Dakota Park-Ozee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Dakota Park-Ozee has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Sharon E. Jarvis
The University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA
2 shared publicationsAlley Agee
1 shared publicationAllison Blumling
1 shared publicationJason Jordan
1 shared publication- Jason Jordan1 shared publication
Kevin Coe
University of Utah
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Western Journal of Communication
- Vol. 90 (4) , 580-600
Bella Ciao: A Case Study in Formalistic Solidarity
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Western Journal of Communication
- Vol. 90 (4) , 580-600
Bella Ciao: A Case Study in Formalistic Solidarity
- 12 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 194-212
The “Big Lie” Lurked Online
This chapter examines how people’s media habits related to their attitudes about electoral integrity going into the 2020 presidential election. Specifically, it builds on work addressing (1) social media news exposure and (2) perceptions of threats to American elections. The data from a survey in the field in October of 2020 reveals how individuals who reported social media was the most common way they received their political news were more likely to anticipate the electoral contest would be contested, to believe Donald Trump would win, and to fear the potential of voter fraud than others in the sample. Social media users, too, were less likely to support election results should Joe Biden beat Trump and were even less interested in voting than individuals with more balanced media diets. The chapter presents these data, showing how social media users may have been predisposed to anticipate—and be open to—Trump’s “Big Lie” that he was victorious in 2020, and advances questions for future research on social media use and perceptions of electoral integrity.
- 12 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 194-212
The “Big Lie” Lurked Online
This chapter examines how people’s media habits related to their attitudes about electoral integrity going into the 2020 presidential election. Specifically, it builds on work addressing (1) social media news exposure and (2) perceptions of threats to American elections. The data from a survey in the field in October of 2020 reveals how individuals who reported social media was the most common way they received their political news were more likely to anticipate the electoral contest would be contested, to believe Donald Trump would win, and to fear the potential of voter fraud than others in the sample. Social media users, too, were less likely to support election results should Joe Biden beat Trump and were even less interested in voting than individuals with more balanced media diets. The chapter presents these data, showing how social media users may have been predisposed to anticipate—and be open to—Trump’s “Big Lie” that he was victorious in 2020, and advances questions for future research on social media use and perceptions of electoral integrity.
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Communication and Democracy
- Vol. 58 (1) , 96-115
“The man who has money is king”: Discursive constructions of affluent domination of US politics in letters-to-the-editor, 1948–2016
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Communication and Democracy
- Vol. 58 (1) , 96-115
“The man who has money is king”: Discursive constructions of affluent domination of US politics in letters-to-the-editor, 1948–2016
- 17 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Feminist Media Studies
- Vol. 23 (8) , 3924-3941
The year of the missing woman: an analysis of women as sources and subjects in 2018 midterm campaign coverage by Texas newspapers
In light of the historic gains made by women in the 2018 midterm elections—both as candidates and as newly elected officials—an updated assessment of gender parity in campaign coverage is warranted. The results of an empirical discourse analysis show that despite record numbers of women serving in both the United States House of Representatives and Senate, men as candidates, journalists, and quoted sources dominate the reporting landscape. The results foreground a neglect of women as candidates for office and of women as quoted sources in the discussion of political campaigns, regardless of reporter gender. Women’s voices and candidacies do not survive in political reporting, even when the reporter is a woman. These results may be due to both structural biases in the political arena writ large—mirrored by press organizations—and gendered practices in the newsroom.
- 17 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Feminist Media Studies
- Vol. 23 (8) , 3924-3941
The year of the missing woman: an analysis of women as sources and subjects in 2018 midterm campaign coverage by Texas newspapers
In light of the historic gains made by women in the 2018 midterm elections—both as candidates and as newly elected officials—an updated assessment of gender parity in campaign coverage is warranted. The results of an empirical discourse analysis show that despite record numbers of women serving in both the United States House of Representatives and Senate, men as candidates, journalists, and quoted sources dominate the reporting landscape. The results foreground a neglect of women as candidates for office and of women as quoted sources in the discussion of political campaigns, regardless of reporter gender. Women’s voices and candidacies do not survive in political reporting, even when the reporter is a woman. These results may be due to both structural biases in the political arena writ large—mirrored by press organizations—and gendered practices in the newsroom.
