Giovanna Bimonte
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Giovanna Bimonte has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Luigi Senatore
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy
4 shared publications - Cristian Barra
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy
3 shared publications - Maria Russolillo
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy
3 shared publications - Concetto Paolo Vinci
Department of Economic and Statistical Sciences, University of Salerno, 84084 Fisciano, Italy
2 shared publications - Han Lin Shang
Macquarie University
2 shared publications - Luigi Aldieri
Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Salerno, Fisciano, Italy
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Forecasting
Enhancing mortality forecasting with ensemble learning: A shapley-based approach
- 12 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Forecasting
Open AccessEnhancing mortality forecasting with ensemble learning: A shapley-based approach
- Open Access
- 12 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 356 (1) , 123-134
Efficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form
The aim of this paper is to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games in partition function form, given an externality scheme $$ f \in \textsf{Ex}(N) $$ . We extend the notion of convexity to incorporate externality effects. By introducing a new concept of rationality, called collective rationality, we demonstrate the efficiency of the grand coalition $$ N $$ . We also identify a sufficient condition for the efficiency of the grand coalition using the property of individual superadditivity.- 12 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 356 (1) , 123-134
Open AccessEfficiency and the core in NTU games in partition function form
The aim of this paper is to establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games in partition function form, given an externality scheme $$ f \in \textsf{Ex}(N) $$ . We extend the notion of convexity to incorporate externality effects. By introducing a new concept of rationality, called collective rationality, we demonstrate the efficiency of the grand coalition $$ N $$ . We also identify a sufficient condition for the efficiency of the grand coalition using the property of individual superadditivity. - Open Access
- 31 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- Vol. 48 (2) , 1131-1159
Mortality models ensemble via Shapley value
Model averaging techniques in the actuarial literature aim to forecast future longevity appropriately by combining forecasts derived from various models. This approach often yields more accurate predictions than those generated by a single model. The key to enhancing forecast accuracy through model averaging lies in identifying the optimal weights from a finite sample. Utilizing sub-optimal weights in computations may adversely impact the accuracy of the model-averaged longevity forecasts. By proposing a game-theoretic approach employing Shapley values for weight selection, our study clarifies the distinct impact of each model on the collective predictive outcome. This analysis not only delineates the importance of each model in decision-making processes, but also provides insight into their contribution to the overall predictive performance of the ensemble.
- 31 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- Vol. 48 (2) , 1131-1159
Open AccessMortality models ensemble via Shapley value
Model averaging techniques in the actuarial literature aim to forecast future longevity appropriately by combining forecasts derived from various models. This approach often yields more accurate predictions than those generated by a single model. The key to enhancing forecast accuracy through model averaging lies in identifying the optimal weights from a finite sample. Utilizing sub-optimal weights in computations may adversely impact the accuracy of the model-averaged longevity forecasts. By proposing a game-theoretic approach employing Shapley values for weight selection, our study clarifies the distinct impact of each model on the collective predictive outcome. This analysis not only delineates the importance of each model in decision-making processes, but also provides insight into their contribution to the overall predictive performance of the ensemble.
- Open Access
Game Theory Applications to Socio-Environmental Studies, Development Economics, and Sustainability Research
The present investigation elaborates on the level of game theory application for the applied and theoretical analyses of climate change and development studies. This editorial shows that the common good character of global climate alongside the increasing internalization of environmental externalities through national regulations and international environmental treaties jointly result in the increasing congruence between the context of climate change problems and the game theoretical method. Furthermore, the adoption of the Paris Accord by the overwhelming majority of developing countries as well as the disproportionate vulnerability of the Global South have led to an increasing shift in focus with regard to international development cooperation, from poverty alleviation and economic growth to green growth and circular economy solutions, within developing countries. The underutilization of game theory in the context of development studies is not satisfactory. This paper underlines the importance of implementing an impetus to researchers for scholarly discussions and applications of game theory in a discourse on the following topics: 1. economic growth; 2. climate change mitigation and adaptation; and 3. a broader socioeconomic development.
Open AccessGame Theory Applications to Socio-Environmental Studies, Development Economics, and Sustainability Research
The present investigation elaborates on the level of game theory application for the applied and theoretical analyses of climate change and development studies. This editorial shows that the common good character of global climate alongside the increasing internalization of environmental externalities through national regulations and international environmental treaties jointly result in the increasing congruence between the context of climate change problems and the game theoretical method. Furthermore, the adoption of the Paris Accord by the overwhelming majority of developing countries as well as the disproportionate vulnerability of the Global South have led to an increasing shift in focus with regard to international development cooperation, from poverty alleviation and economic growth to green growth and circular economy solutions, within developing countries. The underutilization of game theory in the context of development studies is not satisfactory. This paper underlines the importance of implementing an impetus to researchers for scholarly discussions and applications of game theory in a discourse on the following topics: 1. economic growth; 2. climate change mitigation and adaptation; and 3. a broader socioeconomic development.
- 5 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 27 (2) , 4541-4569
Food security assessment in the light of sustainable development goals: a post-Paris Agreement era
- 5 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 27 (2) , 4541-4569
Food security assessment in the light of sustainable development goals: a post-Paris Agreement era
- Open Access
- 23 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Soft Computing
- Vol. 28 (2) , 1491-1501
An interdisciplinary educational path to understand the economic phenomena of a fluid and complex world with mathematics
In this paper, we describe an activity that involves economics and mathematics. It is included in the planning of orientation paths towards university studies within the Mathematical High School Project and is dedicated to students in the last years of high school. In particular, this research will deal with the issue of solving an economic problem using not only real analysis instruments but also geometrical topics concerning Euclidean geometry and topology. Mathematics becomes a language to understand and explain a real life problem, such as determining the optimal position of an airport, a nuclear reactor and so on. Some activities made use of dynamic geometry software and computer simulations.
