JTJonathan Tallant

Jonathan Tallant

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years

Research Subjects


Jonathan Tallant has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Attitudes of trust: experimental evidence for a morally relevant conception of trust

    by Sareh Pouryousefi, Caitlin C. Belfiore, Annika Hillebrandt, Jonathan Tallant

  • Three Objections to DeRose’s Contextualism

    by Jonathan Tallant

    Contextualism in epistemology, as developed by Keith DeRose, holds that the truth of knowledge attributions depends on the epistemic context of the attributor. This paper presents three objections to DeRose’s formulation of contextualism, each aimed at undermining its standard motivations. First, I argue that the natural-language methodology typically used to support contextualism is insufficient to establish its semantic conclusions. By constructing parallel HIGH/LOW cases involving the predicate ‘is real’, I suggest that if such arguments were sound, they would commit us to implausible forms of metaphysical indexicality, thereby weakening the natural-language motivation for contextualism about knowledge. Second, I challenge the claim that contextualism offers a distinctive explanation of sceptical scenarios. I introduce symmetric SHIGH/SLOW cases in which raising epistemic standards appears to license, rather than undermine, certain knowledge attributions, casting doubt on the asymmetry required for the contextualist response to scepticism. Finally, I argue that there are contexts in which ‘knows’ is correctly applied despite the absence of belief, suggesting that variation in knowledge attributions sometimes reflects shifts in meaning rather than shifts in epistemic standards. Taken together, these considerations do not show contextualism to be false, but they significantly weaken the case for its standard motivations.

  • Open Access

    Untrustworthiness

    by Jonathan Tallant

    Discussions of trustworthiness are not ubiquitous in the philosophical literature (compare remarks by Jones 2012, 61). Nonetheless, there are some attempted analyses and there is excellent work ongoing. The goal of this paper is to focus on trustworthiness's even less discussed opposite: untrustworthiness. So far as I can tell, the concept has gone largely undiscussed in the philosophical literature. This is unfortunate. For, just as Hawley (2014) points out that a theory of trust must be rendered compatible with a theory of distrust, so (I claim) a theory of trustworthiness must be rendered compatible with a theory of untrustworthiness. A further wrinkle to be introduced along the way is the need for a further distinction: cases where we must talk, not of trustworthiness or untrustworthiness, but of neither.


  • Open Access

    Locative grounding harmony

    by Samuel Baron, Kristie Miller, Jonathan Tallant

    In this paper, we explore locative grounding harmony, according to which the location of the grounds mirrors the location of the grounded. We proceed in three stages. First, we clarify the notion of locative harmony and describe different locative harmony principles. Second, we offer two arguments for the claim that grounding between physically located entities obeys principles of locative harmony. Third, we consider and respond to a range of cases that seem to show that grounding relations between physically located entities do not obey such principles. We conclude that grounding between such entities obeys locative harmony.

  • Open Access

    Presentism and representation: saying it without words

    by Sam Baron, Kristie Miller, Jonathan Tallant

    The Triviality Argument against presentism maintains that we should reject presentism because there is no way to define the view that is not either trivially true or obviously false. We suggest that this style of argument over-emphasises purely linguistic means of representing a philosophical thesis. We argue that there is no reason to suppose that all philosophical theses must be linguistically representable, and thus that the failure to linguistically represent presentism is no big deal. It certainly shouldn’t lead us to reject the view. We offer a more general moral for philosophy, and that is to look beyond purely linguistic methods of representing philosophical views and embrace a wider range of representational media.

  • Open Access

    Trusting What Ought to Happen

    by Jonathan Tallant

    This paper introduces a new account of trust and distrust. The core aim of the paper is to introduce an account of trust that places treats trust and what ‘ought’ to happen as close conceptual companions. Over the course of the paper, I develop the account and compare it with certain rival accounts.


  • Open Access

    Empirical and Philosophical Reflections on Trust

    by Sareh Pouryousefi, Jonathan Tallant

    A dominant claim in the philosophical literature on trust is that we should stop thinking in terms of group trustworthiness or appropriate trust in groups. In this paper, we push back against this claim by arguing that philosophical work on trust would benefit from being brought into closer contact with empirical work on the nature of trust. We consider data on reactive attitudes and moral responsibility to adjudicate on different positions in the philosophical literature on trust. An implication of our argument is that the distinction between different kinds of groups—mere groups versus institutional groups—deserves more attention than is currently recognized in the philosophical literature on trust.In the first section of the paper, we draw some basic philosophical distinctions concerning the nature and kinds of trust. In section two, we present the positions taken by Hawley (2017), who argues against trust in groups, and Faulkner (2018), who argues in favor of trust in groups. In section three, we introduce some empirical data and suggest that, albeit tentatively, this looks to undermine Hawley's position and is compatible with Faulkner's approach. We thus suggest, on the basis of the evidence that we have available, that we have reasons to prefer the position taken by Faulkner (2018) over that taken by Hawley (2017). We end by discussing some implications for distinctions between different kinds of groups relevant for future philosophical work on trust.