Jonathan Tallant
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jonathan Tallant has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sam Baron
School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
9 shared publications - David Ingram
University of York
7 shared publications - Kristie Miller
Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
6 shared publications Andrew Fisher
Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
2 shared publications- Andrew Fisher
University of Nottingham
2 shared publications Philosophy Documentation Center
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 11 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (7) , 2265-2286
Attitudes of trust: experimental evidence for a morally relevant conception of trust
- 11 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 183 (7) , 2265-2286
Attitudes of trust: experimental evidence for a morally relevant conception of trust
- 31 December 2025
- Published by Aletheia - Associacao Cientifica e Cultural in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
- Vol. 81 (4) , 1083-1098
Three Objections to DeRose’s Contextualism
Contextualism in epistemology, as developed by Keith DeRose, holds that the truth of knowledge attributions depends on the epistemic context of the attributor. This paper presents three objections to DeRose’s formulation of contextualism, each aimed at undermining its standard motivations. First, I argue that the natural-language methodology typically used to support contextualism is insufficient to establish its semantic conclusions. By constructing parallel HIGH/LOW cases involving the predicate ‘is real’, I suggest that if such arguments were sound, they would commit us to implausible forms of metaphysical indexicality, thereby weakening the natural-language motivation for contextualism about knowledge. Second, I challenge the claim that contextualism offers a distinctive explanation of sceptical scenarios. I introduce symmetric SHIGH/SLOW cases in which raising epistemic standards appears to license, rather than undermine, certain knowledge attributions, casting doubt on the asymmetry required for the contextualist response to scepticism. Finally, I argue that there are contexts in which ‘knows’ is correctly applied despite the absence of belief, suggesting that variation in knowledge attributions sometimes reflects shifts in meaning rather than shifts in epistemic standards. Taken together, these considerations do not show contextualism to be false, but they significantly weaken the case for its standard motivations.
- 31 December 2025
- Published by Aletheia - Associacao Cientifica e Cultural in Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
- Vol. 81 (4) , 1083-1098
Three Objections to DeRose’s Contextualism
Contextualism in epistemology, as developed by Keith DeRose, holds that the truth of knowledge attributions depends on the epistemic context of the attributor. This paper presents three objections to DeRose’s formulation of contextualism, each aimed at undermining its standard motivations. First, I argue that the natural-language methodology typically used to support contextualism is insufficient to establish its semantic conclusions. By constructing parallel HIGH/LOW cases involving the predicate ‘is real’, I suggest that if such arguments were sound, they would commit us to implausible forms of metaphysical indexicality, thereby weakening the natural-language motivation for contextualism about knowledge. Second, I challenge the claim that contextualism offers a distinctive explanation of sceptical scenarios. I introduce symmetric SHIGH/SLOW cases in which raising epistemic standards appears to license, rather than undermine, certain knowledge attributions, casting doubt on the asymmetry required for the contextualist response to scepticism. Finally, I argue that there are contexts in which ‘knows’ is correctly applied despite the absence of belief, suggesting that variation in knowledge attributions sometimes reflects shifts in meaning rather than shifts in epistemic standards. Taken together, these considerations do not show contextualism to be false, but they significantly weaken the case for its standard motivations.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in AI and Ethics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 13
Trustability and trustworthiness: conceptual foundations and the case of AI
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in AI and Ethics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 13
Trustability and trustworthiness: conceptual foundations and the case of AI
- 31 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 191-206
Carnap and Theoretical Virtues
- Open Access
- 2 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-21
On the possibility of a normative account of corporate trust
- 2 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-21
Open AccessOn the possibility of a normative account of corporate trust
- Open Access
Untrustworthiness
Discussions of trustworthiness are not ubiquitous in the philosophical literature (compare remarks by Jones 2012, 61). Nonetheless, there are some attempted analyses and there is excellent work ongoing. The goal of this paper is to focus on trustworthiness's even less discussed opposite: untrustworthiness. So far as I can tell, the concept has gone largely undiscussed in the philosophical literature. This is unfortunate. For, just as Hawley (2014) points out that a theory of trust must be rendered compatible with a theory of distrust, so (I claim) a theory of trustworthiness must be rendered compatible with a theory of untrustworthiness. A further wrinkle to be introduced along the way is the need for a further distinction: cases where we must talk, not of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, but of neither.
