Aila M. Matanock
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Aila M. Matanock has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Natalia Garbiras-Díaz
European University Institute, Max Weber Programme
3 shared publicationsMiguel García-Sánchez
Universidad de los Andes
2 shared publications- Alberto Diaz-Cayeros
Stanford University
1 shared publication - Allison Namias Grossman
Tulane University
1 shared publication Arsène Brice Bado
Centre de Recherche et d’Action pour la Paix
1 shared publicationBeatriz Magaloni
Stanford University, CA, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 February 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (9) , 1670-1699
Seeing what Citizens Miss: How Monitors Improve Election Violence Reporting
Documenting election violence is central to safeguarding electoral integrity, but collecting such data is difficult. While citizen crowdsourcing is often seen as a cost-effective alternative to traditional monitoring, we argue that monitors offer unique advantages through their training and insulation from local pressures. Our field experiment during Côte d’Ivoire’s 2020 presidential election assessed whether monitors enhance election violence documentation when used alongside citizen reporting. We found that the presence of a monitor increased the likelihood of violence being reported by 10.7 percentage points without affecting citizen behavior. Monitors with more geographic experience were more likely to report incidents, regardless of their proximity to their home communities. These findings highlight the importance of monitors in revealing latent violence and in enhancing the scope and depth of reports. This demonstrates the critical value of monitors, even as crowdsourced data become more prevalent.
- 16 February 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (9) , 1670-1699
Seeing what Citizens Miss: How Monitors Improve Election Violence Reporting
Documenting election violence is central to safeguarding electoral integrity, but collecting such data is difficult. While citizen crowdsourcing is often seen as a cost-effective alternative to traditional monitoring, we argue that monitors offer unique advantages through their training and insulation from local pressures. Our field experiment during Côte d’Ivoire’s 2020 presidential election assessed whether monitors enhance election violence documentation when used alongside citizen reporting. We found that the presence of a monitor increased the likelihood of violence being reported by 10.7 percentage points without affecting citizen behavior. Monitors with more geographic experience were more likely to report incidents, regardless of their proximity to their home communities. These findings highlight the importance of monitors in revealing latent violence and in enhancing the scope and depth of reports. This demonstrates the critical value of monitors, even as crowdsourced data become more prevalent.
- Open Access
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 19 (3) , 1-45
Weapons of the weak state: How post-conflict states shape international statebuilding
International Organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (U.N.), engage in statebuilding in a range of post-conflict states. Statebuilding scholarship largely assumes that IOs, backed by their powerful member states, have at least temporary authority over the seemingly “weak” states in which they intervene. We argue, in contrast, that many post-conflict states shape IO statebuilding efforts through many statebuilding contracts, which we call incomplete arrangements, that give the post-conflict state the residual rights of control over the unnegotiated components of these statebuilding contracts with IOs. These incomplete arrangements, as opposed to complete takeovers, which are the other type of statebuilding contracts, provide procedural “weapons of the weak state” that enable the post-conflict state to influence what the IO mandate contains, where it intervenes, whom it hires, and when it exits. Using in-depth case studies of Burundi, Guatemala, and Timor-Leste, as well as analysis of 36 U.N. interventions in post-conflict states from 2000–2020, this article demonstrates the potential of incomplete arrangement statebuilding contracts to give post-conflict states institutional power over IO statebuilders, with important implications for scholarship on statebuilding and global governance.
- 11 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in The Review of International Organizations
- Vol. 19 (3) , 1-45
Open AccessWeapons of the weak state: How post-conflict states shape international statebuilding
International Organizations (IOs), such as the United Nations (U.N.), engage in statebuilding in a range of post-conflict states. Statebuilding scholarship largely assumes that IOs, backed by their powerful member states, have at least temporary authority over the seemingly “weak” states in which they intervene. We argue, in contrast, that many post-conflict states shape IO statebuilding efforts through many statebuilding contracts, which we call incomplete arrangements, that give the post-conflict state the residual rights of control over the unnegotiated components of these statebuilding contracts with IOs. These incomplete arrangements, as opposed to complete takeovers, which are the other type of statebuilding contracts, provide procedural “weapons of the weak state” that enable the post-conflict state to influence what the IO mandate contains, where it intervenes, whom it hires, and when it exits. Using in-depth case studies of Burundi, Guatemala, and Timor-Leste, as well as analysis of 36 U.N. interventions in post-conflict states from 2000–2020, this article demonstrates the potential of incomplete arrangement statebuilding contracts to give post-conflict states institutional power over IO statebuilders, with important implications for scholarship on statebuilding and global governance.
