George Ainslie
Research Subjects
Research Interests
George Ainslie has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
John Monterosso
Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024, USA; Department of Psychology, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024, USA
3 shared publications- Andrew Ward
Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College, United States of America
1 shared publication Arthur Brody
1 shared publication- Edythe D. London
Department of Psychiatry and Biobehavioral Sciences, Semel Institute for Neuroscience and Human Behavior, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
1 shared publication Ellsworth Masten
Coatesville VA Medical Center
1 shared publicationJennifer Bramen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 48, e79
Cognition and valence as chicken and egg: Motivational force evolved alongside cognition
The convergent evolution described for invertebrate cognition might have occurred in similar fashion with motivational valence, the other pillar of response selection. Primitive examples of such properties as liking (versus wanting), dependence on appetite, and especially attenuation with delay might provide clues to a longstanding puzzle: how incentive salience, classical conditioning, emotional arousal, and mental behavior in general are apparently all entwined with valence.
- 3 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 48, e79
Cognition and valence as chicken and egg: Motivational force evolved alongside cognition
The convergent evolution described for invertebrate cognition might have occurred in similar fashion with motivational valence, the other pillar of response selection. Primitive examples of such properties as liking (versus wanting), dependence on appetite, and especially attenuation with delay might provide clues to a longstanding puzzle: how incentive salience, classical conditioning, emotional arousal, and mental behavior in general are apparently all entwined with valence.
- 31 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 48, e25
Endogenous reward is a bridge between social/cognitive and behavioral models of choice
Endogenous reward (intrinsic reward at will) is a fiat currency that is occasioned by steps toward any goals which are challenging and/or uncommon enough to prevent its debasement by inflation. A “theory of mental computational processes” should propose what properties let goals grow from appetites for endogenous rewards. Endogenous reward may be the universal selective factor in all modifiable mental processes.
- 31 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 48, e25
Endogenous reward is a bridge between social/cognitive and behavioral models of choice
Endogenous reward (intrinsic reward at will) is a fiat currency that is occasioned by steps toward any goals which are challenging and/or uncommon enough to prevent its debasement by inflation. A “theory of mental computational processes” should propose what properties let goals grow from appetites for endogenous rewards. Endogenous reward may be the universal selective factor in all modifiable mental processes.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 47, e68
Behavioral proxies compete by the time courses of their rewards, including endogenous rewards
Natural selection is slow, so behavioral goals must be based on patterns of reward. Addictions are rewarded in the same way as adaptive choice, so they can be distinguished only by their time course. In addition, the reward process is more plastic than is generally recognized, so abstract goals are shaped by the “legibility” of their proxies.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 47, e68
Behavioral proxies compete by the time courses of their rewards, including endogenous rewards
Natural selection is slow, so behavioral goals must be based on patterns of reward. Addictions are rewarded in the same way as adaptive choice, so they can be distinguished only by their time course. In addition, the reward process is more plastic than is generally recognized, so abstract goals are shaped by the “legibility” of their proxies.
- 18 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e113
“Switching” between fast and slow processes is just reward-based branching
Shortcuts to goals are rewarded by faster attainment and punished by more frequent failure, so selection of the various kinds – heuristics, cached sequences (habits or macros), gut instincts – depends on reward history just like other kinds of choice. The speeds of shortcuts lie on continua along with speeds of deliberation, and these continua have no obvious separation points.
- 18 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e113
“Switching” between fast and slow processes is just reward-based branching
Shortcuts to goals are rewarded by faster attainment and punished by more frequent failure, so selection of the various kinds – heuristics, cached sequences (habits or macros), gut instincts – depends on reward history just like other kinds of choice. The speeds of shortcuts lie on continua along with speeds of deliberation, and these continua have no obvious separation points.
- 1 February 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychology of Addictive Behaviors
- Vol. 37 (1) , 13-24
Behavioral construction of the future.
Public Health Significance Statement This work reviews the 50-year discussion between Howard Rachlin and the author about the hyperbolic discounting of delayed reward, its role in addictions, and how rewards can be framed to overcome current temptations. A model of motivation for nonrealistic future beliefs is presented. Objective: To examine Howard Rachlin's hypothetical model of molar choice as a tactic for resisting addictions and to explore how some of its then-radical components can be developed to account for nonphysical and far future rewards. Method: The history of Rachlin's long dialog with the present author about molar choice is reviewed. The possible implications are described of both authors' proposal that behavior can depend entirely on reward. Results: Molar choice entails bringing wider-and thus further future-contingencies to bear on current choices. The two authors proposed mechanisms with different foci, which they respectively called teleological behaviorism and intertemporal bargaining. Laboratory results have been modest, but supplementary demonstrations by thought experiments and brain imaging are described. Both proposals have left open how the value of distant outcomes, such as sobriety, savings, and healthy aging, survives temporal discounting enough to compete with present motivational pressures. In contradiction to Rachlin, but following his suggestion that reward is behavior, it is deduced that some reward must be endogenous rather than secondary to external primary rewards. Endogenous reward is proposed as a fiat currency that can function only to the extent that it is protected from inflation by some kind of uniqueness (singularity). Such uniqueness can be provided by personal disciplines for testing reality, but also by extraneous factors such as needs, coincidences, and biases. Conclusions: Rachlin's teleological behaviorism is a valuable hypothesis, but limited by its ruling out of nonexternal rewards and of intrapersonal self-prediction, both of them useful for understanding nonsubstance addictions.
