Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Maia David
Professor, Université Paris-Saclay, AgroParisTech, INRAE, PSAE, Palaiseau, France; maia.david{at}agroparistech.fr
2 shared publications Alessio D’AMato
University of Naples Parthenope and SEEDS , Naples , Italy
1 shared publicationJeremy Laurent-Lucchetti
1 shared publication- Joan Canton
European Commission, Directorate General for Climate Action, Avenue de Beaulieu 1, 1160 Brussels, Belgium
1 shared publication Justin Leroux
1 shared publication- Maia David
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE LABORATOIRE D'ECONOMETRIE 1rue Descartes F-75005 Paris
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 October 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 26 (1) , 299-310
Ergonomics and Incentive Compensation
Ergonomics is frequently invoked to foster productivity, competitiveness, regulatory compliance, consumer welfare, and the fulfillment of organizational objectives. As a first step to integrate ergonomics in the theory of the firm, we use a simple but non-standard principal-agent model. The principal (the firm) sets monetary compensation, while also investing in decreasing the agent’s (a representative employee’s) marginal cost of effort – thanks to process ergonomics – and increasing consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a more user-friendly product – thanks to product ergonomics. Our main finding/prediction is that investing in ergonomics comes with relatively lower incentive pay but entails higher output. Some policy implications and potential research avenues are briefly discussed.
- 14 October 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 26 (1) , 299-310
Open AccessErgonomics and Incentive Compensation
Ergonomics is frequently invoked to foster productivity, competitiveness, regulatory compliance, consumer welfare, and the fulfillment of organizational objectives. As a first step to integrate ergonomics in the theory of the firm, we use a simple but non-standard principal-agent model. The principal (the firm) sets monetary compensation, while also investing in decreasing the agent’s (a representative employee’s) marginal cost of effort – thanks to process ergonomics – and increasing consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a more user-friendly product – thanks to product ergonomics. Our main finding/prediction is that investing in ergonomics comes with relatively lower incentive pay but entails higher output. Some policy implications and potential research avenues are briefly discussed.
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 88 (8) , 2029-2057
Internal Carbon Pricing in the Multidivisional Firm
- 24 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 88 (8) , 2029-2057
Internal Carbon Pricing in the Multidivisional Firm
- 30 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Data Science and Analytics
- Vol. 20 (6) , 5921-5937
Chasing Unknown Unknowns with the Available Data
- 30 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Data Science and Analytics
- Vol. 20 (6) , 5921-5937
Chasing Unknown Unknowns with the Available Data
- 22 May 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 92-96
Eco-industry
- 10 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-21
Remarks on the Scope and Deployment of Integrated Thinking in Business Firms
- 10 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-21
Remarks on the Scope and Deployment of Integrated Thinking in Business Firms
- 26 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 119
On the (non-) reliance on algorithms—A decision-theoretic account
- 26 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
- Vol. 119
On the (non-) reliance on algorithms—A decision-theoretic account
- Open Access
- 11 July 2023
- Published by Open Publishing Association in Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 379, 507-517
Mining for Unknown Unknowns
- 11 July 2023
- Published by Open Publishing Association in Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 379, 507-517
Open AccessMining for Unknown Unknowns
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Resource and Energy Economics
- Vol. 66, 101261
Green human resource management – A personnel economics perspective
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Resource and Energy Economics
- Vol. 66, 101261
Green human resource management – A personnel economics perspective
- 3 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Quality & Quantity
- Vol. 56 (4) , 2415-2434
Measuring innovation and innovativeness: a data-mining approach
- 3 September 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Quality & Quantity
- Vol. 56 (4) , 2415-2434
Measuring innovation and innovativeness: a data-mining approach
- 4 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (2) , 449-467
Principles versus principal: Reconciling norm compliance and shareholder value
This paper considers situations where an agent (say, a polluting firm's CEO) must allocate his nonobservable effort across two distinct tasks (say, revenue/market share enhancement and environmental stewardship), and where two principals (say, the firm's shareholders and an external stakeholder) hold diverging viewpoints on what the best allocation should be. Both characteristics of this context—multitasking and conflicting principals—are normally seen as obstacles to strengthening the agent's incentives. This paper proposes a simple arrangement, based on contingent monitoring and clawbacks, that can overcome these obstacles. Under this arrangement, the principals would end up coordinating their respective incentive schemes so that the agent considers his two tasks as complementary utility‐increasing activities. Applications to regulatory compliance, corporate social responsibility, and innovation management are briefly sketched.
- 4 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 22 (2) , 449-467
Principles versus principal: Reconciling norm compliance and shareholder value
This paper considers situations where an agent (say, a polluting firm's CEO) must allocate his nonobservable effort across two distinct tasks (say, revenue/market share enhancement and environmental stewardship), and where two principals (say, the firm's shareholders and an external stakeholder) hold diverging viewpoints on what the best allocation should be. Both characteristics of this context—multitasking and conflicting principals—are normally seen as obstacles to strengthening the agent's incentives. This paper proposes a simple arrangement, based on contingent monitoring and clawbacks, that can overcome these obstacles. Under this arrangement, the principals would end up coordinating their respective incentive schemes so that the agent considers his two tasks as complementary utility‐increasing activities. Applications to regulatory compliance, corporate social responsibility, and innovation management are briefly sketched.