- Open Access
- 26 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Communication
- Vol. 41 (6) , 944-964
Facebook Usage and Outgroup Intolerance in Myanmar
- 26 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Communication
- Vol. 41 (6) , 944-964
Open AccessFacebook Usage and Outgroup Intolerance in Myanmar
- Open Access
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 61 (5) , 874-890
Political elite cues and attitude formation in post-conflict contexts
Civil conflicts typically end with negotiated settlements, but many settlements fail, often during the implementation stage when average citizens have increasing influence. Citizens sometimes evaluate peace agreements by voting on referendums or the negotiating leaders, and, almost always, they decide whether to cooperate. Yet, despite their role, we do not know much about how citizens form attitudes toward peace agreements. In this article, we assess how citizens form attitudes toward settlements, specifically the policy provisions that emerge from them, which are central in shaping the post-conflict context. These are complex policy changes, involving deeply factionalized actors, and the citizens evaluating them are often focused on rebuilding their lives. We therefore theorize that citizens use stark cues from political elites with whom they have affinity to form their attitudes. We test our theory using survey experiments in Colombia. We find that citizens rely on political elites’ cues to decide their stance on the settlement’s provisions. These cues appear to supply easily-accessible information that respondents use over other information. In contrast to work positing that peace agreements are exceptional and weary citizens are stabilizing forces, our results suggest that even these decisions are politics as usual, where divisions among political elites drive the outcome.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 61 (5) , 874-890
Open AccessPolitical elite cues and attitude formation in post-conflict contexts
Civil conflicts typically end with negotiated settlements, but many settlements fail, often during the implementation stage when average citizens have increasing influence. Citizens sometimes evaluate peace agreements by voting on referendums or the negotiating leaders, and, almost always, they decide whether to cooperate. Yet, despite their role, we do not know much about how citizens form attitudes toward peace agreements. In this article, we assess how citizens form attitudes toward settlements, specifically the policy provisions that emerge from them, which are central in shaping the post-conflict context. These are complex policy changes, involving deeply factionalized actors, and the citizens evaluating them are often focused on rebuilding their lives. We therefore theorize that citizens use stark cues from political elites with whom they have affinity to form their attitudes. We test our theory using survey experiments in Colombia. We find that citizens rely on political elites’ cues to decide their stance on the settlement’s provisions. These cues appear to supply easily-accessible information that respondents use over other information. In contrast to work positing that peace agreements are exceptional and weary citizens are stabilizing forces, our results suggest that even these decisions are politics as usual, where divisions among political elites drive the outcome.
- Open Access
- 20 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Prospective and Retrospective Approaches: Conflict Exposure and Attitudes on the Peace Agreement in Colombia
There is no clear consensus on the effect of exposure to conflict on attitudes towards peace agreements. For example, in Colombia, some suggest that exposure to FARC violence increases support for peace (Dávalos et al., 2018; Tellez, 2019); others show that attitudes towards the peace process are not strongly correlated with conflict experiences (Hazlett and Parente, 2020; Liendo and Braithwaite, 2018; Nussio et al., 2015). In this paper, we contribute to this debate. While most work assumes that those exposed to violent contexts use their past experiences with violence to form their attitudes toward peace agreements, we argue that people living in these regions form their opinions about the accords by weighing the future benefits that they will have access to after a peace agreement is signed. Using new survey data from a matched sample of municipalities in Colombia, we test the effects of past violence and being a potential beneficiary of the agreement on four sets of outcomes: general attitudes towards peace; provisions included in the accord that directly benefit former combatants; provisions that potentially benefit regular citizens; and the actual expected benefits. We find that previous experience with violence has almost no association with these attitudes; however, being a resident of a locality targeted by provisions that potentially provide peace dividends has a consistent and strong impact on these attitudes.