- 11 May 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Behavioral Scientist
- Vol. 67 (5) , 612-628
The Qualitative Power of a Crowd: Trump’s Rallies, Public Opinion, Attention Economy
Journalists, pundits, and pollsters critiqued President Donald J. Trump’s fixation on his crowds—often suggesting they were smaller than he boasted or meaningless in connection to electoral or legislative outcomes. This project takes a qualitative rather than a quantitative stance to interpreting the meaning of Trump’s crowds. In doing so, we find messages presented his rallies as (1) engaging multiple audiences, (2) eliciting feedback from his base to sharpen his talking points, and (3) enraging his devotees to act on his behalf. These types of communications did two things that traditional polling data are unlikely to do: they garnered attention and vast recirculation in the contemporary media environment and have been linked to the insurrection of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. This article draws from scholarship on Trump, news coverage, and social media posts to advance these themes, invites a more nuanced look at crowds as a complement to traditional understandings of public opinion, and closes by posing paths for future discussions of them.
- 11 May 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Behavioral Scientist
- Vol. 67 (5) , 612-628
The Qualitative Power of a Crowd: Trump’s Rallies, Public Opinion, Attention Economy
Journalists, pundits, and pollsters critiqued President Donald J. Trump’s fixation on his crowds—often suggesting they were smaller than he boasted or meaningless in connection to electoral or legislative outcomes. This project takes a qualitative rather than a quantitative stance to interpreting the meaning of Trump’s crowds. In doing so, we find messages presented his rallies as (1) engaging multiple audiences, (2) eliciting feedback from his base to sharpen his talking points, and (3) enraging his devotees to act on his behalf. These types of communications did two things that traditional polling data are unlikely to do: they garnered attention and vast recirculation in the contemporary media environment and have been linked to the insurrection of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. This article draws from scholarship on Trump, news coverage, and social media posts to advance these themes, invites a more nuanced look at crowds as a complement to traditional understandings of public opinion, and closes by posing paths for future discussions of them.
- 14 December 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Behavioral Scientist
- Vol. 65 (4) , 587-599
What Does Rigged Mean? Partisan and Widely Shared Perceptions of Threats to Elections
This article is a piece of a larger line of research supported by the Democracy Fund studying how to communicate about threats to elections in ways that do not dampen people’s desire to vote or make them question the integrity of electoral outcomes. It reports findings from a computerized text analysis of 2,970 open-ended survey responses in the field during the fall of 2018 to the prompt “when people say that elections are rigged, what do you think they mean?” Four key themes emerged in the data: (1) Democrats and Republicans were equally likely to regard electoral outcomes as predetermined, (2) Republicans were twice as likely to be concerned about illegal voting than Democrats, (3) Democrats were slightly more likely to be upset about money in politics than Republicans, and (4) Democrats were twice as likely to be preoccupied with Russian meddling than Republicans. A qualitative analysis of the first theme revealed both similarities across partisans as well as how Democrats focus on how threats to elections benefit people already in power, whereas Republicans worry that elections are threatened by ordinary people cheating. These findings, and the nuances contributing to them, raise new paths for research on communicating about elections without decreasing people’s faith in them.
- 14 December 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Behavioral Scientist
- Vol. 65 (4) , 587-599
What Does Rigged Mean? Partisan and Widely Shared Perceptions of Threats to Elections
This article is a piece of a larger line of research supported by the Democracy Fund studying how to communicate about threats to elections in ways that do not dampen people’s desire to vote or make them question the integrity of electoral outcomes. It reports findings from a computerized text analysis of 2,970 open-ended survey responses in the field during the fall of 2018 to the prompt “when people say that elections are rigged, what do you think they mean?” Four key themes emerged in the data: (1) Democrats and Republicans were equally likely to regard electoral outcomes as predetermined, (2) Republicans were twice as likely to be concerned about illegal voting than Democrats, (3) Democrats were slightly more likely to be upset about money in politics than Republicans, and (4) Democrats were twice as likely to be preoccupied with Russian meddling than Republicans. A qualitative analysis of the first theme revealed both similarities across partisans as well as how Democrats focus on how threats to elections benefit people already in power, whereas Republicans worry that elections are threatened by ordinary people cheating. These findings, and the nuances contributing to them, raise new paths for research on communicating about elections without decreasing people’s faith in them.