Open AccessUntrustworthiness
Discussions of trustworthiness are not ubiquitous in the philosophical literature (compare remarks by Jones 2012, 61). Nonetheless, there are some attempted analyses and there is excellent work ongoing. The goal of this paper is to focus on trustworthiness's even less discussed opposite: untrustworthiness. So far as I can tell, the concept has gone largely undiscussed in the philosophical literature. This is unfortunate. For, just as Hawley (2014) points out that a theory of trust must be rendered compatible with a theory of distrust, so (I claim) a theory of trustworthiness must be rendered compatible with a theory of untrustworthiness. A further wrinkle to be introduced along the way is the need for a further distinction: cases where we must talk, not of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, but of neither.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (8) , 1971-2001
Locative grounding harmony
In this paper, we explore locative grounding harmony, according to which the location of the grounds mirrors the location of the grounded. We proceed in three stages. First, we clarify the notion of locative harmony and describe different locative harmony principles. Second, we offer two arguments for the claim that grounding between physically located entities obeys principles of locative harmony. Third, we consider and respond to a range of cases that seem to show that grounding relations between physically located entities do not obey such principles. We conclude that grounding between such entities obeys locative harmony.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 181 (8) , 1971-2001
Open AccessLocative grounding harmony
In this paper, we explore locative grounding harmony, according to which the location of the grounds mirrors the location of the grounded. We proceed in three stages. First, we clarify the notion of locative harmony and describe different locative harmony principles. Second, we offer two arguments for the claim that grounding between physically located entities obeys principles of locative harmony. Third, we consider and respond to a range of cases that seem to show that grounding relations between physically located entities do not obey such principles. We conclude that grounding between such entities obeys locative harmony.
- Open Access
- 20 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-33
Presentism and representation: saying it without words
The Triviality Argument against presentism maintains that we should reject presentism because there is no way to define the view that is not either trivially true or obviously false. We suggest that this style of argument over-emphasises purely linguistic means of representing a philosophical thesis. We argue that there is no reason to suppose that all philosophical theses must be linguistically representable, and thus that the failure to linguistically represent presentism is no big deal. It certainly shouldn’t lead us to reject the view. We offer a more general moral for philosophy, and that is to look beyond purely linguistic methods of representing philosophical views and embrace a wider range of representational media.
- 20 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-33
Open AccessPresentism and representation: saying it without words
The Triviality Argument against presentism maintains that we should reject presentism because there is no way to define the view that is not either trivially true or obviously false. We suggest that this style of argument over-emphasises purely linguistic means of representing a philosophical thesis. We argue that there is no reason to suppose that all philosophical theses must be linguistically representable, and thus that the failure to linguistically represent presentism is no big deal. It certainly shouldn’t lead us to reject the view. We offer a more general moral for philosophy, and that is to look beyond purely linguistic methods of representing philosophical views and embrace a wider range of representational media.
- Open Access
- 31 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (5) , 1887-1902
Trusting What Ought to Happen
This paper introduces a new account of trust and distrust. The core aim of the paper is to introduce an account of trust that places treats trust and what ‘ought’ to happen as close conceptual companions. Over the course of the paper, I develop the account and compare it with certain rival accounts.
- 31 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 89 (5) , 1887-1902
Open AccessTrusting What Ought to Happen
This paper introduces a new account of trust and distrust. The core aim of the paper is to introduce an account of trust that places treats trust and what ‘ought’ to happen as close conceptual companions. Over the course of the paper, I develop the account and compare it with certain rival accounts.
- Open Access
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 9 (3) , 450-470
Empirical and Philosophical Reflections on Trust
A dominant claim in the philosophical literature on trust is that we should stop thinking in terms of group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in groups. In this paper, we push back against this claim by arguing that philosophical work on trust would benefit from being brought into closer contact with empirical work on the nature of trust. We consider data on reactive attitudes and moral responsibility to adjudicate on different positions in the philosophical literature on trust. An implication of our argument is that the distinction between different kinds of groups—mere groups versus institutional groups—deserves more attention than is currently recognized in the philosophical literature on trust.In the first section of the paper, we draw some basic philosophical distinctions concerning the nature and kinds of trust. In section two, we present the positions taken by Hawley (2017), who argues against trust in groups, and Faulkner (2018), who argues in favor of trust in groups. In section three, we introduce some empirical data and suggest that, albeit tentatively, this looks to undermine Hawley's position and is compatible with Faulkner's approach. We thus suggest, on the basis of the evidence that we have available, that we have reasons to prefer the position taken by Faulkner (2018) over that taken by Hawley (2017). We end by discussing some implications for distinctions between different kinds of groups relevant for future philosophical work on trust.
- 27 July 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 9 (3) , 450-470
Open AccessEmpirical and Philosophical Reflections on Trust
A dominant claim in the philosophical literature on trust is that we should stop thinking in terms of group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in groups. In this paper, we push back against this claim by arguing that philosophical work on trust would benefit from being brought into closer contact with empirical work on the nature of trust. We consider data on reactive attitudes and moral responsibility to adjudicate on different positions in the philosophical literature on trust. An implication of our argument is that the distinction between different kinds of groups—mere groups versus institutional groups—deserves more attention than is currently recognized in the philosophical literature on trust.In the first section of the paper, we draw some basic philosophical distinctions concerning the nature and kinds of trust. In section two, we present the positions taken by Hawley (2017), who argues against trust in groups, and Faulkner (2018), who argues in favor of trust in groups. In section three, we introduce some empirical data and suggest that, albeit tentatively, this looks to undermine Hawley's position and is compatible with Faulkner's approach. We thus suggest, on the basis of the evidence that we have available, that we have reasons to prefer the position taken by Faulkner (2018) over that taken by Hawley (2017). We end by discussing some implications for distinctions between different kinds of groups relevant for future philosophical work on trust.