- 1 February 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychology of Addictive Behaviors
- Vol. 37 (1) , 13-24
Behavioral construction of the future.
Public Health Significance Statement This work reviews the 50-year discussion between Howard Rachlin and the author about the hyperbolic discounting of delayed reward, its role in addictions, and how rewards can be framed to overcome current temptations. A model of motivation for nonrealistic future beliefs is presented. Objective: To examine Howard Rachlin's hypothetical model of molar choice as a tactic for resisting addictions and to explore how some of its then-radical components can be developed to account for nonphysical and far future rewards. Method: The history of Rachlin's long dialog with the present author about molar choice is reviewed. The possible implications are described of both authors' proposal that behavior can depend entirely on reward. Results: Molar choice entails bringing wider-and thus further future-contingencies to bear on current choices. The two authors proposed mechanisms with different foci, which they respectively called teleological behaviorism and intertemporal bargaining. Laboratory results have been modest, but supplementary demonstrations by thought experiments and brain imaging are described. Both proposals have left open how the value of distant outcomes, such as sobriety, savings, and healthy aging, survives temporal discounting enough to compete with present motivational pressures. In contradiction to Rachlin, but following his suggestion that reward is behavior, it is deduced that some reward must be endogenous rather than secondary to external primary rewards. Endogenous reward is proposed as a fiat currency that can function only to the extent that it is protected from inflation by some kind of uniqueness (singularity). Such uniqueness can be provided by personal disciplines for testing reality, but also by extraneous factors such as needs, coincidences, and biases. Conclusions: Rachlin's teleological behaviorism is a valuable hypothesis, but limited by its ruling out of nonexternal rewards and of intrapersonal self-prediction, both of them useful for understanding nonsubstance addictions.
- 25 October 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 45, e221
Framing is a motivated process
Frames group choices into categories, thus modifying the incentives for them. This effect makes framing itself a motivated choice rather than a neutral cognition. In particular, framing an inferior choice with a high short-term payoff as part of a broad category of choices recruits incentive to reject it; but this must be motivated by its being a test case.
- 25 October 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 45, e221
Framing is a motivated process
Frames group choices into categories, thus modifying the incentives for them. This effect makes framing itself a motivated choice rather than a neutral cognition. In particular, framing an inferior choice with a high short-term payoff as part of a broad category of choices recruits incentive to reject it; but this must be motivated by its being a test case.
- 26 April 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 44, e57
Reply to commentaries to willpower with and without effort
Twenty-six commentators from several disciplines have written on the assumption that choice is determined by comparative valuation in a common denominator of reward, the “competitive marketplace.” There was no apparent disagreement that prospective rewards are discounted hyperbolically, although some found that the resulting predictions could come just as well from other models, including the interpretation of delay as risk and analysis in terms of hot versus cold valuation systems. Several novel ideas emerged.
- 26 April 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 44, e57
Reply to commentaries to willpower with and without effort
Twenty-six commentators from several disciplines have written on the assumption that choice is determined by comparative valuation in a common denominator of reward, the “competitive marketplace.” There was no apparent disagreement that prospective rewards are discounted hyperbolically, although some found that the resulting predictions could come just as well from other models, including the interpretation of delay as risk and analysis in terms of hot versus cold valuation systems. Several novel ideas emerged.
- 16 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (3) , 321-341
Elster's eclecticism in analyzing emotion
Fine examination of our accumulated cultural knowledge is especially helpful in studying the emotions, which are only tangentially accessible to experimental manipulation. Here I use the six properties of emotions that Elster has summarized to suggest how they show a need for changes in the science of motivation. The apparent adaptive purpose of emotions lies in their action tendencies - what they add to the cold calculation of advantage. Subjectively they stand out by their intrusiveness, the duration of which often has a half-life. Emotions each have a valence, which suggests that they are not only motivating but also motivated, an implication that requires re-examination of how negativity works. Emotions are also experienced as 'triggered', but are so malleable that triggering cannot mean a simple conditioned reflexiveness. Emotions are not only triggered - or motivated - by beliefs, but motivate beliefs in turn, and can be fed back on themselves in a 'wildfire' phenomenon. These feedback effects are further evidence against emotions being reflexive. With regard to the three great revolutions, I argue that enthusiasm differs from romantic love only in its object, and urgency comes from the dysphoria of using response suppression for self-control. I can add nothing further to Elster's masterful history.