- 1 May 2020
- Published by University of Chicago Press in American Journal of Education
- Vol. 126 (3) , 423-445
The “Discourse of Derision” in News Coverage of Education: A Mixed Methods Analysis of an Emerging Frame
Commentators have observed a “discourse of derision” in news coverage of the US education system, but the contours of this discourse are not well understood. This article pairs quantitative content analysis with qualitative framing analysis to sharpen the conceptual and empirical focus of the discourse of derision as an object of study. We theorize four components of this discourse—tone, assessments of quality, teacher voice, and criticism of teachers—and analyze them in a representative sample (n = 602) of broadcast television evening news stories from 1990 to 2015. Our findings reveal that the discourse of derision is a common but not overwhelming feature of television news, occurring primarily through negativity in tone and assessments of quality.
- 1 May 2020
- Published by University of Chicago Press in American Journal of Education
- Vol. 126 (3) , 423-445
The “Discourse of Derision” in News Coverage of Education: A Mixed Methods Analysis of an Emerging Frame
Commentators have observed a “discourse of derision” in news coverage of the US education system, but the contours of this discourse are not well understood. This article pairs quantitative content analysis with qualitative framing analysis to sharpen the conceptual and empirical focus of the discourse of derision as an object of study. We theorize four components of this discourse—tone, assessments of quality, teacher voice, and criticism of teachers—and analyze them in a representative sample (n = 602) of broadcast television evening news stories from 1990 to 2015. Our findings reveal that the discourse of derision is a common but not overwhelming feature of television news, occurring primarily through negativity in tone and assessments of quality.
- Open Access
- 3 December 2019
- Published by Wiley in Presidential Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 50 (2) , 264-285
Uncivil Name‐Calling in the U.S. Presidency, 1933–2018
Political incivility in the United States is a growing concern among both citizens and scholars. Prior research focusing on incivility among political elites has largely neglected the presidency, however. Thus, popular claims that Donald Trump is particularly uncivil have not yet been subjected to empirical scrutiny vis‐à‐vis presidential norms. The present study undertakes a large‐scale quantitative content analysis of modern presidential communication to provide insight into one key form of incivility: name‐calling. We find that uncivil name‐calling is generally rare in the presidency, and that three presidents—Harry S. Truman, George H. W. Bush, and especially Donald Trump—are outliers in the frequency with which they employ this form of communication.
- 3 December 2019
- Published by Wiley in Presidential Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 50 (2) , 264-285
Open AccessUncivil Name‐Calling in the U.S. Presidency, 1933–2018
Political incivility in the United States is a growing concern among both citizens and scholars. Prior research focusing on incivility among political elites has largely neglected the presidency, however. Thus, popular claims that Donald Trump is particularly uncivil have not yet been subjected to empirical scrutiny vis‐à‐vis presidential norms. The present study undertakes a large‐scale quantitative content analysis of modern presidential communication to provide insight into one key form of incivility: name‐calling. We find that uncivil name‐calling is generally rare in the presidency, and that three presidents—Harry S. Truman, George H. W. Bush, and especially Donald Trump—are outliers in the frequency with which they employ this form of communication.
- 11 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 128-133
When Do Perpetrators Count
- 11 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 230-235
Networked Argumentation via Collective Rhetorics at the Women’s March on the Utah State Capitol and the Women’s March on Washington
- 11 November 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 230-235
Networked Argumentation via Collective Rhetorics at the Women’s March on the Utah State Capitol and the Women’s March on Washington