Simon James Cropper
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Simon James Cropper has a total of 78 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel R. Little
Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
10 shared publications - Margaret E. Webb
The University of Melbourne
7 shared publications - Charles Kemp
Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
5 shared publications - David R. Badcock
School of Psychology, University of Western Australia, Crawley, Western Australia, Australia
5 shared publications - Alan Johnston
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
4 shared publications - Andrew M. Derrington
School of Psychology, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, UK
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
A Bayesian Account of the Phantom Lighthouse Illusion
Observers sometimes infer that a rotating lighthouse beam originates from a “phantom lighthouse” that lies in the opposite direction from the true source of the beam. We argue that this illusion arises from underestimating the distance of the remote parts of the beam. This underestimation is consistent with Bayesian inference based on natural scene statistics, and also explains why lighthouse beams are perceived as pointing down rather than parallel to the ground. Our theory makes the novel prediction that the phantom lighthouse illusion emerges at a critical point at which the observer is located around 67 metres in front of the true lighthouse, and we find support for this prediction in a virtual reality experiment. Although we focus on the phantom lighthouse illusion, our approach contributes to a broader body of work that explains perceptual phenomena (including visual illusions) in terms of Bayesian inference.
Open AccessA Bayesian Account of the Phantom Lighthouse Illusion
Observers sometimes infer that a rotating lighthouse beam originates from a “phantom lighthouse” that lies in the opposite direction from the true source of the beam. We argue that this illusion arises from underestimating the distance of the remote parts of the beam. This underestimation is consistent with Bayesian inference based on natural scene statistics, and also explains why lighthouse beams are perceived as pointing down rather than parallel to the ground. Our theory makes the novel prediction that the phantom lighthouse illusion emerges at a critical point at which the observer is located around 67 metres in front of the true lighthouse, and we find support for this prediction in a virtual reality experiment. Although we focus on the phantom lighthouse illusion, our approach contributes to a broader body of work that explains perceptual phenomena (including visual illusions) in terms of Bayesian inference.
- Open Access
- 29 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The Perception and Metacognition of Time Within and Between Stimulus Modalities
Time perception depends not only on judging duration but also on evaluating how accurate that judgement was. Our previous work compared visual, auditory, and audiovisual intervals separately and observed a modality asymmetry at short durations. The present study examined whether pairing them within a trial reproduces this pattern, and whether order matters. Eleven participants completed a modified temporal bisection task, bisecting two consecutive intervals then choosing the more accurate. Intervals were both audiovisual (AV), auditory followed by visual (A+V), or visual followed by auditory (V+A), tested at 1500 and 3000 msec. The AV condition ran twice, showing no reliable repetition difference. The modality asymmetry did not reappear once the two modalities were directly paired. Neither Modality nor Duration reliably affected the metacognitively-selected estimate. However, this stability did not extend to metacognitive accuracy, indexed by our Metacognitive Index (MCI), which was higher for V+A at the shorter duration, though only anecdotally (BF10 = 1.43). A hierarchical Bayesian model tracked the observed data closely, with individual consistency explaining much of the between-participant variability. In summary, perceiving a duration and judging one’s own performance may not be the same computation, with the latter more sensitive to modality-induced distortion.
- 29 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe Perception and Metacognition of Time Within and Between Stimulus Modalities
Time perception depends not only on judging duration but also on evaluating how accurate that judgement was. Our previous work compared visual, auditory, and audiovisual intervals separately and observed a modality asymmetry at short durations. The present study examined whether pairing them within a trial reproduces this pattern, and whether order matters. Eleven participants completed a modified temporal bisection task, bisecting two consecutive intervals then choosing the more accurate. Intervals were both audiovisual (AV), auditory followed by visual (A+V), or visual followed by auditory (V+A), tested at 1500 and 3000 msec. The AV condition ran twice, showing no reliable repetition difference. The modality asymmetry did not reappear once the two modalities were directly paired. Neither Modality nor Duration reliably affected the metacognitively-selected estimate. However, this stability did not extend to metacognitive accuracy, indexed by our Metacognitive Index (MCI), which was higher for V+A at the shorter duration, though only anecdotally (BF10 = 1.43). A hierarchical Bayesian model tracked the observed data closely, with individual consistency explaining much of the between-participant variability. In summary, perceiving a duration and judging one’s own performance may not be the same computation, with the latter more sensitive to modality-induced distortion.
