we explore different designs of a future (2050) net-zero European electricity system, and its distributional implications based on the application of different justice principles. In addition to the utilitarian and egalitarian approach, we include, among others, principles of ‘polluters pay’ and ‘ability-to-pay’, which take historical contributions of greenhouse gas emissions and the socio-economic conditions of a region into account. We find that fair distributions of electricity generating infrastructure look significantly different depending on the justice principles applied. The results may stimulate a greater discussion among researchers and policymakers on the implications of different constructions of justice in modelling, expansion of approaches, and demonstrate the importance of transparency and assumptions when communicating such results.