- 20 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessProspective and Retrospective Approaches: Conflict Exposure and Attitudes on the Peace Agreement in Colombia
There is no clear consensus on the effect of exposure to conflict on attitudes towards peace agreements. For example, in Colombia, some suggest that exposure to FARC violence increases support for peace (Dávalos et al., 2018; Tellez, 2019); others show that attitudes towards the peace process are not strongly correlated with conflict experiences (Hazlett and Parente, 2020; Liendo and Braithwaite, 2018; Nussio et al., 2015). In this paper, we contribute to this debate. While most work assumes that those exposed to violent contexts use their past experiences with violence to form their attitudes toward peace agreements, we argue that people living in these regions form their opinions about the accords by weighing the future benefits that they will have access to after a peace agreement is signed. Using new survey data from a matched sample of municipalities in Colombia, we test the effects of past violence and being a potential beneficiary of the agreement on four sets of outcomes: general attitudes towards peace; provisions included in the accord that directly benefit former combatants; provisions that potentially benefit regular citizens; and the actual expected benefits. We find that previous experience with violence has almost no association with these attitudes; however, being a resident of a locality targeted by provisions that potentially provide peace dividends has a consistent and strong impact on these attitudes.
- Open Access
- 11 May 2020
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Political Science
- Vol. 23 (1) , 357-383
How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals
International actors at times seek to help bring peace, democracy, and human rights. Studies of how international actors help enforce political bargains between incumbent governments and their domestic opponents are proliferating. They show that opposition groups have trouble trusting incumbents to adhere to the political bargains they strike because incumbents can use their familiarity with state institutions and can use their asymmetric hold on power during bargain implementation to violate terms by retaining more of the status quo than agreed. International actors can overcome these “reversion problems,” however, by using monitoring mechanisms (often focused on electoral campaigns) and incentives conditioned on compliance. Reversion problems, and enforcement by international actors as a solution, are common across issue areas—arising when domestic actors try to end civil conflict, open elections, and reduce repression—but the literatures in these issue areas have largely remained segregated. This review proposes advancing this research agenda by unifying them and (re)examining the conditions under which this solution works best.
- 11 May 2020
- Published by Annual Reviews in Annual Review of Political Science
- Vol. 23 (1) , 357-383
Open AccessHow International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals
International actors at times seek to help bring peace, democracy, and human rights. Studies of how international actors help enforce political bargains between incumbent governments and their domestic opponents are proliferating. They show that opposition groups have trouble trusting incumbents to adhere to the political bargains they strike because incumbents can use their familiarity with state institutions and can use their asymmetric hold on power during bargain implementation to violate terms by retaining more of the status quo than agreed. International actors can overcome these “reversion problems,” however, by using monitoring mechanisms (often focused on electoral campaigns) and incentives conditioned on compliance. Reversion problems, and enforcement by international actors as a solution, are common across issue areas—arising when domestic actors try to end civil conflict, open elections, and reduce repression—but the literatures in these issue areas have largely remained segregated. This review proposes advancing this research agenda by unifying them and (re)examining the conditions under which this solution works best.
- 19 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 341-374
Third-Party Policymakers and the Limits of the Influence of Indicators
The Power of Global Performance Indicators - edited by Judith G. Kelley March 2020
- 19 March 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 341-374
Third-Party Policymakers and the Limits of the Influence of Indicators
The Power of Global Performance Indicators - edited by Judith G. Kelley March 2020
- Open Access
- 15 February 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Untouchable Forces: Restoring Trust in Security in Weak States?
How can weak states improve security? We build on existing work theorizing that a crucial component of strengthening security is improving citizen perceptions of the institutions providing security and then thereby securing their cooperation with those institutions. We examine whether foreign missions that states invite to conduct security functions, “delegation agreements” (DAs), are able to change citizens’ perceptions on these dimensions. We argue DAs are likely to improve citizen perceptions of security while they are operating but to have little transfer effect to state institutions. We test the theory by examining the U.N.’s International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), a team of investigators and prosecutors that operated in Guatemalan courts from 2007-2019, which was a canonical and seemingly successful DA. In this “most likely” case to detect any transfer effects, we use a survey experiment to examine, first, whether invoking CICIG as a case investigator increases citizen beliefs that the perpetrators and their state collaborators will be correctly identified, prosecuted, and convicted. We find that the CICIG prime does have consistently positive effects. We then examine citizen perceptions of institutions, and, measuring several outcomes, we find that CICIG has little transfer effect to state security institutions, although a successful CICIG may reduce the legitimacy of the state to some extent. Our results identify a positive effect from this foreign mission but no overall shift in citizen perceptions and subsequent pathway to increased security through their cooperation.
