Omer Solodoch
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Omer Solodoch has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Yotam Margalit
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel
2 shared publications - Daniel J. Hopkins
Department of Political Science, Perelman Center for Political Science and Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
1 shared publication - Edward D. Mansfield
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication - Edward D. Mansfield
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication Ryan C Briggs
1 shared publication- Ryan C. Briggs
University of Guelph
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- p. 1-21
Globalization and the Hinterland: International Trade and the Rural–Urban Divide
The growing political divide between rural and urban regions is often attributed to rural deindustrialization and import competition in manufacturing. Yet this cleavage emerged in many countries well before rural industrialization, pointing to underlying economic forces that existing accounts have overlooked. We argue that comparative advantage in agriculture is one such force: rural voters are more likely to support protectionist parties and policies when local agriculture is uncompetitive, since this sector is often central to their communities’ economic and social life. Using a new harmonized dataset of surveys from 123 countries and extensive data on voting behavior in the European Union, we find strong support for our argument. An additional analysis exploiting exogenous subnational variation in agricultural competitiveness in the United States post-NAFTA further corroborates our findings: the political divide between rural and urban voters is pronounced in uncompetitive regions but negligible in those possessing a comparative advantage in agriculture.
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- p. 1-21
Open AccessGlobalization and the Hinterland: International Trade and the Rural–Urban Divide
The growing political divide between rural and urban regions is often attributed to rural deindustrialization and import competition in manufacturing. Yet this cleavage emerged in many countries well before rural industrialization, pointing to underlying economic forces that existing accounts have overlooked. We argue that comparative advantage in agriculture is one such force: rural voters are more likely to support protectionist parties and policies when local agriculture is uncompetitive, since this sector is often central to their communities’ economic and social life. Using a new harmonized dataset of surveys from 123 countries and extensive data on voting behavior in the European Union, we find strong support for our argument. An additional analysis exploiting exogenous subnational variation in agricultural competitiveness in the United States post-NAFTA further corroborates our findings: the political divide between rural and urban voters is pronounced in uncompetitive regions but negligible in those possessing a comparative advantage in agriculture.
- Open Access
- 18 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 78 (4) , 800-822
The Effect of Education on Support for International Trade: Evidence from Compulsory-Education Reforms
Across countries and over time, support for economic globalization is strongest among individuals with the highest levels of education. Yet despite long-lasting debates on the sources of this correlation, reliable evidence that isolates the causal effect of education from the nonrandom selection of individuals into education is lacking. To address this fundamental issue, I exploit compulsory-schooling reforms that increased the minimum school-leaving age in eighteen countries. Employing a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I find that the reform-induced added years of education substantially and durably increased support for trade liberalization. And using new data on the content of school curricula, I find that the effect of schooling largely stems from instilling tolerance and pluralism in citizens and reducing the perceived cultural threat of globalization. In contrast, there is little evidence that the effect of schooling reflects the distributive consequences of international trade, separating globalization winners and losers.
- 18 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 78 (4) , 800-822
Open AccessThe Effect of Education on Support for International Trade: Evidence from Compulsory-Education Reforms
Across countries and over time, support for economic globalization is strongest among individuals with the highest levels of education. Yet despite long-lasting debates on the sources of this correlation, reliable evidence that isolates the causal effect of education from the nonrandom selection of individuals into education is lacking. To address this fundamental issue, I exploit compulsory-schooling reforms that increased the minimum school-leaving age in eighteen countries. Employing a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I find that the reform-induced added years of education substantially and durably increased support for trade liberalization. And using new data on the content of school curricula, I find that the effect of schooling largely stems from instilling tolerance and pluralism in citizens and reducing the perceived cultural threat of globalization. In contrast, there is little evidence that the effect of schooling reflects the distributive consequences of international trade, separating globalization winners and losers.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 86 (3) , 1098-1103
Political Costs of Trade War Tariffs
- 1 July 2024
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 86 (3) , 1098-1103
Political Costs of Trade War Tariffs
- 11 August 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 68 (6) , 1252-1275
Changes in Perceptions of Border Security Influence Desired Levels of Immigration
Security concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifying their borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat from immigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, they might enhance citizens’ sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using survey experiments run on a quota sample of over 1000 Americans. The findings show that allocating more government resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likely driven by a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widely considered as symbols of closure and isolation, can increase public support for immigration.
- 11 August 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 68 (6) , 1252-1275
Changes in Perceptions of Border Security Influence Desired Levels of Immigration
Security concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifying their borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat from immigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, they might enhance citizens’ sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using survey experiments run on a quota sample of over 1000 Americans. The findings show that allocating more government resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likely driven by a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widely considered as symbols of closure and isolation, can increase public support for immigration.