- 16 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (3) , 321-341
Elster's eclecticism in analyzing emotion
Fine examination of our accumulated cultural knowledge is especially helpful in studying the emotions, which are only tangentially accessible to experimental manipulation. Here I use the six properties of emotions that Elster has summarized to suggest how they show a need for changes in the science of motivation. The apparent adaptive purpose of emotions lies in their action tendencies - what they add to the cold calculation of advantage. Subjectively they stand out by their intrusiveness, the duration of which often has a half-life. Emotions each have a valence, which suggests that they are not only motivating but also motivated, an implication that requires re-examination of how negativity works. Emotions are also experienced as 'triggered', but are so malleable that triggering cannot mean a simple conditioned reflexiveness. Emotions are not only triggered - or motivated - by beliefs, but motivate beliefs in turn, and can be fed back on themselves in a 'wildfire' phenomenon. These feedback effects are further evidence against emotions being reflexive. With regard to the three great revolutions, I argue that enthusiasm differs from romantic love only in its object, and urgency comes from the dysphoria of using response suppression for self-control. I can add nothing further to Elster's masterful history.
- 26 August 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 44, e30
Willpower with and without effort
Most authors who discuss willpower assume that everyone knows what it is, but our assumptions differ to such an extent that we talk past each other. We agree that willpower is the psychological function that resists temptations – variously known as impulses, addictions, or bad habits; that it operates simultaneously with temptations, without prior commitment; and that use of it is limited by its cost, commonly called effort, as well as by the person's skill at executive functioning. However, accounts are usually not clear about how motivation functions during the application of willpower, or how motivation is related to effort. Some accounts depict willpower as the perceiving or formation of motivational contingencies that outweigh the temptation, and some depict it as a continuous use of mechanisms that interfere with re-weighing the temptation. Some others now suggest that impulse control can bypass motivation altogether, although they refer to this route as habit rather than willpower.It is argued here that willpower should be recognized as either or both of two distinct functions, which can be calledresolveandsuppression. Resolve is based on interpretation of a current choice as a test case for a broader set of future choices, which puts at stake more than the outcome of the current choice. Suppression is inhibiting valuation of (modulating) and/or keeping attention from (filtering) immediate alternatives to a current intention. Perception of current choices as test cases for broader outcomes may result in reliable preference for these outcomes, which is experienced as an effortlesshabit– a successful result of resolve, not an alternative method of self-control. Some possible brain imaging correlates are reviewed.
- 26 August 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 44, e30
Willpower with and without effort
Most authors who discuss willpower assume that everyone knows what it is, but our assumptions differ to such an extent that we talk past each other. We agree that willpower is the psychological function that resists temptations – variously known as impulses, addictions, or bad habits; that it operates simultaneously with temptations, without prior commitment; and that use of it is limited by its cost, commonly called effort, as well as by the person's skill at executive functioning. However, accounts are usually not clear about how motivation functions during the application of willpower, or how motivation is related to effort. Some accounts depict willpower as the perceiving or formation of motivational contingencies that outweigh the temptation, and some depict it as a continuous use of mechanisms that interfere with re-weighing the temptation. Some others now suggest that impulse control can bypass motivation altogether, although they refer to this route as habit rather than willpower.It is argued here that willpower should be recognized as either or both of two distinct functions, which can be calledresolveandsuppression. Resolve is based on interpretation of a current choice as a test case for a broader set of future choices, which puts at stake more than the outcome of the current choice. Suppression is inhibiting valuation of (modulating) and/or keeping attention from (filtering) immediate alternatives to a current intention. Perception of current choices as test cases for broader outcomes may result in reliable preference for these outcomes, which is experienced as an effortlesshabit– a successful result of resolve, not an alternative method of self-control. Some possible brain imaging correlates are reviewed.
- 29 November 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 40, e348
Positivity versus negativity is a matter of timing
“Negative” emotions are never purely negative. They attract attention at the very least and often stay attractive enough to make rehearsing them an addictive activity. As the authors point out, they also counteract a relentless tendency for positive emotions to become boring. Analysis in terms of reward suggests why this tendency occurs and how symbiosis with negative emotions may arise, in art and in life.
- 29 November 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 40, e348
Positivity versus negativity is a matter of timing
“Negative” emotions are never purely negative. They attract attention at the very least and often stay attractive enough to make rehearsing them an addictive activity. As the authors point out, they also counteract a relentless tendency for positive emotions to become boring. Analysis in terms of reward suggests why this tendency occurs and how symbiosis with negative emotions may arise, in art and in life.