- 15 February 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessUntouchable Forces: Restoring Trust in Security in Weak States?
How can weak states improve security? We build on existing work theorizing that a crucial component of strengthening security is improving citizen perceptions of the institutions providing security and then thereby securing their cooperation with those institutions. We examine whether foreign missions that states invite to conduct security functions, “delegation agreements” (DAs), are able to change citizens’ perceptions on these dimensions. We argue DAs are likely to improve citizen perceptions of security while they are operating but to have little transfer effect to state institutions. We test the theory by examining the U.N.’s International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), a team of investigators and prosecutors that operated in Guatemalan courts from 2007-2019, which was a canonical and seemingly successful DA. In this “most likely” case to detect any transfer effects, we use a survey experiment to examine, first, whether invoking CICIG as a case investigator increases citizen beliefs that the perpetrators and their state collaborators will be correctly identified, prosecuted, and convicted. We find that the CICIG prime does have consistently positive effects. We then examine citizen perceptions of institutions, and, measuring several outcomes, we find that CICIG has little transfer effect to state security institutions, although a successful CICIG may reduce the legitimacy of the state to some extent. Our results identify a positive effect from this foreign mission but no overall shift in citizen perceptions and subsequent pathway to increased security through their cooperation.
- Top Cited Papers
- 29 October 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 53 (7) , 1124-1174
Living in Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion in Mexico’s Drug War
Why do drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) sometimes prey on the communities in which they operate but sometimes provide assistance to these communities? What explains their strategies of extortion and co-optation toward civil society? Using new survey data from Mexico, including list experiments to elicit responses about potentially illegal behavior, this article measures the prevalence of extortion and assistance among DTOs. In support of our theory, these data show that territorial contestation among rival organizations produces more extortion and, in contrast, DTOs provide more assistance when they have monopoly control over a turf. The article uncovers other factors that also shape DTOs’ strategies toward the population, including the degree of collaboration with the state, leadership stability and DTO organization, and the value and logistics of the local criminal enterprise.
- 29 October 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
- Vol. 53 (7) , 1124-1174
Top Cited PapersLiving in Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion in Mexico’s Drug War
Why do drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) sometimes prey on the communities in which they operate but sometimes provide assistance to these communities? What explains their strategies of extortion and co-optation toward civil society? Using new survey data from Mexico, including list experiments to elicit responses about potentially illegal behavior, this article measures the prevalence of extortion and assistance among DTOs. In support of our theory, these data show that territorial contestation among rival organizations produces more extortion and, in contrast, DTOs provide more assistance when they have monopoly control over a turf. The article uncovers other factors that also shape DTOs’ strategies toward the population, including the degree of collaboration with the state, leadership stability and DTO organization, and the value and logistics of the local criminal enterprise.
- Open Access
- 21 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 710-727
How and Why Armed Groups Participate in Elections
Armed actors are often involved in electoral politics, from the fusing of ballots and bullets in armed political parties to insurgents covertly backing politicians. We develop new concepts and theory to better understand these complex relationships between violent actors and democratic practice. We first offer a novel conceptualization of armed groups’ electoral strategies that systematically maps out variation in the organizational directness and public openness of groups’ involvement in elections. We then use comparative case studies to develop theory about the conditions under which each of these electoral strategies is most likely, and what can trigger changes between them. The interaction of armed groups’ power and expectations of popular support with governments’ policies of toleration or repression determines the strategies of electoral participation that groups pursue. These concepts and arguments lay the foundation for a systematic research agenda on when and how “normal” and armed politics become intertwined.
- 21 August 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 710-727
Open AccessHow and Why Armed Groups Participate in Elections
Armed actors are often involved in electoral politics, from the fusing of ballots and bullets in armed political parties to insurgents covertly backing politicians. We develop new concepts and theory to better understand these complex relationships between violent actors and democratic practice. We first offer a novel conceptualization of armed groups’ electoral strategies that systematically maps out variation in the organizational directness and public openness of groups’ involvement in elections. We then use comparative case studies to develop theory about the conditions under which each of these electoral strategies is most likely, and what can trigger changes between them. The interaction of armed groups’ power and expectations of popular support with governments’ policies of toleration or repression determines the strategies of electoral participation that groups pursue. These concepts and arguments lay the foundation for a systematic research agenda on when and how “normal” and armed politics become intertwined.