- Open Access
- 6 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
A Bayesian account of the phantom lighthouse illusion
Observers sometimes infer that a rotating lighthouse beam originates from a "phantom lighthouse" that lies in the opposite direction from the true source of the beam. We argue that this illusion arises from underestimating the distance of the remote parts of the beam. This underestimation is consistent with Bayesian inference based on natural scene statistics, and also explains why lighthouse beams are perceived as pointing down rather than parallel to the ground. Our theory makes the novel prediction that the phantom lighthouse illusion emerges at a critical point at which the observer is located around 67 metres in front of the true lighthouse, and we find support for this prediction in two experiments carried out in the field and in virtual reality. Although we focus on the phantom lighthouse illusion, our approach contributes to a broader body of work that explains perceptual phenomena (including visual illusions) in terms of Bayesian inference.
- 6 September 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessA Bayesian account of the phantom lighthouse illusion
Observers sometimes infer that a rotating lighthouse beam originates from a "phantom lighthouse" that lies in the opposite direction from the true source of the beam. We argue that this illusion arises from underestimating the distance of the remote parts of the beam. This underestimation is consistent with Bayesian inference based on natural scene statistics, and also explains why lighthouse beams are perceived as pointing down rather than parallel to the ground. Our theory makes the novel prediction that the phantom lighthouse illusion emerges at a critical point at which the observer is located around 67 metres in front of the true lighthouse, and we find support for this prediction in two experiments carried out in the field and in virtual reality. Although we focus on the phantom lighthouse illusion, our approach contributes to a broader body of work that explains perceptual phenomena (including visual illusions) in terms of Bayesian inference.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology (ARVO) in Journal of Vision
- Vol. 24 (3) , 5
Measuring the perception and metacognition of time
The ability of humans to identify and reproduce short time intervals (in the region of a second) may be affected by many factors ranging from the gender and personality of the individual observer, through the attentional state, to the precise spatiotemporal structure of the stimulus. The relative roles of these very different factors are a challenge to describe and define; several methodological approaches have been used to achieve this to varying degrees of success. Here we describe and model the results of a paradigm affording not only a first-order measurement of the perceived duration of an interval but also a second-order metacognitive judgement of perceived time. This approach, we argue, expands the form of the data generally collected in duration-judgements and allows more detailed comparison of psychophysical behavior to the underlying theory. We also describe a hierarchical Bayesian measurement model that performs a quantitative analysis of the trial-by-trial data calculating the variability of the temporal estimates and the metacognitive judgments allowing direct comparison between an actual and an ideal observer. We fit the model to data collected for judgements of 750 ms (bisecting 1500 ms) and 1500 ms (bisecting 3000 ms) intervals across three stimulus modalities (visual, audio, and audiovisual). This enhanced form of data on a given interval judgement and the ability to track its progression on a trial-by-trial basis offers a way of looking at the different roles that subject-based, task-based and stimulus-based factors have on the perception of time.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by Association for Research in Vision and Ophthalmology (ARVO) in Journal of Vision
- Vol. 24 (3) , 5
Open AccessMeasuring the perception and metacognition of time
The ability of humans to identify and reproduce short time intervals (in the region of a second) may be affected by many factors ranging from the gender and personality of the individual observer, through the attentional state, to the precise spatiotemporal structure of the stimulus. The relative roles of these very different factors are a challenge to describe and define; several methodological approaches have been used to achieve this to varying degrees of success. Here we describe and model the results of a paradigm affording not only a first-order measurement of the perceived duration of an interval but also a second-order metacognitive judgement of perceived time. This approach, we argue, expands the form of the data generally collected in duration-judgements and allows more detailed comparison of psychophysical behavior to the underlying theory. We also describe a hierarchical Bayesian measurement model that performs a quantitative analysis of the trial-by-trial data calculating the variability of the temporal estimates and the metacognitive judgments allowing direct comparison between an actual and an ideal observer. We fit the model to data collected for judgements of 750 ms (bisecting 1500 ms) and 1500 ms (bisecting 3000 ms) intervals across three stimulus modalities (visual, audio, and audiovisual). This enhanced form of data on a given interval judgement and the ability to track its progression on a trial-by-trial basis offers a way of looking at the different roles that subject-based, task-based and stimulus-based factors have on the perception of time.