- 23 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Soft Computing
- Vol. 28 (2) , 1491-1501
Open AccessAn interdisciplinary educational path to understand the economic phenomena of a fluid and complex world with mathematics
In this paper, we describe an activity that involves economics and mathematics. It is included in the planning of orientation paths towards university studies within the Mathematical High School Project and is dedicated to students in the last years of high school. In particular, this research will deal with the issue of solving an economic problem using not only real analysis instruments but also geometrical topics concerning Euclidean geometry and topology. Mathematics becomes a language to understand and explain a real life problem, such as determining the optimal position of an airport, a nuclear reactor and so on. Some activities made use of dynamic geometry software and computer simulations.
- 18 December 2022
- Published by Wiley in Business Strategy and the Environment
- Vol. 32 (6) , 3792-3800
Government eco‐innovation incentives in a recycling system: A Stackelberg‐type model
As past economic progress has come at the expense of diminishing natural resources, increasing pollution and widespread damage to ecosystems around the world, an imperative we must respond to is to seek ways in which to achieve economic, social, and environmental sustainability, including actions aimed at a circular economy and eco‐innovation. Recycling has numerous implications for the environment, economic and production performance, employment, and production of wealth. The environmental regulator must therefore consider all the aspects of the waste cycle when deciding the right policies to maximize social welfare. We consider three types of agents involved in a Stackelberg game: manufacturers, importers and sellers (MIS), recyclers, and the government acting as an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In our model, we introduce the cost to adopt new technology for eco‐innovation per unit produced by the MIS, resulting in the possibility to reduce the weight of the advanced recycling fees if they invest more in the aptitude to be recycled of their products. The results give interesting prompts to investigate the relationship between environmental taxation and ecological incentives.
- 18 December 2022
- Published by Wiley in Business Strategy and the Environment
- Vol. 32 (6) , 3792-3800
Government eco‐innovation incentives in a recycling system: A Stackelberg‐type model
As past economic progress has come at the expense of diminishing natural resources, increasing pollution and widespread damage to ecosystems around the world, an imperative we must respond to is to seek ways in which to achieve economic, social, and environmental sustainability, including actions aimed at a circular economy and eco‐innovation. Recycling has numerous implications for the environment, economic and production performance, employment, and production of wealth. The environmental regulator must therefore consider all the aspects of the waste cycle when deciding the right policies to maximize social welfare. We consider three types of agents involved in a Stackelberg game: manufacturers, importers and sellers (MIS), recyclers, and the government acting as an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In our model, we introduce the cost to adopt new technology for eco‐innovation per unit produced by the MIS, resulting in the possibility to reduce the weight of the advanced recycling fees if they invest more in the aptitude to be recycled of their products. The results give interesting prompts to investigate the relationship between environmental taxation and ecological incentives.
- 12 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 103-108
Shapley Value in Partition Function Form Games: New Research Perspectives for Features Selection
- 12 April 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 103-108
Shapley Value in Partition Function Form Games: New Research Perspectives for Features Selection
- Open Access
Green Innovation and Competition: R&D Incentives in a Circular Economy
The present paper provides theoretical insights regarding the determinants of firms’ incentives to invest in a Circular Economy. The analysis relies on a Cournot model disaggregating the disposal cost in the production function. In a non-simultaneous sequential game, two risk-neutral firms are endowed with a green innovation project that, if successful, would reduce the overall production costs and implement a Circular Economy. Firms are plagued by asymmetric information about the exact value of the other firm’s innovation. In this setting, the R&D investment in a Circular Economy, by affecting the distribution of production and disposal costs, influences the production decisions of both the innovating and the rival firms. The sign of the impact depends on the firms’ strategy in the product market. Furthermore, the analysis points out that cooperation in R&D of firms competing in the product market reinforces incentives to invest in green innovation. This suggests that governments aimed to advance a Circular Economy should encourage firms’ cooperation.
Open AccessGreen Innovation and Competition: R&D Incentives in a Circular Economy
The present paper provides theoretical insights regarding the determinants of firms’ incentives to invest in a Circular Economy. The analysis relies on a Cournot model disaggregating the disposal cost in the production function. In a non-simultaneous sequential game, two risk-neutral firms are endowed with a green innovation project that, if successful, would reduce the overall production costs and implement a Circular Economy. Firms are plagued by asymmetric information about the exact value of the other firm’s innovation. In this setting, the R&D investment in a Circular Economy, by affecting the distribution of production and disposal costs, influences the production decisions of both the innovating and the rival firms. The sign of the impact depends on the firms’ strategy in the product market. Furthermore, the analysis points out that cooperation in R&D of firms competing in the product market reinforces incentives to invest in green innovation. This suggests that governments aimed to advance a Circular Economy should encourage firms’ cooperation.
- 2 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Quality & Quantity
- Vol. 53 (4) , 1913-1940
Cooperation, diffusion of technology and environmental protection: a new index
- 2 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Quality & Quantity
- Vol. 53 (4) , 1913-1940
Cooperation, diffusion of technology and environmental protection: a new index