- Open Access
- 11 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 54 (3) , 928-936
Personal Economic Shocks and Public Opposition to Unauthorized Immigration
Do negative economic shocks heighten public opposition to immigration, and through what mechanisms? Extant research suggests that economic circumstances and levels of labour market competition have little bearing on citizens' immigration attitudes. Yet personal economic shocks have the potential to trigger the threatened, anti-immigration responses – possibly through channels other than labour market competition – that prior cross-sectional research has been unable to detect. To examine these propositions, we used a unique panel study which tracked a large, population-based sample of Americans between 2007 and 2020. We found that adverse economic shocks, especially job losses, spurred opposition to unauthorized immigration. However, such effects are not concentrated among those most likely to face labour market competition from unauthorized immigrants. Instead, they are concentrated among white male Americans. This evidence suggests that the respondents' anti-immigration turn does not stem from economic concerns alone. Instead, personal experiences with the economy are refracted through salient socio-political lenses.
- 11 August 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 54 (3) , 928-936
Open AccessPersonal Economic Shocks and Public Opposition to Unauthorized Immigration
Do negative economic shocks heighten public opposition to immigration, and through what mechanisms? Extant research suggests that economic circumstances and levels of labour market competition have little bearing on citizens' immigration attitudes. Yet personal economic shocks have the potential to trigger the threatened, anti-immigration responses – possibly through channels other than labour market competition – that prior cross-sectional research has been unable to detect. To examine these propositions, we used a unique panel study which tracked a large, population-based sample of Americans between 2007 and 2020. We found that adverse economic shocks, especially job losses, spurred opposition to unauthorized immigration. However, such effects are not concentrated among those most likely to face labour market competition from unauthorized immigrants. Instead, they are concentrated among white male Americans. This evidence suggests that the respondents' anti-immigration turn does not stem from economic concerns alone. Instead, personal experiences with the economy are refracted through salient socio-political lenses.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (9) , 2455-2482
Overburdened? How refugee dispersal policies can mitigate NIMBYism and public backlash
With growing numbers of forcibly displaced people and their tendency to spatially cluster, destination countries around the world consider dispersing them over their territory. While the egocentric not-in-my-back-yard syndrome (NIMBYism) predicts that dispersion will spark a public backlash, sociotropic considerations and appeals to civic fairness predict the contrary. I theorise that the institutional set-up determines which force prevails. Although the local proximity of refugees triggers public opposition, it can be substantially countered by tighter regulation on refugee dispersion. Setting clear guiding rules, such as an upper limit or proportional allocation can enhance both burden-sharing in the accommodation of refugees and public support for their incorporation. Evidence from survey experiments conducted in Norway and Israel supports these theoretical accounts. The findings have implications for understanding how countries can mitigate public backlash against immigrants and refugees while maintaining their admission and integration.
- 22 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (9) , 2455-2482
Open AccessOverburdened? How refugee dispersal policies can mitigate NIMBYism and public backlash
With growing numbers of forcibly displaced people and their tendency to spatially cluster, destination countries around the world consider dispersing them over their territory. While the egocentric not-in-my-back-yard syndrome (NIMBYism) predicts that dispersion will spark a public backlash, sociotropic considerations and appeals to civic fairness predict the contrary. I theorise that the institutional set-up determines which force prevails. Although the local proximity of refugees triggers public opposition, it can be substantially countered by tighter regulation on refugee dispersion. Setting clear guiding rules, such as an upper limit or proportional allocation can enhance both burden-sharing in the accommodation of refugees and public support for their incorporation. Evidence from survey experiments conducted in Norway and Israel supports these theoretical accounts. The findings have implications for understanding how countries can mitigate public backlash against immigrants and refugees while maintaining their admission and integration.
- Open Access
- 6 December 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Changes in perceptions of border security influence desired levels of immigration
Security concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifying their borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat from immigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, they might enhance citizens' sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using survey experiments run on a nationally representative sample of over 1,000 Americans. The findings show that allocating more government resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likely driven by a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widely considered as symbols of closure and isolation, can promote openness to immigration.
- 6 December 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessChanges in perceptions of border security influence desired levels of immigration
Security concerns about immigration are on the rise. Many countries respond by fortifying their borders. Yet little is known about the influence of border security measures on perceived threat from immigration. Borders might facilitate group identities and spread fear of outsiders. In contrast, they might enhance citizens' sense of security and control over immigration. We test these claims using survey experiments run on a nationally representative sample of over 1,000 Americans. The findings show that allocating more government resources to border security increases desired levels of immigration. This effect is likely driven by a sense of control over immigration, induced by border security measures even when the number or characteristics of immigrants remain unchanged. Our findings suggest that border controls, which are widely considered as symbols of closure and isolation, can promote openness to immigration.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 52 (3) , 1055-1075
Against the Flow: Differentiating Between Public Opposition to the Immigration Stock and Flow
Vast research on immigration lumps together native citizens' attitudes toward two different groups: the immigrant stock of non-naturalized resident aliens, and the immigrant flow, that is, the future arrival of foreigners seeking to enter and live in the country. Does popular opposition to immigration distinguish between the two, and if so, how? This article analyzes theoretically the reasons the stock and flow might induce different views among natives, and presents experimental evidence from the United States showing that natives are systematically more accepting of the former. The analysis indicates that this ‘stock premium’ partly stems from a sense of moral obligation toward people residing in the country. Replicating two widely cited experiments, the study shows that the stock–flow distinction has important implications for the interpretation of earlier findings on immigration attitudes, and for understanding voter preferences regarding policies designed to curtail immigration.