- Open Access
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
A Bayesian account of two visual illusions involving lighthouse beams
Lighthouse beams are often perceived as bent rather than straight, and observers sometimes infer that a rotating lighthouse beam originates from a ``phantom lighthouse'' that lies in the opposite direction from the true source of the beam. We argue that both illusions arise as a result of Bayesian inference based on natural scene statistics and support our argument by implementing a formal computational model. In addition to capturing both illusions, our model makes the novel predictions that a beam viewed from the side is perceived to bend towards the observer, and that the phantom lighthouse illusion should only emerge at a critical point at which the observer is located around 75 metres in front of the true source of a rotating lighthouse beam. Our theory therefore motivates a future line of experimental work, and contributes to a broader body of research that explains perceptual phenomena (including visual illusions) in terms of Bayesian inference.
- 9 May 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessA Bayesian account of two visual illusions involving lighthouse beams
Lighthouse beams are often perceived as bent rather than straight, and observers sometimes infer that a rotating lighthouse beam originates from a ``phantom lighthouse'' that lies in the opposite direction from the true source of the beam. We argue that both illusions arise as a result of Bayesian inference based on natural scene statistics and support our argument by implementing a formal computational model. In addition to capturing both illusions, our model makes the novel predictions that a beam viewed from the side is perceived to bend towards the observer, and that the phantom lighthouse illusion should only emerge at a critical point at which the observer is located around 75 metres in front of the true source of a rotating lighthouse beam. Our theory therefore motivates a future line of experimental work, and contributes to a broader body of research that explains perceptual phenomena (including visual illusions) in terms of Bayesian inference.
- Open Access
Measuring the perception and metacognition of time
The ability of humans to identify and reproduce short time intervals (in the region of a second) may be affected by many factors ranging from the gender of the individual observer, through the attentional state, to the precise spatiotemporal structure of the stimulus. The relative roles of these very different factors are a challenge to describe and define; several methodological approaches have been used to achieve this to varying degrees of success. Here we describe a new paradigm affording not only a first-order measurement of the perceived duration of an interval but also a second-order metacognitive judgement of perceived time. This approach, we argue, expands the form of the data generally collected in duration-judgements and allows more detailed comparison of psychophysical behaviour to the underlying theory. We also describe a measurement model which provides estimates of the variability of the temporal estimates and the metacognitive judgments allowing comparison to an ideal observer. We fit the model to data collected for judgements of 750ms (bisecting 1500ms) and 1500ms (bisecting 3000ms) intervals across three stimulus modalities (Visual, Audio & Audiovisual). This enhanced form of data on a given interval judgement and the ability to track its progression on a trial-by-trial basis offers a way of looking at the different roles that subject-based, task-based and stimulus-based factors have on the perception of time.
