Utteeyo Dasgupta
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Utteeyo Dasgupta has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Subha Mani
13 shared publicationsSmriti Sharma
Dayalbagh Educational Institute, Dayalbagh, Agra, India
6 shared publications- Pushkar Maitra
Department of Economics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
4 shared publications Saurabh Singhal
United Nations - World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER)
4 shared publicationsLata Gangadharan
University of Melbourne - Department of Economics
3 shared publications- Lata Gangadharan
Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Look Who Contests!
Competition policies focus on incumbent firm's anticipatory behavior to actual or potential entry threats leading to an erosion of monopoly power. Curiously, very little attention is paid to the potential entrant firm except that they are assumed to exist to provide competitive threats whenever suitable conditions for competition are fostered. I construct an example to demonstrate that once we explicitly model the potential entrant in a game form then even in the extreme case of a perfectly contestable market one might witness monopoly pricing as part of a static Nash Equilibrium. Consequently, the positive effects of a competition policy are not automatically guaranteed.
- 10 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLook Who Contests!
Competition policies focus on incumbent firm's anticipatory behavior to actual or potential entry threats leading to an erosion of monopoly power. Curiously, very little attention is paid to the potential entrant firm except that they are assumed to exist to provide competitive threats whenever suitable conditions for competition are fostered. I construct an example to demonstrate that once we explicitly model the potential entrant in a game form then even in the extreme case of a perfectly contestable market one might witness monopoly pricing as part of a static Nash Equilibrium. Consequently, the positive effects of a competition policy are not automatically guaranteed.
- 6 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 238
Games of prejudice - experiments with adolescents
- 6 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 238
Games of prejudice - experiments with adolescents
- 10 February 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 23 (1) , 281-326
Trust me: Communication and Competition in a Psychological Game
We study, both theoretically and experimentally, a communication game with and without seller competition and embed it in a psychological-game framework where players experience costs for lying, misleading others, and being disappointed. We derive the equilibrium predictions of this model, compare them to the setting without psychological payoffs, and test these predictions in a laboratory experiment, in which we induce both material and psychological payoffs. We find that the setting in which players have both material and psychological payoffs features more trade, trades goods of marginally better quality, and does so without welfare losses to either side of the market relative to the setting with material payoffs only. However, the introduction of competition counteracts this improvement and lowers welfare for both sides of the market. This happens due to a surge in dishonesty by sellers in the competitive setting and the buyers’ inability to detect this deception.
- 10 February 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 23 (1) , 281-326
Trust me: Communication and Competition in a Psychological Game
We study, both theoretically and experimentally, a communication game with and without seller competition and embed it in a psychological-game framework where players experience costs for lying, misleading others, and being disappointed. We derive the equilibrium predictions of this model, compare them to the setting without psychological payoffs, and test these predictions in a laboratory experiment, in which we induce both material and psychological payoffs. We find that the setting in which players have both material and psychological payoffs features more trade, trades goods of marginally better quality, and does so without welfare losses to either side of the market relative to the setting with material payoffs only. However, the introduction of competition counteracts this improvement and lowers welfare for both sides of the market. This happens due to a surge in dishonesty by sellers in the competitive setting and the buyers’ inability to detect this deception.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Experimental Development Economics: Current Scope and Future Directions
Experimental Development Economics as a field of study is relatively new in Economics. Consequently, as part of this handbook project we conceived a special chapter dedicated towards collecting some of the thoughts, comments and opinions from four prominent and established young scholars in the field as our final chapter of this handbook collection.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExperimental Development Economics: Current Scope and Future Directions
Experimental Development Economics as a field of study is relatively new in Economics. Consequently, as part of this handbook project we conceived a special chapter dedicated towards collecting some of the thoughts, comments and opinions from four prominent and established young scholars in the field as our final chapter of this handbook collection.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Behavioral Development Economics
There is a growing realization that economic development is not merely about removing material frictions; Behavioral frictions prompted by sustained material impoverishments are equally important and need to be addressed. This modified focus has led to the advent of Behavioral Development Economics, which uses realism improving and psychologically relevant models of decision making to study problems in economic under-development. It focuses on the importance of emotions, norms, the bounds of reasoning, influence of culture, history and the social environment in explaining under-development. It has added a new dimension to our understanding of the process of economic development and provides a renewed emphasis on evidence-based policy making.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBehavioral Development Economics
There is a growing realization that economic development is not merely about removing material frictions; Behavioral frictions prompted by sustained material impoverishments are equally important and need to be addressed. This modified focus has led to the advent of Behavioral Development Economics, which uses realism improving and psychologically relevant models of decision making to study problems in economic under-development. It focuses on the importance of emotions, norms, the bounds of reasoning, influence of culture, history and the social environment in explaining under-development. It has added a new dimension to our understanding of the process of economic development and provides a renewed emphasis on evidence-based policy making.
- 7 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 214, 30-43
Republic of beliefs: An experimental investigation✰
- 7 August 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 214, 30-43
Republic of beliefs: An experimental investigation✰
- 7 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 104
Looking beyond misbehaving?
- 7 March 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 104
Looking beyond misbehaving?
- 2 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 87, 102449
Indeed “We Are All Behavioral Economists Now!”
- 2 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 87, 102449
Indeed “We Are All Behavioral Economists Now!”
- 20 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 59 (2) , 848-857
PERSISTENT PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR: TWO INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS 350 YEARS APART
Outbreaks of infectious diseases bring behavior and policy responses into sharp focus since societies face acute constraints and uncertainties. This paper compares two infectious disease outbreaks: the Covid‐19 pandemic and the 1665 London plague outbreak described by Daniel Defoe in A Journal of the Year of the Plague published in 1722. We compare three aspects: individual behavior, social behavior, and governance and find striking similarities in behavior in spite of these events being separated by 350 years. We contend that the same models of behavior can be used to explain human responses during such outbreaks regardless of when they occur. (JEL A10, B52, Z11)
- 20 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 59 (2) , 848-857
PERSISTENT PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR: TWO INFECTIOUS DISEASE OUTBREAKS 350 YEARS APART
Outbreaks of infectious diseases bring behavior and policy responses into sharp focus since societies face acute constraints and uncertainties. This paper compares two infectious disease outbreaks: the Covid‐19 pandemic and the 1665 London plague outbreak described by Daniel Defoe in A Journal of the Year of the Plague published in 1722. We compare three aspects: individual behavior, social behavior, and governance and find striking similarities in behavior in spite of these events being separated by 350 years. We contend that the same models of behavior can be used to explain human responses during such outbreaks regardless of when they occur. (JEL A10, B52, Z11)
- 22 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 5731-5734
Vocational Selection