- 22 April 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 52 (3) , 1055-1075
Open AccessAgainst the Flow: Differentiating Between Public Opposition to the Immigration Stock and Flow
Vast research on immigration lumps together native citizens' attitudes toward two different groups: the immigrant stock of non-naturalized resident aliens, and the immigrant flow, that is, the future arrival of foreigners seeking to enter and live in the country. Does popular opposition to immigration distinguish between the two, and if so, how? This article analyzes theoretically the reasons the stock and flow might induce different views among natives, and presents experimental evidence from the United States showing that natives are systematically more accepting of the former. The analysis indicates that this ‘stock premium’ partly stems from a sense of moral obligation toward people residing in the country. Replicating two widely cited experiments, the study shows that the stock–flow distinction has important implications for the interpretation of earlier findings on immigration attitudes, and for understanding voter preferences regarding policies designed to curtail immigration.
- 28 August 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 69 (4) , 1009-1032
Do Sociotropic Concerns Mask Prejudice? Experimental Evidence on the Sources of Public Opposition to Immigration
Does opposition to immigration mostly stem from prejudice or from sociotropic concerns about broad economic and cultural implications on the nation as a whole? Previous work on immigration preferences cannot answer this question because the two explanations are observationally equivalent when focusing on the attitudes of natives. I analyze a unique survey experiment that asks both natives and immigrants of various origins to evaluate different profiles of visa applicants to the Netherlands. The experiment also assigns an “ingroup treatment”—applications by individuals of the same ethnocultural background as the respondent. Using this rich data, I show that sociotropic concerns are the major source of immigration preferences, while ethnic biases play a moderate role. Remarkably, the ingroup treatment has limited effects on admission. However, bias against specific immigrant groups is detected in preferences of immigrant respondents and of those who sympathize with the far-right Freedom Party.
- 28 August 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 69 (4) , 1009-1032
Do Sociotropic Concerns Mask Prejudice? Experimental Evidence on the Sources of Public Opposition to Immigration
Does opposition to immigration mostly stem from prejudice or from sociotropic concerns about broad economic and cultural implications on the nation as a whole? Previous work on immigration preferences cannot answer this question because the two explanations are observationally equivalent when focusing on the attitudes of natives. I analyze a unique survey experiment that asks both natives and immigrants of various origins to evaluate different profiles of visa applicants to the Netherlands. The experiment also assigns an “ingroup treatment”—applications by individuals of the same ethnocultural background as the respondent. Using this rich data, I show that sociotropic concerns are the major source of immigration preferences, while ethnic biases play a moderate role. Remarkably, the ingroup treatment has limited effects on admission. However, bias against specific immigrant groups is detected in preferences of immigrant respondents and of those who sympathize with the far-right Freedom Party.
- 2 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 14 (1) , 63-81
Explaining the birthright citizenship lottery: Longitudinal and cross‐national evidence for key determinants
In the modern nation‐state, birthright citizenship laws – jus soli and jus sanguinis – are the two main gateways to sociopolitical membership. The vast majority of the world's population (97 percent) obtains their citizenship as a matter of birthright. Yet because comparative research has focused on measuring and explaining the multiple components of citizenship and immigration policies, a systematic analysis of birthright citizenship is lacking. We bridge this gap by analyzing the birthright component in prominent databases on citizenship policies and complementing them with original data and measures. This allows us to systematically test institutional and electoral explanations for contemporary and over‐time variation in birthright citizenship. Institutional explanations – legal codes and colonial history – are consistently associated with limitations on birthright law. As for electoral explanations, specific electoral powers – Nationalist, Socialist and Social‐Democratic parties – rather than the traditional left/right‐wing divide, are linked with reforms in birthright regimes.
- 2 July 2018
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 14 (1) , 63-81
Explaining the birthright citizenship lottery: Longitudinal and cross‐national evidence for key determinants
In the modern nation‐state, birthright citizenship laws – jus soli and jus sanguinis – are the two main gateways to sociopolitical membership. The vast majority of the world's population (97 percent) obtains their citizenship as a matter of birthright. Yet because comparative research has focused on measuring and explaining the multiple components of citizenship and immigration policies, a systematic analysis of birthright citizenship is lacking. We bridge this gap by analyzing the birthright component in prominent databases on citizenship policies and complementing them with original data and measures. This allows us to systematically test institutional and electoral explanations for contemporary and over‐time variation in birthright citizenship. Institutional explanations – legal codes and colonial history – are consistently associated with limitations on birthright law. As for electoral explanations, specific electoral powers – Nationalist, Socialist and Social‐Democratic parties – rather than the traditional left/right‐wing divide, are linked with reforms in birthright regimes.