Open AccessMeasuring the perception and metacognition of time
The ability of humans to identify and reproduce short time intervals (in the region of a second) may be affected by many factors ranging from the gender of the individual observer, through the attentional state, to the precise spatiotemporal structure of the stimulus. The relative roles of these very different factors are a challenge to describe and define; several methodological approaches have been used to achieve this to varying degrees of success. Here we describe a new paradigm affording not only a first-order measurement of the perceived duration of an interval but also a second-order metacognitive judgement of perceived time. This approach, we argue, expands the form of the data generally collected in duration-judgements and allows more detailed comparison of psychophysical behaviour to the underlying theory. We also describe a measurement model which provides estimates of the variability of the temporal estimates and the metacognitive judgments allowing comparison to an ideal observer. We fit the model to data collected for judgements of 750ms (bisecting 1500ms) and 1500ms (bisecting 3000ms) intervals across three stimulus modalities (Visual, Audio & Audiovisual). This enhanced form of data on a given interval judgement and the ability to track its progression on a trial-by-trial basis offers a way of looking at the different roles that subject-based, task-based and stimulus-based factors have on the perception of time.
- 17 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Space Safety Engineering
- Vol. 9 (3) , 397-402
A study of ambient sensing as a strategy against monotony and boredom in space
- 17 June 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Space Safety Engineering
- Vol. 9 (3) , 397-402
A study of ambient sensing as a strategy against monotony and boredom in space
- 30 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Astronomy
- Vol. 6 (4) , 406-409
Comparing constellations across cultures
- 30 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Astronomy
- Vol. 6 (4) , 406-409
Comparing constellations across cultures
- 22 February 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 33 (3) , 354-363
Perceptual Grouping Explains Similarities in Constellations Across Cultures
Cultures around the world organize stars into constellations, or asterisms, and these groupings are often considered to be arbitrary and culture specific. Yet there are striking similarities in asterisms across cultures, and groupings such as Orion, the Big Dipper, the Pleiades, and the Southern Cross are widely recognized across many different cultures. Psychologists have informally suggested that these shared patterns are explained by Gestalt laws of grouping, but there have been no systematic attempts to catalog asterisms that recur across cultures or to explain the perceptual basis of these groupings. Here, we compiled data from 27 cultures around the world and found that a simple computational model of perceptual grouping accounts for many of the recurring cross-cultural asterisms. Our results suggest that basic perceptual principles account for more of the structure of asterisms across cultures than previously acknowledged and highlight ways in which specific cultures depart from this shared baseline.
- 22 February 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 33 (3) , 354-363
Perceptual Grouping Explains Similarities in Constellations Across Cultures
Cultures around the world organize stars into constellations, or asterisms, and these groupings are often considered to be arbitrary and culture specific. Yet there are striking similarities in asterisms across cultures, and groupings such as Orion, the Big Dipper, the Pleiades, and the Southern Cross are widely recognized across many different cultures. Psychologists have informally suggested that these shared patterns are explained by Gestalt laws of grouping, but there have been no systematic attempts to catalog asterisms that recur across cultures or to explain the perceptual basis of these groupings. Here, we compiled data from 27 cultures around the world and found that a simple computational model of perceptual grouping accounts for many of the recurring cross-cultural asterisms. Our results suggest that basic perceptual principles account for more of the structure of asterisms across cultures than previously acknowledged and highlight ways in which specific cultures depart from this shared baseline.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 17 June 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (25)
Naming unrelated words predicts creativity
Significance: Many traditional measures of creativity require time-intensive and subjective scoring procedures. Their scores are relative to the specific sample, which makes multicultural or international assessments difficult. Our results show that a shorter and simpler task with automatic and objective scoring may be at least as reliable at measuring verbal creativity. This finding enables assessments across larger and more diverse samples with less bias.
- 17 June 2021
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 118 (25)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessNaming unrelated words predicts creativity
Significance: Many traditional measures of creativity require time-intensive and subjective scoring procedures. Their scores are relative to the specific sample, which makes multicultural or international assessments difficult. Our results show that a shorter and simpler task with automatic and objective scoring may be at least as reliable at measuring verbal creativity. This finding enables assessments across larger and more diverse samples with less bias.